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As part of efforts to mitigate the oil palm industry’s harmful impacts in 
Southeast Asia, scholars have begun showing more interest in smallholder 
farming arrangements. However, the reasons why most smallholders in 
Malaya have shunned the crop since its introduction have not been 
carefully investigated to date. Historians have typically claimed that oil 
palms exhibited processing cost economies that favoured large-scale 
farming arrangements. The history of Malaya, with particular reference to 
Johor, a major site of oil palm cultivation since the 1920s, suggests a 
different argument.  
This thesis contends that Malayan smallholders spurned oil palms because 
of high opportunity costs, grounded in the counter-attractions of other tree 
crops. Hevea rubber was especially alluring, with its relatively high cash 
returns. Similarly important to smallholders, but barely acknowledged by 
historians, was the coconut palm. First, it flourished in soils where rubber 
floundered. Second, prior to the oil palm’s arrival, coconut palm products 
were already domestically popular. Consequently, Malayan processors and 
traders, key influences mediating demand and supply, had little incentive to 
encourage smallholders to channel labour into oil palms, when estates 
began adopting the tree. Third, labour requirements for oil palms were 
more exacting than those for other tree crop mainstays, including coconut 
palms. Fourth, government policies affecting the cultivation, processing and 
domestic consumption of oil palm products helped restrain small-scale 
involvement, whereas official support for smallholder coconut farming was 
more forthcoming. These opportunity costs ensured that small-scale oil 
palm cultivation remained muted, despite significant policy changes 
favouring smallholders during the 1950s and 1960s.  
This thesis contributes to the economic history of Southeast Asia through a 
detailed examination of oil and coconut palm farming, two important 
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pursuits neglected by historical scholarship. It stresses the significance of a 
set of overlooked economic actors, incorporating cultural considerations in 
the process. Lastly, it makes novel analytic links between pre-colonial, 
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NOTE ON CURRENCIES, WEIGHTS, AND MEASURES 
All monetary references are in Straits Settlements dollars (later the 
Malayan/Malaysian dollar/ringgit) unless otherwise designated. Between 
1906 and 1966 one Straits (Malayan/Malaysian) dollar was equivalent to 
2s.4d ($60 equalled £7). 
 
Weights and measures are normally expressed in the metric system, except 
where the historical figure is more appropriate.  
 
All unit measures of tons refer to the imperial ton/long ton. 
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1 ton of copra is assumed to yield 0.625 tons of copra oil and 0.35 tons copra 
cake. 
5,913 whole coconuts are assumed to yield 1 ton of copra oil.1 
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Palm oil, obtained from the outer layer of the fruit of the oil palm 
(Elaeis guineensis), is one of the world’s most heavily used vegetable oils 
today. In 2013, approximately half of all packaged foods consumed 
worldwide contained palm oil.1 Oil palm products (including palm kernel 
oil, derived from the fruit’s kernel) are also used in a wide variety of non-
edible goods, including cleaning agents, cosmetics, plastics, herbicides, 
drugs, textiles, and biofuels.2  Palm oil’s commercial ascendance has been 
relatively recent, going from 6 per cent of all fat exports in the late 1960s 
to 38 per cent by the late 1990s.3 Malaysia was at the forefront of this 
global transformation, nearly quintupling its share of world palm oil 
exports from 10 per cent in 1950 to 57 per cent in 2000.4 More recently, 
neighbouring Indonesia surpassed Malaysia in 2009 to become the world’s 
top exporter of palm oil. The two territories account for nearly nine-tenths 
of all global palm oil exports today.5 
The oil palm’s rise as a globally traded commodity has been 
dogged by controversy. Although a significant trade in palm oil and 
kernels from West African peasant holdings took place during the 
nineteenth century, the oil palm’s territorial expansion since the 
beginning of the twentieth century has been dominated by large-scale 
estate arrangements in Southeast Asia. Whether privately or publicly-
                                                          
1
 Roundtable on Sustainable Palm Oil Secretariat, "Why Palm Oil Matters in Your Everyday 
Life: Consumer Fact Sheet." Roundtable on Sustainable Palm Oil website (last accessed 3 
May 2017, at http://bit.ly/2oWx4OP). 
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owned, these typically involve a tightly-organised labour force toiling 
amongst endless rows of oil palm monocultures, taking on strenuous 
harvesting, fruit collecting and field maintenance activities.6 Fruits are 
then milled for their oil and kernels within large factories, creating a hub-
and-spoke system centred on the processing facility.  
Proponents of such layouts argue that they are needed for efficient 
land use, and cost economies associated with palm fruit processing.7 Such 
arguments are bolstered by the palm fruit’s rapid perishability once 
harvested, and, since the middle decades of the twentieth century, 
significant advances in breeding techniques. Intensively farmed oil palms 
currently need one-tenth the land required by their closest commercial 
competitor, soybeans, to produce the same amount of oil.8 Some 
researchers have also contended that the oil palm’s compatibility with 
large-scale milling arrangements has allowed tropical producers to engage 
in rare instances of successful resource-based industrialisation. Thus, in 
Malaysia, oil palm production arrangements arguably facilitated 
technological upgrading and vertical integration during the second half of 
the twentieth century, leading to new manufacturing jobs with higher 
incomes.9 
Critics point to a multitude of concerns raised by oil palm 
expansion in Malaysia and Indonesia during the past few decades. Indeed, 
as some scholars have contended, the recent boom is just one aspect of a 
global elite-driven ‘resource grab’, not just involving agricultural land, but 
their accompanying forest, water and mineral resources.10  Yet, while 
                                                          
6
 Rob A. Cramb and John F. McCarthy, "Characterising Oil Palm Production in Indonesia 
and Malaysia." In The Oil Palm Complex: Smallholders, Agribusiness and the State in 
Indonesia and Malaysia, eds. Rob A. Cramb and John F. McCarthy (Singapore: NUS Press, 
2016), 33. 
7
 Koh Lian Pin, Patrice Levang, and Jaboury Ghazoul, "Designer Landscapes for Sustainable 
Biofuels." Trends in Ecology & Evolution 24, no. 8 (2009), 431-432. 
8
 R. H. V. Corley and P. B. H. Tinker, The Oil Palm. Fifth Edition (Hoboken, NJ: Wiley, 
2016), 10-11. 
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 Susan M. Martin, The UP Saga (Copenhagen: NIAS Press, 2003), 1-13; Rajah Rasiah, 
"Explaining Malaysia’s Export Expansion in Palm Oil and Related Products." In Technology, 
Adaptation and Exports, ed. Vandana Chandra (Washington: The World Bank, 2006), 163-
224. 
10
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Asia (Singapore: NUS Press, 2011); Oliver Pye and Jayati Bhattacharya, The Palm Oil 





literature on the oil palm’s expansion is voluminous and still rising, most 
discussions have tended to focus on discreet aspects of the problem, 
rather than treat them as a synoptic whole. 
In discussions centred on the oil palm itself, exceptions to this 
conceptual myopia include a recent collection of essays edited by 
anthropologists Rob Cramb and John McCarthy, who begin their overview 
of the crop with the premise that numerous environmental, political, 
social, and economic issues connected to the Southeast Asian oil palm 
boom cannot be effectively addressed in isolation from one another.11 They 
note that the oil palm industry’s environmental problems in both Malaysia 
and Indonesia have been especially publicised. These include the immense 
biodiversity losses brought on by the large-scale conversion of tropical 
rainforests and coastal peatlands to oil palm monocultures, as well as 
chemical pollution from mills and estates. The victims of these changes 
extend well beyond areas brought under oil palm plantations.12 
However, these environmental transformations are conditioned by 
deeper socio-political processes, involving a massive transfer of property 
rights into the hands of politically-connected business elite. Such transfers 
often disadvantage small landowners and local communities. They are 
also based on the exploitation of cheap migrant estate labour, sowing 
tensions between local and migrant cultivators. In a situation where the 
global demand for oil palm products is still steadily expanding, Cramb, 
McCarthy, and others point out that it is the manner in which the oil palm 
is commodified, rather than the crop itself, which is the real problem. The 
key challenge is to work out how the oil palm can ‘provide the greatest 
contribution to sustainable rural livelihoods’, instead of undermining 
them.13 
                                                                                                                                              
the Age of Empire: Europe and the Transformation of the Tropical World. (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2017). 
11
 Rob A. Cramb and John F. McCarthy, "Introduction." In The Oil Palm Complex: 
Smallholders, Agribusiness and the State in Indonesia and Malaysia, eds. Rob A. Cramb and 
John F. McCarthy. (Singapore: NUS Press, 2016), 2-8. 
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In response, scholars have begun investigating ways to encourage 
more independent smallholder involvement in oil palms, both in 
Southeast Asia and elsewhere.14 Besides the economic benefits derived 
from cash cropping, independent smallholders usually retain control over 
their own labour and its deployment, unlike estate labourers or scheme 
settlers. This arguably leads to more proficient and cost-effective 
agricultural practices, since households tend to have a superior grasp of 
local environmental conditions influencing cultivation, and do not need 
costly management structures to supervise their work.15  
In addition, since the global commodities busts of the 1990s, 
institutional funders have faced pressures to move away from policies 
promoting what were believed to be more efficient smallholder crop 
specialisation practices, towards those favouring crop diversification 
instead.16 Researchers and policymakers have shown increased interest in 
agroforestry techniques, in which large numbers of trees are interspersed 
among shorter-cycle cultivars, resulting in varying degrees of complexity 
and species diversity.17 The most optimistic arguments claim that 
economic and environmental benefits can be maximised over time 
through such approaches. Households using such techniques often live on 
a mixture of farm and non-farm activities, including the production of 
different crops for both sale and subsistence. Instead of maximizing the 
yield of a single crop, resilience to individual crop failures and crop price 
                                                          
14
 Gina Koczberski, "Loose Fruit Mamas: Creating Incentives for Smallholder Women in Oil 
Palm Production in Papua New Guinea." World Development 35, no. 7 (2007), 1172-85; 
Lesley M. Potter, "Alternative Pathways for Smallholder Oil Palm in Indonesia: 
International Comparisons." In The Oil Palm Complex: Smallholders, Agribusiness and the 
State in Indonesia and Malaysia, eds. Rob A. Cramb and John McCarthy (Singapore: NUS 
Press, 2016), 155-188; Alison Rieple, Susan Martin, Jane Chang, Bonaventure Boniface, and 
Amran Ahmed, "Small Farmers and Sustainability: Institutional Barriers to Investment and 
Innovation in the Malaysian Palm Oil Industry." American Association of Geographers 
Conference. Chicago, Illinois, 21-25 April 2015. 
15
 Frank Ellis, Peasant Economics: Farm Households and Agrarian Development (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1988), Ch. 10; Yujiro Hayami, "The Peasant in Economic 
Modernization." American Journal of Agricultural Economics 78, no. 5 (1996), 1158; Derek 
Byerlee, "The Fall and Rise Again of Plantations in Tropical Asia: History Repeated?" Land 
Development Digest 3, no. 3 (2014), 576-577. 
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 François Ruf and Götz Schroth, "Introduction." In Economics and Ecology of 
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(Dordrecht: Springer, 2015), 1-2. 
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fluctuations is increased.18 Lower incomes from lower crop yields are 
mitigated by lower household operating costs. According to such 
arguments, in enhancing resilience to economic risks, smallholders, 
including those farming oil palms, simultaneously become more ‘wildlife-
friendly’ farmers.19 
These dynamics have already arisen in parts of Southeast Asia and 
the Pacific, including East Malaysia, Indonesia, and Papua New Guinea. In 
these territories, oil palms have been occasionally found planted among 
other village orchard crops in a diversified landscape, as part of household 
strategies to stabilise incomes.20 This smallholder ‘pushback’ against 
estate-style oil palm production arrangements nevertheless remains a 
minor feature of a landscape dominated by the latter. To be sure, about 40 
per cent of oil palm lands in Indonesia were farmed by smallholders in 
2010. However, most of these growers, according to Koh, Levang, and 
Ghazoul, were dependent on sales to a single large processing entity, 
curtailing their capacity to negotiate fair prices and manage their lands 
according to their own preferences.21 In Malaysia (including Sarawak and 
Sabah), the smallholder share of oil palm lands was only 14 per cent in 
2011, with a similar dependence on large-scale mills.22 Such findings are 
especially significant when one considers the fact that the oil palm is the 
only tree crop in tropical Asia which did not become dominated by 
independent smallholder arrangements at the end of the twentieth 
                                                          
18
 Potter, ‘Alternative Pathways’, 166. 
19
 Koh et al., Designer Landscapes, 432-435; Jeyamalar Kathirithamby-Wells, "The 
Implications of Plantation Agriculture for Biodiversity in Peninsular Malaysia: A Historical 
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Michael R. Dove, Percy E. Sajise and Amity A. Doolittle (Durham: Duke University Press, 
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of the Plantation? Historical and Contemporary Trends in the Relation between 






century: a long list that includes major crops such as Hevea rubber, coffee, 
coconuts, and cocoa.
23
   
Growing scholarly interest in oil palm smallholder arrangements 
has sparked recent attempts to explain this agricultural anomaly. For 
example, development economist Derek Byerlee attributes the disparity to 
government prejudice against smallholders, and more importantly, the oil 
palm’s relatively late introduction to Southeast Asia, which has limited the 
extent to which smallholders have diversified into the crop thus far.24 
Byerlee’s argument, however, overlooks the fact that oil palm crop booms 
occurred in Southeast Asia much earlier, first in Sumatra during the 1910s, 
and then Malaya a decade later. By 1960, estates had already planted 
nearly 140,000 acres worth of oil palms in Malaya alone. Indeed, while 
multidisciplinary interest in the oil palm’s Southeast Asian trajectory has 
grown into a veritable industry of its own, the period before the 1960s is 
typically treated as an insignificant prelude to the expansion taking place 
in the decades afterwards.25 
 
HISTORIOGRAPHY 
This thesis thus seeks to unravel the mystery of the missing oil 
palm smallholder in Southeast Asia, right from the outset of the crop’s 
commercial presence in the region. It focuses on Malaya (now known as 
Peninsular Malaysia), where the estate share of oil palm cultivation 
remains the highest in Southeast Asia, if not the world. In doing so, this 
study breaks new ground through a detailed historical examination of 
smallholder involvement in Malaya’s oil palm sector before 1960. In short, 
it seeks to understand why oil palms in Malaya have proven so resistant to 
smallholder cultivation. 
                                                          
23
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1500-1989 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003); Robin Dand. The International 
Cocoa Trade (3rd ed.) (Cambridge: Woodhead, 2010); Corley et al., Oil Palm, 19-20. 
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Historical accounts of the Malaysian oil palm sector rarely 
acknowledge the involvement of independent smallholders, let alone 
question the absence of interest in the crop. This is partly because many 
accounts of the sector follow nationalist narratives which emphasise the 
role of post-colonial Malaysian authorities in fostering greater 
industrialisation within the sector, as well as the state’s role in 
encouraging participation by small growers through group farming 
schemes. Thus, according to development economist Rajah Rasiah,  
until 1960 there was no special government-driven 
support to expand exports….Under British rule, planters 
of oil palm specialized in primary production and 
received no subsidy or protection from the government. 
Specialisation in primary production continued after 
independence. The government’s first intervention came 
in the late 1960s, when foreign-owned estates were 
acquired by parastatals….During the 1950s and 1960s the 
government extended the Rural Industry and 
Smallholders Development Authority to include oil palm 
cultivation and launched FELDA [the Federal Land 
Development Authority] to alleviate poverty.
26
 
Rasiah’s account inadvertently credits post-colonial authorities 
with innovations pioneered during British colonial rule, and leaves the 
question of the industry’s development during the colonial period 
unexplored. But these misrepresentations point to a deeper tendency 
among historians to neglect the immense contribution of smallholders to 
tropical cash crop production (and thus ultimately to the expansion of a 
global economy), in favour of estate-centred narratives.27  
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To date, the most comprehensive historical account of Malaysia’s 
oil palm sector remains Susan Martin’s study of United Plantations, which 
relies on company archives and personnel interviews to chart the origins 
and growth of the firm into a highly respected enterprise within Malaysia. 
In doing so, Martin provides an extremely lucid analysis of how the 
private oil palm estate sector in Malaysia grew from strength to strength, 
since its inception in the early 1910s. By illuminating connections between 
technical developments in the oils and fats industries outside Malaysia, 
the Malaysian scene itself, and United Plantation’s contribution to 
domestic industrialisation, Martin’s monograph has become required 
reading for understanding how Malaysia’s oil palm estate sector arrived at 
its current eminent position.  
Yet, in Martin’s study, the only oil palm small growers mentioned 
are those who were inducted into government-managed land 
development schemes in Malaysia, as well as West African peasants.28 
There is no recognition of the independent smallholder contribution to 
Malaysian oil palm cultivation in her work, despite the fact that 
smallholdings accounted for nearly one-fifth of all oil palm lands 
cultivated in Peninsular Malaysia by the mid-1980s: a period firmly within 
Martin’s chronology.29 Other writings which have touched on more 
discrete components of Malaysia’s oil palm sector, including agency 
houses, refineries, and state-directed oil palm group schemes, have also 
been conspicuously silent on the matter.30 
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 Extant historical scholarship on smallholder involvement in oil 
palms in Malaysia is thus virtually non-existent. Barbara and Leonard 
Andaya, in their authoritative general history of Malaysia, offer a fleeting 
mention of oil palm smallholdings during the interwar years, with no 
reference provided for their claim.31 The only detailed local case histories 
of oil palm smallholders focus on the period after 1960, including Shamsul 
Amri Baharuddin’s ethnography of village communities in Selangor, and 
Tan Pek Leng’s spotlight on Chinese involvement in the oil palm 
industry.32 In the realm of historical analysis then, little has changed since 
Shamsul’s pointed observation, made in 1986, that ‘[there] has not been a 
single detailed study to date on peasant oil palm growers’.33 
 This lack of historical research has not prevented speculation on 
the reasons behind the absence of smallholder oil palm cultivation within 
Malaya. Prevailing scholarship, influenced by the estate–driven narrative, 
views the problem primarily as a struggle between smallholders and 
estates for economic competitiveness, particularly at the primary 
processing stage. Biological differences between the oil palm and other 
major tree crop cultivars, such as the Hevea rubber tree (Hevea 
brasiliensis), and the coconut palm (Cocos nucifera), shaped the 
techniques that could be used to process crops after the harvest. 
Processing palm fruit for oil and kernels was subject to greater cost 
economies than copra (dried coconut kernel) or rubber sheet production, 
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thus implying that capital-scarce smallholders had an advantage working 
with coconuts and rubber, but not oil palms.  
For example, in Harcharan Singh Khera’s pioneering book-length 
economic survey of the Malaysian oil palm industry in 1976, stress is 
placed on the fact that palm fruit cash cropping in Malaya (and Malaysia) 
has been a complex and expensive option, which tends to favour players 
with the vast capital resources needed to deploy large-scale machinery, 
technical personnel, specialised field labour, and large contiguous areas of 
land needed to grow the crop.34 No doubt this view was influenced by 
prevailing palm fruit production arrangements in Malaysia at the time, 
conducted on a much larger scale than in West Africa, where smallholders 
continue to control most oil palm cultivation arrangements. In this 
reformulation of the David and Goliath narrative, smallholders are cast as 
the losing parties in this supposed commercial battle with cash-rich 
estates. 
This mechanist rationale has been adopted by a number of 
prominent historians studying Southeast Asia. For instance, in his 
economic history of Malaysia since 1800, John Drabble uses the processing 
argument with exemplary succinctness: 
[T]he industry in Malaya was confined to estates (almost 
entirely European-owned), principally because of the 
expensive technology necessary to process the fruit 




Similarly, the Andayas’ History of Malaysia states that the need for ‘capital 
and special expertise, especially in the processing of the oil’ confined the 
industry to large plantations in colonial Malaya.36 Muzaffar Tate, in his 
review of the Malaysian estate industry’s fortunes since the late eighteenth 
century, justifies the absence of smallholder oil palm cultivation by the 
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need for tightly coordinated field operations and large-scale fruit milling.37 
Gregg Huff’s economic history of twentieth-century Singapore, Nicholas 
White’s discussion of post-independence-era British business activity in 
Malaya, and Valeria Giacomin’s historical survey of Southeast Asia’s oil 
palm sector essentially take the same line as Tate.38 None of these 
accounts, save for White’s, cite a direct reference for the claim. 
Yet this contention, lacking any grounding in extensive archival 
research, suffers from crucial weaknesses, not least the omission of crucial 
historical facts. A domestic market for low-quality, high-acid Malayan 
palm oil actually existed by the 1930s, one in which Malayan estates 
themselves were active participants. Furthermore, labour-intensive 
processing operations were a reality for many estates, including those 
which were producing high-quality palm oil, as late as two decades after 
the oil palm industry’s inception. And contrary to previous assumptions, 
oil palm estates in Malaya were willing to purchase palm fruit supplies 
from smallholders before the 1960s, with some smallholders selling their 
fruits accordingly. 
The mechanist rationale is also analytically problematic. It makes 
it harder, rather than easier, to explain why smallholders moved into oil 
palms in greater numbers from the 1960s onwards, despite the 
proliferation of even larger palm fruit factories in Malaya. The argument 
ignores the very real shift in political support which occurred during the 
1950s and 1960s. The rationale thus ignores the crucial question of why 
that shift occurred when it did.  
One common response has been to claim that cash returns from 
other smallholder crops in Malaya, such as rubber, were higher than those 
for oil palm products during the period up to the 1960s, before the tide 
turned in favour of oil palms, with the implication that state authorities 
changed their views when they read the straws in the wind. But the 
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evidence used for this argument tends to be anachronistic, drawing on 
price trends during the 1960s and 1970s, rather than the interwar years.39 
Neither can changes in relative prices account for the situation with 
coconuts, a major smallholder tree crop with lower returns than oil palms 
by the 1930s. Finally, the price argument cannot alone explain why estates 
had already planted 80,000 acres of oil palms in Malaya by 1941, while the 
recorded contribution from smallholders remained negligible. 
Scholars, including some earlier-mentioned ones, have tried 
redressing these weaknesses by highlighting the role that state 
discrimination against smallholders played in the pre-1960s oil palm 
sector, in terms of exclusionary cropping conditions stipulated on land 
alienated to small growers.40 But as critics have shown, similar 
discriminatory land regulations were imposed on smallholders wishing to 
grow rubber and coconuts, with often little actual effect on cultivation 
decisions.41 Politics alone cannot explain the sheer disparity between 
smallholder and estate involvement in oil palms in Malaya. Using ‘state 
discrimination’ as a catch-all also reduces what were in fact complex and 
contending official views of smallholders in oil palm cultivation to 
unremitting support for a European-dominated ‘plantation paradigm’.42 
Indeed, as this study will demonstrate, conflicting official perspectives 
were present throughout the Malayan oil palm industry’s development, 
right from its inception. The more interesting question that this study 
addresses is why estate-centric official perspectives have won out at 
certain times, and for certain crops, but not others. 
Finally, a few scholars have alluded to the role that local 
consumption plays in smallholder agriculture. Both Khera and Tate briefly 
acknowledge that smallholders in colonial Malaya were not interested in 
oil palms as a source of cooking oil. They argue that smallholders already 
had the coconut palm, whose fruits constituted the main source of edible 
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oil in local diets.43 This question was, in fact, broached in an inverted form 
nearly eighty years ago. George Deasy, an American geographer who was 
investigating reasons for the lack of peasant interest in coconut cultivation 
in tropical West Africa, noted that the region had  
long been the center for the oil palm…an excellent 
substitute for the coconut palm. Hence, greater apathy 
to the cultivation of the coconut palm is probably found 
there than anywhere in the Tropics. It is significant to 
note that the only parts of Africa supplying appreciable 
quantities of coconut products to commercial channels 
are found on the eastern rather than the western coast of 




Despite the novelty and potential richness of such arguments, few 
scholars have acknowledged this competitive aspect of palm product 
consumption in Southeast Asia. For those who have done so, local 
disinterest in palm oil compared to coconut oil is treated as a self-evident 
fact, rather than a product of historical contingency.45 As historians 
Penelope Franks and Janet Hunter have noted, such indifference is 
symptomatic of a general apathy concerning historical patterns of popular 
consumption in the non-Western world.46 But a topic like food, typically 
glossed over in many historical sources, is also methodologically 
challenging to examine, ironically because food is so deeply embedded 
within the everyday textures of life to begin with. 
In sum, this thesis aims to restore a sense of dynamism to an 
important but neglected narrative. It examines developments that have 
been overshadowed by preoccupations with the contemporary oil palm 
boom in Malaysia, developments that, a century ago, were already being 
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shaped by largely rural but migratory populations, Asian industrialists, 
officials of different ideological stripes and skillsets, and rapidly changing 
ecologies. In doing so, we can finally begin to see the Malaysian oil palm 
industry’s rise as a drama peppered with missed opportunities, conflicting 
interests, and overt favouritism, rather than merely an inevitable 
realisation of estate-centric production arrangements. 
 
OBJECTIVES 
Given the limitations of existing scholarship on the question of the 
missing smallholder, this thesis has six interrelated objectives. In seeking 
to achieve them, new historical data, novel approaches to historical 
research, and critical analysis are brought to bear on the question at hand. 
In doing so, this study not only aims to advance historical scholarship on 
Southeast Asia during the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, but also 
strives to reframe the contemporary debate concerning Southeast Asia’s 
oil palm boom. 
First, this thesis seeks to move away from the predominantly 
estate-centric view of oil palm expansion in Malaya, to one that highlights 
the perspectives of smallholders themselves. Where external 
commentators saw (and continue to see) a failure by ‘ignorant’ and 
‘parochial’ smallholders to copy Western advances in agriculture, this 
thesis places primary emphasis on the fact that smallholders had their 
own sensible reasons for shunning the crop, which boiled down to the 
lower opportunity costs of engaging in other forms of economic activity. 
Just as importantly, smallholders could choose to act on these preferences, 
unlike migrant estate workers, whose labour was confined to cash crops 
chosen from above. In other words, understanding why smallholders were 
not diversifying into oil palms requires knowing what they were doing to 
begin with. In this sense, my study falls in line with a long-established 





Lim Teck Ghee, Shamsul Amri Baharuddin, Shaharil Talib, and John 
Overton.47 
Second, through the examination of smallholder activity in 
Malaya, this thesis aims to illuminate a whole domain left unexplored by 
the estate-driven narrative, which has nevertheless influenced the latter’s 
historical development. The estate narrative is not so much ignored, as 
repositioned within a broader context populated by historically neglected 
actors and activities.  
This means giving primacy to local ecological dynamics 
conditioning the responses of growers to newly introduced crops, 
including differences in soil conditions across Malaya. Human economic 
activity shaped, and was shaped by such soils. In Malaya, many 
agriculturalists had to grapple with the harsh realities of cultivating crops 
on flat, poorly-draining coastal soils, establishing extensive drainage 
networks on these strips of land. Most scholarship on water control in 
Southeast Asia has focused on irrigation systems, studying them in order 
to reconstruct histories of labour and power relations. Yet studies of 
drainage systems, the flipside of irrigation, are remarkably rare, despite 
scholarly acknowledgement that in regions with excess water supplies, 
drainage is often more important.48 
In seeking to recover neglected histories of non-Western water 
control, attention is inevitably drawn towards major tree crops whose 
expansion in Malaya was heavily influenced by prevailing soil conditions: 
Hevea rubber, arecanuts (from the palm Areca catechu), and most of all, 
coconuts. Coconut palms were probably the most commonly farmed tree 
crop in Malaya before Hevea rubber’s advent, and remained an immensely 
popular crop after.  
                                                          
47
 Lim, Peasants; Shamsul, Malaysia; Shaharil Talib, After Its Own Image: The Trengganu 
Experience, 1881-1941 (Kuala Lumpur: Oxford University Press, 1984); John Overton, 
Colonial Green Revolution? Food, Irrigation and the State in Colonial Malaya (Wallingford: 
CAB International, 1994). 
48
 Peter Boomgaard, "In a State of Flux: Water as a Deadly and Life-Giving Force in 
Southeast Asia." In A World of Water: Rain, Rivers and Seas in Southeast Asian Histories, 





The focus on local conditions also means illuminating the critical 
functions that non-Western actors, particularly those of Chinese, Indian 
and Japanese origins, have played in shaping past smallholder livelihood 
practices in Southeast Asian commodity production networks, in their 
often-maligned roles as crop dealers, crop processors, and industrialists.49 
What is being investigated here, as Christine Dobbin contends, ‘is not a 
curiosity in the history of Asia but rather the larger…question which aims 
to understand the changes brought about in society by embryonic 
industrial capitalism in which two partners, Asia and Europe, were 
involved’.50 By investigating the mixture of local conditions that shaped 
creative and productive responses to historical change, a more nuanced, 
less Eurocentric history of economic transformation outside of the West 
can begin to be written.51 
Connected with this reassessment of local context is a third 
objective: to provide more sophisticated understandings of the kinds of 
cultural factors that affect smallholder decisions regarding what to grow 
and harvest in Southeast Asia. Historians will undoubtedly face difficulties 
when trying to account for past actions which are ‘motivated by unreason 
or emotion’.52 There are nevertheless crucial ways to help move the debate 
on culture away from derogatory characterisations of lower-class social 
strata as conservative, fatalistic, and indolent.53  
This thesis addresses cultural considerations partly by turning the 
analytical lens back towards those who helped foster such negative 
perceptions of smallholders to begin with. It seeks to show how colonial 
stereotypes of growers shaped policies towards smallholders. This 
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question has been addressed at some length in the Malayan rubber sector 
by John Drabble and Lim Teck Ghee.54 Lim also discusses the coconut 
situation to a lesser extent, and this study consequently builds on Lim’s 
path-breaking work. Nothing, however, has been done by way of 
examining official attitudes towards smallholder involvement in the 
Malayan oil palm sector, save for brief and unsubstantiated allusions to 
the period of the early 1930s.55 Chapter Three thus addresses this lacuna, 
contending that unpleasant official experiences with smallholder 
participation in the Malayan coconut and rubber sectors moulded 
subsequent views regarding smallholder involvement with Malayan oil 
palms. 
Stereotypes aside, this study also focuses on another cultural 
factor, namely the role that consumption plays in market formation and 
producer decision-making.  Economic historians have often treated 
consumer desire as an engine powering smallholder crop diversification, 
in which the most remunerative crops are chosen and grown solely for 
their exchange value, so as to widen the range of goods rural households 
can choose to purchase.56 While not incorrect, this approach to 
understanding consumption downplays important questions concerning 
the social values that shape consumption patterns, as well as the role that 
subsistence farming plays in livelihood construction.  
This thesis thus seeks to make what has been previously taken for 
granted, namely the absence of oil palm subsistence farming in pre-1960s 
Malaya, a mystery worth addressing in detail, not least because of its 
ramifications for the shape and extent of smallholder tree crop agriculture 
in Southeast Asia.  It takes its lead from Sidney Mintz’s dictum that ‘when 
unfamiliar substances are taken up by new users, they enter into pre-
existing social and psychological contexts and acquire – or are given – 
contextual meanings by those who use them. How that happens is by no 
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means obvious’.57 In the case of Malaya, the contextual meanings 
surrounding oil palm products were shaped by applied chemists, the local 
chemical industry and its technologies, colonial administrators, wartime 
deprivation, and the perceptions of Malayan consumers themselves, many 
of whom continued to prefer the products of the coconut palm.  
This study thus intersects with an emerging body of literature 
exploring the extent to which the forces of industrialisation, mass 
consumption, advertising, and Western education changed the views of 
non-Westerners regarding health, hygiene, cleanliness and beauty.58  
However, the scope of this thesis limits such investigations here to a brief 
acknowledgement of their influence on consumer preferences, rather than 
a full-blown exploration of these factors, let alone their entanglement with 
religion, politics, class, gender, and race. In other words, readers 
interested in the relationship between changing non-Western 
consumption patterns and a greater ‘civilising process’ will be 
disappointed.59 But for those who are interested in the idea that the 
domestic consumer preferences of a non-Western region can shape what 
is being produced for overseas markets, they will find much to chew on in 
here. This study thus finds itself in good company with commodity 
historians and social researchers working on a variety of geographic 
frontiers, extending across Latin America, sub-Saharan Africa and 
Southeast Asia.60  
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Fourth, this thesis seeks to extend the corpus of historical 
literature on commodity chains in a new direction, by examining the 
trajectory of Malaya’s oil palm industry in conjunction with that of the 
coconut palm’s. The coconut industry was Malaya’s foremost oil crop 
sector long before the arrival of the oil palm. It continued to play a more 
significant export role than oil palms as late as the 1950s.61 Yet this is rarely 
acknowledged in the historical literature on twentieth century Malayan 
commodities, which tends to focus more on rubber, tin and rice.62 By 
comparing, contrasting, and linking developments pertaining to the 
Malayan oil palm and coconut commodity chains with each other, this 
thesis seeks to offer an innovative and nuanced understanding analysis of 
how the divergent fortunes of these industries were deeply intertwined. At 
the centre of the narrative lie the smallholders themselves, who were 
simultaneously driving and being subject to these massive changes. To 
extend William Clarence-Smith’s argument, the methodological decision 
to focus on not just one, but two different commodity chains, can help to 
reveal unexpected associations between seemingly isolated events.63  In 
doing so, the thesis also contributes to a small but growing body of 
historical literature on the socio-economic significance of the coconut 
palm. This is, after all, a cultivar whose fruits are still tended by more than 
11 million farmers, mostly low-income smallholders, in over 90 countries 
today.64 
Fifth, this study departs from previous analyses of Malaya’s oil 
palm industry that frame its development within a nationalist narrative. 
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Instead, we will evaluate the sector’s growth in the broader contexts of 
British imperialism and decolonisation in Southeast Asia, as well as the 
Japanese Occupation of 1942-1945. This thesis will reconstruct important 
links between British Malayan authorities, officials in the Home 
Government, policymakers in Malaya during the wartime Japanese rule, 
and the first independence-era government of Malaya. In doing so, we will 
see how official ideologies – namely those concerning smallholders, the 
crops they grew, and the way such crops were to be consumed – were 
fostered, shared, debated, and implemented over long periods of time. 
Indeed, these ideologies existed as processes that spanned multiple forms 
of political authority, pre-dating the ascent of Malaya’s domestic 
nationalist elites. 
In doing so, particular emphasis is placed on the roles that 
specialist advisers, as opposed to general administrators, played in 
shaping such ideas and policies throughout the entire period of study. As 
Joseph Hodge notes in his broader study of British imperialism in the 
tropics, applied scientists had some influence in halls of power, but often 
struggled to have their views heard and endorsed within government.65 In 
the case of Malaya, their struggles led to the inconsistent application of 
policies supporting smallholder agricultural activity. As will be discussed 
in throughout the thesis, but especially in Chapters Four, Five, and Seven, 
these events ultimately dampened the uptake of oil palms among 
independent smallholders. Growers would have otherwise benefited from 
more consistent state support at critical moments in Malaya’s agricultural 
trajectory. 
 Finally, this study attempts to contribute to broader debates 
regarding the optimal scale of production in different economic activities. 
Many scholars have asked why, in an age of growing industrial capitalism, 
some occupations continue to persist along small-scale lines, including 
those related to agriculture.66 This thesis will focus on one related sub-
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theme, namely the extent to which smallholder tree crop farming in 
Malaya was more environmentally sustainable than estate production 
during the period of study. To this end, we will adopt François Ruf’s 
concept of ‘forest rent’ as a framework with which to evaluate the 
ecological dimensions of smallholder tree crop cultivation.67 Although 
Ruf’s schema arose from research on cocoa, it can be modified and 
extended to oil and coconut palms.  
To paraphrase Ruf’s argument, forests provide an array of 
ecological and economic benefits, including low weed frequency, good 
retention of moisture and fertility in rich organic topsoil, fewer problems 
with pests and diseases, protection against drying winds, and provision of 
food, timber and other forest products.68 However, in the low-lying tidal 
swamp environments covered within this study, moisture was abundant. 
Removing excess water, and the kind of water involved, were more 
pertinent issues. Nevertheless, many other aspects of Ruf’s framework, 
including how forests help suppress weeds, provide produce, and 
safeguard soil fertility, remain directly applicable to the Malayan case. 
Farmers who plant up recently-cleared lands will quickly lose many of the 
advantages derived from these forests. In other words, the forest rent 
quickly declines. More labour and inputs are then needed to uphold crop 
yields for future harvests, often making it impractical to replant the 
original, ageing tree crop with a similar, but younger version.  
The question regarding how growers manage declining forest rent 
lies at the heart of Ruf’s analysis, and it also constitutes a major 
preoccupation of this study. As Chapters Four, Five and Seven will show, 
crop diversification was one of the prime strategies used by Malayan 
smallholders to weather the loss of forest benefits. Over time, original 
coastal forests were replaced with increasingly complex agroforests. But 
this leads back to the question of why the oil palm was not usually one of 
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these tree crops, given its high tolerance for many of the same heavy soils 
teeming with coconut palms. This question is addressed throughout the 
thesis. Coming full circle, a concluding chapter will use insights derived 
from the forest rent framework to address wider debates regarding the 
suitability of smallholder agroforestry arrangements for oil palms in 
Southeast Asia. 
Put succinctly, in the following chapters I will argue that 
smallholders generally avoided farming oil palms before the 1960s because 
of high opportunity costs, grounded in the counter-attractions of other 
tree crops. Hevea rubber was especially alluring, with its relatively high 
cash returns. Similarly important to smallholders, but barely 
acknowledged by historians, was the coconut palm. First, it flourished in 
soils where rubber floundered. Second, prior to the oil palm’s arrival, 
coconut palm products were already domestically popular. Consequently, 
Malayan processors and traders, key influences mediating demand and 
supply, had little incentive to encourage smallholders to channel labour 
into oil palms, when estates began adopting the tree. Third, labour 
requirements for oil palms were more exacting than those for other tree 
crop mainstays, including coconut palms. Fourth, government policies 
affecting the cultivation, processing and domestic consumption of oil 
palm products helped restrain small-scale involvement, whereas official 
support for smallholder coconut farming was more forthcoming. These 
opportunity costs ensured that small-scale oil palm cultivation remained 
muted, despite significant policy changes favouring smallholders during 
the 1950s and 1960s.  
 
TERMS OF REFERENCE 
The central subjects of this study defy easy categorization. The 
term ‘smallholder’ often refers to growers who farm a relatively small area 
of land, using mainly household labour to do so, while engaging with 
external markets to varying degrees. This is consistent with the ‘peasant’ 





primary characteristic distinguishing smallholders from other kinds of 
growers.69 However, the official Malayan definition of a smallholding as a 
plot of less than 100 acres cannot be ignored.70 To be sure, the kind of 
labour arrangement required to farm a 50 acre plot, is clearly different 
from that needed to work a piece of land below five acres. But official 
definitions have an important place in this study, not least because 
government policies treated producers differently on the basis of official 
categories.  
Connected to this issue are four other social phenomena 
encountered within this study, which conventional definitions of 
smallholders as family farmers tend to obscure. The first is the historical 
centrality of local trader intermediaries to smallholder cropping decisions. 
Crop dealers, who were sometimes urban dwellers, often owned (or 
intended to hold) property too large to be worked by family labour alone. 
This would exclude them from more narrow definitions of smallholders. 
However, the properties already farmed by such traders were often crucial 
to their ability to reduce the ‘pioneering costs’ of a comparatively novel, 
risky cash crop like the oil palm. Having done so, dealers played crucial 
roles in encouraging smallholder uptake of these new cash crops, chiefly 
through the provision of planting materials, the knowledge surrounding 
their production and harvesting, and any credit needed to tide over the 
period of crop maturation.71 Second, distinctions between smallholders 
and dealers were often clouded by changes in wealth and livelihood 
strategies. Third, the knowledge and materials needed for crop 
diversification were often derived from work on estates themselves. In the 
process, growers sometimes straddled the lines between middling planter, 
agricultural labourer and family farmer. Lastly, how the state responded to 
all such ‘smallholder’ initiatives, including those of dealers, whose lands 
were lumped together with smaller peasant growers, was often critical to 
diversification outcomes.   
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This thesis thus adopts a broader notion of smallholdings that 
includes what were often termed ‘medium’ holdings. These properties 
were typically owned by absentee landowners, artisans, traders, or Indian 
moneylenders. Yet, as Peter Bauer has noted, such holdings still tended to 
rely less on outside labour than large estates.72 In this study, a 
‘smallholder’ thus refers to an individual, or household, in charge of 
deciding what main cash crops to farm in an area below 100 acres in size 
This definition thus excludes settlers working on government-organised 
schemes, who, like estate labourers, have comparatively little say in crop 
choices.73 The logical contrast is with farming arrangements occupying 
landholdings of 100 acres and above, requiring an elaborate hierarchy of 
specialist wage labourers.74 These constitute the estates (and plantations) 
that are subsequently discussed in this thesis. 
My study focuses on events in Malaya, a geographic entity that 
equates to contemporary Peninsular Malaysia and the island of Singapore. 
Where used, ‘Malaysia’ refers to the political territory that took shape in 
1963 upon Malaya’s new federal arrangements with North Borneo, 
Sarawak, and Singapore (these arrangements with the latter ended in 
1965). Where sources permit, ethnic descriptors used in this thesis will 
allude to a person’s previous place of residence before Malaya, such as 
‘Javanese’ instead of ‘Malay’. With that caveat in mind, ‘Malayans’ here 
refers to Eurasians, Europeans, Indians, Malays, Chinese, and other 
persons of Asian descent who were inhabitants of Malaya at some time 
during the period covered by the study, and earned at least part of their 
livelihoods there. 
Throughout this story, particular reference will be made to Johor, 
the southernmost state of mainland Malaya. Two factors sealed the 
decision to focus on Johor. First, practicalities of time limited the 
geographic scope of a four-year doctoral thesis to a discreet portion of the 
Malay Peninsula. Second, Johor was Malaya’s single largest contributor to 
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cash crop production during most of the period studied. This included the 
main tree crops investigated in this thesis – oil and coconut palms – but 
also extended to other popular cultivars at the time, including Hevea 
rubber and areca palms. One might therefore expect smallholder interest 
in both oil and coconut palms to be especially pronounced in Johor. 
Where integral to this study’s main themes, important developments 
within Malaya proper, the general Asian region, West Africa, and Europe 
itself are also discussed in relation to Johor. 
The core trajectory of the narrative begins in 1862. The choice of 
starting year marks Temenggong Sri Maharaja Abu Bakar’s ascension to 
the rulership of Johor, and reflects the importance of his support for 
migrant coconut cultivation from this period onwards. Under Abu Bakar, 
Johor witnessed its first coconut boom, sowing the seeds for local 
smallholder aversion to oil palms. 
The decision to end the study at 1963 is also thematic. 1963 was the 
first year in which unprecedented Malayan government support for the 
smallholder cultivation of oil and coconut palms was implemented, 
setting precedents for decades to come. However, the conditions leading 
to this support stemmed from the pre-independence era. My study’s 
chronological framework is thus designed to demonstrate continuities 
within Malaya’s oil palm and coconut industries before and after 
independence in 1957. But the study also pays attention to developments 
before and after the given time frame. These provide additional necessary 
context for understanding the causes and effects of the smallholder 
participation gap between oil palms and other tree crops. 
 
SOURCES 
My study uses primary sources from archives and libraries in 
Peninsular Malaysia, Singapore, and the United Kingdom. These consist 
mostly of official correspondence, reports, memorandums, oral 





data derived from these sources were compiled, compared, and distilled 
into a coherent narrative in order to answer the central question at hand. 
The most important sources for this study are held in Peninsular 
Malaysia. The holdings of the National Archives of Malaysia, both at its 
main facility in Kuala Lumpur, and its Johor Baru branch, were consulted 
extensively. Both repositories contain a vast array of materials concerned 
with agriculture, primarily in the form of land applications, district 
reports, and policy decisions. In addition, the Kuala Lumpur facility 
houses correspondence pertaining to federal-level policy discussions on 
smallholder activity. When put together, the sources from the Kuala 
Lumpur and Johor archives can be highly complementary, making it 
possible to reconstruct debates and concerns about smallholders as they 
were relayed and contested across the imperial chain of command, from 
Whitehall to as far down as the local Malayan sub-district. 
Putting together this thesis involved an arduous search for 
smallholder oil palm land applications lodged with state authorities. To 
this end, at Johor Baru, the papers held under the series of the 
Commissioner of Lands and Mines, the General Adviser, and the Collector 
of Land Revenue (Batu Pahat) were extensively consulted, as were those of 
the Selangor Secretariat in Kuala Lumpur, for the period between the 1910s 
and 1950s. By sifting through thousands of agricultural land applications, 
irrefutable proof was found of smallholder involvement with oil palms in 
pre-1960s Malaya. Such episodes were extremely hard to locate, with less 
than 10 encountered in total. Ironically, the very rarity of such applications 
sometimes provoked heated internal official discussions on how to 
respond. This made it possible to reconstruct detailed case studies of 
smallholder interest in oil palms (Chapters Four and Five).  These same 
archival series, as well as those of papers held under the collections of the 
Ministry of Agriculture and the Ministry of Commerce and Industry in 
Kuala Lumpur, also contained sizeable records of internal official 
discussions and decisions regarding the performance of Malaya’s coconut 





Public repositories in the United Kingdom were another valuable 
source of raw materials for this study. At the National Archives (Public 
Record Office) at Kew, records compiled by the Colonial Office under 
series codes CO 273, CO 323, CO 537, CO 717, CO 758, and CO 852 proved 
useful for understanding the broader imperial context in which policies 
pertaining to the coconut trade, as well as dietary practices in Malaya, 
were carried out. Sources categorised by the Ministry of Food, under series 
codes MAF 83 and MAF 97, were also consulted sparingly, in order to 
understand the impact of the international political economy of trade in 
fats on Malayan producers during the 1940s. 
Given the considerable bias expressed against smallholders and 
intermediaries in official records, critical readings of sources were 
necessary from the outset. Initially, textual analysis took the form of 
paying attention to who was saying what, how concerns were being 
articulated, and what was being left out of discussions. With extended 
immersion and reflection on the records, it eventually became possible to 
read most official sources both ‘along the grain’ and ‘against the grain’, in 
order to understand some of the deeper motivations, prejudices, and 
concerns that were driving policy decisions at different levels of 
bureaucracy.75  
These materials were also cross-examined through the use of 
published government sources held in various repositories, which, besides 
the archives mentioned above, included the British Library and the 
libraries of SOAS (University of London), the London School of 
Economics and Political Science, and the Malaysian Palm Oil Board. These 
contain annual reports, commission enquiries, statistical compilations, 
and official surveys. In addition, both the libraries of the Wellcome 
Institute in London and the National University of Singapore were 
consulted for a large amount of ‘grey literature’ produced by applied 
scientists under government and university employment, chiefly articles 
in the Malayan Agricultural Journal and Malayan Medical Journal. These 
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technical documents helped to refine and qualify findings from other 
official sources. 
No amount of critical reading, however, can address thematic 
oversights within official records. The materials proved particularly weak 
in their documentation of several sub-topics of vital interest to this study. 
These include the workings of Malayan Chinese chemical manufacturing 
enterprises, the activities of rural crop buyers, and local household 
consumption patterns. These gaps were addressed in several ways. First, 
the papers of the Sir Raymond Firth Collection, housed at the archives of 
the London School of Economics and Political Science, were consulted. 
The Firth papers contain a wealth of data, including an unpublished 
manuscript on Malaya’s smallholder economy co-authored by 
anthropologist Raymond Firth himself. This document, provisionally 
titled Malay Peasant Agriculture: An Economic Survey, proved especially 
useful in tackling thematic gaps in smallholder marketing and 
consumption patterns.  
Second, the business archives of Unilever at Port Sunlight hold the 
collected papers of the Overseas Committee, formed in 1926 to coordinate 
the global work of Lever Brothers. From 1935 onwards, briefings on 
different aspects of Malaya’s oil and fats industries, including Unilever’s 
competitors, were regularly compiled by visiting senior executives. These 
were perused extensively, and used to bridge knowledge gaps regarding 
the development of Malaya’s soap-making industry during the interwar 
years, as well as its linkages with coconut and oil palm farming. 
Third, oral sources were tapped to introduce ‘new evidence from 
the underside’.76 While this thesis would undoubtedly have benefitted 
from interviews with smallholders, limited time and sampling challenges 
dictated that a less ambitious strategy be pursued. To this end, informal 
conversations were held with individuals who had been heavily involved 
in various aspects of the Malaysian oil palm industry, including 
smallholder representatives, planters, agronomists, chemists, and 
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mechanical engineers. The findings from these discussions were used 
predominantly to recalibrate research strategies within the archives. 
Interview data was otherwise only deployed directly within the thesis 
when there was an established knowledge gap in the official sources. Such 
testimonies are referenced accordingly within the study.  
In Singapore, the National Archives contained a wealth of pre-
recorded oral testimonies accumulated through government-driven 
initiatives. As it turned out, these records were especially useful for 
understanding historical developments during the Japanese Occupation, a 
period for which many of the relevant official Malayan archival records 
have been either lost or destroyed.77 For this study, the most important 
contribution made by the recordings was to help reconstruct the 
perceived meanings of palm oil consumption during and after wartime. In 
these testimonies, complex emotions could be gleaned through the ‘orality 
of oral sources’, including changes in the tone and narrative ‘velocity’ of 
interviewee responses.78 A final, more indirect, source of oral testimonies 
came from essays written by undergraduate students from Universiti Sains 
Malaysia, published as a series of monographs edited by Paul Kratoska and 
Abu Talib Ahmad. These publications addressed a variety of topics related 
to everyday rural life rarely found in official records. 
Four groups of secondary sources proved especially useful to this 
study. The first were writings by scholars of Malayan, Southeast Asian and 
West African history, including John Drabble, Christaan Heersink, Gregg 
Huff, Jeyamalar Kathirithamby-Wells, Amarjit Kaur, Paul Kratoska, Lim 
Teck Ghee, Susan Martin, Ichirō Sugimoto, Carl Trocki and Nicholas 
White. These helped flesh out the broad geographic and economic milieu 
in which the Malayan tree crop experience took place. Sugimoto’s 
statistical analysis of Singapore’s historical economic development also 
provided an important quantitative toolkit with which to scrutinize 
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historical data on commodity prices.79 Second, the writings of François 
Ruf and his collaborators helped to frame the analysis of environmental 
change observed in this study. Third, a number of technical treatises on 
tree crop cultivation, together with publications issued by Malaysia’s 
Incorporated Society of Planters, facilitated a better understanding of the 
opportunity costs involved in oil palm cropping. Lastly, several student 
theses discussing local histories of Johor and the Malayan coconut 




The main body of this study, Chapters Four to Seven, is organised 
in strict chronological fashion, but it relies on two thematic ‘legs’ for 
initial direction. The first leg, Chapter Two, reconstructs the origins of the 
smallholder participation gap in Malaya. It examines tree crop 
developments in Malaya since the precolonial period, and pays attention 
to the specific social and geographic contexts in which these 
developments took place. It highlights Johor’s unusual situation, where 
farming arrangements for coconut and oil palms had become starkly 
inverted images of each other by 1929, and analyses how this condition 
came about. Finally, the chapter introduces the core framework for 
understanding how opportunity costs buttressed the smallholder 
participation gap between oil palms and other major Malayan tree crops. 
The second leg, Chapter Three, charts the formation of colonial 
policies regarding smallholder involvement in oil and coconut palms, as 
an analytic complement to the previous chapter’s stress on social and 
ecological factors. It examines the reactions of British colonial authorities 
to the smallholder participation gap as they observed it taking shape in 
Malaya during the 1920s, and the reasons behind their responses, as they 
coalesced into a distinctive set of approaches that would, from 1929 
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onwards, condition Malayan policies towards oil and coconut palms for 
the next three decades. 
In covering successive intervals between 1929 and 1963, Chapters 
Four to Seven extend, refine and modify the core arguments advanced in 
Chapters Two and Three. Despite facing odds that were already heavily 
stacked against their involvement in oil palms, smallholders repeatedly 
found room to manoeuvre after 1929. The missing oil palm smallholder 
was not a foregone conclusion. In every decade after the 1920s, there were 
crucial junctures at which the Malayan oil palm industry’s trajectory could 
be, and was indeed reoriented, in response to specific circumstances and 
decisions made. Outcomes were cumulative, with the results of each 
juncture impacting on following ones. In fact, over time, it became harder, 
rather than easier, for smallholders to diversify into oil palms. By the 
1960s, it had become extremely difficult, but not impossible, for 
smallholders to enter the oil palm industry in selective ways. 
Chapter Four shows how the period of the Great Depression 
placed pressures on smallholders to move away from familiar coconut 
cropping routines of the 1920s, and diversify into a wide range of other 
economic activities, including oil palm cultivation. Economic changes 
brought on between 1929 and 1934 helped terminate the ‘pioneering 
phase’ of coconut cultivation in Johor. Meanwhile, Asian interest in 
Malaya’s local oil palm product trade accelerated at the levels of 
cultivation, primary processing, and finished goods. At the same time, 
government interventions and inherent opportunity costs curbed the 
extent to which the localisation of the oil palm trade actually took place, 
particularly in terms of smallholder oil palm cultivation in Johor. 
Chapter Five reveals how the structures of the Malayan oil palm 
and coconut trades continued to converge in the aftermath of the 
Depression. Between 1934 and 1941, smallholder involvement in oil palms 
went from mere interest to actual cultivation, while coconut farming in 
Johor became increasingly unpopular, in partial reaction to long-term 





remained considerable, giving cultivators less reason to exit the industry 
quickly. Numerous state interventions also slowed the narrowing of the 
smallholder participation gap between oil palms and other tree crops. 
Chapter Six examines the impacts of war and reconstruction on 
the smallholder gap between 1942 and 1948. The period saw further 
convergence between the oil and coconut palm trades, but this proved to 
be a temporary development stemming from international market 
upheaval. The extremely harsh conditions under which palm oil was 
consumed during wartime extinguished nascent interest in the oil as a 
cooking ingredient, effectively raising the opportunity costs of oil palm 
cultivation for smallholders even further. Future smallholder interest in 
the crop remained heavily dependent on sales to estate factories, rather 
than on internal household use or transactions with artisanal processors. 
Ultimately, this would limit the appeal of the crop to wealthier 
smallholders prepared to specialise in its cultivation, as opposed to those 
preferring to rely on a more diverse range of agricultural activities. 
 Chapter Seven investigates the period between 1948 and 1963, 
when smallholders began to participate in oil palm farming in greater 
numbers. Driving these moves were pressures to replant and diversify 
away from ageing rubber and coconut cultivars. Yet, by the end of the 
interval, the smallholder participation gap remained far wider than what 
proponents of smallholder oil palm farming arrangements in Malaya had 
envisioned. A mild revival of coconut farming was also underway, given 
impetus by vested interests lobbying for government support. Behind 
these contradictory developments lay the longer-term opportunity costs 
that smallholders still associated with oil palm farming, costs that the 
Malayan authorities themselves were partly responsible for. 
The concluding chapter summarises the overall findings of the 
thesis. In doing so, it distils some general principles that affect 
smallholder involvement in tree crops in the Malay Peninsula. On this 
basis, the thesis suggests ways in which further smallholder participation 




THE BIRTH OF THE SMALLHOLDER PARTICIPATION GAP: TREE 
CROPPING IN MALAYA BEFORE 1930 
 
Researchers interested in the causes of wealth and poverty have 
sometimes asked whether different natural resources are imbued with 
unique physical properties that prejudice the manner of their 
exploitation.1 Those inclined towards environmentally determinist views 
have often argued that oil palms possess inherent physical traits that 
predispose them to large-scale production arrangements. The palm fruit’s 
propensity to be milled cost-effectively using capital-intensive machinery 
is typically referred to, especially among scholars focused on Southeast 
Asia, where most of such mechanisation took place during the twentieth 
century. According to these arguments, capital-scarce smallholders tend 
to be placed at a severe disadvantage whenever they try to enter the palm 
fruit production market. This is all either a blessing or a curse, depending 
on whether one is more interested in the industrial or the socio-
environmental implications of intensive oil palm cash cropping.  
Nonetheless, such explanations suffer from two weaknesses. First, 
they hardly question the nature of the produce flowing from all this costly 
machinery, namely vegetable oil intended for further industrial processing 
into a bland, colourless substance that Susan Martin has memorably 
termed an ‘invisible ingredient’.2 It is as if no alternatives to industrial oil 
manufacture exist. Direct connections are seldom made between the 
manner in which palm oil and palm kernels are produced, and their final 
user markets, except among scholars interested in the numerous 
territories surrounding both sides of the Atlantic Basin, a vast region that 
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harbours localised circulations of oil palm products that only make their 
way overseas in limited amounts today.3  
Second, environmental explanations tend to discuss the oil palm’s 
peculiar biology in abstract, without considering the broader social and 
historical contexts that the palm is situated within, including the presence 
of other competing crops and activities. This might make sense for a 
plantation specialising in the bulk production of palm oil and kernels for 
sale to the chemical industry, especially if it is vertically integrated. But it 
runs counter to economic reality for many small growers, whose only 
insurance against sharp falls in international commodity prices usually 
involves livelihood diversification, and seeking out alternative markets for 
the sale of their main cash crop. 
 It is a little known fact that on the eve of the industry’s 
establishment in Malaya, colonial officials thought capital was the least 
important constraint on local oil palm expansion. In 1909, Malaya’s 
inaugural Director of Agriculture voiced concerns about how other crops 
in Malaya were already soaking up the labour and lands of cultivators. 
Estates, he argued, had little incentive to switch into oil palms when 
Hevea rubber was much more attractively priced. Smallholders, in his 
view, were similarly unlikely to take up oil palms because coconut 
production could offer a comparable income for far less work.4 
 Such views allude to a puzzle lying at the heart of Malaya’s 
agricultural development before 1930. Most oil palm estates established 
during this period did not rely on costly machinery, and instead depended 
heavily on labour at all stages of production. Yet, by the end of the 1920s, 
oil palm cultivation in places like Johor was completely dominated by 
estates, whereas smallholders had laid claim to the production of most 
coconuts and, to a lesser extent, rubber. The smallholder participation gap 
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between oil palms and other major tree crops thus cannot be directly 
attributed to the use of large-scale processing machinery, since little was 
in operation during this period. If there were indeed inherent physical 
differences between these tree crops that complicated exploitation, 
answers must lie elsewhere. 
Current environmental explanations for the smallholder 
participation gap, while flawed, should not be dismissed prematurely. 
Indeed, they gain strength when revised to take specific historical and 
ecological contexts into account. Coconut palms, indigenous to much of 
Southeast Asia, have been a central pillar of economy, culture and society 
in Malaya since antiquity. Yet pre-colonial coconut palm expansions in 
response to local and regional markets have been neglected in 
historiography, and were probably much more significant than previously 
acknowledged. They laid the geographic and social basis for the Malayan 
coconut sector’s growth during the better-known copra boom of the early 
twentieth century. During this later period, rubber also entered the 
Malayan agricultural landscape, becoming yet another crop demanding 
the time and energy of smallholders, but with even greater monetary 
rewards.  
By the time of its introduction to Malaya, the oil palm faced stiff 
competition from other tree crops. Rubber grew in a large variety of soils, 
and was undoubtedly more lucrative to farm. Coconut palms, however, 
were more vulnerable to being side-lined, because of their lower cash 
returns compared to palm oil. But coconuts benefited from a multiplicity 
of market outlets, and were relatively undemanding in the labour needed 
for their harvesting and handling. Just as crucial was the presence of 
trader intermediaries, who shaped opportunity costs by bridging demand 
and supply, while simultaneously taking on crop processing tasks that 
were incompatible with many smallholder work schedules. The oil palm 
would have to become a more attractive crop for both traders and 
smallholders before it could be more widely adopted. Understanding 
initial aversions to the oil palm thus requires turning towards the more 






THE COCONUT PALM’S POPULARITY 
Available evidence suggests that the coconut palm, like sugar cane 
and rice, was domesticated in Southeast Asia possibly sometime around 
12,000 – 6,000 BP (Before Present).5  The scholar-administrator Richard 
Winstedt has claimed that coconuts were being cultivated in Peninsular 
home gardens during the ‘prehistoric’ period, alongside bananas and 
sugarcane, a practice that seems to have continued into the first 
millennium CE.6  Perhaps Man’s oldest and most localised use of coconuts 
was as a source of uncontaminated water.7 Moreover, the practice of 
extracting oil from fleshy coconut kernel has occurred long enough in 
history for coconut oil to be considered a traditional source of fat in 
Malayan diets.  
Fresh coconut oil was usually made at home, with the use of 
manual kernel extraction tools, a fire and an earthenware pot of boiling 
water (Photograph 1). The clear, fragrant oil, once skimmed off, was 
typically used for frying and illumination. Coconut ‘milk’ (santan) was also 
made by soaking freshly grated kernel in warm or hot water, and then 
squeezing the wet mass by hand through a sieve. Santan formed a popular 
sweet-savoury base for innumerable curries, desserts, and traditional 
medicines. Besides being a calorie-dense food ingredient, coconut milk 
enhanced the flavour and mouthfeel of starchy staples (rice, other grain 
crops, sago and tubers), fish, and numerous vegetables. Coconut oil could 
be used as a hair and skin emollient, while fermented coconut water, 
together with indigo, was turned into a dyeing agent for cloth.8 There 
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were at least 10 known different Malay names given to a coconut as it 
ripened, in line with different uses for the nut at different stages of 
ripeness.9 
 
Photograph 1. Handheld coconut kernel grater, circa 1900. Photograph taken by 
author at the National Museum of Singapore, July 2014. 
Other parts of the coconut palm were also highly valued, 
sometimes at the expense of kernel fat production. Across Southeast Asia, 
the sap of the unopened inflorescence was tapped and made into sugar 
(by boiling), or into drinking alcohol and vinegar (via fermentation).10 The 
terminal bud (‘cabbage’) of the palm made for a locally popular vegetable, 
either eaten raw, boiled or pickled.11 Windbreaks and fishing lures were 
fashioned out of palm fronds, construction timber hewn from trunks, and 
combustion fuel from the palm’s fruit husk, flower spathe and petioles. 
Vernacular knowledge was considerable, with specific breeds favoured for 
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specialist applications. The kernel shell of kelapa sekol, for example, was 
fancied for household cups.12  
Other palms, notably the nibong (Oncosperma tigilarium), sago 
(Metroxylon sagu), nipa (Nypa fruticans), kabong (Arenga saccharifera), 
and areca (Areca catechu), were sometimes preferred over coconut palms 
for construction, masticatory, and edible purposes in Malaya.13 The fruit of 
the areca palm, for instance, was treasured for its mild stimulatory effects 
and ritual significance.14 Throughout much of Asia, arecanuts were 
typically chewed together with lime and leaf wrappers from the betel vine 
(Piper betle).15 For the Indo-Pacific region, however, Malaya included, the 
coconut palm appears to have been the dominant palm species around 
which a self-sufficient domestic economy based on arboriculture 
developed historically.16 
Notwithstanding localised circulations, coconut palm products 
have also travelled across Asia since antiquity. Copra was not a Western 
construct, and had long been traded within Asia and Southeast Asia for 
conversion into a cooking fat.17  Moreover, before Chinese and Arab 
traders began to dominate trade networks during the nineteenth century, 
Bugis and other ‘Malay’ merchants frequently used southern Malaya as a 
zone for the trade and redistribution of coconut produce throughout the 
wider Malay Archipelago during the seventeenth and eighteenth 
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centuries.18 For households, copra had no use-value. It formed a durable 
medium for long-distance transport of vegetable fat, and could be created 
using simple techniques and local materials. But by being easily stored 
and consolidated over long intervals, copra became highly amenable to 
large-scale oil extraction methods when these came to be available in the 
West by the mid-nineteenth century. 
When sold, copra faced a different market and set of competing 
products, compared to those facing village-made coconut produce. It is 
thus important that a clear distinction be made between various kinds of 
coconut-based produce. Following historian Christaan Heersink, coconut 
oil in this study refers to the oil made from fresh nuts using manual 
methods accessible to households.19 During the period studied, coconut 
oil, coconut milk, fresh nuts, palm sugar, and coconut sap-based alcohol 
(toddy), were all trades based on artisanal production methods. Copra oil, 
in contrast, refers to the oil expressed from copra using more complex 
mechanical methods, typically on a much larger scale than coconut oil-
making.20 By the twentieth century, copra oil usually had downstream 
linkages with industrial manufactures such as mass-produced soap, 
cooking oil, copra cake, and margarine. In their own ways, both types of 
coconut produce would prove critical to keeping Malaya’s coconut farms 
afloat during times of enormous international upheaval, not least during 
the Great Depression and Japanese Occupation. 
By the eighteenth century, areas under coconut cultivation in 
Malaya, both old and new, began noticeably expanding.21  The 
enmeshment of older Asian and newer British trading interests lifted 
demands for consumer goods within Malaya itself. Malaya’s growing 
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production of tin and cash crops for the China trade, greased by an inflow 
of migrant labour, boosted the local market for coconut produce. 
Population growth was further accelerated by British colonisation of 
Penang and Singapore, urbanisation, and the founding of Johor as a 
territorial state in the early nineteenth century.22 In one historian’s 
estimate, Malaya’s population grew almost six-fold in less than a century, 
going from 250,000 in 1800 to 1.4 million in 1891.23 Within this context, the 
domestic Peninsular trade in coconut products expanded.  
Malaya’s booming copra trade with the West would only begin to 
take place by the late nineteenth century. But even before this, exports of 
coconut produce from Malaya to the wider Asian region were already 
expanding rapidly. During the nineteenth century, regions such as Burma 
saw their populations increase significantly, from four million in 1830 to 
10.5 million in 1901, driving demand for a popular dietary staple.24 By the 
1880s, Penang was a major exporter of copra and coconut oil to southern 
Burma, southern Siam, and Deli (Sumatra). To meet this rising regional 
demand, Penang’s recorded coconut acreage grew from about 6,000 acres 
in 1830 to 17,000 acres by 1874.25 
The expanding geography of coconut palm cultivation followed 
broader trends in Malaya’s economic development during the nineteenth 
century. While many palms were cultivated on Malaya’s sandier East 
Coast, most new cultivation during the nineteenth century unfolded along 
the western half of the Peninsula, where the bulk of tin deposits, transport 
infrastructure, and consumers were located.26 The palms planted along 
the Peninsula’s western seaboard during this period grew up mostly on 
poorly-draining, low-lying clay soils. These lands were distinctly different 
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from the porous crumb on which most coconuts grew outside Malaya.27 
Indeed, dense soils are problematic for many forms of dryland agriculture, 
and often require man-made drainage interventions to be useful. 
However, the high natural fertility of Malaya’s coastal alluvial clays, 
coupled with the ability of the coconut palm’s roots to respire in 
waterlogged conditions for limited intervals, made the western coastline a 
relatively conducive environment for the coconut palm (provided 
adequate drainage was established) (Photograph 2). 
 
Photograph 2. Coconut cultivation in Malaya, circa 1860-1890. Reproduced with 
permission of The National Archives of the United Kingdom. 
 
COCONUT EXPANSION UNDER ABU BAKAR’S RULE 
 Following its reconstitution from maritime kingdom to territorial 
state by the early nineteenth century, the polity of Johor was not to be left 
out of this economic surge. As part of Singapore’s expanding hinterland, 
Johor’s location and abundance of land placed the territory in a prime 
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position to capitalise on the boom in coconut cultivation. Although 
coconuts were grown around scattered settlements in Johor throughout 
the nineteenth century, the most appropriate year to mark the expansion 
of Johor’s sector is 1862. This was the year in which Temenggong Sri 
Maharaja Abu Bakar succeeded his father as the ruler of Johor. Under Abu 
Bakar’s watch, new initiatives were quickly launched by his brother, 
Ungku Abdul Rahman. One of these was the creation of new settlements 
along Johor’s western and southern coastlines, where ‘police stations’ and 
coconut groves were established with the aid of hundreds of immigrant 
Javanese settlers.28 
According to historian Carl Trocki, Abdul Rahman’s sponsorship 
of these enterprises was motivated by the need to reduce the Johor 
aristocracy’s reliance on revenues from the incumbent Chinese-dominated 
Kangchu system. The Kangchu system, peculiar to Johor, Singapore and 
Riau during the nineteenth century, consisted of grants of riverine 
agricultural concessions to Chinese strongmen, where pepper and 
gambier were planted on freshly deforested land (Map 1). Revenue 
diversification seems to have become especially urgent after a financial 
crisis in Singapore almost bankrupted Johor’s Chinese planters during the 
mid-1860s.29  
The development of coastal settlements helped to widen Johor’s 
range of agricultural produce beyond inland pepper and gambier. Besides 
the economic benefits derived from these new settlements, Johor’s ruling 
elites were able to establish direct links of patronage with a growing 
immigrant population from the Dutch East Indies, thus cultivating a 
following of clients that would not have been possible via the arms-length 
nature of the Kangchu system. These coastal settlements eventually 
became bastions of political legitimacy for the Johor government. The 
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latter would eventually style itself as a Malay-dominated administration, 
ruling over a largely ethnic Malay state, with a Malay Sultan as its apex.30 
 
Map 1. Johor: Chinese riverine agricultural settlements (Kangkar) up to 1924. 
Source: James C. Jackson, Planters and Speculators: Chinese and European 
Agricultural Enterprise in Malaya 1786-1921 (Kuala Lumpur: University of Malaya 
Press, 1968), 268-269. 
 In contrast to the archival records concerning Kangchu 
arrangements, accounts of Johor’s state-endorsed coastal agricultural 
expansion are hampered by sparse government records.31 Some detailed 
accounts can be found in the writings of Johor’s first ‘court scribe’, 
Mohamed Ibrahim Munshi. While accompanying Abdul Rahman and his 
entourage on a tour of Johor’s West Coast in 1871, Ibrahim jotted down 
manifold observations about pioneer settlements at Tanjong Kupang, Batu 
Pahat, and Padang (Map 2). 
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Map 2. Johor: administrative divisions, 1874. Source: Trocki, Pirates, 165. 
 Besides the fact that these coastal areas were easily accessible to 
traffic via waterways, soil conditions appeared to be suitable for coconut 
planting, at least in the short term. Javanese labourers had been brought 
in by Abdul Rahman to dig ditches, build new roads and clear the 
mangrove forests lining the shores at both Padang and Tanjong Kupang.  
Ibrahim gives no reasons for forest removal, but it is possible that much of 
the resultant mangrove firewood and timber was sold for use within the 
Malayan tin and construction industries.32 But forest clearance would have 
disrupted organic processes of swamp-based land reclamation, and left 
both settlements vulnerable to future coastal erosion and inundation from 
the tides.33 
At Tanjong Kupang, the ground, already extensively drained by 
settlers, was said to be  
reddish black and swampy, soft and full of crab-holes. It 
is not proper earth but a soil composed of leaves and so 
forth. It is because many wide, deep and long ditches 
have been made that the soil is dry and the trees can 
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Similarly peaty conditions prevailed at Padang.35 Both localities offered 
attractive, yet precarious environmental situations for its inhabitants. 
Nearby streams ran red with sediment, and their water had to be boiled 
before drinking, which reduced the risk of falling ill, but did little to 
improve its palatability.36  
 By the time of Ibrahim’s visit, coconut groves already formed the 
agricultural mainstays of these settlements.  A compact block of 80 acres 
at Tanjong Kupang was ‘dark with coconut [palms]…all of them low and 
bearing fruit’.37 The smaller-than-average fruit size and low height of these 
palms may have alluded to the ‘yellow dwarf’ coconut variety, a breed 
commonly seen in local markets during the twentieth century.38 Dwarf 
palms were often preferred by migrant growers because they began 
yielding fruit at a very early age.39   
Other food crops were also being grown by the settlers, either on a 
permanent basis, or as a temporary catch crop near coconut palms, until 
the latter shaded out the food crops. At Padang, where a hundred Javanese 
migrants had recently settled, coastal soils permitted sugar cane, bananas, 
and various tubers to be grown. Areca palms were also being harvested for 
construction lumber and fruit sales.40 Rice appears to have been cultivated 
during the initial settlement of Tanjong Kupang, but had become 
neglected, possibly as a consequence of the maturing of the local coconut 
stands. Valuable protein was also being obtained through fishing.41  
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These cost-saving pioneer strategies were not unique to Johor. In 
the Dutch East Indies, coconut palms were often sown alongside faster-
maturing subsistence crops like rice, and once the former’s fruits could be 
harvested and sold, growers increased their reliance on markets for their 
food supplies.42 In coastal Perak, most new coconut lands were being 
cultivated by ‘immigrant peasants who, unlike the indigenous peasantry, 
tended towards specialized monoculture of the crop’.43 At most, these 
farms were all probably ‘simple agroforests’ comprised of one tree species 
and a few short-cycle crops.44 These smallholdings were all being run by 
farmers looking for quick returns on their labour. 
 Some literature has treated decisions to sow large numbers of 
coconut palms along Malaya’s western coastlines as part of a response 
towards the copra export economy in Europe.45 However, this view cannot 
explain attempts to plant dense groves in places like Johor since at least 
the 1860s, several decades before the European-oriented copra boom 
began in Malaya. There is no sign of any incipient copra manufacture in 
Ibrahim’s writings, and it would have been uncharacteristic of him to 
ignore such activity if encountered. Aside from cultural beliefs regarding 
the positive value of coconut palms in new settlements, coconut kernel fat 
would have been an essential component of rural diets. Its fruits were an 
extremely useful regional tradable, as were arecanuts, whose palms were 
planted in dense blocks alongside coconuts, and did reasonably well on 
peaty soils.46  
Furthermore, Ibrahim’s comments on the scarcity of freshwater 
supplies at coastal settlements allude to the importance of the palm as a 
source of potable water. To quench his thirst, Ibrahim periodically drank 
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coconut water from local nuts.47 To reduce the likelihood of diseases like 
cholera, it made sense to sow quick-growing coconut palm varieties as 
soon as possible.48 Coconuts would have been especially important in a 
region lacking in fresh springs and constructed wells.49 Rapid land 
clearance for perennial crops was probably also necessary to secure 
usufruct rights at a time when Johor’s rulers had yet to provide a legal 
framework for permanent property ownership.50  
 West Johor’s growing population soon made railways economically 
feasible, even without British administrative support. After bringing the 
northwestern territory of Muar under his control in 1879, Abu Bakar 
established a light railway system within Muar, beginning with Padang 
district. By the time of the railway’s completion in 1890, Padang had 
become Muar’s ‘richest agricultural district’, boasting some 10,000 
Javanese settlers growing arecanuts, coconuts and other crops for sale.51 
The railway ferried agricultural produce from Padang to Muar’s port town 
of Bandar Maharani for onward shipment. In exchange, rice and other 
consumer goods were railroaded back to Padang’s villages.52 The train line 
also helped expand Muar’s economy by opening up more coastal land for 
agriculture. By 1911, Padang’s population had increased to 12,000.53  
By this time, however, recently introduced tree crops, such as 
Hevea rubber, and the oil palm, were beginning to make their commercial 
presence felt on Johor’s landscape. The next section discusses how these 
new cultivars reshaped Johor’s agricultural landscape during the first three 
decades of the twentieth century, even as the coconut sector continued to 
expand. 
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THE SHAPING OF JOHOR’S TREE CROP BOOM   
 In stark contrast to Malaya, West Africans had already spent 
several millennia developing an extensive subsistence culture revolving 
around the indigenous oil palm. The Portuguese-led introduction of the 
coconut palm only occurred sometime after 1500 CE.54 Although the oil 
palm is unusual in that it yields fruit containing two different oils – palm 
oil and palm kernel oil – West African repertoires of palm cultivation, 
harvesting, product preparation and consumption harboured similarities 
to coconut palm cultures in Southeast Asia and elsewhere. Once harvested 
from both wild and cultivated palms, palm fruits were boiled, macerated, 
and pounded for their oils, to be used in a spread of everyday dishes. Like 
coconut oil in Southeast Asia, palm oil was a popular relish which enabled 
its consumers to ingest large amounts of starchy staples, especially yams.55 
Palm oil was also used for illumination and medicinal purposes. 
Meanwhile, palm kernel oil had a buttery character which made it 
especially useful for frying and anointing on skin. Like the coconut palm, 
sap from the immature oil palm inflorescence was commonly made into 
wine and vinegar. The hard shells of palm kernels made a useful 
combustion fuel, and could be carved into ornaments. Oil palm leaf fronds 
and stalks were made into fencing, fish traps, and other household 
constructs, while its trunk was used as lumber.56 Likewise, a lively internal 
trade in oil palm products had existed in the Nigerian region long before 
the rise of palm oil exports to Europe during the nineteenth century.57 
 For those enamoured with its taste, palm oil’s aesthetic attractions 
were obvious. Fran Osseo-Asare, a food historian and long-time gourmand 
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of Ghanaian cooking, enthuses that ‘it is as hard to capture the essence of 
the palm fruit as it is to describe the hues of sunset to a blind person. The 
fruit has a color like paprika or glowing coals, with the softness of red 
velvet, the silkiness of a fine sari, and the richness of fresh cream’.58 In 
Nigerian novelist Chinua Achebe’s classic treatment of the social tensions 
affecting Igbo society during the late nineteenth century, he offers readers 
a glimpse of the deeper historical cosmologies surrounding the oil palm: 
‘the art of conversation is regarded very highly [in Igbo society], and 
proverbs are the palm-oil with which words are eaten’.59 In short, the oil 
palm’s products literally and metaphorically greased the rituals of daily 
life in many parts of West Africa. 
Amidst this oil palm-centred culture, the nineteenth century saw 
mounting sales of peasant-produced West African oil palm products, as 
well as a search for new tropical zones for profitable oil palm planting 
outside West Africa. The prime instigator of this double shift was Western 
Europe’s increasing demand for tropical commodities, brought about by 
the industrial revolution. By the mid-nineteenth century, West African-
sourced palm oil had become a major industrial material for soap-making, 
candles, railway lubricants, and tin plating.60 During this same period, 
both palm kernels and copra also became useful exports to Europe. In 
contrast to palm oil, which in its freshly squeezed form was a complex, 
semi-solid oil at ambient temperatures of 25oC and upwards, and whose 
high carotenoid content gave palm oil its characteristic orange-red glow, 
both the oils of palm kernels and copra were fairly colourless, richer in 
lauric acid, and ‘harder’ with higher melting points. For these reasons, 
manufacturers in temperate climates preferred using the latter oils for 
soap-making.61 Moreover, unlike palm oil, both kernel oils also left behind 
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kernel cake as a by-product of extraction, which became increasingly 
useful for feeding cattle in Europe.62 
Palm kernels from West Africa gained from the additional benefit 
of being located much closer to Europe, compared to Asian-sourced copra 
in its pre-Suez Canal, pre-steamship days.63 This situation changed 
somewhat with the lowering of freight costs due to the communications 
revolution of the 1870s and 1880s. Not only did Asia-Pacific copra become 
a more commercially attractive tradable, but interest in cultivating Elaeis 
in Southeast Asia for exportable palm oil and kernels began to grow 
significantly. This was especially so in the Dutch East Indies.64  
What truly pushed oil palm planters to look beyond West Africa 
were two concurrent developments during the twentieth century’s 
opening decades. One was the limited ability of West African peasant 
producers to scale up their production of palm oil and kernels for 
European markets. The other was the general difficulty of establishing 
mechanised processing and plantation arrangements in British West 
Africa, which would have, in principle, permitted much higher extraction 
rates of palm oil than existing peasant methods were capable of. The 
results of this stalemate, as already recounted elsewhere, ultimately saw 
palm fruit factories set up in the Belgian Congo, the establishment of the 
first dedicated oil palm plantation-mill complex in Sumatra, and the first 
oil palm estates in Johor and Selangor, all from 1910-1911 onwards.65 Yet, for 
Johor’s oil palm sector to assume the expansive dimensions reached by the 
end of the 1920s, one important local requirement still needed fulfilling: 
the territory’s ability to attract large European fixed capital investments. 
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Initially, this issue was eclipsed by the continued growth of Johor’s 
coconut sector. By the beginning of the twentieth century, recorded copra 
exports from Malaya and Johor were increasing at unprecedented rates, in 
line with the boom in demand from the fat-processing industries of 
Western Europe, North America, and Japan.66 Following breakthroughs in 
the hydrogenation of liquid fats in 1902, plant- and marine-based fats with 
higher melting points, including those from coconuts, palm kernels, 
groundnuts, and whales, could be substituted for traditional ‘hard’ 
livestock fats in margarine and shortening with increasing cost-
effectiveness.
67
 Palm oil, however, with its pigments, odour and lower 
plasticity, was more difficult to refine, and thus did not benefit as much 
from the hydrogenation revolution until after the Second World War, 
when refining technologies shifted in its favour.  
In the meantime, between 1904 and 1913, the estimated coconut 
acreage in the Federated Malay States - Perak, Selangor, Negri Sembilan 
and Pahang - grew by an average of almost seven per cent per annum, 
from 77,500 to 175,000 acres, while copra production increased tenfold in 
the same interval, from 976 to 9,287 tons.68 It was Johor, though, which 
became the single largest contributor to Malaya’s copra sector. From 1914 
to 1918, Johor exported a total of 73,156 tons of copra, which compared 
favourably with the roughly 90,000 tons of copra sent abroad by the entire 
Federated Malay States grouping during the same interval. 
Seen from a global perspective, Malaya’s copra boom was even 
more extraordinary. Between 1909 and 1924, the territory’s estimated 
world share of exports rose from three to 12 per cent. Malaya consequently 
surpassed British Ceylon as a copra exporter.69 When Malaya’s role as a re-
exporter of Dutch East Indies copra is taken into account, the former 
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territory’s significance grows further. In 1925, for example, Malaya’s gross 
copra export figure, including that of transhipped produce of Dutch East 
Indies origin, was the world’s second highest (237,510 tons), surpassing 
that of the Philippines (144,392 tons) and more than twice of Ceylon’s 
(113,686 tons).70  
Within Malaya, the development of Johor’s coconut farms was 
especially remarkable, given how heavily coconut production relied on 
smallholder activity within a relatively confined area along its western 
coastline. As will be seen in the penultimate section of this chapter, the 
technologies and economics of coconut and copra production generally 
favoured minimally mechanised operations. Relying on family labour and 
catch cropping strategies, smallholder coconut farms could be established 
at one-quarter the cost of European estates.71 Nevertheless, estate 
arrangements for coconuts were still more prevalent in the Federated 
Malay States than in Johor. Malaya’s inaugural national coconut census of 
1930 estimated that estates only held two per cent of coconut land in 
Johor, whereas equivalent figures for Perak and Selangor were 45 and 34 
per cent respectively.72 This phenomenon requires explanation, especially 
given that Johor would host some of Malaya’s largest ever oil palm 
plantations to date by the end of the 1920s. 
Johor’s nominal independence from British control meant that it 
was unable to attract large-scale European investment until the 1910s. The 
state’s rulers had tried opening up Johor’s economy to a raft of European-
funded charter schemes during the preceding four decades, including 
proposals for agricultural concessions spanning hundreds of thousands of 
acres.73 However, given the perceived political risks of investing in 
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territories lying outside the British protectorate system, coupled with the 
presence of competing investment opportunities in the Malay States 
already brought under British control, investors wanted a guarantee of 
British government support to cover unforeseen losses in Johor. The 
Colonial Office was unwilling to share in such risks, arguing that 
successful European ventures would strengthen Johor’s economic 
standing and sovereignty, while unsuccessful schemes would become 
costly burdens for any incoming colonial government.74  
European planter interest thus only took effective shape with 
formal British control over Johor. This was catalysed by a long-running 
stand-off between the Federated Malay States authorities and Johor’s 
Sultan, regarding the terms on which the Johor segment of Malaya’s 
expanding trans-peninsular railway system was to be constructed and 
funded. By the end of 1909, Johor’s segment had been completed by the 
Johor authorities themselves, bisecting the entire territory in the process. 
But this had been accomplished through heavy loans from the Crown 
Agents to the Johor Treasury. Worse still, the latter institution was already 
under crushing debt due to falling revenues from the shrinking Kangchu 
sector, an absence of European commercial investment, and heavy 
expenditures on foreign travel and local entertainment during Sultan Abu 
Bakar’s reign.75 Consequently, the state’s first British Adviser was 
appointed the following year, bringing direct British influence to bear on 
Johor’s bureaucracy, not least on systems of state finance.76  By this time, 
however, Western interest in coconut planting was being dissipated by 
rising Hevea rubber prices. Mass production of cars had already begun in 
the United States by 1907, consequently boosting international demand 
for rubber for vehicle tyres.77  
From this point onwards, Johor’s agriculture expanded rapidly 
along two distinct fronts. Put together, these expansions accounted for an 
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overwhelming proportion of Johor’s population growth between 1911 and 
1931, the fastest by far among all the Malay states.78 The first front was the 
old western coastal zone, easily reached from Sumatra and Java within 
several days, if not hours. Although Johor’s rubber exports soon began to 
overshadow those of other traditional tree crop exports during the 1910s, a 
persistently vibrant West Coast trade in coconuts, copra and arecanuts 
weighed heavily in favour of new settlements along Malaya’s western 
front. With its relatively abundant coastal lands, Johor consistently 
claimed the lion’s share of Dutch East Indies migrants coming to Malaya, 
with some 120,200 of its residents claiming Dutch East Indies ancestry by 
1931, out of a total of 280,600 across Malaya.
79
 Smallholding ownership in 
Johor cost practically nothing except one’s labour, as land tenure was 
effectively based on usufruct rights until well into the first half of the 
twentieth century. Further encouragement was provided by sponsorship 
from wealthy patrons (orang kaya and penghulu), many of whom were 
recent migrants themselves.
80
 Over time, initial success bred further 
interest. Fresh settlers gravitated towards communities of friends and 
relatives along the coastline, on whom they could call on for help.81 
Johor’s water-logged coastline was transformed by this influx of 
settlers. From the northern district of Batu Pahat down to Pontian, 
existing streams and tributaries were straightened and widened by 
Javanese, Bugis, and Banjarese settlers, who brought with them coastal 
engineering techniques inherited from their places of origin.82 Because of 
the indivisible nature of this pioneering work, labour was usually 
mobilised through locally-organised mutual assistance systems (gotong 
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royong), arrangements which continued to be used around Southeast Asia 
to open up tidal swamp lands well into the late twentieth century.83 
Internal drains were dug for individual smallholdings, and linked up with 
refurbished canals (parit) (Photograph 3). These networks were used to 
transport coconuts and other cash crops towards the coast, for processing 
and shipment to Singapore. Wooden tidal gates were installed on some 
canals, both to control sea water incursions, and to extend the reach of 
waterborne transport several kilometres inland. Coastal bunds were also 




Photograph 3. Labourers excavating a drain on a Malayan coconut holding, circa 
1900-1920. Reproduced with permission of Arkib Negara Malaysia. 
The Johor state, now under direct British guidance, appears to 
have done little to aid these endeavours before the Second World War. 
Having reformed the taxation system, and with revenues quickly 
accumulating from rising demand for export commodities like rubber, the 
government was more focused on using its newfound surplus for other 
purposes. The state’s most immediate priorities were to discharge its 
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outstanding debts to the Crown Agents, and to build an extensive interior 
road network to pry open Johor’s interior to further investment.  
However, by the end of the 1920s, the state was investing much 
more of its surplus into bonds, funds and securities across the rest of the 
British Empire, namely to territories suffering from high levels of public 
debt, such as Britain and British India.85 This last development was 
particularly controversial from the viewpoint of Johor’s affairs. Yet this 
substantial drain from Johor’s public finances, as Ichiro Sugimoto has 
shown, co-existed with selective interventions to support Johor’s 
economic expansion, such as the above-mentioned construction of 
metalled roads. The real issue, as would become increasingly apparent, 
was the Johor government’s privileging of large-scale producers, such as 
oil palm plantations, over the specific needs of smallholders in different 
areas of the territory. There were several ways in which this favouritism 
would occur, but preferences for road-building over coastal engineering 
were to assume one of the most physically obvious forms of 
discrimination by the 1930s. 
Meanwhile, West Johor’s drainage networks were soon coming 
under heavy strain from within.  By the 1910s and 1920s, uncultivated lands 
along West Johor’s coastline were growing scarce, prompting incoming 
settlers to establish new holdings up to 10 kilometres inland.86 According 
to historian Mohamed Halib, the drains dug by these settlers were latched 
on to existing canals. Little effort was made to enlarge the capacities of 
these older parit and accompanying infrastructure. By the late 1920s, some 
tidal gates were being regularly overwhelmed, while bunds were 
collapsing, causing prolonged flooding that hurt coconut yields in affected 
areas.87 
 Halib’s account suggests that gotong royong systems were unable 
to cope with the fallout from this increased economic activity. But 
perhaps, as other historians have suggested, co-operative labour 
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arrangements were already being undermined by changes to local village 
leadership organisation occurring under colonial rule in Malaya.88 In 
Johor, the village headman (penghulu) was originally the founder of a 
single settlement, and personally accountable to his constituents in 
exchange for tribute and loyalty. Under British rule, he eventually became 
a minor salaried official under the purview of British district officers, with 
only formal oversight of several villages. This occurred in different parts of 
Johor, during an interval of rapid settler expansion in the 1910s and 
1920s.89 Control over communal labour routines was probably disrupted 
during this transition to a new system. In short, the decline in West 
Johor’s forest rent was not a straightforward process, and may have been 
aggravated by colonial political restructuring. 
 These problems were compounded by state-backed forest 
clearance within Johor’s interior, where a second front of agricultural 
expansion was getting underway. In the midst of Malaya’s first rubber 
boom, the completion of the new Federated Malay States-owned railway 
axis led to the ‘opening up of the great rubber belt of west central 
Johore’.90 Between 1906 and 1910, Johor’s recorded rubber acreage grew 
tenfold to 43,517 acres. Much of this rubber was clustered around the new 
railway route and ancillary road networks, where about 170,000 acres of 
adjacent land had been alienated for cultivation by 1910 (Map 3). Both 
estates and smallholders were involved in these expansions, which 
resulted in a tenfold increase in the value of Johor’s rubber exports 
between 1910 and 1913.91  
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Map 3. Johor: major railway and road routes, 1911. Source: Kaur, Transport, 58. 
 The new railway axis had two quite different effects on West 
Johor’s coastal farmlands. By encouraging inland expansions of rubber 
plantations, water runoff from catchment areas was dramatically 
increased during heavy rains. Soil erosion contributed to the further 
silting of westward-flowing rivers and drains.92 Notwithstanding their own 
weaknesses, drainage systems on Johor’s West Coast were thus put under 
further strain by upstream developments. All of these early drainage 
problems, troubling as they already were for Johor’s coastal smallholders, 
would pave the way for even more dramatic environmental 
transformations during the Great Depression, triggering the gradual 
downfall of West Johor’s great coconut frontier. 
 The railway route also helped ground the location of Johor’s 
subsequent oil palm developments, especially once an uninterrupted rail 
link had been established with Singapore in 1923. By the end of the 1920s, 
every existing oil palm estate in Johor was positioned close to the central 
railway line, at the locales of Kulai, Layang Layang, Renggam, Kluang, and 
Labis.93 The Federated Malay States-led railway alignment thus strongly 
precluded the possibility that oil palm estates would be set up in the 
vicinity of Johor’s western coconut-growing areas, giving smallholders in 
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these areas less of an incentive to start farming oil palms themselves. 
Meanwhile, proposed line extensions to Johor’s West Coast, where Abu 
Bakar had built Johor’s first railway, were aborted because coastal soils 
were supposedly too soft and peaty for line construction.94 
Nevertheless, the interior railway was not primarily responsible for 
the sheer size of the oil palm estates which developed nearby. Neither did 
the railway prevent smallholders from cultivating lands near the line and 
its associated feeder roads, nor explain why these growers tended to focus 
on the cultivation of rubber, coconut, and other fruit trees, when the 
demonstration effects from nearby oil palm estates would have been most 
obvious to smallholders in this central region. In short, we need to look 
elsewhere to understand why smallholders did not draw more inspiration 
from oil palm estate expansions during the 1920s, as they did with rubber. 
 The growth of Johor’s oil palm sector was, in the first instance, 
indirectly fuelled by the ‘soft infrastructure’ provided by the state. Legal 
foundations were laid in 1910-1911, when the evolving Johor administration 
brought the state’s land tenure framework in line with that of the 
Federated Malay States through a new Land Enactment, establishing long-
term concessionary systems for both large and small holdings, ‘thereby 
making the state more attractive to would-be investors of all kinds’.95  
These included middling Chinese entrepreneurs, who sharecropped 
pineapples amidst young rubber in Johor as an effective way of lowering 
the start-up costs of a rubber estate.96 
By 1917, Johor’s rubber boom had begun to falter, and a search for 
alternative avenues for agricultural investment quickly got underway. The 
accumulation of rubber stocks due to shipping shortages during the Great 
War put considerable downward pressure on rubber prices in Johor, 
which hurt state revenues as well. Although these conditions were 
ameliorated after the armistice of November 1918, the consequent post-
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war depression of 1920 and 1921, followed by the onset of the Stevenson 
Restriction Scheme in late 1922, drove many large European estates to 
diversify into other crops. These included, with some government 
support, coffee, tea, sugar and nipah palms. Meanwhile, Chinese planters 
in Johor continued to use pineapples as a way of mitigating income 
volatility from rubber until the early 1930s.97  
There was thus no concerted official effort at the time to promote 
oil palms over other non-rubber crops. But news of the superior yields 
that could be extracted from oil palms had begun to emerge from Sumatra 
after the war. Where a hectare of well-tended coconuts might be expected 
to yield one ton of oil at most, the same land under oil palms could 
potentially generate two tons of palm oil and 600 kilograms of palm 
kernels.98 This news drove another nail into the coffin for European 
interest in coconut plantations, and prepared the way for further investor 
interest in oil palms. 
Johor of the late 1910s still lagged behind the Federated Malay 
States in attracting European investment, and its unoccupied lands were 
comparatively abundant. State administrators therefore proved highly 
willing to grant generous land concessions for a number of non-rubber 
crops, including oil palms. For example, between February and May 1920, 
the authorities approved a total of 35,000 acres for oil palms to two 
different enterprises, premium-free. This compared favourably with the 
$4.00-6.00 acreage premium being levied on new rubber lands in Johor in 
1919.99 Moreover, even before the advent of the Stevenson Scheme, 
officials had taken steps to make all fresh concessions conditional on the 
exclusion of rubber.100 In the 1930s, annual Johor quit rents for oil palm 
estate lands were still only half of those for rubber and coconuts during 
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the first six years of ownership, following which rents for oil palm lands 
dropped to just a quarter of rubber’s.101  
 To be sure, such large-scale oil palm concessions were also 
somewhat underwritten by budding beliefs in the superior economics of 
capital-intensive palm fruit processing equipment. But during the 1920s, 
there was little detailed information, let alone consensus, regarding the 
optimal size of milling machinery. This led to wildly diverging estimates of 
the ‘minimum economic size’ of land that could be alienated to 
complement a prospective factory. In the mid-1920s, as lower-capacity 
centrifugal presses entered the market, the floor for matching concessions 
ranged from anything between 200 to 3,000 acres of oil palm land.102   
These thresholds were further qualified by a widespread official 
understanding that not every estate needed to have its own mill, 
something which had been anticipated even before the First World War.103 
For instance, in 1924, two middling planters of South Asian origin 
obtained separate but adjoining land parcels of 50 and 25 acres 
respectively for oil palm cultivation in the administrative subdivision of 
Tanjong Duablas, Selangor. Official approval was partly based on the fact 
that both men had chosen plots close to larger oil palm holdings, 
including 600 acres of lands already owned by a Chinese businessman, 
and another 1,000 acres westwards, held by Brooklands Estate.104 
 Nevertheless, official perspectives differed considerably. As late as 
1927, Johor’s chief land authority, the Commissioner of Lands and Mines, 
claimed that the minimum economic size for an oil palm concession was 
an unprecedented 4,500 acres.105 The Commissioner acknowledged that 
estate clustering strategies would lower this threshold significantly, but 
still appeared heavily in favour of much larger concessions than 
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administrators of the Federated Malay States.106 However, the 
Commissioner’s views may have had less to do with exaggerated faith in 
cost-effective large-scale machinery, than an awareness of the Johor 
administration’s shortage of competent land officials to deal with rapid 
agricultural expansion in both West and Central Johor. Into the early 
1930s, the Johor authorities still preferred alienating land in large tracts for 
relative ease of inspection and administration.107 
 Pinning the absence of oil palm smallholdings in Johor on state 
discrimination alone thus has clear limits. Indeed, across Malaya, 
smallholders generally found legalistic strictures on cultivation relatively 
easy to evade.108 In Johor, the degree of migrant smallholder activity vastly 
outpaced the local administration’s ability to monitor, let alone manage 
such expansions. In 1924, some 80,000 smallholdings along the West 
Coast had yet to be surveyed, due to a lack of qualified staff.109 As late as 
1941, Johor’s land offices still found themselves devoting considerable time 
issuing summons to individuals who had been found cultivating rubber, 
areca palms, fruit trees, and other crops, on lands without any official 
title.110 If the state was not holding back the smallholder at this juncture, 
answers must lie within the smallholder economy itself. 
In the past, scholars have tried rationalising the participation gap 
through three arguments, but none have been especially persuasive. First, 
at the level of processing, the most prevalent scholarly contention 
characterises the disparity as primarily a competition for economic 
efficiency between smallholders and estates. Because the Malayan oil palm 
industry was populated by large steam-powered processing units by the 
1930s, contemporaries found it plausible to believe that only estates with 
deep pockets could afford the capital-intensive production methods used 
to process raw fruit into premium-quality palm oil, for shipment to 
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Europe’s and North America’s margarine processors. Historians evidently 
picked up on these official perspectives, and cited them uncritically in 
subsequent scholarship. Yet, as already outlined in Chapter One, this 
argument vastly oversimplifies developments that occurred before the 
1960s, and fails to satisfactorily explain the events that took place 
afterwards. 
Second, at the cultivation stage, scientists have sometimes argued 
that mature oil palms throw a heavier shade profile than coconuts, which 
reduces their usefulness for the labour-intensive, soil-conserving 
intercropping strategies supposedly characteristic of tropical peasant 
arboriculture.111 Yet this contention ignores a long history of establishment 
and permanent intercropping under oil palms in West Africa, where 
palms were less closely spaced than in plantation monocultures.112 
Moreover, as seen earlier, many coconut stands along Malaya’s western 
coastline were not initially farmed as diverse agro-food systems, but as 
blocks of pure stands geared towards commercial nut sales. At most, they 
were surrounded by other densely-packed blocks of tree cultivars, 
including areca palms and Hevea rubber. Intercropping arguments are 
thus fairly weak in the overall Malayan context. 
 A third rationale, at the income level, lies on firmer ground. Some 
scholars have argued that cash returns from other popular smallholder 
crops in Malaya, such as rubber, were generally higher than they were for 
oil palm products during the period up to the 1960s.113  This observation is 
partly correct. During the interwar years, the relative unit value of 
exported rubber stayed well above that of oil palm products, copra and 
arecanuts. On average, rubber’s unit price was about 3.3 times that of 
Malayan palm oil exports between 1927 and 1939.114 
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 The idea that relative prices were an important consideration for 
smallholders is also reinforced by path dependence concerns intrinsic to 
tree crop cultivation. Once planted, Hevea rubber trees had an average 
economic life of about 30-40 years in Malayan smallholdings.115 Coconut 
palms were an even ‘stickier’ crop, with a typical productive lifespan 
ranging between 60 to 80 years.116 Cutting down older perennials to make 
space for new crops involved trade-offs between income foregone from 
the old tree while waiting for the new sapling to yield its first crop, and 
expected returns from the new cultivar over the long run. 
The oil palm in Malaya thus suffered from a double disadvantage. 
Not only were returns from oil palm products usually lower than rubber’s, 
but the oil palm was a relative latecomer to Malaya’s commodity 
production frontiers. By the time of Malaya’s first oil palm boom, Hevea 
rubber had been widely adopted by smallholders for at least a decade, and 
coconut palms were also a major feature of the smallholder landscape. 
Seen this way, the arguments against smallholders switching from rubber 
into oil palms become highly persuasive, especially where growers lacked 
the resources to plant fresh lands. 
For coconuts, however, the matter is rather different, given the 
significantly lower incomes associated with the crop. During the interwar 
years, rubber’s unit price was on average about 5.7 times that of copra, a 
gap much wider than that between rubber and palm oil.117 In theory then, 
coconut palms on smallholdings were in danger of being replaced (or at 
least supplemented) by either rubber or oil palms. Across Malaya, coconut 
palms were indeed supplemented by rubber stands, but diversification 
into rubber was limited by the tree’s intolerance for the salty, acidic, 
poorly-draining soils of Malaya’s western coastline. Thus, the coconut 
palm had the upper hand in much of West Johor, where new palm 
planting continued throughout the 1910s and 1920s, despite high rubber 
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prices.118 However, oil palms did much better than rubber on West Coast 
muck soils. Their greater tolerance for such soils placed them in direct 
competition for land with coconut palms. 
To be sure, any prospective palm fruit suppliers would have found 
it difficult to send crops to inland oil palm estates and mills, given a 
minimum of 50 kilometres’ journey. But sheer physical distance cannot 
account for the crop diversification choices of smallholdings closer to 
estates further inland, including innumerable smallholdings peppered 
with isolated stands of coconut groves. Neither does physical geography 
explain why oil palms, whose many products were technically similar to 
the coconut palm’s, were not cultivated for subsistence and local markets 
along Johor’s West Coast. Indeed, by the 1930s, many of Johor’s coconut 
smallholders, occupying hundreds of thousands of acres of farmland, were 
diversifying into large numbers of other crops for these very purposes, but 
not the oil palm. The income and path dependence arguments are thus 
relevant but insufficient explanations for smallholder aversion to oil 
palms.  
 
SMALLHOLDER OPPORTUNITY COSTS 
In situations where agricultural land was still abundant, the main 
costs of tree crop cultivation for smallholders were those pertaining to 
household labour. It therefore makes sense to compare the relative 
demands placed on labour by different tree crops. This thesis contends 
that what ultimately mattered to smallholders were the opportunity costs 
of foregone production from other tree crops, particularly coconut palms 
and rubber trees (but also areca palms, coffee, and other fruit trees to a 
lesser extent). Relative cash returns mattered, but so did the labour 
expended in the harvesting and handling of a new crop, including any 
associated learning costs. 
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To my knowledge, there has been no systematic study of such 
historical opportunity costs to date. What follows is necessarily 
impressionistic, rather than comprehensive. My aim is to redirect 
enquiries into more promising channels, rather than cling to older, 
increasingly precarious arguments. The relevant evidence comes from 
archival material and secondary literature in four main areas. The first is 
the historical record of Malayan smallholder activity in the coconut and 
rubber sectors. Particular emphasis is placed on the coconut palm, given 
its relative historiographic neglect, and copra’s tendency to fetch lower 
cash returns than rubber, and sometimes even arecanuts and rice.119 
Second, the experiences of Malayan oil palm estate labourers during the 
twentieth century provide some indication of the kinds of demands that 
would have been made on Malayan smallholders if they chose to work 
with oil palms. The history of West African farming households offers a 
third window into these issues, but from a more subsistence-oriented 
perspective. Finally, technical literature on tree crop farming helps fill 
some gaps, and correct occasional misunderstandings in the historical 
record. When all four sources are combined, they permit a discreet 
assessment of the likely disincentives for smallholder oil palm farming in 
Malaya from the 1920s onwards. That the evidence stems from sources 
spanning the twentieth century, rather than the period before 1930, is less 
indicative of anachronistic reasoning than the fact that such fundamental 
crop-specific differences continue to influence farming decisions even 
until today. 
The general literature does not suggest that oil palms were more 
difficult to cultivate than Hevea rubber trees or coconut palms. If 
anything, the most common oil palm variety found in Malaya during the 
interwar years, the Deli dura, held a major advantage over these crops, 
maturing within four years. This growth rate was roughly two years faster 
than rubber and most coconut palms (except dwarf varieties) in Malaya at 
the time.120 The real disadvantages of working with oil palms lay 
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afterwards, at the harvesting, handling, packaging, and marketing stages 
of the crop. Coconuts and rubber, by comparison, were more attractive to 
work with in all these production segments. As a result, they lent 
themselves more easily to small-scale rural trading, and enabled 
smallholders to outsource labour-intensive tasks like copra production to 
specialised intermediaries. 
Harvesting 
Unlike rubber tapping, which has usually been a dextrous, but 
relatively light, hazard-free activity close to the ground, harvesting oil 
palm fruit was (and still remains) a dangerous and tiring affair. Before 
most Malayan estates used sickle-mounted poles to reach tall palms from 
the 1960s onwards, climbing the tree was necessary, with or without a 
ladder. The same applied to tall coconut palms, but major differences in 
the physicalities of the two palms made the oil palm a more difficult crop 
to harvest.  
Both palms rely on woody leaf fronds to support their respective 
fruit bunches as they enlarge and ripen, but similarities end there. 
Coconut bunches contain, on average, about eight to ten large fruits each. 
These form loose, sprawling clusters that eventually spill over the palm’s 
crown. In contrast, mature oil palm fruit bunches are dense, tightly 
packed, honeycomb-like constructs harbouring thousands of individual 
fruits, wedged into the crown of the tree by sturdy fronds (Photograph 4). 
While individual ripe palm fruits do fall on their own, their pebble-like 
size and sheer number make them more tedious to gather in order to 
match an equivalent quantity of oil from a coconut. Furthermore, fallen 
palm fruit tends to rot much more quickly than dropped coconuts, 
introducing a further time-specific labour demand if more than the kernel 
is desired. It thus becomes essential to find ways to gain direct access to 
the oil palm fruit bunch itself, evacuating the fruits while they are still 
tightly packed together.121 
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Photograph 4. Oil palm at Ulu Remis Estate, Johor, circa late 1940s. Reproduced 
with permission of The National Archives of the United Kingdom. 
For coconuts, bunch extraction is not only easier, but often 
unnecessary due to the large size of individual fruits. Shorter palms 
needed little except bare hands to twist each nut off its stalk, or a simple 
cutting tool to sever the entire bunch from the tree.122 For taller palms, a 
trained ‘coconut monkey’ could be enlisted to cast nuts down (Photograph 
5). The monkey, typically a male, was either from the pig-tailed macaque 
species (Berok, or Macaca nemestrina), or the long-tailed macaque family 
(Kera, or Macaca fascicularis). Indigenous to Southeast Asia, both primate 
species had been used for centuries to economise on human labour, and 
were sometimes rented out by their owner-handlers to coconut 
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smallholders for harvests.123 Trained monkeys were used in a similar 
fashion to harvest arecanuts.124 In contrast, the use of monkey (or ape) 
harvesters to extract oil palm fruit has yet to be encountered in Malaysia, 
or anywhere else for that matter. Presumably this is because of the 
numerous problems associated with the skilful use of a heavy cutting tool 
- such as a chisel, axe, or machete – needed to excise the bunch from its 
thick leaf base. As a research officer from Singapore’s Botanic Gardens 
noted in 1920, ‘there is no picking the fruit of Elaeis guineensis; it is sheer 
hard whacking that does it’.125 
 
Photograph 5. Two fishermen with their trained coconut monkeys, Melawi, 
Kelantan, 1960. Reproduced with permission of The National Archives of the 
United Kingdom. 
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From the viewpoint of smallholders, this inability to delegate 
harvesting tasks to animals is indeed unfortunate, because unlike the 
coconut palm, oil palm leaf fronds are studded along their entire length 
with large vicious spines, some up to six centimetres long (Photograph 6). 
These pose a threat to anyone present in an oil palm grove. More 
fortunate contemporary field workers in Malaysia are equipped with 
personal protective gear, including thick gloves, boots, and heavy 
clothing. Few labourers in earlier decades had recourse to such 
equipment. As documented during the 1970s, oil palm fronds that came 
into direct contact with field labourers invariably left painful wounds that 
turned septic within hours if left untreated, sometimes resulting in 
permanent disabilities. Inexperienced workers tended to suffer the highest 
injury rates, suggesting that the learning costs of oil palm harvesting were 
very high.126 
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Photograph 6.  A partially pruned oil palm. Photograph taken by author, Kuala 
Lumpur, August 2015. 
Oil palm harvesting’s unpopularity has persisted since the Malayan 
industry’s emergence. During the 1930s, most oil palm estates were short 
of harvesters.127 One major oil palm estate awarded the highest wages to 
its harvesters, even more than male rubber tappers elsewhere, for fear of 
losing them to other enterprises.128 In 1942, during the first full year of the 
Japanese Occupation, harvesters were usually the foremost group of 
workers to be found either missing or claiming illness. Meanwhile, 
contract harvesters refused jobs unless they were amply compensated.129 
In the 1950s, perpetual harvester shortages at estates like Ulu Bernam in 
Perak were only resolved by replanting older palm stands with younger, 
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shorter, ones.130 Similar problems have been encountered by oil palm 
estates outside Malaya, such as the Belgian Congo, where harvesters 
absconded during the early 1920s.131 
Handling and packaging 
 After harvesting, palm fruit bunches are much more difficult to 
handle than coconuts (and many other crops like rubber and arecanuts).  
Because coconuts have evolved to be propagated via water, they come 
‘pre-packaged’, predisposing them to airtight storage for weeks. With their 
strong fibrous husks, and their portability (weighing on average just under 
a kilogram, with a diameter of nine to 13 cm), coconuts can be thrown, 
rolled, floated, and loaded quickly with bare hands without harm to 
handlers or the fruits themselves.132 This made them highly suitable crops 
for transport via the riverine networks of West Johor. 
In contrast, the ‘hedgehog-like’ palm fruit bunch is typically ovoid 
in shape and very hefty. Average bunches weigh between 10 and 30 kg, 
reaching half a metre in length (Photograph 7). Each bunch is packed with 
thousands of spines, guaranteeing injuries from prolonged handling with 
bare hands.133 Moreover, the outer layer of an individual fruit, from which 
palm oil is derived, is mostly pulpy and soft. Unlike the inner kernel with 
its hard shell, the outer layer is very fleshy, and susceptible to bruising and 
a build-up of free fatty acids once harvested. Having evolved to rely on 
animal agency and gravity for propagation, palm fruits do not float in 
water, adding additional costs to water-borne transport.134 All this makes 
for difficult handling and storage: something which was presumably 
discouraging not just for smallholders, but riverine traders as well.  
                                                          
130
 Martin, Saga, 177. 
131
 Clarence-Smith, ‘Rivaud-Hallet’, 121-122. 
132
 Mathieu, Elaeis Guineensis, 220; Hartley, Oil Palm, 83; Douglas M. Considine and Glenn 
D. Considine, Foods and Food Production Encyclopedia (New York: Van Nostrand Reinhold, 
1982), 449. 
133
 Wolf, Injuries, 10-12, 18. 
134






Photograph 7. An oil palm fruit bunch, circa 1920. Reproduced with permission 
from Arkib Negara Malaysia. 
Although the costs of packing and storing palm oil and kernels 
could be outsourced to mills, this still meant that handling challenges 
between field and factory needed to be overcome. The oil palm fruit’s 
biology permits no intermediate option for long-term storage between 
harvesting and oil extraction. Trader intermediaries had less than 48 
hours to consolidate a batch of raw fruit for consignment to mills, if low-
acid palm oil was desired.  
Such a problem, however, was less about cost economies than 
coordination between growers and traders within the vicinity of a mill, 
especially when smallholders had no oil palms to begin with.135 Growers 
would only be incentivised to start cultivation if they could be assured of a 
buyer for their produce, usually in the first instance a trader. Traders, 
however, needed the assurance of prior fruit supplies from a reasonably 
compact area of cultivation before they could commit to purchases, a task 
further complicated by the difficulties of harvesting and handling palm 
fruit. Millers, if they were not already crop dealers to begin with, wanted 
regular and reliable quantities of palm fruit from traders. All this led to a 
chicken-and-egg conundrum. As subsequent decades would demonstrate, 
the ability of smallholders to enter the oil palm industry was dependent 
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on overcoming this conundrum. Yet successful entrance also hinged upon 
support from the state, or least benign neglect, qualities which were, 
despite internal differences between officials, generally not forthcoming 
until the mid-1950s. 
For all other Malayan tree crop mainstays, the coordination 
challenge had been surmounted by the 1920s. Hevea rubber’s relatively 
high commodity value, and its ease of handling and portability, meant 
that smallholder supplies could be consolidated at multiple trading tiers 
for re-processing and export without issue.136 Coconuts (as well as 
arecanuts) were similarly easy to transport and store. Harvesting and 
handling were less time-sensitive than oil palm fruit. Once prepared as 
copra, coconut produce could be stored for months prior to milling, 
making relatively small quantities from remote areas amenable to trade 
and consolidation (Table 1). 
Operation Time (days) 
House storage 1 to 7 
Shophouse storage 0 to 7 
Local dealers' stores 0 to 7 
Road, river or coastal transport 1 to 4 
Warehousing at export centre 0 to 150 
Ocean shipment 30 to 40 
Bulk storage before milling 3 to 14 
Total 35 to 229 
Table 1. Malayan smallholders’ copra: approximate time for various operations, 
circa 1930. Source: F. Cooke, "Copra Deterioration During Storage and Shipment." 
Malayan Agricultural Journal 27, no. 11 (1939), 425. 
The only point at which coconut handling placed severe time 
pressures on labour was when kernels were first split in half, exposing the 
wet fatty inner tissue to oxidation and decay. As will be seen shortly, this 
made copra production more suitable for outsourcing to traders. For 
households extracting milk (santan) and oil from coconuts, processes 
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were similarly time-specific.  Before the advent of refrigeration, freshly 
squeezed santan would not keep for more than a day. Households either 
typically cultivated a small grove of palms in their backyards for the 
occasional harvest, or otherwise stockpiled coconuts purchased from local 
markets, to be opened one at a time whenever required (Photograph 8). 
Why the oil palm did not become a similar backyard cultivar is a tricky 
question, but insufficient household demand must surely play a role. 
 
Photograph 8. Hawking coconuts at Kajang, Selangor, circa 1900-1920.  
Reproduced with permission of Arkib Negara Malaysia. 
Marketing 
 Coconut palms held one other major advantage over oil palms, in 
that there had already been a vigorous market for Malayan coconut 
produce prior to the copra boom. Dealers were consequently assured of 
supplies for export markets, with the main variable being the price of 
copra itself. For the oil palm however, its raw products held relatively little 
allure for domestic Malayan consumers between the 1920s and 1960s, 
whether as an edible relish, cooking oil, livestock feed, construction 
material, or combustible fuel source. Without this subsistence-oriented 
profile, the critical mass of smallholder supplies needed to overcome the 





image of the situation in West Africa, where a wide range of local uses has 
made oil palms suitable for spontaneous diversification away from ageing 
cocoa stands.137 
 It bears emphasising that until the recent turn towards odourless, 
bland-tasting and colourless cooking oils, edible oils have usually been 
prized for their inherent fragrance and colour.138 Those accustomed to the 
taste of freshly squeezed palm oil often found much pleasure in its 
consumption. As famously remarked by a Venetian merchant visiting 
West Africa in the fifteenth century, palm oil had ‘the scent of violets, the 
taste of our olive oil, and a colour which tinges the food like saffron, but is 
more attractive’.139 For Malayans, however, whose habitual cooking oils 
tended to be pale-coloured to begin with, their initial interwar-era 
encounters with crude palm oil’s vibrant hue were jarring ones. 
Yet, such apparent differences masked similarities in taste profiles. 
In the same way as many West Africans appreciated palm oil with an 
increased free fatty acid content for its additional ‘bite’, Malayans had a 
distinct fondness for ‘tangy’ coconut oil, accentuated by moderate 
amounts of free fatty acids.140 The need for an unfermented low-acid oil, 
and accompanying pressures to deliver a raw product as rapidly as 
possible to processors, was driven by the interests of refiners seeking to 
minimise the costs of creating interchangeable oils for further industrial 
treatment. In doing so, the inverse relationship between crop delivery 
time and product quality was simplified and exaggerated.141 In Malaya, any 
movement towards a liking for unrefined palm oil would have reduced the 
labour demands associated with rapid crop harvesting, handling, and 
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extraction, and lowered its opportunity costs substantially. The growth of 
a home market for artisanal oil palm produce would have made 
coordination between growers, dealers and processors much less 
problematic. 
Yet, during the 1930s and 1940s, unrefined palm oil became both 
increasingly well-known and increasingly detested by Malayan consumers. 
This was completely the result of consumption policies fostered by highly-
educated elites in Malaya over three decades. These figures, who included 
chemists, nutritional experts, administrative officials, school teachers, and 
estate managers, unintentionally accomplished the rare task of turning 
what was initially an unknown substance into an object widely recognised 
by the disgust it invoked in recipients. Aside from situations of severe food 
scarcity, traders saw little sense in sourcing palm oil for local 
consumption, when coconut oil was more easily obtainable, and more 
happily ingested. 
 Although palm kernel oil and coconut oil have similar chemical 
profiles, extracting oil from palm kernels requires significantly more 
effort, not least because they are smaller, more numerous, and usually 
have harder shells to crack.142 It did not help that the predominant 
Malayan Deli palm fruit variety had a much smaller proportion of kernel 
to palm oil than its West African brethren. In the early 1930s, the value of 
Malayan palm kernels obtained from an acre of land was merely one-tenth 
the value of palm oil from the same.143 Worse still, there was no drinking 
water to be had from the tree’s fruits.  
For these reasons, smallholders who did adopt the oil palm before 
the 1960s preferred to harvest whole bunches for sale to mills of varying 
sizes and sophistication, rather than undertake their own crop processing 
for household use. The presence of interested dealers was thus of crucial 
importance in lowering the opportunity costs associated with palm fruit 
marketing and processing. Indeed, for smallholders, one of the main 
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attractions of export-oriented coconut cultivation was the fact that labour 
could be minimised through the outsourcing of processing tasks to 
dealers. 
Copra processing 
 Despite the coconut’s light labour demands, most Malayan 
smallholders found copra manufacture impractical to adopt from the 
outset of the copra boom. Here, and contrary to what scholars have 
suggested in other contexts, the opportunity costs of coconut processing 
were prohibitively high.144 Copra was an intermediate product, meant 
ultimately for crushing by mills. It lacked the flexibility associated with 
whole nuts, which could either be sold straight to traders, or made into 
coconut milk or oil within the household on demand. Moreover, most 
smallholders preferred to save labour by harvesting coconuts on a 
monthly or bimonthly basis, compared to the fortnightly practice of most 
estates. Although this generated a fair number of unripe nuts alongside 
ripe ones, the former had many non-copra uses, and could be stored 
separately for further ‘seasoning’ (although this required additional time 
for nut sorting).145 Sometimes even harvesting tasks were outsourced to 
labourers brought in by traders, and grower compensation reduced 
accordingly.146 
This tendency to generate large but infrequent consignments of 
coconuts made it difficult for smallholders to commit to copra processing, 
which exhibited modest cost economies. A facility large enough to process 
a batch of nuts from single harvest would go unused for the rest of the 
month, unless other smallholdings were included.147 Furthermore, copra 
production required many continuous hours of labour in order to split 
hundreds of kernels prior to drying (Photograph 9). Kernels decompose 
rapidly once exposed to air, owing to their high moisture content (up to 
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50 per cent of total kernel weight). Such moisture attracts the attention of 
bacteria, mould and insects within hours, causing, amongst other things, a 
rise in free fatty acid levels.148 Smoking kernels swiftly after nut splitting 
halted decay, but drying could take several days per kernel batch, thus 
requiring continual attention to avoid scorched or under-dried copra. 
These time-sensitive processes clashed with other daytime activities, such 
as subsistence farming, plantation wage labour, mining, rubber tapping, 
and forest product gathering. The main alternative copra preparation 
method, sun-drying, ought to have been easily integrated into smallholder 
livelihood strategies, owing to its negligible material costs (including 
firewood), and its ability to produce uniformly dry, high-quality copra. 
However, for much of Malaya, including Johor, extensive sun-drying was 
precluded by the absence of a prolonged dry season. Sun-drying was more 
typically used to round out copra before and after smoking.149 
 
Photograph 9. Copra preparation prior to smoking, circa 1920-1950. Reproduced 
with permission of Arkib Negara Malaysia. 
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Trader intermediaries were well-positioned to take on copra 
processing tasks in Malaya, given their experience with consolidating 
produce from multiple smallholdings. In most cases, the use of 
moderately large kilns or drying racks favoured operations by small 
groups of specialist labourers, usually drawn from the trader’s family or a 
pool of part-time workers.150 Dealers could also benefit from economies of 
scope by smoking copra in rubber sheds, and stockpiling the material in 
facilities occupied by other businesses, like sundry goods retailing.151 Copra 
manufacturing in Malaya thus provided a typical example of how 
smallholders and traders often maintained mutually symbiotic 
relationships. And in doing so, such divisions of labour copra gave both 
parties further reason to entrench their respective participation in the 
coconut sector throughout the colonial period. 
 
CONCLUSION 
By end of the 1920s, the smallholder participation gap between oil 
palms and other major tree crops in Malaya was firmly established. 
Smallholders already accounted for two-fifths of rubber acreage in Johor, 
and virtually all coconut holdings.152 Of the 57,000 acres already planted 
with oil palms across Malaya, 95 per cent were held by estates with at least 
500 acres of land. The remainder was in the hands of smaller estates in 
Selangor and Negri Sembilan, with no smallholdings in sight.153 
 It is important to stress that until 1929, there was no concerted 
official effort to keep smallholders out of the Malayan oil palm sector. 
Policies encouraging oil palm cultivation were subsumed within a need to 
encourage various agricultural alternatives to rubber cultivation. 
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European estates indirectly benefitted from this situation, not just because 
they had difficulties coping with a low price environment for rubber, but 
because they found it extremely challenging to get around official 
restrictions on new rubber planting. Smallholders, with their lower 
production costs and higher official monitoring costs, had fewer problems 
with either issue. One can only wonder how much oil palm planting 
would have actually materialised in Malaya if the rubber situation had not 
deteriorated during the early 1920s. 
 Crop dealers were a critical enabler of smallholder cash cropping 
of coconuts, rubber and arecanuts. But they remain absent from many 
scholarly discussions of smallholder activity. This has perpetuated the 
mistaken notion that smallholders were responsible for most small-scale 
crop processing activities, when in reality, dealers took on most of the 
work themselves, enabling trade to expand rapidly. If palm fruit 
processing is to be studied from a smallholder-centric perspective, dealers, 
and their relationships with smallholders, also need to be primary subjects 
of enquiry. Similarly, while sufficient source materials may exist for a 
broad-based study of the historical contributions of crop dealers to 
Malaya’s agricultural development, very little of the sort has been 
attempted to date.154 Historians have been redressing this lacuna in 
neighbouring regions for some time now, making scholarship on Malaya 
appear increasingly outdated.155 
 That being said, the regional dynamics enabling Malaya’s rise as a 
major exporter of coconut products by the nineteenth century could 
benefit from further investigation. Burma, for instance, appears to have 
become a significant importer of Malayan coconuts after devoting much of 
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its arable land to rice farming, but this notion needs more investigation.156 
Price data for coconut produce relative to other prominent crops during 
the nineteenth century, including arecanuts, also awaits reconstruction. 
Given that much agricultural activity was subsistence-oriented and 
difficult to record, this may be an impossible task. Nonetheless, an outline 
of the coconut trade and its geographic coverage could at least be 
sketched out, in ways similar to those already attempted for the areca 
palm trade.157 
Finally, the question of historic smallholder opportunity costs 
could benefit from enquiries beyond Malaya. More still needs to be known 
about the smallholder situation in the Dutch East Indies, especially 
Sumatra, where the oil palm industry expanded more rapidly at the outset 
than in Malaya.158 Limited resources, and lack of proficiency in the use of 
Dutch-language archival material, precluded any attempt to redress this 
gap personally. To my knowledge, no historical investigations have yet 
been conducted on the oil palm industry in the Dutch East Indies from 
the perspective of smallholders. This study will now continue to show why 
such a task may be worth undertaking. 
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COLONIAL RESPONSES TO THE PARTICIPATION GAP BEFORE 
1930 
 
By 1929, official Malayan views of agriculture had coalesced into a 
formal belief that oil palms were unsuitable for small-scale cultivation. 
Earlier, fragmented views had sometimes rationalised this unsuitability on 
the grounds of the crop’s inherently higher labour demands. The new 
arguments, in contrast, emphasised capital intensity, namely the notion 
that oil palm fruits supposedly exhibited greater processing cost 
economies than other tree crops in Malaya. Yet, fearful of smallholder 
involvement, Malayan oil palm cultivation was officially restricted to 
enterprises that would support capital-intensive estate arrangements. 
Concurrently, support for smallholder cultivation of a different palm, the 
coconut, was expanded.  
However, the notion that the Malayan oil palm industry’s enclave 
character had to be safeguarded by the colonial state lay in tension with a 
second official impulse that had developed during the 1920s. Unlike 
rubber, palm oil lent itself to use as a consumer edible, at least in theory. 
This possibility quickly led to the notion that Malayan palm oil could be 
widely consumed by residents in a manner similar to coconut oil. In 
practice, palm oil consumption was initially promoted as a way to entice 
plantations unsure of the oil palm’s commercial prospects. Policies 
encouraging palm oil consumption were also motivated by efforts to 
reduce Malaya’s dependence on food supplies from non-sterling areas. 
However, rising concerns about the need to improve local nutritional 
levels eventually took precedence. This shift increased the likelihood of a 
clash between a policy that actively discouraged oil palm smallholder 
cultivation, and one that implied the opposite.  
Both of these official Malayan responses to local involvement in 





in imperial economic exploitation. Fractious arguments regarding 
appropriate methods of producing export commodities from Britain’s 
colonies often broke out, as the relative merits of labour-intensive small-
scale production systems were expounded, often in opposition to capital-
intensive, large-scale arrangements. Moreover, regardless of the 
arrangements used, wealth accumulation bred both winners and losers 
within the colonies. Colonial governments thus came under pressure to 
respond to the needs of disenfranchised locals, or otherwise risked 
undermining the legitimacy that underpinned colonial rule.  
These broad-based conflicts played out in Malaya with major 
consequences for long-term policies towards the coconut and oil palm 
sectors. During the 1910s, attempts to raise the quality of coconut-based 
exports by excluding smallholders from supply chains failed. This put the 
authorities in the difficult position of trying to get coconut smallholders to 
behave more like coconut estate labourers. The fact that coconut 
smallholders refused to behave like specialist estate labourers, coupled 
with the continued dominance of smallholders in the coconut sector, gave 
rise to concerns that it would become impossible to dislodge smallholders 
from the oil palm sector if they got involved. Fearing a repeat of the 
coconut situation, where exports failed to attain a significant quality 
premium in Western markets, colonial authorities eventually took 
unprecedented measures to restrict small-scale oil palm cultivation. 
Ironically, the initial success of these measures stemmed mostly from the 
fact that most smallholders had little interest in oil palms to begin with. In 
short, the initial smallholder participation gap between oil palms and 
other tree crops in Malaya both provoked and enabled the Malayan 
authorities to take measures to reinforce existing disparities in crop 
cultivation patterns. 
 
THREE FACES OF COLONIAL EXPLOITATION 
 During the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, the 





abetted capital accumulation within British colonies. These included 
growing landlessness, socio-economic differentiation, and rural 
discontent. Many of the policies that arose in connection with these 
concerns came under the rubric of ‘colonial development’. A number of 
important studies have explored this complex topic.1 Particularly relevant 
here is Joseph Hodge’s wide-ranging enquiry, in which he retraces the 
evolution of three strategic approaches to the exploitation of Britain’s 
tropical colonies.2 
The first of these approaches was the mercantilist call for state 
intervention to help open up Britain’s colonial possessions to British 
capitalist investment. Ultimately, the argument went, this would unlock 
the economic potential of the colonies, harnessing their natural resources 
and grooming their consumer markets for the benefit of British industry 
and trade (and empire in general). Most eloquently propounded by then-
colonial secretary Joseph Chamberlain in his speech about managing 
Britain’s ‘great estate’ in 1895, this was imperialism envisioned in its most 
directly expansionist form, and it gained more followers in the wake of the 
First World War.3 In the agricultural sector, European-owned plantations 
were believed to be integral to the extraction of maximum surplus. 
Bolstered by the rising scientific status of tropical agronomy, they became 
physical emblems of European power.4 
The second and third approaches arose largely as reactions to the 
first. The more moderate of the two retained the ethos of colonial 
commerce as the fundamental driver of human well-being, but argued 
that such arrangements would be less ethically questionable, and more 
economically productive, along ‘native lines’ of development. Social 
reform campaigners and prominent colonial officials like Frederick Lugard 
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contended that the traditional laws and cultures of colonial societies 
should be respected and upheld. In their view, commodity production was 
best based upon existing local arrangements, namely peasant farming, 
rather than concessionary monopolies to foreign investors. In short, 
indirect forms of exploitation were economically efficient and morally 
virtuous.5 At the same time, advocates of this approach often saw a need 
to redress the alleged shortcomings of smallholder farming practices 
through scientific methods, themselves often based on European 
agricultural practices.6 
The third approach placed much more emphasis on colonial 
trusteeship and the ‘human’ side of development. Proponents contended 
that the labour productivity of colonies could be significantly improved if 
colonial governments paid more attention to problems of native health 
and education. Improving native welfare would help intensify colonial 
exploitation, but in a manner which would strengthen the legitimacy of 
colonial rule.7 Pressures to move in this direction also came from external 
parties, as international organisations like the League of Nations and the 
Rockefeller Foundation developed their own health commissions, 
compelling colonial powers to expand public healthcare services within 
their colonies.8  
Despite their very real differences, all three approaches harboured 
fundamental similarities. They all addressed difficult questions regarding 
who the prime beneficiaries of colonial policies ought to be, and the 
means through which such benefits could be delivered. Also common to 
each approach was a moral belief in a European civilising mission. This 
could take the form of an obligation to harness a colony’s natural 
resources using the most efficient means believed possible, or a drive to 
educate natives in the finer aspects of nutrition and crop maintenance. 
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In doing so, all three approaches to colonial development 
deepened their reliance on Western-controlled knowledge of science and 
technology.9 The high esteem attached to scientific knowledge helped to 
support Western claims to superiority over ‘primitive’, non-Western 
societies. As the international trading system grew increasingly 
protectionist after the First World War, and the powers of European states 
were expanded to meet the needs of reconstruction efforts, scientific 
innovation was further embraced as a tool to help governments transform 
colonial economies so as to increase their compatibility with the 
metropolitan economies of each respective imperial network.10  For 
instance, under the stewardship of Leopold Amery, Britain’s Colonial 
Secretary from 1924 to 1929, a number of metropolitan institutions were 
created to support infrastructural development and scientific research 
within British colonies themselves. These included the Empire Marketing 
Board, the Colonial Development Fund, and specialist advisory bodies in 
the areas of medicine and agriculture.11  
Such initiatives supported long-term research in aid of tropical 
commodity exports. Their successful dissemination, however, was 
premised on backing from governments of the colonies themselves. In 
Malaya, prior research conducted within the Federated Malay States 
helped secure Whitehall’s support for future work. By the 1920s, colonial 
development had become a multifaceted phenomenon in which 
interactions between the metropole, colonies and transnational 
organisations shaped the direction and nature of imperial exploitation. 
 
COCONUTS ALONG ‘NATIVE LINES’ 
In contrast to the smallholder cultivation of rubber, which 
attracted censure from the Malayan authorities for its apparent neglect of 
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subsistence production, exports of coconuts from smallholdings were 
officially supported from the outset. Since the late nineteenth century, 
Federated Malay States authorities had sought to encourage smallholder 
coconut palm cultivation, on the grounds of export diversification, local 
food security, secure land tenure, and rural income generation. Officials 
also expected that the multi-functional palm would help anchor Malay 
society in notions of rural self-sufficiency and social stability. Considerable 
publicly-funded work was thus undertaken around the turn of the 
twentieth century to excavate drainage systems in low-lying coastal 
flatlands, and control the spread of coconut palm pests, especially the 
coconut beetle (Oryctes rhinoceros).12  
These efforts were problematized by the rubber boom a decade 
later. Where soil conditions permitted, growers began to violate 
cultivation conditions associated with coconut planting, in favour of 
rubber. This included planting rubber immediately after receiving new 
lands, to the gradual inter-planting of coconut lands with rubber, to the 
outright removal of palm trees in order to plant rubber. This last strategy 
appears to have rattled the authorities, who eventually promulgated the 
Coconuts Preservation Enactment of 1917 to try and stop such practices. 
Concerns about an impending post-war shortage of food imports also 
weighed on official decisions to support coconut cultivation.13  
When oil palm estates began to expand across Malaya in the 1920, 
senior agricultural officials voiced similar concerns about the possible 
neglect of smallholder coconut palms. Malaya’s Chief Field Officer 
implored his colleagues to ensure that smallholders continued cultivating 
coconuts on fertile alluvial soils along the western coastline, where yields 
and incomes might outweigh the ‘possible counter-attraction of Oil 
Palm’.14 It appears that even at this early stage, some agricultural officials 
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had begun to acknowledge the smallholder participation gap between the 
two palms, and were already thinking of ways to keep the gap in place. 
Despite these concerns, little government research was conducted 
on coconuts, compared to rubber and other cash crops. Ostensibly this 
was because the coconut industry remained mostly in the hands of 
smallholders, unlike rubber.15 But the fact that Malayan palm varieties 
already contained a wide range of indigenous breeds, each with differing 
characteristics, complicated Malayan coconut research from the 
beginning.16 
Following the reorganisation of Malaya’s Department of 
Agriculture in 1920, more systematic efforts at applied research were 
made, covering statistical data collection, palm breeding, copra 
preparation, manuring, drainage, and the study of pests and diseases. The 
establishment of a dedicated field station near Klang helped to 
consolidate research activity, and reportedly encouraged similar initiatives 
in newly established stations in Ceylon and the Dutch East Indies. For 
Malaya, however, much of the agronomic knowledge gained from Klang 
was arguably discountable until another field station sited on the kinds of 
muck soils typical of West Coast coconut holdings was established in 
Johor during the 1950s.17 This misstep may have hampered efforts to 
understand the soil-related challenges of Malaya’s West Coast coconut 
holdings, aggravating the sector’s gradual decline over the next four 
decades.   
 In the meantime, attention was showered on copra quality 
improvement. Quality had become an urgent concern due to mounting 
                                                          
15
 Straits Settlements Vegetable Oils Committee, Report of a Committee…on the Present 
Economic Condition of the Coconut and Other Vegetable Oil Producing Industries in Malaya 
(henceforth SSVOC) (Kuala Lumpur: Government Press, 1934), 45. 
16
 G. E. Coombs and W. S. Cookson, "Observations on Coconut Experiments." Agricultural 
Bulletin of the Federated Malay States 5, no. 10 (1916), 381-88; Ahmed Bin Haji Omar, "Races 
of the Coconut Palm." Gardens’ Bulletin, Straits Settlements 2, no. 5 (12 September 1919), 
pp.143-144. 
17
 ANM-KL: DA/GEN/100, Enc. 27; Department of Agriculture, FMS and SS, Annual Report 
(henceforth AR DAFMS) for the year 1924 (Kuala Lumpur: Government Printer, 1925), 4-5; 
Frank Stockdale, Report by Sir Frank Stockdale, ..., on a Visit to Malaya, Java, Sumatra and 
Ceylon, 1938 (London: Colonial Office, 1939), 47; SSVOC, Report, 45-46; D. J. M. Tate, The 
RGA History of the Plantation Industry in the Malay Peninsula (New York: Oxford 





competition between different oils and fats for access to industrial 
markets. Although copra oil’s composition and sweetness ensured that it 
remained a principal ingredient in margarine and vegetable shortening, 
shifting patterns of international trade after the First World War saw 
more fats vying for entry to Western consumer markets. These included 
butterfat, whale oil, soybean oil, cottonseed oil, West African palm kernel 
oil, Philippine copra, and low-acid palm oil from Sumatra.18  
Even before the First World War, Malayan agricultural officials 
frequently lamented the highly uneven quality of local copra. Material 
sourced from dealers affiliated with smallholdings and Asian estates was 
often found to be discoloured, slimy, and mouldy. In contrast, copra 
produced by European-owned plantations tended to be white, crisp, and 
hard, the very best comprised of two-thirds oil and less than one per cent 
free fatty acid content, maximising the amount of oil that could be 
subsequently extracted.19  
Officials typically underestimated the structural constraints 
militating against efforts to prod dealers and smallholders into producing 
high-quality copra. Initially, they hoped that market premiums awarded 
for first-class copra would motivate smallholders to diligently harvest 
coconuts at their optimal ripeness, rather than via the usual infrequent 
mixed collections of ripe and unripe fruit.20 But the quality premium for 
copra was usually too slim to merit the additional production cost and 
efforts involved. For most of the 1920s, the Singapore premium never 
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exceeded five per cent more than second-class copra’s price.21  Indeed, 
across Southeast Asia and beyond, copra was a cheap and bulky 
commodity usually valued in quantity rather than quality. This gave 
producers perverse incentives to manufacture copra laden with excess 
moisture, while buyers depressed their quotations on the basis that such 
adulteration was already commonplace.22 
Furthermore, little official consideration seemed to have been 
given to the fact that dealers serving local and regional markets for whole 
nuts often preferred purchasing under-ripe green nuts from smallholders, 
probably due to their longer shelf-life.23 Moreover, smallholders often 
hedged between the markets for fresh nuts and that for copra, because 
these competed for ripe coconuts.24 Ripe nuts were frequently reserved for 
meal preparations, leaving smaller, less ripe nuts for copra manufacture. 
 The copra quality conundrum was exacerbated by Malaya’s long-
standing position as a regional coconut trade centre. Malaya’s standing 
was grounded in Singapore and Penang’s common functions as staple 
ports, specialising in the export of raw materials and resource-intensive 
goods. This pattern pre-dated the Western-oriented copra boom. Since 
the early nineteenth century, Malayan Chinese entrepreneurs had 
operated small foot-pedal mills, adapted from technology previously used 
in Guangdong and Fujian, to make oil out of coconuts from Penang, for 
export to Burma and other neighbouring territories.25  
With the advent of Western demand for copra, small-scale mills 
gave way to much larger steam-driven machinery by the end of the 
nineteenth century. A new generation of Straits Chinese businessmen 
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were looking to increase their family fortunes on the backs of Asian and 
Western demands for Southeast Asian commodities. In order to dominate 
the regional milling industry, Malayan crushers had to offer higher prices 
for copra than competitors elsewhere in Southeast Asia. They did so by 
investing in state-of-the-art European-made crushing machinery, with the 
highest oil extraction ratios possible at the time. These capital-intensive 
facilities, armed with copra disintegrators, Anderson oil expellers, and in-
house barrel-making services, were explicitly geared towards attracting 
produce from the wider Malay Archipelago.26 Such initiatives probably 
took their lead from the pioneering example of the Singapore Oil Mills, a 
German-owned concern arising from the merger of two separate 
Singapore-based crushing facilities during the 1890s, both of which drew 
heavily on copra supplies from the Dutch East Indies.27 
One of the most prominent new entrants was Ho Hong Oil & Rice 
Mills. Led by Lim Peng Siang, an heir to the growing Ho Hong business 
empire, crushing facilities were established in Singapore by 1905, with the 
potential to produce roughly 6,700 tons of copra oil per year. By 1908, Ho 
Hong Oil Mills was reportedly working at full capacity in response to 
overseas orders. Ho Hong’s crushing facilities drew upon a daily copra 
supply from the equivalent of between 20,000 to 37,000 acres of land, far 
larger than any oil processing facility that would be established by the 
Malayan oil palm industry during the interwar years.28 With heavy 
advertising, Ho Hong’s oil-based products quickly became well-known, 
and its ‘Elephant and Palm Tree’ marque inspired a number of imitators 
(Illustration 1). Ho Hong also developed in-house steam shipping facilities 
that enabled the enterprise to import regular supplies of copra from island 
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Southeast Asia during the First World War.29 But like other millers, the 
firm relied on a larger Chinese-dominated trading ecosystem extending to 
Hong Kong, Indochina, Siam, Burma, British Borneo, and the Dutch East 
Indies, in which rice, dried fish, coconuts, arecanuts, and other produce 
were widely circulated.30 
 
Illustration 1. Advertising notice for Ho Hong Oil & Rice Mills, 1906. Source: The 
Straits Times, 27.1.1906, 9. 
 The trans-imperial reach of Malaya’s staples trade made it 
impossible to effect any lasting changes to copra quality within the ambit 
of Malaya alone. Wholesale merchants in Singapore and Penang earned 
their living by purchasing and sorting copra assignments of varying 
quality from all over the Malay Archipelago, especially stocks from the 
Dutch East Indies, eventually bartering them for rice and other essential 
goods.31 Lower-quality material was sold to Malayan oil millers for 
processing into crude copra oil, which proved popular within regional 
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Asian markets at the time. In 1919, a nominal $6 million’ worth of copra oil 
was exported from Singapore, mostly to the Federated Malay States, Java, 
Borneo, and Siam, with only a small quantity sent to Great Britain.32 Some 
copra oil was retained within Singapore for further processing into 
laundry soap, fragrant cooking oil and copra cake. Higher-quality stocks of 
copra, copra cake, and copra oil were exported to Europe and Australia.33 
By the mid-1920s, Malaya’s physical copra market had turned the 
colony into the world’s second largest gross exporter of copra. Nearly two 
thirds of Malaya’s trade volumes consisted of consignments from the 
Dutch East Indies.34 In this, Malayan copra merchants had benefited from 
the implosion of an overextended milling industry in the Dutch East 
Indies and the Philippines after the end of the First World War, when 
long-distance freight rates reversed in favour of copra.35 To be sure, 
Malayan crushers suffered from similar overcapacity, with actual 
industrial copra oil production never exceeding 20 per cent of total 
estimated production potential in the decade after the war. But their 
survival appears to have been sustained by the fact that production was 
concentrated in the hands of a few large owners in Singapore and Penang, 
who had substantial business interests in other areas of commerce, such 
as shipping and rice trading.36 Domestic competition was also somewhat 
limited by the fact that Ho Hong’s chief competitor, the German-owned 
Singapore Oil Mills, was first liquidated as enemy property during the war, 
and then acquired by Ho Hong shortly after.37 In fact, such overcapacity 
meant that when freight rates changed once again to favour copra oil over 
                                                          
32
 Department of Agriculture, Federated Malay States and Straits Settlements, Malayan 
Agriculture: 1922 Handbook (Kuala Lumpur: Department of Agriculture, Federated Malay 
States, 1922), 86. 
33
 The Singapore Oil Mills Manager, "Letters to the Editor." Agricultural Bulletin of the 
Straits and Federated Malay States S 1, no. 10 (1902), 400; Wright, Malaya, 647-650, 652, 
824, 828; Cooke, Coconut Crop, 344. 
34
 TNA: CO 323/1050/2, Enc. 2, ‘Table B: Domestic Exports of Copra From Producing 
Countries in the Empire’. 
35
 H. W. Wamsteker, 60 Years Unilever in Indonesia 1933-1993 (Jakarta: P.T. Unilever 
Indonesia, 1993), 15-19; Heersink, Green Gold, 187-189; Wong Kwok-Chu, The Chinese in the 
Philippine Economy, 1898-1941 (Quezon City: Ateneo De Manila University Press, 1999), 56-
57. 
36
 Appendices 6.1, 6.3; Huff, Singapore, 225; Yong, Lim Peng Siang, 11-21; Wong, Big Five, 113-
114. 
37
 Anon., ‘Singapore Oil Mills.’ The Singapore Free Press and Mercantile Advertiser, 





copra, as they would by the early 1930s, Malaya’s millers would be well-
positioned to expand copra oil production rapidly, helping to support 
farmgate prices at a time when traditional European markets for coconut 
produce were flagging. In the meantime, this regional arrangement fuelled 
an interlocking system where local Malayan copra producers were heavily 
dependent on millers and merchants in Penang and Singapore for their 
livelihoods, but where the latter enterprises themselves were profoundly 
reliant on copra imports to run their businesses profitably.38  
In the ostensible interests of improving the quality of Malayan 
coconut exports, European businesses made several attempts to bypass 
the Malayan copra market. The most ambitious of these occurred towards 
the end of the First World War, when changes to long-distance freight 
rates temporarily favoured the transport of copra oil over bulky copra 
from Southeast Asia. In 1918, a number of British trading houses, coconut 
businesses and European planters lobbied the Federated Malayan 
authorities for funding to build several large-scale mills that would only 
accept first-class copra supplies from European-owned estates. In essence, 
lobbyists sought to carve out a completely separate coconut commodity 
chain within Malaya, free of ‘unreliable’ produce from smallholders, 
smaller Asian estates, Chinese copra-makers, and Chinese millers. 
However, the proposal was aborted due to official concerns over cost-
sharing, and more importantly, the politically untenable idea of using 
public funds to exclude Malay smallholders from a ‘traditional’ industry 
within a British Protectorate.39   
This unwillingness to exclude coconut smallholders (and initially, 
Chinese dealers) from producing copra for Western markets prompted 
administrators to fully embrace Asian participation. This was to be 
managed by scaling up efforts to develop crop processing technologies 
that might help improve smallholder copra quality.40 In this, Malayan 
officials shared a common scientific concern with other tropical territories 
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whose coconut zones had no extended dry season, such as Fiji, Zanzibar, 
and much of maritime Southeast Asia. The goal was to realise affordable 
artificial copra drying methods that could match the quality benchmark of 
first-class, sun-dried copra from Ceylon and British India’s Malabar 
Coast.41  
Between 1928 and 1929, ongoing Malayan research was given a 
boost from London, where copra had been recently identified as a 
commodity of imperial importance (Illustration 2). Malaya was awarded 
funding by the Empire Marketing Board’s Research Committee for a new 
copra research scheme, with the personal approval of Amery at the 
Colonial Office. Malaya’s successful bid also stemmed from 
recommendations by botanical advisers from Kew Gardens, who noted its 
already considerable research staffing, as well as its habitually rainy 
climate. As argued in a memorandum from Kew, any future research into 
Malayan copra quality would not only improve Malayan copra’s reputation 
among overseas copra buyers, but would also benefit other climatically 
disadvantaged territories once results were disseminated.42    
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Illustration 2. Empire Marketing Board artist’s depiction of copra production in 
South Asia, circa late 1920s-early 1930s. Accompanying text reads: ‘Our factories 
depend more and more on the tropics for their raw material. This comes west 
while in exchange our goods steam east through the [Suez] Canal.’ Sources: TNA: 
CO 956/119; CO 956/120. Image reproduced with permission of The National 
Archives of the United Kingdom. 
Most of the preliminary logistics for the scheme were settled 
quickly. The Empire Marketing Board agreed to fund half of the four-year 
research programme’s projected costs, with the other half to be 
shouldered by the Malayan authorities.43 Seemingly by coincidence, the 
officials tasked with leading the copra push from within Malaya were also 
appointed in 1929. First came Dr. Harold Tempany, who had previously 
served as Mauritius’ Director of Agriculture, where he had become 
familiar with the use of Empire Marketing Board funds to facilitate sugar 
cane breeding research.44 Tempany took up the post of Director of 
Agriculture in Malaya in early 1929, and henceforth became Malaya’s de 
facto leading scientific authority on all matters pertaining to economic 
botany (Photograph 10). Next came Francis Cooke, formerly employed 
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with Lever Brothers, who was specifically hired through the Board to lead 
the copra research scheme. He arrived in Malaya in September 1929 to 
take up a specially created post, the Assistant Chemist for Copra Research, 
under Tempany’s watch.45 
 
Photograph 10. Dr. Harold Augustin Tempany, 1936. Source: Anon., "Retirement 
of Dr. H. A. Tempany, C.B.E.". Malayan Agricultural Journal 24, no. 6 (1936), 305-
306. 
This renewed enthusiasm for improving Malaya’s copra quality 
had been partly driven by Malaya’s rising importance as source of copra 
for Europe during the 1920s, relative to British India and Ceylon, as well as 
the prospect of selling British-made crop processing equipment to the 
tropics.46 But the scientific nature of the enterprise indicates, above all, 
the sense of optimism shared by technical experts and sympathetic 
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colonial administrators in the potential for applied research to improve 
the exploitation of Britain’s colonies. This was particularly so with the 
products and growers of the coconut palm, long associated in the West 
with tropical idyll, backwardness and indolence even before the late 
nineteenth century’s copra boom.47 Thus, despite the gravity of Malaya’s 
regional economic context having worked against decades of official calls 
to improve local copra quality, the coconut smallholder sector was now 
targeted with unprecedented levels of publicly-sanctioned scientific 
support. 
 
MANAGING MALAYA’S GREAT (OIL PALM) ESTATE 
The tensions between ‘native’ and ‘Western’ patterns of 
commodity circulation also extended to Malaya’s oil palm industry. Here, 
however, most knowledge and methods of production, processing and 
trade were severed from their indigenous West African origins, and 
dominated by European actors from the outset. The Sumatran industry, 
which pioneered the pursuit of high-quality palm oil under plantation 
conditions, became the one for Malayan investors to emulate.48 
 In doing so, Malaya’s oil palm industry was able to achieve much 
higher levels of product quality than the Malayan coconut sector from 
early on. By the mid-1920s, initial exports of Malayan palm oil in wooden 
barrels averaged two to three per cent free fatty acid content, which made 
them theoretically cheaper to bleach for margarine-making. Colonial 
administrators, technicians, and planters tended to credit this 
achievement to the industry’s own ‘scientific manipulations’ of the crop.49 
The obvious contrast was with the supposedly primitive smallholder-
dominated coconut sector. But there was also clear pride in the fact that 
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European prestige was being upheld through European initiation and 
domination of a new agricultural enterprise in Malaya. Official attention 
was lavished on the oil palm industry’s initial use of sophisticated large-
scale equipment to transport, sterilise and mill palm fruit rapidly, 
including railways, autoclaves, bunch threshers and motorised presses. 
The industry’s tight control over specialised estate labour was also lauded, 
as frequent plantation harvests helped maximise fruit quality and oil 
yields.50  
In contrast to the coconut sector, government scientists and 
officials in the 1920s were left with the task of maintaining existing quality 
standards in the oil palm industry, rather than trying to improve them. 
They remained mindful that European-owned coconut estates, 
constituting a small proportion of overall copra production, had been 
unable to raise the overall middling quality of Malaya’s copra and copra oil 
exports, despite their careful attention to harvesting and copra 
manufacture.51 This reinforced a sense that any future smallholder 
participation in Malaya’s oil palm trade needed to be policed tightly. 
Anxieties regarding smallholder participation were compounded 
by a crucial impediment to the oil palm industry’s quest for profit. Unlike 
Sumatran palm oil, which had already attained sufficient recognition in 
Western margarine markets to be paid a premium similar to other high-
grade edible oils such as coconut and groundnut oil, the Malayan variant 
struggled to solicit the same interest from buyers, even into the 1930s. 
Malayan palm oil’s relatively small contribution to palm oil exports during 
the late 1920s (roughly 1/20th of the Dutch East Indies’) prevented it from 
obtaining independent quotations from edible oil buyers in both Europe 
and North America.52 The largest North American palm oil buyers also 
penalised sellers who tried hawking individual consignments below 
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preferred volumes.53 Malayan palm oil was consequently graded and sold 
mostly under the old British-based Lagos Standard that catered primarily 
to lower-grade inedible uses, such as laundry soap. Any premium awarded 
by this system was insufficient to justify production of high-quality palm 
oil in the long run: a mere four per cent more than what West African 
sellers of a ‘standard’ 18 per cent free fatty acid palm oil would have earned 
in 1927.54 In this sense, Malayan oil palm growers at the time still had 
more in common with Malayan coconut producers (and West African oil 
palm smallholders) than they would have wished. 
The pursuit of a premium niche in the West required increases in 
palm oil production up to levels that margarine manufacturers in America 
and Europe would be willing to consider purchasing in bulk. This was the 
commercial context in which overwhelming encouragement was being 
given to the large-scale mechanisation of Malayan palm oil extraction.55 
Older, labour-intensive methods of bunch transport, fruit separation, and 
oil extraction were consequently mostly ignored by newspapers, trade 
journals and officials by the late 1920s, despite their proven ability to 
produce technically excellent palm oil of less than four per cent free fatty 
acid content.56 Before mechanical bunch threshers were widely adopted, 
many estates required labourers to lay out fruit bunches on racks at 
designated field collection centres for up to three days, so as to allow 
ripened fruit to detach from the bunch on its own. Any remaining fruits 
were then removed promptly by the labourers themselves (Photograph 
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11).57 At the oil extraction stage, estates found manual methods to be 
particularly useful where fruit volumes were relatively low. In a visit to 
Malaya in 1925, British North Borneo’s Agricultural Adviser reported that: 
At the present price of palm oil it seems possible to 
make a profit by extraction with the simplest of 
appliances. On one estate in the [Federated Malay 
States],…the fruit is boiled in open shallow pans, 
squeezed in a hand press to extract some of the oil, then 
steamed over boiling water and pressed again. About 50 
per cent of the total amount of oil in the pericarp is thus 
obtained; the quality is high.
58
 
Such figures were corroborated and updated in an official planting 
advisory published by Malaya’s Department of Agriculture in 1934, which 
noted that oil extraction rates using such methods could actually reach 70 
per cent with additional pressings.59 
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Photograph 11. Estate labourers extracting palm fruits by hand in a collecting 
shed, circa 1920. Reproduced with permission from Arkib Negara Malaysia, Kuala 
Lumpur. 
Bearing these small-scale practices in mind, the main commercial 
advantages of the new large-scale factory presses being deployed in Johor, 
Perak and Selangor by the late 1920s were two-fold. First, they were more 
efficient extractors of palm oil, reaching 90 per cent extraction rates.  
Their large capacities also enabled them to handle rising volumes of 
harvested estate fruit, as recently planted trees began maturing during the 
late 1920s. Second, they allowed estates to substitute capital for the labour 
need to manually separate and sterilise fruits, extract palm oil, and 
remove kernels for shelling and drying. This helped lessen the heavy 
demands on management associated with supervising labour dispersed 
over a wide area. Supervision was necessary to ensure that labourers did 
not neglect their tasks and allow product quality to slip.60 During this 
transition, estates were fortunate that the most popular variety of oil palm 
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grown on Malayan estates during the interwar years, the Deli dura, had a 
much thicker palm oil-rich outer layer in its fruits than many other 
African oil palm varieties.61 The pulpy fibre of the flesh cradling the dura 
fruit’s kernel helped to prevent the kinds of accidental kernel breakages 
known to have frequently occurred when such machines were trialled on 
thinner-fleshed palm fruit varieties in West Africa during the early 
twentieth century. Such breakages had resulted in palm oil being 
contaminated by kernel oil, and vice versa.62 
However, compared to earlier labour-intensive methods, large-
scale processing machinery in Malaya did not improve on palm oil quality 
itself, and even produced inferior-quality palm kernels. High-pressure 
steam – used by autoclaves to sterilise palm fruit bunches in bulk – 
produced kernels that, while intact, yielded discoloured oil of lower 
quality than that from manually-extracted West African kernels, creating 
additional bleaching costs for refiners in Europe.63 But Malayan palm fruit 
millers were willing to accommodate this setback, since the high 
proportion of palm oil in Malayan Deli fruits made it more lucrative to 
focus on palm oil production, rather than palm kernel sales to Europe 
(Chapter Two). Colonial officials themselves reinforced this palm oil-
centric trajectory. When a Straits Chinese businessman applied for land in 
Johor in 1928 to grow oil palms for the sole purpose of palm kernel 
production for English markets, his request was denied because his 
proposed processing arrangements had made no provisions for palm oil 
collection.64 
Increasing confidence in large-scale palm fruit processing 
arrangements seems to have contributed to a reluctance to alienate 
smaller parcels of land for oil palm cultivation. Before the mid-1920s, 
concessions below 100 acres had been granted for oil palms in Selangor, 
on the grounds that they supported larger clusters, such as one centred on 
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Brookfields Estate (Chapter Two). By 1926, there were signs of a tightening 
of criteria used to assess such land applications. An attempt by the Sungei 
Manggis Company to obtain 150 acres of land near the afore-mentioned 
cluster was personally disparaged by the Secretary of Agriculture, who 
now expressed concerns that Brooklands Estate would be unwilling to 
process the smaller holding’s crops ‘on terms which will be remunerative 
to both’. This response was sufficiently exacting to make the firm 
withdraw its application.65 The growing official preference for large-scale 
oil palm concessions was also reinforced by a coconut-centric argument, 
namely that the quality of harvested palm fruit could be better controlled 
if left to plantation labour, rather than peasants, due to the latter’s 
apparently ‘indiscriminate’ methods of fruit collection (as opposed to 
alternative uses of nuts beyond first-class copra).66 
A more careful consideration of the differences between the oil 
palm and coconut industries in Malaya would have given administrators 
less reason to worry about smaller agriculturalists in the former sector. 
The primary factors driving the rudimentary quality of Malayan coconut 
produce – a heavy reliance on Dutch East Indies supplies for the staple 
trade, the vibrancy of local and regional markets for semi-manufactured 
coconut oil, and the ease of obtaining a year-round income from the 
occasional harvest – were absent in Malaya’s oil palm sector. There was 
comparatively little demand for low-grade palm oil within Malaya or the 
neighbouring region during the early years of the industry, whose fruits 
were in any case more troublesome to harvest and process than coconuts. 
This also accounted for the relative absence of trader and smallholder 
interest in oil palms to begin with. Accordingly, the Malayan and Dutch 
East Indies oil palm industries were both focused on high-quality exports 
directly to Europe and North America, operating in parallel with each 
other. In these closed systems, quality control was more straightforward.67 
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Some Malayan expatriates already seemed keenly aware of such 
differences. In 1928, a veteran planter by the name of Cuthbert Malet 
made his views known in the local press, exhorting associates to diversify 
out of rubber into oil palms. Appealing to the notion that planters would 
face less competition for land with smallholders if oil palms were 
cultivated, he contended that 
[o]ne great advantage [oil palm] planting has over 
rubber lies in the fact that the smallholder cannot plant 
it – it is utterly useless to him. It is not his national food 
(as in Africa – the trade growing out of surplus stock) 
and he can do nothing with a basket full of fruit once a 
week! Unless natives deliberately took up several 
thousand acres of land for Palm Oil in one region so that 
a local Tan Kah Kee factory could be built, they could do 
nothing with the fruit at all. Making crude native Palm 
Oil is a very laborious process, and there would be no 
market for the product.
68
 
Malet’s comments underline the extent to which the smallholder 
participation gap between oil palms and other tree crops had already 
become an empirical reality by 1928, despite the absence of any official 
prohibitions against smallholder involvement in the Malayan industry. 
Nevertheless, official anxieties about smallholder threats persisted, 
and erupted at the end of the 1920s. In September 1929, Malaya’s new 
Director of Agriculture, Harold Tempany, circulated a memorandum 
among the senior administrators of Johor and all Federated Malay States, 
seeking to clarify and streamline official policies towards small growers of 
oil palms. In contrast to the previous two decades, when ‘unfolding 
surprise’ at the speed and extent of smallholder rubber planting had 
provoked reactionary official responses, Tempany’s attempt to restrict oil 
palm smallholder cultivation was largely pre-emptive, occurring at a time 
when rubber and copra prices were falling, and no known peasant-run oil 
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palm farms existed.69 His intervention was likely to have been provoked 
by earlier competition from rubber smallholders, as well as the alleged 
technical shortcomings of coconut smallholdings, given that one of 
Tempany’s concurrent tasks was to oversee the new copra research 
scheme. Previous scholarship appears to have relied on second-hand 
information regarding the memo, badly distorting its content, as well as 
its subsequent effects.70 To redress any further misunderstandings, the 
memo is fully reproduced in Appendix 8.1. 
Tempany’s despatch was a direct attempt to prevent smallholders 
from cultivating oil palms for domestic use. The underlying rationale 
justifying this attack was that of product quality. However unlikely that oil 
palms might be assimilated into smallholder subsistence arrangements 
and rural trading networks, Malaya’s budding industry could not afford 
any ‘indigenisation’ if it led to the kinds of quality issues permeating the 
coconut palm industry. With its relatively low export volumes during the 
late 1920s, Malaya’s oil palm sector had yet to achieve a level of 
recognition from the edible oils market akin to Sumatra’s. Moreover, the 
Malayan industry’s use of wooden barrels to export palm oil rendered the 
sector vulnerable to reputational risk, due to the difficulty of checking 
each and every barrel for quality control before shipment. Again, Sumatra 
was ahead of the game, having initiated centralised bulk storage and 
shipment of palm oil from Belawan in 1925. 
This did not mean that small growers were forbidden from 
acquiring lands for oil palms in Malaya, as scholars have mistakenly 
claimed. Tempany’s memo, which had no legal power to begin with, was a 
classic example of the broader tendency for colonial authorities to restrict 
smallholder tree crop cultivation to avenues that would support 
plantation development.71 The memo argued that small grower 
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participation should be permitted, provided cultivators rely on a ‘factory’ 
to process fruit supplies promptly, in the interests of maximising the 
output of high-quality palm oil. In this sense, Tempany’s guidelines 
remained consistent with decisions by the Selangor authorities to grant oil 
palm lands less than 100 acres in size to South Asian planters during the 
mid-1920s. The implication here was that, if and when the economics of 
small palm fruit processing facilities improved, such strictures on 
smallholder participation could be lifted. 
From the outset, however, the subtleties of Tempany’s memo were 
lost on general administrators more concerned with maximising land 
revenue and minimising the hassle of potentially innumerable 
applications from small growers, amidst the looming threat of Depression-
era staff cuts.72 In subsequent correspondence meant to clarify the 
minimum size of land that could be alienated without the recommended 
restrictions, Tempany suggested 150 acres, a figure which may have been 
derived from the earlier pronouncement of the Secretary of Agriculture in 
1926. This went considerably beyond the official Malayan definition of an 
estate of 100 acres of farmland. But even so, Tempany’s recommendation 
was criticised by the Resident of Pahang, who suggested a lower limit of 
1,000 acres, though it seems Tempany’s suggestion was followed in the 
end.73  
The first casualties of the new official policy towards small-scale 
oil palm farming surfaced almost immediately. In Klang District, a 
unresolved application for 100 acres of land for oil palms by the Sultan of 
Selangor himself was rejected by the British Resident without any 
reference to nearby factories, on the terse grounds that the ‘Govt. is not 
prepared to give grants of small areas…for this form of cultivation’.74 Thus, 
within several months of circulation, the memo had already become an 
instrument which Malayan administrators could wield for their own 
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imperatives. In Johor, a state about to become Malaya’s leading grower of 
oil palms, administrators would repeatedly adopt this strategy against 
smallholders in a variety of contexts during the 1930s, with far-reaching 
consequences for the eventual shape of Malaya’s oil palm industry. 
 
EARLY ATTEMPTS TO PROMOTE LOCAL PALM OIL CONSUMPTION 
Ironically, some Malayan officials had few qualms about 
promoting policies that could conceivably undermine the industry they 
sought to protect from small-scale involvement. The local consumption of 
oil palm fruit appears to have been condoned from a very early stage in 
the industry’s development. In 1923 and 1924, the Perak and Selangor land 
authorities recommended waiving special conditions on oil palm estates 
to set aside one tenth of their land for food cultivation, on the grounds 
that the oil palm’s products ‘were largely foodstuffs’.75 Although these 
moves were partly motivated by the Federated Malay States governments’ 
then-general policy of encouraging diversification away from rubber 
planting, they were also based on the common observation that most 
European estates tended to apportion land for coconut palms for the 
subsistence requirements of their Indian and Javanese labour forces.76 
However, given the liberal concessionary atmosphere at the time, it 
cannot be ruled out that land officials did not seriously think that estate 
workers would actually take to oil palm fruit voluntarily, and were simply 
trying to find new ways to entice plantation investments, even if this 
meant eroding the ability of labourers to maintain their preferred dietary 
patterns. 
From mid-1920s onwards, palm oil provisioning began to be 
developed in a more deliberate fashion. The Department of Agriculture’s 
chemists had been working on ways to promote local substitutes for 
groundnut products, most of which were from China and the Dutch East 
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Indies, so as to reduce Malaya’s dependence on edible oil products from 
non-sterling areas.77 At the time, the three most commonly consumed 
edible oils in Malaya – those of coconuts, groundnuts and sesame seeds – 
had pale complexions, and did not visibly alter the colour of the foods 
being cooked in them.78 Freshly squeezed Malayan palm oil, however, was 
a ‘thin, pasty, deep orange-yellow mass’, tinting food during the cooking 
process.79 This colour shift convinced the scientists that local consumers 
would not consider trying oil with such a strong colour in their existing 
recipes.  
This state of affairs contrasted sharply with two other ongoing 
dynamics. Outside of Malaya, in parts of Central and South America, West 
Africans brought over via the slave trade had already spontaneously 
propagated the oil palm for subsistence purposes centuries earlier, having 
brought with them familiar associations with the tree and its socio-
cultural significance.80 No such West African migrant presence had 
accompanied the oil palm’s introduction to Malaya. This, however, did not 
necessarily mean that other social groups could not transmit similar 
cultural messages surrounding the oil palm to Malaya, including 
Europeans themselves. 
Indeed, within Malaya itself, many Europeans had already become 
habituated to non-European foodways. However, these were not 
preparations of West African origin, but dishes of Malayan provenance, 
often introduced through the cooking of Malayan servants. In the process, 
many Europeans in Malaya, like other inhabitants of Southeast Asia, had 
begun to prize simple, kitchen-made coconut oil for the rich, tangy 
flavour it added to curries.81  
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The internalisation of such Malayan aesthetics in Europeans was 
not matched by a growing affinity with West African meals when the oil 
palm was introduced to Malaya. For instance, one research official had 
spent a considerable amount of time with the oil palm at Singapore’s 
Botanic Gardens during the early 1920s, and had tried using unrefined 
palm oil to fry his eggs. He found the experience annoying, noting that his 
eggs ‘came to the table with a deep orange film, suggestive of varnish or 
floor polish – and the flavour, to a palate accustomed to fresh coconut oil 
or [sesame oil], was not quite pleasant’.82 Indeed, many Malayan officials 
and planters had never spent much time in West Africa. And amongst the 
few who had done so, considerable reservations were expressed about 
dishes of West African provenance. This was evident in one planter’s 
description of palm oil chop, in a recipe widely disseminated by Malaya’s 
leading journal for estate staff, The Planter: ‘a delicious dish, though very 
unappetizing in appearance’.83 It was as if those promoting palm oil did 
not really believe their own claims about its desirability. This general 
apathy and detachment from West African meal preparations was one 
reason why, throughout the colonial period and beyond, officials and 
chemists keen on promoting small-scale involvement in the palm oil trade 
would only consider West African preparatory techniques for palm fruit if 
they aided palm oil and kernel production, and not their consumption. 
Meanwhile, Malaya’s Department of Agriculture had begun 
promoting finished samples of bleached palm oil, denuded of its orange 
flush, at a major public exhibition in Kuala Lumpur in 1925. Bottles of oil 
were displayed alongside a picture of the oil palm, making the connection 
between tree and oil more explicit to attendees.84 However, reception was 
poor. This was apparently because the prevalent air-bleaching techniques 
used at the time to heat the oil to very high temperatures had actually 
increased its odour, which, while not necessarily unpleasant in itself, must 
have been jarring to those expecting a fragrance similar to that of fresh 
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coconut or groundnut oil. The rudimentary bleaching techniques used at 
the time also left a curious brown tinge in the palm oil.85  
Nevertheless, the Department’s chemists continued promoting 
palm oil’s usage. Several years later, another version of bleached palm oil 
was prescribed to Chinese miners as a substitute for groundnut oil. Again, 
the oil held little attraction for its recipients. Refining techniques used 
were still too unsophisticated to shift palm oil’s melting point (35 degrees 
Celsius) closer to that of groundnut oil’s (three degrees Celsius). The 
chemists had also not yet learnt to separate the liquid and more solid 
fractions of palm oil prior to bleaching: a technique which was only 
initially explored in Malaya from the early 1930s onwards.86 When the 
samples were poured over lukewarm rice, as Chinese labourers usually did 
with groundnut oil in mixed rice dishes, they gave a greasy, unpleasant 
mouthfeel to the meal.87 Without more sophisticated refining techniques, 
palm oil could not mimic the appearance, scent, texture, and taste of 
other fats commonly featuring in Malayan food culture at the time. 
Despite these early failures, enthusiasm surrounding palm oil’s 
potential consumer market in Malaya continued to grow, chiefly because 
of the unrefined oil’s potential to alleviate vitamin deficiency diseases 
among local workers. The crucial developments underpinning the 
nutritional dimensions of palm oil’s rise to prominence occurred during 
the 1910s and 1920s, as part of a wider imperial interest in public health in 
the colonies after the First World War.88  General problems of native 
welfare and scarce labour supplies had begun to impinge on the original 
Chamberlainite aims of imperial exploitation by the early 1920s. Colonial 
governments came under increasing pressure to ensure that their labour 
forces were managed better.89 In Malaya, the events of the First World 
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War and a consequent rice shortage during 1920-1921 also brought food 
security to the forefront of official concerns throughout the 1920s. 
Increasing numbers of medical, technical and scientific personnel were 
consulted on these issues, and many felt it worthwhile to initiate their 
own contributions.90 
By the second half of the 1920s, anxieties about food supplies were 
compounded by concerns about food quality. This policy shift was initially 
driven by medical practitioners. As colonial public health services 
expanded, and Western scientific literature on vitamin deficiencies 
proliferated, Malayan medical personnel became better at identifying 
vitamin A deficiencies in Indian plantation labourers.91 These diseases 
were typically associated with an inability to shed tears. Mild cases 
consisted of ‘night blindness’, while more severe forms included 
xerophthalmia, Bitot’s spots and Keratomalacia (Illustration 3). The last 
condition, with its characteristically opaque and perforated corneas, was 
irreversible.92 
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Illustration 3. Bitot’s spots, documented in Malayan Tamil children, circa 1940. 
Source: A. Kingsbury and P. Fasal. A Nutritional Survey of the Federated Malay 
States. I. Illustrated Descriptions of Common Clinical Manifestations of 
Subnutrition among Rural Malays and Tamils. Kuala Lumpur: Federated Malay 
States Government Press, 1940, Plate I. 
However, comparatively little was known within medical circles 
about the kinds of locally accessible food that might alleviate such 
deficiency diseases. Extant knowledge was limited to food more easily 
available in Europe and North America, such as milk and cod liver oil. 
These were items rarely consumed in Malaya at the time.93 Instead, some 
Malayan medical officers found themselves following the lead of Indian 
estate labourers themselves, who typically consumed vitamin A-rich goat’s 
liver, where locally accessible, as an effective cure for night blindness.94 
Yet it is unclear why this practice, with its roots in Ayurvedic medicine, 
did not occur often enough to stop such diseases from occurring widely. It 
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may have had to do with the fact that estate managers usually prohibited 
their field workers from keeping livestock onsite, for fear of damage to 
rubber saplings and other young cultivars.95 
Healthcare practitioners were torn in their responses to these 
challenges. They realised that labourer diets were generally very heavy in 
carbohydrates, and lacked protein and fat. Noting the degraded quality of 
many of these mostly imported foodstuffs, they argued that the problem 
was not specifically vitamin A-related, but one of general living standards. 
These included a lack of access to fresh food, better housing, and potable 
water.96 At the same time, growing scientific knowledge regarding the 
causes and consequences of vitamin A deficiency – which included not 
just eye problems but stunted physical growth and weakened immune 
systems – prompted medical officers to suggest that surveys of local foods 
rich in vitamin A would assist the cause of preventive medicine.97 
Somewhat ironically, estate managers were singled out as potential 
collaborators for improving the nutritional status of labourers and their 
families.98 In fact, by the late 1930s, numerous Malayan estates would be 
found launching palm oil provision schemes for their labourers, with 
highly questionable outcomes for all involved. 
Malayan doctors were not the only clinicians to be caught in this 
bind between broad and narrow approaches to native welfare. In a classic 
essay on imperial public health, Michael Worboys has argued that this 
conundrum was intrinsic to British colonial nutrition policies. Worboys 
contended that medical officers concerned about deficiency diseases in 
non-European populations were often aware of colonialism’s role in the 
matter, namely its encouragement of cash crop production and reliance 
on international food markets at the expense of local food production 
strategies and household economic resilience. Unease about colonialism 
was nevertheless tempered by the rapid and still-novel advances of 
nutritional science. With their tantalising promise of fostering better lives 
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through more precisely calibrated diets, nutritional findings tended to 
encourage paternalistic, piecemeal, and depoliticised approaches to 
poverty alleviation.99 
The Malayan dilemma was pushed in the direction of nutritionism 
when research along biochemical lines was given a tremendous fillip from 
abroad. In the interests of ‘human development’, an endowment of 
$350,000 was bestowed by the Rockefeller Foundation on Singapore’s King 
Edward VII College of Medicine in 1925, establishing two Chaired 
Professorships in Bacteriology and Biochemistry in the process. These also 
led to the founding of the Biochemistry Department, and the appointment 
of John Rosedale, aged 37, as the inaugural Chaired Professor in 
Biochemistry.100 The son of an English clergyman, Rosedale came to 
Malaya in 1927 armed with a trans-Atlantic research background in the 
nutritional properties of amino-acids, as well as the distinction of having 
studied under Elmer McCollum, an American already famous for 
pioneering nutritional experiments with rats, and more controversially, 
his claim (eventually disproven) to have been the first chemist to identify 
vitamin A.101  
In 1928, Rosedale’s unfolding research objectives and agenda were 
publicised in a leading Malayan academic journal for public health 
researchers. In a brief article, Rosedale argued that applied nutritional 
research on Malayan foodstuffs could contribute significantly to imperial 
goals. Playing on imperial insecurities regarding starvation-induced 
political instability at the British Empire’s peripheries, Rosedale pointed 
out that medical investigators had already shown that Malayan diets 
urgently needed improvement. With sufficient support, biochemists could 
provide medical practitioners with new scientifically-proven knowledge of 
                                                          
99
 Michael Worboys, "The Discovery of Colonial Malnutrition between the Wars." In 
Imperial Medicine and Indigenous Societies, ed. David Arnold (Manchester: Manchester 
University Press, 1988), 208-209. 
100
 D. W. G. Faris, "History of the King Edward VII College of Medicine Singapore. 1905-
1949." Medical Journal of Malaya 4, no. 1 (1949), 7; J. W. H. Lugg., "The Place of 
Biochemistry in a University." Medical Journal of Malaya 4, no. 1 (1949), 45; H. E. Khoo, 
"Teaching Biochemistry to Medical Students in Singapore - from Organic Chemistry to 
Problem-Based Learning." Annals, Academy of Medicine, Singapore, 34, no. 6 (2005), 79. 
101
 WLA: SA/BMF/A.2/78, J. Rosedale, ‘Application for a Beit Memorial Medical Research 





how to prescribe food as medicine. Once hundreds, if not thousands, of 
known Malayan food ingredients were deconstructed by Rosedale and his 
colleagues at the Biochemistry Department’s laboratories, ‘irrational’ local 
food preferences could be transformed into a nutritionally superior 
dietary regime. A new diet would include foodstuffs with higher levels of 
calcium, phosphorus, and vitamin A, substances that were found lacking 
in popular staples like polished rice and coconut oil.102 
 The first steps towards discovering which local foods were 
nutritionally superior were taken during the late 1920s, when preliminary 
chemical surveys were conducted on various individual Malayan food 
items. The Biochemistry Department appears to have relied on food 
markets in Singapore and the cooperation of the Malayan Department of 
Agriculture for most of its samples.103 Investigations were accelerated from 
mid-1929 onwards, thanks to fresh funds from a joint arrangement 
between the Straits Settlements authorities and the newly-established 
Colonial Development Fund. Spurred by Rosedale’s appeal for support 
regarding ‘the subject of vitamins in Malaya’, the latter body agreed to 
contribute £6,000 to the Department’s research scheme.104  
The Colonial Development Fund’s support for Rosedale’s work was 
founded on reasons similar to those of the Empire Marketing Board’s for 
Malayan copra research. The Fund had a positive view of broad-based 
research initiatives spearheaded by resident experts, and was encouraged 
by the likelihood that Rosedale’s findings would be useful beyond Malaya. 
Moreover, the Colonial Office’s chief medical expert, Ambrose Stanton, 
had previously conducted path-breaking research into deficiency diseases 
in the Federated Malay States before the First World War, and had a keen 
interest in seeing similar work continued in the colonies.105  
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It also helped that the Straits Settlements authorities had agreed 
to supply ‘the larger share’ of funds involving staffing and laboratory 
facilities.106 The enthusiasm of the Straits Settlements authorities had 
probably been fuelled by a similar interest in the potential power and 
utility of new nutritional discoveries. After reading one of Rosedale’s later 
reports on vitamin content in Malayan foods, Harold Tempany, who 
served as Director of Agriculture of the Straits Settlements between 1929 
and 1936, professed a strong belief in the ability of vitamins to influence 
native consumption patterns, despite the lack of any supporting evidence. 
Upon reading that betel leaf, typically used in Asia as a flavoursome 
wrapper for arecanut chewing, was richer in vitamin A than any known 
green leafy vegetable in Malaya, he concluded that betel leaf’s vitamin 
content was ‘one of the reasons for its great popularity among orientals’.107 
Such comments were also suggestive of a general inability on the part of 
colonial officials to fully appreciate the long-standing cultural attractions 
of betel quid consumption for Asians, let alone condone its increased 
consumption. 
 Although financial support from the colonial authorities was 
crucial to Rosedale’s nutritional investigations, the vitamin-bearing 
properties of unrefined palm oil were already well-known within scientific 
networks, particularly those related to nutrition. Thanks to a growing 
body of biochemical research previously conducted in Britain, scientists 
had already shown that carotenoids, substances which gave palm oil its 
characteristic ruddy glow, could be converted into vitamin A in rats.108 
The main task facing Rosedale and his colleagues was to localise such 
research, comparing the nutritional profile of Malayan palm oil with that 
of other locally available oils. Preoccupied with a large number of 
experiments on other Malayan food ingredients, local laboratory results 
backing Malayan palm oil’s superior nutritional profile would only be 
published in the early 1930s. Nonetheless, the path to Malayan palm oil’s 
rise as a superfood had already been mostly paved by 1929. All that was 
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needed now was the stamp of local scientific authority, and a cabal of 
enthusiastic promoters, conditions that would soon be fulfilled during the 
events of the Great Depression and their aftermath. 
 
CONCLUSION 
Official colonial responses to smallholder tree crop agriculture in 
Malaya were initially guided by a number of overarching goals, including 
diversification beyond rubber, alleviating local food insecurity, enhancing 
rural Malay livelihoods, and upgrading the quality of Malaya’s agricultural 
exports. From early on, the improvement of the coconut sector was 
viewed as a way to fulfil these objectives simultaneously. Public 
administrative and scientific support was channelled accordingly. When 
these efforts failed to address quality concerns, anxieties about 
smallholder production repertoires were transferred to the recently 
established oil palm industry. At different times in both sectors, 
exclusionary policies against smallholders were attempted on the grounds 
of quality control. Only in the oil palm sector, however, was there little to 
stand in the way of policy implementation, since relatively few 
smallholders were interested in the industry to begin with. 
To date, historians have not recognised the intimate relationship 
between the coconut and oil palm industries in the making of colonial 
regulatory strategies. Instead, scholars recounting the emergence of 
Malaya’s oil palm industry have typically made two interrelated claims. 
First, they contend that industry’s initial commercial success during the 
interwar years lay in its deployment of large-scale processing machinery, 
which in turn allowed estates to produce palm oil of a consistently high 
quality.109 Second, they assert that it was the spread of these large-scale 
mills which kept smallholders out of the oil palm sector, since they 
rendered labour-intensive small-scale processing methods obsolete.  
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Both views, based on uncritical readings of colonial discourses of 
European technological superiority, require revision in the light of 
evidence presented in this chapter. Low-acid palm oil was, in the first 
instance, the result of careful attention to crop handling, transport and 
sterilisation prior to oil extraction, all of which were already in play during 
the most labour-intensive phase of the Malayan industry’s establishment. 
In short, decisions to focus on quality improvement were made prior to 
heavy mechanisation of the production process, just like how Nigerian 
smallholders, motivated by sufficiently large price premiums, had begun 
to produce large amounts of low-acid palm oil for export after the Second 
World War.110 The heaviest pressures to mechanise palm oil processing in 
Malaya arose not just from the prestige associated with modern 
machinery, but also from the manner in which Western buyers only 
awarded quality premiums for large palm oil consignments, pushing larger 
plantations to substitute labour with capital. Again, this was not because 
labourers could not produce high-quality oil, but probably because of the 
managerial problems associated with supervising time-sensitive 
operations by large numbers of geographically dispersed field workers.  
Extant scholarly interest in Malaya’s oil palm sector has also 
neglected an even more pertinent fact. Far greater processing economies 
were to be found in the coconut industry during the first half of the 
twentieth century, partly because huge quantities of copra could be 
consolidated from dispersed areas, and stored for far longer intervals than 
palm fruit. It should therefore come as no surprise that significant 
numbers of oil palm estates continued to successfully use small-scale 
processing methods to generate palm oil throughout the 1920s. In fact, 
once a domestic market for Malayan oil palm produce began to emerge 
during the 1930s, sections of the local plantation industry found it 
commercially sensible to produce small quantities of palm oil for the 
domestic scene on a regular basis, using relatively labour-intensive 
methods of production.  
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As already seen in Chapter Two, what really made the oil palm less 
amenable to smallholder cultivation were the numerous advantages that 
tree crops like coconuts and rubber offered to smallholders at the 
harvesting, handling, and marketing stages, avoiding the tedium and 
physical danger associated with oil palm cash cropping. After 1929, these 
advantages were compounded by official policies towards smallholders, 
which were openly supportive of coconut farming, but not oil palm 
cultivation. 
Finally, this chapter raises important issues about industrialisation 
under colonial rule that would benefit from further research. The first is 
the extent to which Malaya’s industrial development, including its large-
scale oil extraction and chemical manufacturing facilities, was typical of 
broader trends operating within East, Southeast, and South Asia during 
the first half of the twentieth century.111 The second is the degree to which 
Malaya’s industrialisation actually benefitted British interests, including 
those of high finance. Both are big, complex questions which have only 
begun to be revisited in extant scholarship, in the light of recent findings 
by Japanese economic historians and scholars of British imperial history.112 
To be sure, both of these queries lie well beyond the scope of a thesis 
focused on smallholder farming practices. Nonetheless, the historical 
details surfaced in this chapter and following ones can hopefully serve as 
raw material for future debates regarding the shape and significance of 
non-Western industrialisation during the colonial period. 
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SMALLHOLDER INVOLVEMENT IN TREE CROPS DURING THE GREAT 
DEPRESSION, 1929-1934 
 
Several months after Malaya’s oil palm industry had acquired 
official protection from an imagined smallholder threat, it was forced to 
confront the far more tangible danger of a global commodities bust. The 
Great Depression became the industry’s baptism of fire. The Malayan 
coconut sector, while more familiar with price volatility, also suffered 
from unprecedented export price cuts during the first half of the 1930s. 
The period between 1929 and 1934 is marked by two enigmas. First, 
while both the oil palm and coconut industries experienced setbacks 
during the Depression, the former emerged from the period in far better 
shape than the latter. Throughout the period, the oil palm sector 
expanded steadily in acreage, while the coconut industry’s landholdings 
stagnated, and began to thin out. Second, despite the divergent 
trajectories of these industries, most smallholders remained committed to 
coconut farming, and very few tried moving into oil palms. 
Geography accounts for much of the initial parting of fortunes 
between the two sectors. Malaya’s main coconut-growing areas were 
located along the western coastline, where suitable land was becoming 
scarce, and increasingly prone to prolonged flooding. Coconut yields on 
affected lands subsequently plummeted, compounding the misery of 
falling prices for farmers.  In contrast, most oil palm estates, including 
those in Johor, were sited on inland soils, relatively free of the drainage 
problems harassing the West Coast. Here, where agricultural land was still 
relatively abundant, oil palm growers were able to take advantage of 





The question of smallholder persistence with coconut farming, and 
a continued aversion to oil palms, is more complicated. With some official 
support, coconut growers across Malaya used an array of approaches to 
stabilise incomes and manage the decline of forest rent associated with 
waterlogged soils. To borrow a concept used by François Ruf and Götz 
Schroth, agricultural diversification took place both vertically (through 
increased coconut processing), and horizontally (through the increased 
channeling of labour into other cultivars adapted to poorly-draining 
soils).1 To help meet the increased demands on agricultural labour that 
these strategies required, smallholders appear to have intensified 
sharecropping and the use of animal labour on coconut farms. In some 
circumstances, these techniques even led to income growth. Generally, 
however, they were insufficient to address mounting problems of drainage 
and localised flooding. 
The oil palm situation evolved differently. In Johor, where one 
might have expected spontaneous smallholder diversification into a new 
cash crop, given how quickly estates were planting up land with oil palms 
during this period, the relative absence of any known local uses for the oil 
palm diminished general household interest in its cultivation. Without the 
advantage of prior smallholder involvement in the crop, forming 
collectives to pioneer bulk sales became the only way for smallholders and 
dealers to surmount the opportunity costs of diversification into oil palms. 
This strategy was indeed attempted several times during the period, 
particularly in the vicinity of estates. However, such activities also courted 
official attention, due to their heightened visibility. A new restrictive 
official policy towards oil palm smallholdings, catalyzed by Tempany’s 
memorandum of 1929, was consequently deployed, inhibiting whatever 
interest remained in small-scale oil palm planting. State authorities 
effectively reinforced the notion that rubber, coconuts and other cultivars, 
with their already extensive marketing networks, were much safer options 
for smallholder labour during the period. 
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It is nonetheless premature to conclude that developments during 
this period irrevocably shut smallholders out of the oil palm industry. 
Instead, the Great Depression saw the continuation of a trajectory that 
would harden the implicit terms on which smallholders could feasibly 
cash crop the palm. This involved the consolidation of the oil palm’s 
commodity form as a crop purely for industrial purposes, as opposed to a 
household crop with a mixture of subsistence and commercial functions, 
like the coconut palm.  
The upheavals of the Depression spurred this form of 
commodification in several ways. First, they encouraged Malayan chemists 
to promote unrefined palm oil consumption on the grounds of better 
nutritional intake among locals, in a bid to improve local standards of 
living. These attempts to change dietary preferences, via purely 
biomedical understandings of food, failed to persuade locals to view palm 
oil as an aesthetically attractive substance.  
Second, the Malayan chemical industry took advantage of falling 
prices for both copra and palm oil to boost domestic soap production, and 
displace more costly imported soaps. Palm oil, used in this manner, was 
rendered invisible to its consumers. Knowledge of how its raw form could 
be used by households was supplanted by consumer interest in branded, 
locally-made industrial products.  
Third, cost-cutting measures taken by leading oil palm enterprises 
to survive the lean years ultimately spurred smallholder involvement in oil 
palms. This would only become more apparent decades later, after the 
Second World War. By investing in large-scale infrastructure to reduce 
transport and packaging overheads during the Depression, the industry 
put itself in a better position to take advantage of heavier international 
demands for palm oil during the 1950s, inadvertently encouraging more 
smallholders to sell palm fruits to already existing estate mills. In the early 
1930s, however, the attractions of oil palm farming were driven primarily 





THE MATURING OF WEST JOHOR’S COCONUT FRONTIER  
Although not immediately obvious at the time, the Great 
Depression became the proverbial straw that broke the back of Malaya’s 
coconut farming sector. International demand for copra, which had been a 
major driver of Malayan coconut palm expansion since the early twentieth 
century, petered out during the later stages of the slump, as international 
markets dealt with a growing glut of fats and oils.2 In Johor, where 
coconut production was almost completely derived from smallholdings, 
state-wide copra exports peaked in 1933.3 A similar peaking of copra 
exports appears to have occurred in Perak and Selangor, but at an earlier 
date, sometime between 1930 and 1931.4  
Taken alone, the copra slump of the early 1930s dealt a serious 
blow to the Malayan industry, but not one which did irreparable damage 
to its prospects. The crash was mitigated by the extremely low cash costs 
of smallholder coconut production, which, by one educated estimate, 
were even lower than those of most rubber smallholdings during the same 
period.5 Moreover, as will be seen later, local and regional demands for 
surplus coconut produce provided a level of support that rubber was not 
privy to. 
What was particularly problematic about the slump was how it 
exacerbated other entrenched problems. A gradual but persistent 
deterioration in Malayan copra and copra oil prices had already set in 
from around 1924-1925, about five years before the beginning of the period 
typically associated with the Depression (see Figure 1). This had been 
largely due to a growing number of substitutes for coconut oil entering 
international markets following the First World War. In Perak and 
Selangor, the price decline, coupled with a rubber price boom during the 
mid-1920s, appears to have discouraged further coconut planting on 
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smallholdings by 1927.6 Unlike the Stevenson Plan of the 1920s, whose 
restrictions on rubber production in Ceylon and Malaya helped bring 
about this rubber price spike, nothing comparable could be put in place 
for coconuts owing to the wide range of substitutes already in 
international circulation.7 Thus, even before the Depression’s onset, the 
coconut frontier’s expansion had effectively ceased in Perak and Selangor. 
 
Figure 1. Singapore: wholesale prices, copra and coconut oil, 1923-1934, deflated by 
the Sugimoto Consumer Price Index (1928=100). Source: Appendix 2.1. 
In Johor, however, the frontier had yet to close. Where agricultural 
land was still relatively abundant further inland, and much of this terrain 
suitable for coconuts but not rubber, new coconut planting continued in 
spite of copra price declines.  In 1929, large numbers of Javanese and Bugis 
migrants were found establishing palms in new settlements along the 
West Coast, extending the inward reach of coconut belts in the Batu Pahat 
and Muar districts.8 Malaya’s inaugural Coconut Census of 1930 also 
corroborates the view that coconuts remained a popular crop for new 
planting in Johor during the early years of the Depression. At the time of 
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the survey, two out of every seven of Johor’s planted coconut palms were 
thought to be very recent plantings.9 
The flipside to these inland expansions was the scarcity of land 
closer to Johor’s low-lying western coastline, already observable since the 
1910s. Here, pre-existing problems with prolonged flooding were 
compounded by three factors: inward migration (which placed further 
pressure on common drainage infrastructure), the unprecedented fall in 
copra prices between 1929 and 1934, and what seems to have been a 
resultant shortage of labour to maintain existing drainage systems. This 
conjuncture caused the longest-established households near the foreshore 
to bear the brunt of increased flooding. At Sri Menanti, a prominent 
coconut settlement in northwest Johor, swathes of coastal palms were 
found moribund in 1934, despite having produced some of the largest nuts 
in Muar district just a few years earlier.10 Although the predominant canals 
in the area had been enlarged by smallholders during the 1920s to 
accommodate a growing Malay population, work had halted during the 
Depression. The worst-affected households near the coast sought to 
outlast the slump by mortgaging their holdings to either Chettiar 
moneylenders, or Chinese crop buyers. By the end of 1934, however, many 
such households had given up, forfeiting their properties to creditors, and 
had migrated elsewhere. This abandonment accelerated the decay of 
coastal drainage infrastructure, setting off a chain reaction of misfortune 
further inland for growers and dealers alike.11 
Johor’s coconut woes would have been even more serious, were it 
not for the attempts of smallholders to stabilise their falling incomes 
through several different strategies. The first was the rise of Malay 
participation in copra manufacture. By the 1920s, a wealthier stratum of 
coconut growers doubling up as copra-makers had emerged within 
migrant Javanese communities in West Johor, fuelled by their earlier use 
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of bonded labourers (orang tebusan) for agricultural work.12 This dynamic 
was accelerated by a sharply rising premium for first-class copra during 
the glut, which saw top-quality copra fetch a fifth more value than second-
class copra by 1934.13  
By 1932, about 1,660 kilns were in operation in West Johor, with 
three-fifths of these in the hands of Chinese intermediaries. The 
remainder were owned by ‘Mohammedans’, who seem to have been 
predominantly of Javanese and Bugis origin.14 Some of the kilns owned by 
wealthier non-Chinese owners were permanent constructions made of 
clay, brick, metal and cement.15 Most of the newer entrants, however, used 
low-cost imitations of small Chinese-designed open-air rack furnaces, 
attracting criticisms from technical officials for the draughtiness of such 
racks and their inability to dry copra uniformly (Photograph 12).16 
 
Photograph 12. Copra drying rack, circa 1900-1950. Reproduced with permission of 
Arkib Negara Malaysia. 
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 The ethnic dimensions of this rising competition in the copra 
production segment can be easily exaggerated, given the increasingly 
racist overtones of government records for the era. But it is clear that 
federal and state policies were turning against Chinese copra producers, 
and affecting the playing field somewhat. Official views of Malayan 
Chinese crop buyers had grown increasingly disparaging since the First 
World War, due to the dwindling reliance of colonial administrations on 
Chinese intermediaries for revenue collection, a heightened sense of 
European superiority, and the rapid expansion of the Chinese population 
within Malaya, including Johor.17 Running parallel to this official prejudice 
was the growing sense that coconut and copra producers perceived as 
ethnically Malay needed support if they were to avoid destitution. 
Although a significant minority of agricultural officials continued to argue 
that all producers should be aided, regardless of race, fears that Malay 
growers would forfeit their lands to Chinese intermediaries eventually 
won out.18 
 The Depression thus created an opening for agricultural officials, 
led by Francis Cooke, Malaya’s resident copra research expert since 1929, 
to apply the full force of their technical knowledge to date. Ideally, all 
Malay-owned kilns were to be upgraded so that the full benefits of the 
copra premium could be passed onto growers. From 1932 onwards, sub-
district officials (penghulu) and influential Malay copra makers were co-
opted into programmes where they received instructions on copra 
preparation at the Federal Coconut Experiment Station in Klang, in 
preparation for establishing larger kilns of government design.19 Typical of 
such participants was a wealthy Johor-based landowner, claiming a 
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following of growers from 1,500 acres of coconut lands in the coastal sub-
district of Benut.20 In exchange for government largesse to build the kiln, 
output quality was to be officially supervised for two years from the start 
of production.21 Cooke and his colleagues ultimately intended for these 
pilot projects to catalyse interest among other producers.22 
 In Johor, however, initial progress was painfully slow. Only two 
such kilns had been launched by 1934, both under the ownership and 
control of their respective penghulus at Sri Menanti and Ringgit. It was 
clear that both kilns were technically excellent and capable of producing 
first-class copra, but the benefits derived from the premium were offset by 
heavy transport costs to Singapore, making it more worthwhile to sell the 
copra locally to dealers at lower prices.23  The model kilns were also 
quickly losing the fight for nut supplies in what was already a crowded 
field.24 During the slump, Chinese dealers had reacted to increased 
competition by offering higher farmgate prices for coconut produce. This, 
in turn, narrowed the price gap between lower and higher grade nuts in 
Johor, reducing the incentives of copra producers to prepare copra more 
carefully.25 Similarly, Malay copra marketing cooperatives formed with the 
support of Johor authorities did not last long, owing to more attractive 
cash-on-delivery facilities offered by Chinese dealers.26 Despite a 
redoubling of official efforts to encourage Malay copra manufacturing and 
collective sales until the end of the interwar years, narrow copra price 
premiums persisted, and heavy competition between existing dealers 
meant that copra quality generally remained mediocre.27 
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While such competition helped support underlying coconut 
prices, other competing uses of coconuts limited the numbers of nuts 
copra-makers could acquire from farmers. One of these was the relative 
attractiveness of the fresh produce market in Malaya. By the end of 1933, 
the sale price of fresh nuts had exceeded that of copra in West Johor.28 
When copra prices plunged further during 1934, coconut smallholders 
shifted sales further towards local and regional markets for whole nuts. 
More coconut products were sold to areas that were traditionally coconut-
deficit regions, such as Pahang and Negri Sembilan, suggesting that 
coconut consumption had been low in these areas to start with.29 Even in 
areas with a traditional surplus of coconuts, such as Selangor, Malacca and 
Johor, village-made coconut oil was put on sale in nearby markets (pasar), 
where previously little had been found.30 
The home market for village-made coconut produce was 
undoubtedly important in providing an additional safety net for coconut 
farmers during the global slump. But the absence of any systematic field 
surveys of Malayan rural trade and consumption during this period makes 
its significance difficult to measure. Such methodological problems are 
probably not uniquely Malayan, given the paucity of detailed scholarship 
on peasant consumption in Southeast Asia.31 Nevertheless, however 
rudimentary, some measure of domestic coconut consumption is 
necessary. We can then begin to address the important question regarding 
the extent to which local circulations kept an export-oriented industry 
afloat during a global commodities slump, a question which may also be 
of interest to those studying contemporary events in Southeast Asia (a 
theme we will return to in Chapter Eight).  
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For this period, per capita consumption estimates of artisanal 
coconut produce, primarily in terms of fresh nuts and coconut oil, came 
from agricultural officials tasked with investigating the overarching 
operations of the Malayan coconut sector. As with later estimates, the 
methodologies used to obtain consumption estimates were riddled with 
questionable assumptions and unclear methodologies. It is from these 
impressionistic beginnings that estimates of rural coconut product trade 
are formed.   
In 1930, local coconut expert Francis Cooke claimed that the 
average Malayan consumed the equivalent of 50 coconuts per year in 
terms of village produce, including coconut oil, coconut milk and so forth. 
Such consumption took up a quarter of the estimated annual Malayan 
crop.32 Four years later, an official committee convened to review the 
affairs of Malaya’s oil crop industries offered a per capita estimate almost 
twice of Cooke’s, which amounted to roughly two-fifths of the entire 
coconut production of Malaya.33 Either domestic consumption per capita 
had doubled within four years, or else the estimates themselves were 
grossly inaccurate. The latter seems more likely. As outsiders to village 
life, officials often underestimated the sheer amount of coconut material 
that was being used behind closed doors, whether in the form of coconut 
water, cooking oil, sweet cakes, curry gravy, palm sugar, alcohol, firewood, 
construction materials, and soap. Moreover, the Committee may have had 
a vested interest in underestimating local consumption figures, given that 
their attention was motivated by the need to increase domestic coconut 
consumption in future years, so as to blunt the impact of export 
shortfalls.34 More rigorous consumption estimates based on long-term 
embedded field research in Malaya during the late 1930s offered a much 
higher figure than those earlier in the decade, although, as will be seen in 
Chapter Five, such estimates were not infallible either. Perhaps the best 
that can be said is that there was a significant amount of flexibility built 
into local coconut consumption systems at the time. 
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Besides Malayan consumers, regional markets also took advantage 
of the Malayan surplus in whole nuts. Echoing nineteenth-century 
patterns, much of this trade continued to flow through Penang, enroute to 
Burma.35 But in the first half of 1934, amidst the lowest prices yet seen for 
copra, a vigorous export trade in fresh unhusked nuts was being 
conducted between Benut, in central West Johor, and China. The nuts 
were reportedly being used for rope-making before coconut oil was 
extracted, possibly for soap manufacture by Unilever’s new factory in 
Shanghai. Such a trade, however, was apparently possible only because 
Benut’s households, exhibiting signs of ‘severe poverty’, had few 
alternatives to coconut cultivation at the time, save for some odd jobs, 
and, for those with boats, fishing.36 
Benut’s situation was a harsh reminder of the inherent risks 
associated with overreliance on a single crop, even one with markets as 
diverse as the coconut palm’s. In general, rural households tried to 
increase their involvement in other farm activities where possible, while 
retaining an interest in coconuts, with the expectation that prices would 
eventually recover. Some coconut-related work was outsourced 
accordingly, mostly through an expansion of share-cropping.37 
Agricultural intensification through livestock use also seems to have 
occurred, although Johor’s coastal muck soils, prone to compaction and 
puddling, limited the cattle farming strategies typical of coconut agro-
pastoral systems in many other regions, including long stretches of 
Malaya’s sandier East Coast.38 In contrast, the use of coconut monkeys for 
nut harvesting appears to have increased, although its extent is difficult to 
quantify. The employment of such labour had previously been confined 
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mostly to Kelantan and Trengganu, but by the early 1930s, oral testimonies 
suggest that Johor was adopting the practice as well.  
These labour-intensive arrangements sometimes led to leaps in 
field productivity. For instance, in 1931, Omar Sukri, a young migrant from 
Riau, came to work as a coconut harvester and copra maker for a family 
relation who was a village headman (ketua kampung) in Johor. Initially, he 
harvested 40 nuts daily, and was paid $12 a month for his efforts. After 
about eight months, Omar used his savings to purchase a coconut monkey 
for $4, subsequently increasing his daily collection to 60 nuts. His monthly 
harvesting wage consequently rose to $15. All in all, the monkey’s 
contribution to Omar’s productivity, and Johor’s coconut industry as a 
whole, was roughly around 21,000 more nuts than what Omar would have 
collected alone between 1932-1934.39 After three years, Omar had saved 
enough to move to Kluang, where he acquired his own rubber holdings. 
Not only was Omar able to earn a steady income from coconut sales 
during this interval, but falling food prices during the Depression, coupled 
with his refusal to purchase costly items like new clothes, meant that he 
was actually able to achieve a significant degree of upward mobility within 
several years.40 Omar’s story of resilience, possibly one amongst many, 
alludes to a range of possible strategies that seem to have eluded the 
official records during these lean years. 
Economic diversification was also tied to other local 
environmental factors, chiefly the decline of forest rent. In the western 
districts of Batu Pahat, Muar, and Kukub, renewed attention was given to 
areca palms, which adapted better to the region’s peatier soils, and whose 
crop price declines were less severe than those of the coconut palm.41 
Consequently, the interval between 1931 and 1934 witnessed a Malaya-wide 
rise in net arecanut exports, from 19,260 to 27,336 tons, mostly destined 
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for British India and mainland Southeast Asia.42 In addition, Johor’s 
exports of coffee, a plant commonly found in many West Johor coconut 
settlements, tripled between 1929 and 1932. Much of this seems to have 
been of the pricier Liberian variety, with a smaller Robusta crop grown 
around Batu Pahat.43 Other crops that could survive the West Coast’s 
increasingly waterlogged soils, including sago, pepper, tubers, and 
pineapples, saw massive surges in export values during the interval.44 
Again, on these same soils, efforts to diversify into rubber were 
problematic. But where soils were less dense, and smallholders had access 
to both rubber and coconuts, living conditions appeared ‘considerably 
better’ than in areas where coconuts were the main cash crop.45  
Despite its suitability for many of West Johor’s soils, the oil palm 
option remained problematic for coastal cultivation, given the coast’s 
considerable distance from estate mills in Central Johor. These difficulties 
would have been eased somewhat by the construction of more roads 
between the coast and interior, but throughout the 1930s, the Johor 
authorities preferred to focus on building roads in a north-south 
orientation, effectively keeping the coastal and inland agricultural 
frontiers separate. This, however, seems to have been less an attempt to 
foster a dual economy, than about the sheer physical difficulty of 
constructing roads across vast areas of peatland and freshwater swamp 
forest (Map 4). Such roads, in any case, would do little to foster successful 
agricultural expansion along their axes, given what was already then 
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Map 4. Johor: land use, 1943. Areas in dark pink denote rubber, areas in light pink 
denote oil and coconut palms, areas in dotted green denote peatland and swamp 
forest. Source: B.R. 877 J 15C, Sheet No. 3, Malayan Land Utilisation Map: 
Singapore. From the Collection of ISEAS Library, Courtesy of ISEAS-Yusok Ishak 
Institute, Singapore. 
Domestic interest in the use of the oil palm’s fruits for household 
purposes would have helped overcome distance-based marketing 
problems among coastal growers. Yet such demand appears to have been 
non-existent, despite a growing awareness of palm oil’s nutritional 
benefits. In the end, this still did not stop growers and dealers who resided 
along the coastline, with the resources to farm Johor’s interior, from 
making attempts to diversify into oil palms during the slump. 
 
EARLY SMALLHOLDER INTEREST IN OIL PALMS IN JOHOR 
The Malayan oil palm industry’s main challenges during the 
Depression period were strikingly different from those of the coconut 
palm’s. Most estates, including Johor’s, were located on better-draining, 
but nutrient-poor inland soils, where the accompanying loss of forest rent 




including artificial fertilizers.47 Following on from the late 1920s, 
administrators and the majority of planters continued to prioritise the aim 
of preserving palm oil export quality, scaling up production to quantities 
that could fetch better premiums than those offered by the prevailing 
British-based Lagos grading system.  
During the 1920s, this task had been indirectly aided by liberal 
concessionary policies promoting a wide variety of crops beyond rubber. 
By the end of the 1920s, however, the oil palm industry’s quest for scale 
received a massive boost from Malayan Cultures Co. Ltd., when the 
enterprise successfully acquired 25,000 acres of land at Labis, Central 
Johor, at less than half the cost of oil palm lands in the Federated Malay 
States.48 This handed Johor the distinction of hosting the largest spread of 
oil palm lands in the Malay Peninsula, a position retained until today.49 
Malayan Cultures’ then-agent and part-owner was the Compagnie 
du Selangor, which in turn acted as the local agent for the Socfin group of 
companies until 1932.50 Socfin Co. Ltd. was a global entity that emerged 
from transactions between its founding Franco-Belgian members over a 
decade earlier.51 By 1928, the group could plausibly claim to be ‘the Biggest 
Oil Palm Co. in the World’, with interests in over 250,000 acres of planted 
land in regions as diverse as Indochina, Java, Sumatra, Malaya, the Belgian 
Congo, Cameroon, Senegal, the Ivory Coast, and Abyssinia. A fifth of these 
lands were already under oil palms, and another 170,000 acres under 
rubber.52 Malayan Cultures’ acquisition of Labis came at a time when 
factor production costs were falling amidst the unfolding Depression, 
buttressing Socfin’s countercyclical gamble of acquiring and planting large 
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areas of land on the cheap with slower-maturing tree crops, in the belief 
that yields would eventually rise in tandem with demand.53  
Where resources permitted, similar strategies appear to have been 
pursued by other Johor estates of varying sizes. As rubber prices dropped, 
1929 saw a spurt of interest in applications for oil palm concessions from 
Asian investors. Land was awarded to individuals such as Mirza Mohamed 
Ali Namazie, a Singapore-based trader of Persian-Indian origin, as well as 
enterprises backed by wealthy Chinese planters, including Tan Cheng 
Lock, doyen of the Straits Chinese community.54 An additional 10,000 
acres of oil palms was subsequently planted between 1930 and the end of 
1933.55 The figure would have been even higher if not for Depression-
induced credit shortages, which unsettled the initial expansion plans of 
some estates, including Namazie’s.56 But even a relatively small plantation, 
such as Lee Quee Choo’s 1,700 acre estate in Kulai, managed to stay afloat 
during the slump, commencing palm oil production with a small-scale 
press by the end of 1935. With lower labour costs, Lee was able to hire 80 
workers for field preparation and planting activities during the 
Depression, reducing employee numbers to just 20 once his oil palms 
matured.57  
After 1933, oil palm planting slowed down, reinforced by the Johor 
authorities’ relatively lenient deadlines for planting up reserve lands, and 
their growing reluctance to alienate any additional land parcels for oil 
palm estates. Comparatively little further expansion was undertaken for 
the rest of the interwar years.58 The slump of 1929-1934 thus both hastened 
and ended Johor’s first great wave of oil palm planting (Figure 2). 
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Figure 2. Johor: land planted with oil palms (right axis), and annual export values 
per ton, Malaya (left axis), 1927-1935. Sources: Appendices 2.1, 5.1. 
Given surging interest in oil palms in Johor during 1929 and 1930, it 
should perhaps come as little surprise that Malayan Cultures’ land 
application at Labis provoked curiosity among smaller growers in the 
vicinity. Thanks to previous pepper, gambier, coconut, and rubber crop 
booms, Labis already had a colourful history of agricultural settlement. An 
old riverine village populated by Chinese Teochew households, Kangkar 
Cha’ah, continued to exist near the concession’s boundaries. Many of the 
kangkar’s surrounding lands were still being denuded of primary forest, 
and rubber stands were progressing upending swathes of pepper, gambier 
and cassava plantations carved out from the rainforest during previous 
decades. Extensive tracts of scrubland had also been left to fallow.59 But 
Johore Labis Estate’s new plans ensured that local agriculture would 
henceforth become much more oil palm-focused. Moreover, the 
development of a new metalled road bisecting the area between Labis and 
Yong Peng, and news that a big corporation was planning to construct 
over 160 kilometres of ancillary roads out of its own pocket, could only 
have increased demands for land from other parties in the know. 
 Over the next decade, Johore Labis executives used a four-pronged 
strategy to manage the presence of smallholdings within and around the 
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concession. The first approach was to physically partition them off from 
estate grounds as soon as possible, through the construction of an 
extensive road network (Map 5). Field surveys in 1930 had found some 
blocks of concessionary land to be so densely populated by rubber, 
coconut and fruit trees, that it made little commercial sense for Labis 
Estate to occupy them. Ultimately, in management’s view, roads needed to 
be built quickly to prevent such smallholdings, which were feared were 
choked with lallang (Imperata cylindrica) and other weeds, from ‘infecting’ 
its own estate grounds with unwanted flora and diseases.60 
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Map 5. Johore Labis Estate, 1933. Source: ANM-JB: CL&M 325/29, Enc. 68. 
Second, estate management sought to purchase better-maintained 
smallholdings within the concession at mutually agreeable prices. The 
problem with this approach was the time needed, due to the sheer 
number of smallholdings present and ensuing haggling between 
prospective parties. As late as February 1938, the estate had yet to receive 
its official land title because of ongoing negotiations with smallholders.61 
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Furthermore, this still left unaddressed the question of small growers who 
were actually interested in oil palm farming, despite the considerable 
opportunity costs involved. 
 Here, Labis Estate management appeared to have pursued two 
different approaches. One strategy, which will be recounted below, began 
several years after Labis Estate had begun planting oil palms, at which 
point it was better positioned to lead initiatives with smallholders through 
what is best described as an outgrower scheme. Initially, however, 
management was much more defensive in its outlook, and sought to 
prevent smallholdings and smaller estates from starting any form of oil 
palm cultivation in the vicinity of its grounds. Executives did so by 
denying these prospective growers access to its planned factory, 
deliberately raising grower opportunity costs further. The unusually dense 
nature of Johor official records surrounding Labis Estate’s early 
development allows for the reconstruction of detailed cases where both 
smallholders and trader intermediaries sought entry to the oil palm 
industry. As will become apparent, these historical reconstructions also 
shed light on why Labis Estate pursued such differentiated treatments 
towards smallholders, as well as the contribution made by official 
responses to such developments. 
 While the Johor records contain numerous instances of small 
growers interested in oil palm planting near the Labis concession in 1929, 
we will focus on the case involving Frank Tan @ Tan Joon Mong, because 
of its exemplary detail and historical significance.62 At the time of his 
application for oil palm land, Tan was a 40-year-old Teochew 
entrepreneur of Straits-Chinese descent, operating out of northwest 
Johor’s Batu Pahat district. His assets included a boat shed, a small private 
medical facility, and a land auction outfit in Batu Pahat Town (Bandar 
Penggaram). He was also a member of the local Chinese Chamber of 
Commerce, and was licensed to trade in firearms and ammunition.63 Tan 
was probably a middling gentleman with some savings in hand, and his 
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general correspondence with district authorities suggests that he was 
familiar, trusted, and held with some esteem. 
 In June 1929, Tan made two concurrent land applications for oil 
palms. The first was a joint submission with another trader for 50 acres 
near Kangkar Cha’ah. Both applicants stated they had already visited the 
area, finding it suitable for oil palms. Tan’s second application involved a 
request on behalf of 26 of his mostly Chinese and Sakai associates, for five 
acres of land each. Both applications sought to capitalise on the recently-
constructed road between Labis and Yong Peng (Map 6).64 To weather the 
long maturity period of the oil palm, Tan proposed planting coffee as a 
catch crop where soils permitted. Sago palms would be cultivated in the 
swampier areas of the proposed concession. These initial bids were 
subsequently reduced from a total of 180 to 100 acres, so as to assuage the 
Batu Pahat authorities’ concerns that they did not take up excessive road 
frontage. Following further checks, Batu Pahat’s Collector of Land 
Revenue then wrote to Johor’s most senior land official, the Commissioner 
of Lands and Mines, in full support of the application, citing Tan’s 
qualities as ‘an intelligent man of various activities’, who ‘has his oil palm 
seedlings ready for planting…as early as possible’.65 
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Map 6. Extract from land application by Frank Tan and associates to grow oil 
palms and coffee, 1929. Source: ANM-JB: CLR BP 264/29, Enc. 2. 
The subsequent replies of Walter Pepys, Johor’s Commissioner at 
the time, revealed an official more concerned with facilitating land 
applications from larger entities. His immediate response had been to ask 
how Tan would deal with the factory issue given the small size of his 
proposed holding. The Batu Pahat’s land official wrote back to reassure 
Pepys that Tan and his associates were in a good position to sell fruits to 
Labis Estate’s future mill, adding that he himself understood from Mr. 
Roels, a Compagnie du Selangor executive, that the enterprise ‘would by 
no means object to such agreements with small-holders’.66 Pepys then 
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took the trouble to make his own enquiries, and was emphatically told by 
the Compagnie’s designated agent, Robert Michaux, that the firm was 
unwilling to consider such arrangements for Labis because ‘this would 
mean pilfering of the seeds from the Company’s land’.67 Despite the fact 
that Tan already had his own planting materials, Pepys subsequently 
turned down Tan’s application, as well as any other forthcoming 
application for oil palms where the applicant was ‘not prepared to build a 
factory and run the show himself’.68 Nevertheless, Tan persisted with his 
application during August 1929, claiming to have ‘his own method of 
extracting the oil (a Chinese one) and is prepared to run the place himself 
with his own presses’.69  
Just before Tan could be asked for further details of his processing 
arrangements, Harold Tempany, Malaya’s Director of Agriculture, began 
circulating his landmark memorandum, advocating Malaya-wide 
restrictions on small-scale oil palm cultivation.70 The memo reached the 
Johor authorities in mid-September 1929, prompting Pepys to conclusively 
reject Tan’s application the following month.71 The Commissioner based 
his decision on two criteria. First, despite the memo’s recommendation 
that small growers be allowed to sell fruits to large estate mills, Labis 
Estate was unwilling to entertain such arrangements. Second, Pepys’ 
misgivings towards non-European oil extraction methods were reinforced 
by the memo’s pejorative references to hand methods, which were likely 
to have sparked concerns that Tan’s activities would set an undesirable 
local precedent for Malaya if they were permitted by the Johor authorities 
(despite the fact that some Malayan estates were still using hand methods 
to produce palm oil at the time).72 
Put bluntly, Tan had been the victim of unfortunate timing and 
discriminatory treatment. The Compagnie’s land application had been 
given top priority among all ongoing bids for land in the area. The only 
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exceptions to this general rule of thumb stemmed from a July 1929 
decision by Johor’s Executive Council, with the Sultan in attendance, that 
any lands with frontage facing the Yong Peng-Labis road were to be 
reserved for ‘Malay kampong settlement’, presumably as part of a long-
term political imperative to facilitate the enlargement of Johor’s 
permanent Malay population.73 Strangely enough, this latter decision was 
not conveyed to Tan until November 1929, suggesting that the authorities 
maintained a discreet level of flexibility when deciding on an individual 
applicant’s merits.  
As for Tan himself, he was evidently used to pursuing multiple 
ventures, like the Asian planters before him who had made modest forays 
into Malayan rubber cultivation two decades earlier.74 In response to his 
bureaucratic difficulties, he began trying to sell off his entire stock of 
planting material (20,000 seeds and 4,000 oil palm seedlings) by 
September 1929.75 Two years later, he was found expanding his 
commercial activities in the neighbouring town of Benut, offering services 
in taxidermy, leather tanning, arms sales, and rubber tree bark medicine 
(ubat kulit getah).76 Oil palms had been intended to supplement, rather 
than displace his wide array of activities, which, like smallholder 
repertoires, were geared towards diversifying risks, particularly during 
times of considerable economic uncertainty. 
The consequences of such an episode for the smallholder 
participation gap were significant. Like a number of other traders 
interested in oil palm cultivation in Johor during the Depression, Tan, 
with or without his small-scale processing facilities, would have become 
both a palm fruit dealer and wealthy smallholder had his bid been 
approved. With the support of his associates, he would have made 
significant progress towards overcoming the old chicken-and-egg problem 
of acquiring a reliable supply of palm fruits from small growers. Thus, in 
preventing dealers like Tan from acquiring oil palm lands, Johor officials 
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were effectively preventing smallholders from developing relationships 
with buyers of small quantities of palm fruit, relationships that were 
already commonplace in the coconut, rubber, arecanut, and rice sectors. 
In doing so, the authorities also inadvertently ensured that Johore Labis 
would have a local monopoly over fruit processing. This monopoly, as we 
will now see, became a major concern for the authorities when vetting 
future smallholder developments in the area.  
Although historians have credited Socfin with a string of oil palm-
related technological innovations in Malaya, nothing to date has been 
written regarding the group’s attempt to establish Malaya’s first oil palm 
outgrower scheme in the early 1930s.77 The main reason was for this was 
that the scheme never actually saw the light of day, despite being a 
concrete proposal. It therefore contributed little to the company’s public 
profile. Yet, given the group’s prior experiences in West and Central 
Africa, where locals were employed to harvest semi-wild oil palms, it 
should perhaps be unsurprising that somewhat similar arrangements 
would have been tried in Malaya where opportunities arose.78 
The reasons behind the timing and location of the initiative are 
not hard to fathom. Between the end of 1929 and mid-1932, a remarkable 
11,000 acres of land had already been cleared and planted up with oil 
palms at Labis.79 The only areas which Johore Labis Estate had been 
unable to plant were numerous Asian-owned smallholdings scattered 
across the entire concession, as well as two long strips of land on either 
side of the Yong Peng-Labis road axis, one to two kilometres in depth 
(Map 7). While the Johor authorities were content to let Labis buy out the 
former group of smallholdings, they were keen to prevent acquisitions of 
the latter, in line with the Johore Executive Council’s July 1929 decision to 
promote more Malay settlement in Labis. By August 1931, out of an 
estimated 4,648 acres reserved for migrants from the Dutch East Indies, 
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1,674 acres had been taken up.80 This reserved frontage, all on prime land, 
was equivalent to one fifth of Labis Estate’s already considerable land area. 
By this time, estate management, bearing witness to a growing inflow of 
settlers, probably realised that they had a potentially large pool of contract 
labour confined to a compact set of landholdings lodged within the heart 
of the concession. 
 
Map 7.  Johore Labis Estate, with roadside smallholding reserves demarcated, 22 
August 1931. Each blue grid square represents roughly 1 square
 
kilometre of area. 
Source: ANM-JB: CLR BP 208/29, CLR Batu Pahat to Executive Engineer, P.W.D., 
Segamat, February 1936. 
Naturally, the incoming settlers had their own ideas about what to 
do with their lands. They made their presence felt early on, matching, if 
not surpassing Labis Estate’s speed in clearing overgrowth on their 
allotments. Their methods of removing vegetation were so effective that 
Labis Estate’s General Manager, Sydney Rhodes, was compelled to request 
assistance from the Batu Pahat authorities to persuade the smallholders to 
                                                          
80
 ANM-JB: CLR BP 208/29, Minute, CL&M Johore, 6.7.1929; Ibid., Minute, General Adviser, 





temporarily halt their planting preparations in January 1931. Ostensibly 
this was because any fires used by the smallholders to clear underbrush 
would spread to the estate’s own holdings, clashing with the latter’s plans 
to plant up adjacent lands in mid-1931, and add to the costs of weed 
suppression and anti-erosion measures in the meantime by five extra 
months.81 Rhodes, however, may have already been planning to reserve 
these smallholdings for Socfin-approved oil palms, although by September 
1931, the settlers were reportedly already cultivating ‘fruit’ on their lands, 
which may have included coconuts, durians, rambutans or smaller, faster-
maturing annuals.82  
Rhodes seems to have broached the idea of a contract farming 
scheme with the Johor authorities in June 1931, close to the end of Johore 
Labis’ own initial planting schedule.83 By this time, Malayan Cultures’ 
agency had been taken over by Socfin Co. Ltd. itself, due to ongoing 
internal group restructuring.84  As discussions progressed, Rhodes 
revealed more details, encapsulated in a draft contract approved by the 
Director of Socfin himself. Socfin would assist the smallholders by 
providing most of the investment capital for the new crop. In exchange, 
Socfin wanted full control over seed distribution and fruit quality, as 
reflected in the draft contract’s terms.85 With the frontage settlers 
themselves reportedly ‘keen on planting oil palms’, the only major 
remaining concern was that of marketing coordination.86 Here, as Socfin 
executives believed, the assistance of district authorities was crucial, for 
the latter were responsible for helping to nominate suitable marketing 
representatives among the settlers. 
 In ensuing internal discussions, Johor officials were considerably 
more critical of oil palm farming arrangements than in Frank Tan’s case. A 
number of reasons for disapproval were given. There were concerns that 
suboptimal smallholder harvesting practices would lead to poor fruit 
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quality, as well as the proliferation of rats and other pests. These 
accusations drew on stereotypical characterisations of Malay rubber and 
coconut smallholdings, and were based on shallow understandings, if not 
outright falsehoods surrounding Malay grower behaviour.87 Moreover, the 
rat problem was one as old as the oil palm industry itself. Rats typically 
plagued oil palm estates regardless of palm harvesting frequencies. They 
even devoured saplings.88 Nevertheless, Johor’s Land Commissioner went 
one step further, suggesting that any possible infestation on smallholder 
lots would give Labis Estate an excuse to acquire the holdings and 
overturn the Malay settlement plans of the authorities.89 While there were 
some precedents for such amalgamations in the rubber industry, in this 
particular case, the Johor authorities’ underlying assumptions about 
smallholder incompetence and lethargy were questionable, given the 
speed and skill already demonstrated by settlers during land clearance in 
1930 and 1931.90 
 Above all, officials were deeply concerned that the Malay 
smallholders would be putting themselves at the mercy of a monopsony. 
Labis Estate’s General Manager had previously claimed that the outgrower 
scheme would provide a ‘safe 15%’ return to all participants, but both the 
Land Commissioner and Johor’s Principal Agricultural Officer worried 
that the estate would find it convenient to renege on such claims later.91 
Such anxieties among British officials had deeper roots in a liberal 
tradition of antagonism to monopolistic practices.92 Yet the one principal 
safeguard against monopsonistic abuses by a private firm – competition 
from other fruit buyers – had already been eroded by the Johor authorities 
themselves, in their rejection of earlier attempts by Chinese dealers to set 
up their own milling facilities around Labis. Suggestions that the 
                                                          
87
 Drabble, Interwar Years, 248. 
88
 F. W. South, "Annual Report of the Chief Agricultural Inspector for 1922." M Malayan 
Agricultural Journal 11, no. 10 (1923), 253; B. Bunting, "Rat Control on Oil Palm Estates." 
Malayan Agricultural Journal 27, no. 10 (1939), 403-407. 
89
 ANM-JB: CLR BP 374/31, Minute, CL&M Johore, 15.9.1931. 
90
 Lim, Peasants, 140.  
91
 ANM-JB: CLR BP 374/31, Enc. 5; Ibid., Minute, CL&M Johore, 7.9.1931; Ibid., Minute, 
Principal Agricultural Officer Johore, 15.9.1931; GA 235/32, Minute, Principal Agricultural 
Officer Johore, 16.4.1932. 
92
 Keith Sinclair, "Colonial Office Policy towards British Concessionaires and Investors, 




smallholders could consider extracting palm oil themselves were also 
ruled out, following a review of Tempany’s memo criticising labour-
intensive processing techniques.93  
The Johor authorities’ unwillingness to assist with organising palm 
fruit sales was officially communicated to Rhodes in October 1931. This 
was tantamount to an oblique rejection of the scheme, since cooperatives 
were notoriously hard to organise without government assistance.94 
Johor’s official records offer no evidence that the scheme went ahead. 
Ironically, in this instance, the smallholder ‘threat’ to Malayan oil palm 
industry had been repelled on the grounds that the industry was a threat 
to Malay smallholders. In doing so, Johor officials had subverted 
Tempany’s own earlier guidelines on the matter. 
 Prior historiography has typically claimed that oil palm cash 
cropping in the colonial era remained unattainable for Malayan 
smallholders due to the lack of capital and expertise allegedly needed to 
run a vast complex ensuring quick delivery of bulk produce for large-scale 
milling. The Labis proposal irrevocably demonstrates that the more 
important issue was one of grower coordination, which in this case meant 
the willingness of smallholders, processors, and officials to reach a 
negotiated settlement, if crop dealers were not to be part of the equation. 
The Johor authorities had been unwilling to take responsibility for 
introducing the oil palm to Malay smallholders, despite the proposal’s 
safeguards on palm oil quality. Once again, grower stereotypes and fears 
of Malay destitution had shaped the concerns of the British Malayan 
officials. The main barrier to participation in oil palm cash cropping was 
not technological in nature, but political: a fact that would be re-
discovered in the 1950s, when another oil palm outgrower scheme in Johor 
was proposed, this time by the government itself, under the auspices of 
‘land development’. 
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REAL AND IMAGINED PALM OIL CONSUMPTION 
While Malayan administrators fretted over the possible 
consequences of smallholder participation in the oil palm industry, 
scientists at Singapore’s King Edward VII College of Medicine were 
endeavouring to turn palm oil into a locally useful consumer item. After 
running a battery of laboratory tests on edible oils, Professor of 
Biochemistry John Rosedale and his collaborator, Christopher Oliveiro, 
were finally able to declare in 1934 that unbleached palm oil was more 
effective in addressing vitamin A deficiencies than any other locally 
available vegetable oil, including that of coconuts, sesame seeds, and 
groundnuts. All of these other ‘inferior oils’ had no vitamin A equivalent 
content in them.95 Although there were concurrent claims elsewhere that 
coconut water itself contained vitamin A, Rosedale’s experiments found 
these to be untrue.96 
Rosedale and Oliveiro’s praise for palm oil was seemingly 
vindicated the same year by unrefined palm oil’s deployment as a cheap 
substitute for cod liver oil at child welfare centres across Malaya.97 For the 
biochemists, however, palm oil’s potential market went well beyond its 
deployment in medical settings, since palm oil could be used as a cooking 
fat without significant vitamin loss, unlike animal-derived fats like lard or 
ghee.98 In their view, the case for spreading the gospel of palm oil’s health 
benefits to the average Malayan household was undeniable: 
[R]ed palm oil offers an excellent opportunity of 
improving the health of all communities in [Malaya], 
and is a most economical and valuable asset to the daily 
diet in tropical countries…[A]ny attempt to purify it by 
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decolorising is detrimental to the vitamin and the 
decolorised product should always be refused.
99
 
Rosedale and Oliveiro downplayed any possible negative reactions 
to the unbleached, unrefined version of the oil, claiming that its ‘odour 
and taste…are negligible’.100 As evidence, they cited an extract from a 
recent Malayan Agricultural Journal editorial which had noted that crude 
palm oil had been recently used as a cooking oil by local military 
personnel of Malay, Chinese, Indian and Eurasian backgrounds ‘without 
any complaint’.101 Yet they omitted more inconvenient facts found in the 
same source: that other Malay and Chinese individuals had objected to the 
strong colour that unrefined palm oil imparted to cooked food, and that 
palm oil had caused indigestion in some consumers.102  
Rosedale and Oliveiro’s lack of objectivity was symbolic of the 
dilemma they faced. The relevance of their laboratory work ultimately 
hinged on their ability to persuade Malayans to eat food items that the 
biochemists deemed nutritionally superior, including those of an 
unfamiliar nature. Like the chemists of the Malayan Agricultural 
Department, who had tried promoting palm oil locally during the 1920s, 
Rosedale showed no interest in palm oil being introduced through West 
African dishes. But even if he had wanted to pursue this avenue, he would 
have needed an understanding of the organising principles that located 
palm oil within important relationships with other food items. These 
principles, social and cultural in nature, were what infused palm oil with 
meaning as a key ingredient in a satisfying meal, and elevated the 
substance above its prevalent low status as a raw food.103 However, this 
was something that Rosedale had neither the training nor aptitude to 
pursue.  
Instead, the problem, as understood in rigid essentialist terms by a 
contemporary government chemist, was that ‘local races prefer the oils to 
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which they are accustomed, coconut, groundnut, or gingelly as the case 
may be’.104 This conflation of dietary preference with racial categorisation 
was typical of the ethnic pigeonholing associated with British colonial 
policies worldwide at the time.105 They precluded any notion that Asians 
would find a meal of African origin attractive. Paradoxically, any attempt 
to transform palm oil into a colourless substance that could be substituted 
for oils in existing Malayan foodways would destroy the main nutritional 
benefit encased in its pigments.106  
This paradox created an impasse, typified in the recommendations 
of an official Malayan committee for vegetable oils, formed in 1934 to find 
ways to prop up flagging consumer demand for Malayan palm products. 
The committee, chaired by Harold Tempany, was clearly pressed to 
support Malayan oil palm estates by whatever means possible. In 
examining the question of increasing local demand for the industry’s 
products, the Committee acknowledged that palm oil’s ‘repellent…taste 
and appearance’ limited its domestic popularity, but could only offer a 
vague assurance that consumption might be increased ‘by means of 
judicious advertisement’.107  
For the next two decades, the Malayan establishment – chemists, 
medical practitioners, administrators, and those tasked with dispensing 
palm oil to targetted social groups – tried to resolve this impasse by 
adopting Rosedale’s approach to dietary supplementation. Shorn of its 
West African cultural meanings, unrefined palm oil was to be delivered 
from above to those deemed in greatest need of its nutritional benefits, 
regardless of whether this incurred the distrust and displeasure of 
recipients. Adverse consumer reactions did not in fact really matter, as 
long as valuable nutrients were being ingested by colonial bodies, turning 
them into a more productive labour force. This was yet another instance 
of scientifically-backed paternalism, in which palm oil’s promoters 
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expected recipients to become grateful subjects once the latter began 
experiencing the nutritional benefits of palm oil themselves.  
More critically, this promotional approach reflected a racialized 
nutritional philosophy which assumed that Malayans who were 
malnourished were responsible for their own predicament due to 
ignorance and defective dietary traditions, rather than one where ill-
health was rooted in poverty and structural inequality. As we will see in 
Chapters Five and Six, these assumptions proved extremely difficult to 
challenge, even after the mid-1930s, when a surge of new nutritional field 
surveys across Malaya provided clear evidence of a link between poverty 
and malnourishment. What the establishment also did not count on was 
the possibility that in adopting this paternalistic approach to 
supplementation, palm oil would rapidly accumulate new meanings 
stemming from these very same interventions, associations that would 
leave long-lasting negative impressions on the minds of its Malayan 
recipients, and limit palm oil’s uptake in the absence of coercion. 
Ironically, there was another channel through which palm oil had 
already become widely embedded within Malaya’s local economy, one 
which officials had failed to anticipate. This was the domestic soap 
manufacturing sector, which consisted mostly of Chinese-owned 
enterprises of varying scales and capitalisation, clustered around urban 
centres, as well as a rural cottage industry.108  Large-scale soap-making 
seems to have begun as early as the first decade of the twentieth century, 
in tandem with the expansion of Malayan copra milling.109 Cheap supplies 
of copra oil were fundamental to the Malayan soap industry’s growth. 
The upheaval of the Great Depression benefitted soap producers in 
two ways. First, falling prices for Malayan-manufactured vegetable oils 
lowered the costs of raw materials for local manufacturers. Second, soap-
makers, many of whom were agile Chinese enterpreneurs, found growing 
local and regional demand for their products during the slump. Not only 
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did their offerings cost less than imported Western brands, but they were 
often of a comparable, if not superior quality. Local manufacturers were 
thus able to attract poorer customers, as well as wealthier ones looking to 
switch to cheaper alternatives.110 Even in rural areas, artisanal soap-making 
expanded.111 
The biggest mover in this surge was the Ho Hong Soap Factory, a 
natural extension of the Singapore-based Ho Hong business empire’s 
interests in vegetable oil manufacturing since the early twentieth century. 
The soap factory was built close to Ho Hong’s oil mills at Havelock Road 
in 1927, though plans for its erection appear to have begun before the 
1920s.112 Such initiatives were probably prompted by substantial 
overcapacity in the coconut milling sector since at least the 1920s, given 
that soap-making was seen as a useful outlet for excess oil.113 Perhaps 
because of this raw material advantage, the soap offerings of Ho Hong and 
other manufacturers became extremely popular during the Depression. 
Between 1931 and 1934, local manufacturing’s share of the Malayan soap 
market, previously dominated by imports, rose from 10 to 42 per cent. This 
involved a six-fold increase in local soap output to 3,000 tons, with Ho 
Hong accounting for nearly half of this surge.114 However, the popularity of 
Ho Hong’s soaps, especially among middling Malayan classes, was largely 
due to its superior manufacturing processes and product presentation.115 
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The enterprise, in fact, emerged from the Depression as ‘the largest and 
best equipped soap factory in Singapore’ by 1936.116 
 Sometime in the early 1930s, Ho Hong began to use Malayan palm 
oil in its operations, both within its lower-grade laundry bar soaps and 
higher-grade toilet soaps.117 Sales were primarily domestic, but significant 
quantities were also sold abroad, including to British India, China and the 
Dutch East Indies.118 According to Unilever executives, Ho Hong’s premier 
laundry cleanser, Palm Tree, was a ‘very attractive soap…wrapped in a 
good quality greaseproof wrapper’, made from two-thirds copra oil and 
one-quarter palm oil, and ‘faintly perfumed with Safrol’ (Illustration 4).119 
Ho Hong’s commercial success was underlined by the fact that the firm 
was able to charge 50 per cent more for Palm Tree laundry soap than 
products of local competitors in 1934, while still costing a third less than 
Unilever’s competing line, which had to be imported since Unilever had 
no manufacturing facilities in Malaya at the time.120 Indeed, by the mid-
1930s, Palm Tree laundry soap had become so popular in Singapore and 
the surrounding region that Unilever’s rival soap line, Fine Primrose, had 
its recipe changed to include foreign-sourced palm oil, in order to keep 
production costs outside Malaya under control.121 
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Illustration 4. Newspaper advertisement for Palm Tree Soap and Palm Tree 
Cooking Oil, 1932. Source: Singapore Free Press and Mercantile Advertiser, 2 
January 1932, 10. 
 The use of local palm oil in Malayan soap offerings is a clear 
example of what anthropologist Richard Wilk, using Marx’s notion of 
commodity fetishism, has identified as capitalism’s tendency to erase the 
origins of a raw material that becomes increasingly commodified. As 
ingredients are processed, combined, and packaged into a recognisable 
product, the ability of the finished good to attract consumer interest relies 
on identification with the brand itself, rather than the initial materials 
used. However, Wilk exaggerates the geographic distance required, and 
the role Europe plays, in order for this transformation to occur. In Malaya, 
where a Chinese-dominated chemical industry was rapidly expanding 
during the Depression, the erasure of Malayan palm oil’s identity from a 
Singapore-made soap was a product of industrial specialisation itself, and 




and of far-distant exotic places were magically transformed into expensive 
European luxury products…to be disperse[d] once again around the 
world’.122 The making of palm oil into an industrial manufacture, rather 
than an artisanal good, thus contained significant Chinese capitalist 
contributions, even prior to the more well-known period after Malaya’s 
independence. 
 Ho Hong’s physical proximity to Johor, where palm oil production 
was increasing rapidly, put the firm in an excellent position to capitalise 
on cheap domestic supplies of crude palm oil (as well as Johor-sourced 
copra). By 1932, a tenth of Malaya’s ‘poorer quality’ oil palm produce was 
reportedly being retained in-country for local soap manufacture, 
presumably mostly for Ho Hong’s activities.123 Ho Hong had also 
reportedly begun selling palm oil abroad by 1931 under its ‘Elephant’ 
cooking oil trademark, though little else of this business is known to 
date.124 Here, there may have been some similarities to concurrent 
developments elsewhere in Malaya. For instance, the Danish-owned Ulu 
Bernam Estate had recently begun production of bleached palm oil for 
export to British India and the Middle East for soap-making purposes.125 
In effect, the ‘small parcels of low-grade oil’ that Harold Tempany 
had feared would emerge from the Malayan industry had been realised 
within three years of his memo’s circulation, despite the efforts of colonial 
administrators to stop the spread of oil palm smallholdings and manual 
fruit processing methods.126 Contrary to Tempany’s assumptions, however, 
the main sources of this low-quality oil were not smallholdings (which 
could not possibly have accounted for a tenth of all palm oil and kernel 
production at the time), but established estates which had had to cut back 
on field and factory labour during the Great Depression in order to 
survive.127  
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Most Malayan agricultural officials studiously ignored these 
developments, which is understandable given that such events lay beyond 
their range of influence. Only in mid-1934, with Tempany chairing a 
committee tasked with reviewing the economic health of Malaya’s oil crop 
industries, was the soap industry acknowledged as an outlet for Malayan 
palm oil. Even then, its presence was begrudged, and limited to a few 
words noting that some palm oil was ‘being consumed by local soap 
works’.128 Any further acknowledgement of this avenue was incongruent 
with the Committee’s own preferences, which involved promoting 
Malayan palm oil’s public image and reputation as a premium export, 
whose quality was supposedly ‘uniformly of a very high standard’.129 
Revealingly, in its recommendations for safeguarding the commercial 
viability of Malaya’s vegetable oil producers, the Committee did not 
suggest increasing the use of palm oil within local soap works, despite 
advocating higher amounts of copra oil for domestic soap manufacture.130 
Nevertheless, Tempany’s fears of bad oil pushing out the good did 
not come to pass. The Depression accelerated the one development which 
helped consolidate control over the quality of palm oil destined for high-
grade markets, namely, the permanent establishment of bulk shipping 
facilities for palm oil in Singapore, and the gradual obsolescence of costly 
barrels. From 1931 onwards, palm oil produce was pooled in fewer vessels 
of larger capacities prior to shipment. It became much easier to inspect 
and reject incoming stocks if they failed to meet low-acid stipulations.131 
Not coincidentally, bulk shipping also drove down overall production 
costs by at least $34 per ton of palm oil.132 
Yet, the emphasis on low-acid palm oil belied the fact that the 
strategy only began to yield significant commercial benefits after the 
Second World War, when advances in refining techniques amidst a global 
scarcity of edible oils finally enabled palm oil to enter the margarine 
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sector in significant amounts. Throughout the 1930s, Malayan oil palm 
growers failed to make inroads into the much-vaunted American edibles 
sector. This appears to have been due to concerns over present and future 
protectionism from the United States, and the preference of Malaya’s bulk 
sellers for British imperial markets during this period.133 Moreover, 
margarine makers in the United States and Europe had different raw 
material preferences, due to varying consumer patterns. In the United 
States, margarine was typically used as a cooking fat, whereas in the 
United Kingdom and Europe margarine was used mainly as a butter 
substitute on bread. These differences made it harder for palm oil (and 
even copra oil) to make further forays into the European margarine 
industry. Prevailing refinery technologies meant that whale and soya bean 
oil were now preferred for their superior vitamin-bearing and hardness-
lending properties respectively.134 As such, most Malayan palm oil exports 
were channelled into the less remunerative soap and tin-plating sectors in 
the United Kingdom and Canada.135 
The commercial survival of the Malayan oil palm industry during 
the 1930s thus owed little to the much-vaunted quality of its palm oil. 
Aside from the new transport cost economies derived from bulk shipment, 
the Malayan authorities themselves helped keep costs down through 
exemptions on export duties and land rents. Following consultations by an 
official committee convened to review the affairs of Malaya’s oil crop 
industries in the 1934, all oil palm concession quit-rents in the Federated 
Malay States were reduced to the level of Johor’s (then 50 cents per annum 
for the first six years, and $1 per acre thereafter). As for Johor, its land 
tenure conditions were already felt to be so favourable that the 
committee, chaired by Harold Tempany, did not think any further 
reductions were possible. These discounts lasted seven years until 1941, 
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the eve of the Japanese Occupation in Malaya. Similar measures were 
concurrently instituted in the coconut sector, but these tended to benefit 
larger growers whose land rents were higher to begin with.136 
It is still a matter of conjecture why dealers and smallholders did 
not take more advantage of the new local markets for low-quality palm oil 
in soap and cooking oil manufacture. Besides official discrimination 
against small-scale oil palm planting, many dealers and wealthier Chinese 
smallholders in Johor probably still found it more profitable to rely on the 
catch cropping of pineapples in conjunction with rubber cultivation, 
where soils permitted.137 In turn, there were fewer dealers present 
interested in buying palm fruit from smallholders. 
Household demand for unrefined palm oil would have 
circumvented these obstacles to smallholder oil palm cultivation, but the 
author was unable to find any evidence during this period to suggest that 
Malayan households had developed a habit of consuming palm oil on a 
regular basis. Most signs in fact pointed to the inability of the oil, in its 
various guises, to penetrate local foodways. On the contrary, it was the 
coconut that had become even more domestically-oriented during 
Depression, reflecting a local material culture that continued to prize its 
products more highly than those of the oil palm’s. 
 
CONCLUSION 
The Great Depression placed Malaya’s export trade in coconut, oil 
palm, and rubber products under considerable strain. Smallholders 
involved in these three major cash crops adapted to the impact of falling 
prices by reducing production costs further, learning (or re-learning) 
alternative production and marketing practices, and shifting labour into 
other activities, including arecanut production. Yet the known evidence 
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for these strategies remains sketchy, making specific questions regarding 
rural labour allocation hard to answer conclusively. This is especially 
significant for studies of the Depression, a period when one would expect 
major changes in labour allocation to occur, creating new imbalances in 
various sectors. 
In keeping with the general neglect of coconut farming in 
historical research, there has been virtually no research on the history of 
animal labour in conjunction with coconut palms in Malaya, not least the 
use of coconut monkeys for crop harvesting, a strategy which continues in 
present-day Thailand. Why such practices were apparently less popular in 
Malaya’s southern regions, compared to its northern half, remains 
unclear. Regional differences in human labour costs may be responsible. 
Also, because monkeys were used mainly to harvest taller, older trees, this 
may have limited the application of monkey labour in Johor during this 
period, since many palms were only planted during the 1920s.138 
Alternatively, since monkeys in general were officially categorised as 
wildlife rather than livestock, detailed evidence of monkey labour might 
simply be buried in scattered locations within the Malaysian archives, 
waiting to be found. 
There are similar difficulties with recovering historical information 
on gendered aspects of coconut-related labour, as opposed to those for 
other crops, such as rice. Again, this may reflect greater colonial (and 
scholarly) interest in certain topics, than the reality of women’s historical 
roles in coconut production. Christiaan Heersink has suggested that the 
burden of copra production in neighbouring Sulawesi fell 
disproportionately on women during the late nineteenth century, 
enabling exports to be scaled up, but nothing comparable has surfaced for 
Malaya to date.139 Indeed, more work on gender differences in household 
labour in general might also help to address the question of why drainage 
infrastructure, so central to coastal Malaya’s agricultural efforts, grew 
increasingly neglected during the Depression. 
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Even harder to document are intangible but important socio-
cultural factors reinforcing the persistence of smallholder coconut 
farming, and the unpopularity of oil palm smallholdings. These include 
farmer perceptions of coconuts as a ‘safe haven’ regardless of current 
prices, because of their long history of cultivation and established 
markets. Similarly, the idea that smallholders were averse to oil palm 
farming because they lacked confidence in the crop’s long-term market 
prospects cannot be excluded.140 But both notions are difficult to 
substantiate rigorously, not least because the official records from which 
such evidence can be drawn are already infused with colonial stereotypes 
of Malay smallholders as conservative and overwhelmingly traditional in 
their outlook. Given these difficulties, the comparative study of oil crop 
consumption patterns undertaken throughout this thesis probably 
remains the next best solution. 
 
                                                          
140




THE FIRST NARROWING OF THE PARTICIPATION GAP, 1934-1941. 
 
 In Malaya, the period between 1934 and 1941 has often been treated 
as a momentary lull, bookended by the dramas of the Great Depression 
and the Japanese Occupation (1942-1945). This perspective unfortunately 
overlooks crucial developments that occurred during this period. 
Redressing such neglect is not simply a matter of highlighting the longer-
term impacts of the Depression on Malayan economy and society, or 
understanding how the events of the Japanese Occupation had earlier 
precedents. The closing phase of the interwar years also needs to be 
appreciated on its own terms, as a time when ideological battles within 
the halls of Malayan administration entered uncharted territory, and the 
chasm between locals and Malayan authorities yawned wider than ever. 
More than anything, it was a supremely frustrating period for 
smallholders, as opportunities to shift Malaya’s agricultural trajectory in 
greater favour of small-scale arrangements were repeatedly squandered. 
These issues have been substantively covered for Malayan rubber.1 
Nothing similar has yet been recounted for the oil and coconut palm 
sectors, where much had been envisioned for smallholders, and little 
delivered. 
 This entire episode can be explored through three interconnected 
enquiries. First, it is crucial to understand why some colonial attitudes 
towards the plight of smallholders interested in oil and coconut palm 
farming swung hard in their favour during the period. Second, we need to 
comprehend why these shifts amounted to little in actual policy 
implementation by the end of 1941. Third, there is the challenge of 
assessing what these events actually entailed for smallholder involvement 
in both crops, given important developments concurrently unfolding 
within Malaya’s broader economy. 
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  Shifts in official attitudes were sparked by the fallout from the 
Depression, but took different forms in each oil crop sector. In the 
Malayan oil palm industry, the main impetus for change was external, 
originating with the Colonial Office in London. Here, a new strategy 
prizing grower self-sufficiency was formulated by senior agricultural 
officials, in a bid to stave off social upheaval in Britain’s tropical colonies. 
The new approach acknowledged that smallholders, often presumed to be 
living within closed-off, subsistence-oriented communities, had actually 
been at the forefront of a great expansion of commodity production for 
international markets in previous decades. This was something which 
colonial administrators in many other colonies, including Malaya’s, had 
previously found difficult to accept, preferring plantation cash cropping 
arrangements where possible. With its vitamin-rich fruits and latent 
potential as a peasant food crop, the oil palm was to play an 
unprecedented role in the promotion of smallholder farming 
intensification in Malaya. 
In the coconut sector, where Malayan authorities were already 
supportive of smallholder participation, changing attitudes were primarily 
driven by domestic concerns, as officials began to develop a better 
appreciation of local environmental challenges threatening to overwhelm 
coastal farms, albeit one that was still very crude in its understanding of 
ecological dynamics. Here, the shift was one from a narrow focus on copra 
production and marketing, to one that encompassed drainage problems 
endemic to the West Coast since the early twentieth century. This quiet 
revolution in thought was triggered by the realisation that copra 
improvement policies would undoubtedly fail if the environmental aspects 
of the problem were not tackled first. 
 The inability of these changing attitudes to translate into actual 
policy delivery stemmed from the weight of bureaucratic inertia. This was 
especially so in Johor, where decades of government understaffing amidst 
rapid agricultural expansion had left the state’s leading British officials 
strongly inclined towards consolidating the status quo, rather than 





further. Where actual oil palm smallholdings did arise, and come to the 
attention of authorities, responses remained apathetic, if not hostile. The 
premature departure of Malaya’s most senior official proponent of 
smallholder oil palm farming only worsened this torpor. 
In the case of coconuts, Johor authorities had failed to accumulate 
any local expertise in dealing with the scale of perceived drainage 
problems along the West Coast, and preferred to delay rehabilitation 
schemes until they had built internal capacity in the matter. Meanwhile, 
professional aloofness and political concerns made officials reluctant to 
embrace alternative strategies. These included allowing Chinese and 
Indian growers to shore up local coastal defences themselves, and moving 
settlers from the worst-affected areas of the coastline to better farmland 
elsewhere in Johor. By being adverse to such alternatives, the authorities 
limited the range of livelihood options accessible to smallholders, and 
compounded the agricultural troubles they were already facing. 
 This situation would have led to even sorrier outcomes for Johor’s 
smallholders, if not for their efforts to tap into the remaining 
opportunities for livelihood diversification during the period. Most of 
these approaches bought some time for smallholders, and kept Johor’s 
coconut farms afloat. Growers persisted with strategies adopted during 
the Depression to stem the decline of coastal forest rent, including the 
cultivation of a wide variety of crops adapted to waterlogged soils. 
Participation in non-farm activities such as fishing, mining and forest 
product gathering also appeared to rise, although mangrove harvesting 
probably aggravated flooding in localities where extraction was over-
intensified. Markets for coconuts themselves continued to be resilient, as 
new uses for copra were found. Old habits of household coconut 
consumption persisted, and perhaps even increased.  
The omission of oil palms from most smallholder repertoires 
during the period is glaring, given that the tree adapted well to many of 
West Johor’s poorly draining coastal soils. The main problem was that the 





developments. The domestic market for palm oil as an industrial soap 
feedstock appears to have expanded further. Efforts to promote unrefined 
palm oil as an edible substance were also scaled up. However, the 
persistent inability and unwillingness of elites to conceive of unrefined 
palm oil as anything more than a vehicle for vitamins constrained palm 
oil’s popularity with recipients. In many cases, provisioning led to 
counterproductive results. For smallholders interested in oil palm 
cultivation, all this made proximity to central processing facilities, coupled 
with collective grower action, essential to successful cash cropping. 
However, this was a farming strategy that Johor’s senior administrators 
remained unwilling to support, except for crops which met their approval, 
such as coconuts. 
 
REHABILITATION OF THE MALAYAN SMALLHOLDER 
By the mid-1930s, London’s Colonial Office had embarked on a 
major review of its role regarding native welfare. This was partly in 
response to social unrest roiling its African and West Indian colonies, 
sparked by the economic upheaval of the Great Depression. 
Unprecedented drops in primary export earnings had fuelled widespread 
social deprivation and growing unemployment. Another cyclical 
downturn in 1937-1938 lent further urgency to the Colonial Office’s sense 
that imperial strategies had to pay closer attraction to trusteeship 
concerns than they had in the past, if Britain was not to lose control of its 
colonies.2 
The Colonial Office’s response was to double down on colonial 
agricultural strategies. It began to craft a more holistic approach to native 
farming that would prize greater self-sufficiency, heightened levels of soil 
conservation, and higher nutritional standards than had been allegedly 
attained previously. This view was shaped by underlying anxieties about 
land degradation, soil erosion, overcrowding, and malnourishment in the 
                                                          
2
 Joseph Morgan Hodge, Triumph of the Expert: Agrarian Doctrines of Development and the 





colonies. According to historian Joseph Hodge, the principal architects of 
this new integrated strategy were the Colonial Office’s leading agricultural 
advisers at the time, consisting of Frank Stockdale (the former Director of 
Agriculture at Ceylon), and Professor Frank Engledow (then-Director of 
Cambridge University’s School of Agriculture).3  
Inspiration was drawn from path-breaking investigations into 
indigenous farming systems, conducted in Nigeria during the 1920s. These 
had been led by two senior agricultural officers stationed in the colony, 
Odin Faulkner and James Mackie. Their research was driven by the notion 
that native cultivation methods, while capable of improvement, had been 
responsible for an astounding degree of commodity production during the 
late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries.4 What the Colonial Office 
found especially useful about Faulkner and Mackie’s research was how 
their findings demonstrated the local utility of peasant agriculture, while 
leaving room for its improvement through systematic research.5 
Through Stockdale and Engledow, a growing institutional 
consensus was forged around the idea that agricultural practices along 
‘native lines’, while now recognised for their suitability to local conditions, 
needed external guidance to adapt to a world where land scarcity and 
overpopulation were now supposedly the norm. The institution of the 
Colonial Office, and its itinerant Agricultural Advisers, were to form the 
vanguard of this movement towards more intensive smallholder farming 
practices. Paradoxically, colonial officials knew little about how this was to 
be achieved, given the paucity of research on smallholdings, relative to 
that on estate agriculture.6 
One solution was to promote field experiments within the colonies 
themselves. In 1935, the Colonial Office identified Malaya as a region long 
overdue for a visit from the Agricultural Adviser, who at the time 
remained Stockdale. Stockdale had previously used such visits to the 
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colonies to hammer out research priorities and disseminate new ideas. His 
Malayan tour of early 1938 was geared towards developing measures which 
would enhance native welfare, including the re-evaluation and promotion 
of local food and cash crops for their nutritional value. As was usual 
practice, Stockdale prepared a post-visit report outlining his findings and 
recommendations.7 
The portions of the report dealing with oil palms dealt a sharp 
rebuke to past beliefs and practices of Malayan authorities. Stockdale 
criticised the fact that oil palm research in Malaya had been mostly to the 
benefit of estates, rather than smallholders. Efforts to redress this 
imbalance were overdue: ‘there is little doubt that…trials of oil palms, with 
the use of small presses recently found to be satisfactory in West Africa – 
are worthy… if only for the production of red palm oil as an addition to 
the normal diet of the people’’.8 This argument harmonised with what 
Stockdale had generally seen as the need for smallholders to be producing 
more tropical fruits, for economic and subsistence-related reasons.9  In 
practical terms, he suggested using local agricultural stations to foster 
small-scale oil palm cash cropping experiments, intending to catalyse 
peasant-centred initiatives across Malaya.10 
In a region where estates practically monopolised all oil palm 
cultivation, Stockdale’s recommendations must have been controversial. 
However, his interventions were dwarfed by those launched by Odin 
Faulkner, whose earlier work with Nigerian smallholders had provide the 
scientific justifications for the Colonial Office’s ‘smallholder turn’. In 1936, 
Faulkner stepped in to fill the vacancy left by the departure of Harold 
Tempany, Malaya’s Director of Agriculture since 1929. Compared to 
Tempany, Faulkner was more supportive of the notion that smallholders 
could engage in commercially robust oil palm cultivation. He almost 
certainly saw his time in Malaya as an opportunity to continue research 
and extension work previously carried out on Nigerian oil palm cash 
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cropping. Ironically, this earlier programme been driven by concerns 
regarding the competitive threat posed by exports of high-quality 
plantation-sourced oil from Sumatra and Malaya since the 1920s.11 
In Nigeria, Faulkner had overseen trials of various manually-
operated palm fruit processing machines. By 1931, a clear leader had 
emerged amongst the various contenders: a hand-operated curb press 
manufactured by wine press makers Andre Duchscher and Co. of 
Luxembourg. The press raised small-scale palm oil extraction ratios to a 
maximum of 70 per cent, and soon became popular among producers. At 
one point, there may have been as many as 10,000 units operating in 
Eastern Nigeria alone.12 Nevertheless, the Duchscher press was too costly 
for most Nigerian households to own. They remained instruments to be 
possessed by dealers, who rented them out to smallholders, or bought 
fruit themselves and hired labour to operate the machines.13 
Within several months of his arrival, Faulkner had arranged for the 
most popular press model used in Nigeria (the N.G. No. 1 type) to be sent 
from England, and set up at the Federal Experiment Station in Serdang 
(Photograph 13). During field trials, the unit was fed with local palm fruit, 
following established Nigerian practices.14 The press was able to recover 72 
per cent of palm oil from one batch of fruit, with a resultant free fatty acid 
level of just 2.7 per cent, well below the industry cap of 5 per cent.15 
Although such results seemed impressive, they were not actually very 
different from the results that been achieved by similar small-scale presses 
in Malayan estates during the 1920s and early 1930s. But the results 
nevertheless served as a reminder to interested officials that oil quality 
was not primarily dependent on machinery size. What mattered was the 
speed which with harvested palm fruits could be prepared for crushing, 
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something which had been commonly achieved in 1920s Malaya using 
labour-intensive methods.  
 
Photograph 13. The N.G. No. 1 Duchscher Press. Source: Milsum et al., Small-Scale 
Extraction, 54-55. 
What really made a difference this time round was the desire to 
engage smallholders, rather than estates. This had completely altered the 
circumstances surrounding the press’s introduction, as well as initial 
reception to the results of the trials. The research officers in charge of the 
experiments, John Milsum and Charles Georgi, channelled their 
enthusiasm into the Malayan Agricultural Journal’s February 1938 issue, 
arguing that smallholders would likely benefit from use of the Duchscher 
press, due to the machinery’s relatively low overheads and operating costs. 
At this point, however, their views began to diverge from those of 
Stockdale’s and his nutritionally-minded sympathisers. Milsum and 





palm oil, making a subsistence-oriented approach unlikely. Instead, they 
contended that palm oil production for external industrial markets could 
be more viable with the press. They envisioned smallholders selling palm 
oil directly to shippers in steel drums, bypassing the estate-mill complex.16 
Admittedly, processing cost economies were still significant. 
Priced at $170, the Duchscher press was well beyond the budget of most 
households (the average monthly expenditure of a Malay family of five in 
rural Selangor was estimated to be $11.26 in 1934).17 Furthermore, the 
machine only ran at full capacity in conjunction with 80 acres of oil palm 
holdings. The editorial accompanying Milsum and Georgi’s article pointed 
out that merchants and shippers would be unlikely to accept any 
quantities of palm oil below 5 tons in volume, making bulk selling 
arrangements imperative.18 The likely reality was that, as in Nigeria, 
dealers would be the main proprietors of the press, but this was not 
something that could be publicly stated, given the ongoing political 
unpopularity of non-Malay dealers in Malaya.  
Nevertheless, as with the model copra kiln schemes of the first half 
of the 1930s, federal officials hoped that new processing technologies 
would transform the economics of smallholder cash cropping. Just months 
after the publication of Milsum and Georgi’s landmark article, the 
Duchscher press was already being showcased by the Agricultural 
Department at the Malayan Agri-Horticultural Association’s Fifteenth 
Malayan Exhibition in Kuala Lumpur, a major event attracting some 
46,679 viewers that year. With top dignitaries including the Sultan of 
Selangor in attendance, the Exhibition’s guest-of-honour, High 
Commissioner of the Federated Malay States Sir Shenton Thomas gave the 
opening speech in which he invited audience members to view the press’s 
workings onsite.19 These were the actions of federal officials who had every 
                                                          
16
 Ibid., 53. 
17
 Drabble, Interwar Years, 137. 
18
 Anon., "Editorial: Small-Scale Palm Oil Production." Malayan Agricultural Journal 26, no. 
2 (1938), 52. 
19






intention of encouraging smallholder oil palm farming arrangements in 
Malaya.  
 
THE BACKLASH AGAINST OIL PALM SMALLHOLDERS IN JOHOR 
Nevertheless, federal officials appeared unaware that oil palm 
smallholder collectives were already taking shape within Malaya, 
independent of the Duchscher unit’s arrival. In Johor, the most detailed 
record of actual oil palm involvement during this period comes from the 
sub-district of Ayer Hitam, northwest Johor. Sometime around 1933-1934, 
an individual named Haji Omar bin Abdullah planted several acres’ worth 
of oil palms in this locality. It is unclear if his lands were expressly 
alienated for oil palms, in which case conditions specifying the need for a 
nearby factory (none of which existed at the time in Ayer Hitam) ought to 
have been stipulated. More plausibly, Hj. Omar’s lands were granted for 
the cultivation of crops other than rubber, with no express condition 
against oil palms; a regulatory loophole that was only closed by Johor’s 
Commissioner of Lands and Mines in 1936.20 
Hj. Omar’s circumstances are largely unknown, but probably 
exceptional. According to Muar District’s top land official, Hj. Omar was 
reportedly ‘a Japanese who [had] entered Islam and whose family [had] 
assimilated Malay culture’.21 How the official acquired such knowledge is 
unclear, but his claims are corroborated by circumstantial evidence. Prior 
to the Japanese Occupation of 1942, some Japanese families who had 
settled in nearby Batu Pahat had already converted to Islam, with ‘very 
good knowledge of local languages such as Malay and Mandarin’.22 
Unfortunately, Hj. Omar’s Japanese alias, and details of his family 
arrangements, remain unknown. 
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On the one hand, Hj. Omar, who had a postal address in the town 
of Muar by 1941, may have started out as a planter, like many other 
Japanese nationals who initially had come to Malaya to work for Japanese-
owned rubber plantations during the 1910s. The vast majority of these 
Japanese estates had mushroomed in Johor during and after Malaya’s first 
rubber boom, drawing thousands of new Japanese sojourners to the 
state.23 By the early 1920s, however, the Japanese Malayan rubber sector 
had run into severe headwinds, following the passing of new British 
Malayan laws discriminating against non-British rubber investment in 
Malaya from 1917 to 1919, and sharp falls in global rubber prices shortly 
afterwards.24 With debts steadily mounting, many Japanese estate owners 
either sold up their estates during the mid-1920s, or diversified away from 
rubber.25 Indeed, within the Sango Koshi Estate group – the oldest and 
biggest of the Japanese Malayan rubber enterprises - oil palms had been 
planted experimentally in Johor by the end of 1930.26 Someone like Hj. 
Omar may have thus acquired knowledge of oil palm cash cropping via 
this route.  
On the other hand, we cannot rule out the notion of Hj. Omar 
having engaged in petty trading, perhaps in addition to plantation work. 
Such activities, like those of other Japanese contemporaries working in 
Malaya, would have brought him into frequent contact with various 
individuals and businesses in Johor’s hinterlands, including oil palm 
estates.27 However, Japanese residents in nearby Batu Pahat were 
reportedly shunned by Chinese, which would have made it difficult for 
them to sell popular tree crops, such as rubber, coconuts, and copra, to 
Chinese dealers dominating the trade.28 It is otherwise difficult to explain 
Hj. Omar’s willingness and ability to enter a new economic niche by 
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undertaking a large number of oil palm plantings from his own resources, 
without any other oil palm estates or factories in the immediate vicinity.  
We should also avoid excluding the likelihood of Hj. Omar having 
been recruited as a spy for Japanese intelligence before the Occupation. If 
he had been taken on, the scope of his social and economic activities (like 
that of many other Japanese Malayans) would probably have been 
extended beyond what would normally have been expected.29 Even so, this 
possibility should not detract from the fact that Hj. Omar was genuinely 
committed to Muar’s social and economic life in the long term. By 1937, 
Hj. Omar’s holdings were flourishing, with what appeared to be 40 acres 
of newly fruiting palms.30 These lands were held via an enterprise known 
as the Sister Company Ltd., for which Hj. Omar claimed to be ‘the 
managing partner’.31 Despite the dislocations of the Japanese Occupation 
during the 1940s, Hj. Omar resumed his business activities after the war. 
In 1950, he was in fact found applying to the Muar authorities for a new 
title deed for one of Sister Company’s agricultural holdings, to replace 
losses of documents during wartime from his former residence at Jalan 
Bakri.32   
These ambiguities are further confounded by the fact that, by 1941, 
Sister Company’s landholdings formed the core of a much larger 120-acre 
cluster, owned in parts by 20 other neighbours and associates. This was, in 
essence, the first ever recorded instance of an independently-run oil palm 
smallholder collective in Johor. Over half of this entire acreage was held 
by Malay households, who had only begun to plant oil palms on their 
lands from 1938-1939 onwards, just one to two years after Hj. Omar’s 
palms had fruited (Table 2).33 The opportunity to witness the harvesting – 
and perhaps even processing – of oil palm fruit first-hand would probably 
have encouraged other smallholders to get involved.  
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Presumably, Hj. Omar and his family’s integration into Malay 
society had helped build trust and camaraderie, persuading other 
smallholders to brave the risks associated with a new tree crop. While the 
specific context was unusual – not least because the pre-Second World 
War Japanese community in Malaya was allegedly ‘aloof and self-
contained’ on the whole34 – the oil palm cluster’s underlying dynamics are 
typical of how innovative smallholders outside the Malay Peninsula 






Held By Cultivated Remarks 
(a) 19 56 
Sister Co. 
Ltd. 
Oil palm 1-8 
years old 
No breach of condition 
(b) 10 28 
Malay small 
holders 
Oil palm 1-3 
years old 
No breach of condition 
(c) 13 36 
Malay small 
holders 
Oil palm 1-3 
years old 
Breach of condition 







condition prohibiting oil 
palm etc. 




(f) 2 6 State Land - - 
Total 78 230 120 acres of oil palms 
Table 2. The Ayer Hitam oil palm smallholder cluster, September 1941. Source: 
CL&M 584/41, CLR Muar to CL&M Johore, 8.9.1941 
The cluster began attracting attention from Johor’s senior land 
authorities in 1941. This resulted from the cluster’s attempt to acquire 
more farmland the previous year. In this earlier case, Muar’s Land Office 
had responded by offering 64 fresh acres to the smallholders, provided 
that they were not used to cultivate oil palms. Disappointed with this 
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offer, Hj. Omar and 19 other individuals responded in January 1941 by 
petitioning the Muar Office to have this restriction removed. 
The crucial issue, according to the growers, was that they needed 
more lands specifically for oil palms, in order to increase the commercial 
viability of their activities: ‘[W]e find that it is a very difficult problem to 
produce the profits thereon from the small area unless we have more areas 
cultivated [with oil palms]. More over [sic] the expenses for extracting oil 
from the small holding will cost more money and will incure losses [sic]’.36 
No details of processing methods were given, but it seems reasonable to 
assume that some kind of small press was being operated by the 
smallholders, well below capacity at the time. 
In contrast to previous responses to smallholder interest in oil 
palms in Johor during the early 1930s, official attitudes towards the plight 
of the cluster began on a remarkably positive note. This ideological shift 
was a direct outcome of earlier efforts made by Faulkner and his 
colleagues in the federal bureaucracy to promote small-scale oil palm 
farming across Malaya. Johor’s State Agricultural Officer, A. E. Coleman-
Doscas, was initially consulted for his views on the issue by Muar’s local 
authorities. His response, detailed in a memorandum, showed familiarity 
with the recent history of curb press trials at Serdang, as well as Faulkner’s 
strong support for small-scale oil palm farming. Writing to Muar’s local 
agricultural officer in August 1941, he was unreservedly happy to oblige the 
petitioners’ request: 
[T]here appears to be no reason why the cultivation of 
Oil Palm should not be introduced [in Malaya] in the 
same manner as in Nigeria, and that the development of 
the area concerned [at Ayer Hitam] should provide 
valuable information in this connexion. You should 
suggest that the aggregate area [for oil palms] should not 
be more than 200 acres, and that holdings should as far 
as possible be contiguous to facilitate centralised 
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manufacture. We will do all we can to assist in extraction 
and marketing when the areas come into bearing.
37
 
Muar’s Collector of Land Revenue was initially enthused by this 
view. In his missive to Johor’s most senior land authority, the 
Commissioner of Lands and Mines, he recommended that all areas 
occupied by the smallholders be officially approved for oil palm 
cultivation, including those previously planted illegally (Table 2). He even 
suggested going beyond what the smallholders themselves had requested, 
recommending that another 40 acres being currently used for food crops 
could be converted to oil palms, if desired by their owners.38 
 The Commissioner, O. E. Venables, was reluctant to support such 
an unprecedented development. His immediate reaction was to comb 
through past land regulations concerning oil palms in Johor.39 Unable to 
find anything regarding smallholder oil palm cultivation, he pursued a 
different line of enquiry, asking Johor’s State Agricultural Officer if he 
knew of any actual oil palm smallholdings in Malaya, outside of Johor. 
Coleman-Doscas had no personal knowledge of such developments, and 
looked towards Malaya’s annual compendium of agricultural statistics for 
guidance. He was unable to find any such evidence in the compendium’s 
1940 edition, but this was a foregone conclusion. Since the publication 
first began in 1931, oil palm acreage statistics had been derived from 
returns from estates, with no separate category assigned to smallholders, 
unlike for the rubber and coconut sectors.40 This flawed methodology was 
probably responsible for the exclusion of Johor’s 40 acre oil palm 
smallholding from the compendium, despite its mention in the State 
Agricultural Officer of Johor’s annual report for 1937.41 Coleman-Doscas 
thus had no written means with which to sway the Commissioner’s 
judgement in a more favourable direction. As had been the case with the 
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authorities’ handling of smallholder interest in oil palms during the 
Depression years, official notions that oil palms were unsuitable for small-
scale cultivation were continuing to be a self-fulfilling prophecy. 
 Worse still, as Coleman-Doscas realised when digging deeper into 
past records, the most prominent correspondence on the matter had been 
authored in 1929 by Harold Tempany, Malaya’s now-former Director of 
Agriculture. Upon re-discovering Tempany’s memorandum, which 
advocated the prohibition of oil palm smallholdings except for fruit sales 
to a nearby estate mill, Coleman-Doscas seems to have felt obliged to 
submit the document to Venables for the latter’s consideration. Coleman-
Doscas could not have failed to notice the fundamental conflict between 
Tempany’s hostility to small-scale processing methods, and his direct 
successor Odin Faulkner’s own support for ‘Nigerian-style’ palm fruit 
production.42 Unfortunately for Coleman-Doscas, Faulkner was no longer 
around to weigh in on the matter, having already left to assume a 
prestigious posting in Trinidad as Principal of the Imperial College of 
Tropical Agriculture, barely three years after arriving in Malaya.43 
Commissioner Venables, evidently taken with Tempany’s old 
memo, forwarded it to Muar’s Collector of Land Revenue to consider, 
prefacing the material with the warning that ‘this does not look very 
hopeful’.44 The Muar official, a general administrator rather than an 
agricultural specialist, now sided with the Commissioner. He took it upon 
himself to deny the petitioners their request. In a complete turnaround 
from his earlier stance, he also began preparing punitive measures for 36 
acres of land on which oil palms had been illegally planted (Map 8).45 
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Map 8. The Ayer Hitam oil palm smallholder cluster, 1941. Plots outlined in red 
were already planted with young oil palm, breaching existing land conditions. 
Source: ANM-JB: CL&M 584/41, Enc. 2. 
 It did not have to end this way. Those scrutinizing Tempany’s  
missive of 1929 would have found that its denunciation of small-scale 
palm fruit processing methods was now highly questionable, given the 
recent advances made by the Duchscher press in Malaya. With their 
previous experience supporting smallholder copra processing and 
marketing initiatives, the Johor authorities were enviably well-positioned 
to support the cluster’s efforts. One problem seems to have lain within 
Johor’s bureaucracy, as it gradually expanded in scope and complexity 
during the interwar years. Bureaucratic authority had become increasingly 
compartmentalised and reserved for those at its apex, namely general 





Collectors of Land Revenue.46 Agricultural specialists were still relied on 
for advice, if not increasingly so, but Johor’s generalists had the last say in 
matters of governance. 
The fundamental issue was how those holding state power saw 
their roles in relation to those beneath them. For Johor’s senior 
administrators, the idea of smallholders forming their own producer 
cooperatives, would, in other circumstances, have been strongly 
encouraged. Throughout the second half of the 1930s, the Johor 
government had successfully supported the attempts of a number of 
coconut-growing localities to establish produce certification schemes, 
accompanied by higher sales premiums.47 But oil palms, with their local 
history of domination by large-scale farming arrangements, particularly in 
Johor, did not mesh with the state’s underlying bureaucratic logic, which 
assumed that certain crops were inherently unsuitable to smallholder 
arrangements. 
Worse still, in their initial appeal for more farmland, Hj. Omar’s 
associates had unwittingly informed senior Johor authorities that they had 
already violated the letter of the law by illegally planting a small portion of 
their lands with oil palms. As Christopher Gray has argued in his 
landmark study of Johor’s colonial-era bureaucracy, “state action had to 
uphold the forms and principles of the government apparatus: land, for 
example, was not to be alienated easily to those violating established 
procedures….Government, in other words, had to maintain its integrity”.48 
The Ayer Hitam oil palm cluster’s attempts to expand were anathema to 
colonial officials who treasured consistency and incremental change. 
Perhaps this general hardening of official attitudes had stemmed from 
attempts to cope with the chaotic consequences of decades of 
uncontrolled migration to Johor, migration which had given rise to the 
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fastest growing population of all the Malay States since the 1910s.49 Thus, 
despite the presence of a number of officials sympathetic to the 
progressive views of Faulkner and his associates, the weight of local 
circumstance militated against any attempts to realise smallholder-
friendly policies in Johor’s oil palm sector. 
 
THE STRUGGLE OVER WEST JOHOR’S COASTLANDS 
By this time, in fact, many of Johor’s smallholders were grappling 
with a far more serious agricultural debacle: the West Coast’s waterlogged 
soils. Throughout the second half of the 1930s, officials expressed 
increasing alarm over drainage systems that were letting in excessive 
seawater, while being unable to drain off surplus fresh and brackish water 
that had accumulated inland.50 Particularly disconcerting for senior 
agricultural authorities was the growing sense that the fall in palm yields 
resulting from such inundation was detrimental to copra quality, as copra 
makers were finding it increasingly hard to acquire enough nuts to fill 
their kilns before each firing.51 
In one such fact-finding mission in 1938, Francis Cooke, Malaya’s 
officially-designated expert on copra production, was appalled by the 
additional decline that had taken place at Sri Menanti, previously one of 
Muar’s most prolific coconut-bearing areas during the late 1920s. Recent 
clearance of mangroves along the local foreshore had caused extensive 
coastal erosion and subsidence. Earthen bunds, on the verge of collapse in 
some areas, were found riddled with holes made by local crabs. Lands 
nearest the coast were now completely denuded of palms, and those up to 
three kilometres inland were suffering from taper tops and small crowns, 
the result of extended immersion in water-logged, brackish soils 
(Photograph 14). As a result, palms were only yielding half the amount of 
fruit compared to a decade ago. Indeed, swamp flora and fauna seemed to 
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be reclaiming the area, with woody shrubs characteristic of brackish 
conditions proliferating alongside inland palms.52 
 
Photograph 14. Parit Rabu, Sri Menanti: eroded bunds and heavily debilitated 
palms, 1938. Source: ANM-JB: CL&M 299/39, Enc. 1A. 
Because of these environmental difficulties, Sri Menanti’s coconut-
based economy had been effectively crippled. The large state-funded 
copra kiln at Sri Menanti, first opened to great fanfare in 1934, was now 
only operating once a month, instead of every three days as originally 
planned. Many settlers had abandoned their holdings, driving the local 
Malay population down to a fraction of its former size two decades ago. In 
their place, a smaller number of Chinese households had moved in, 
foreclosing or leasing lands from Malay growers.53 By the late 1930s, 
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officials believed at least one-seventh of West Johor’s coconut farmland 
was being affected in a similar manner.54  
Despite this grim prognosis, environmental decline was not 
inevitable. By the 1930s, state-backed drainage schemes, like other forms 
of public infrastructure such as irrigation, were becoming expressions of 
political commitment to Malay welfare in Johor.55 This shift in priorities 
appears to have been catalysed by the spread of Chinese and Indian 
households into former strongholds of Malay coastal settlement. This led 
to much unease among Johor officials concerned with preserving the 
socio-cultural foundations of the state, not least the Sultan himself.56 
Thus, during the mid-1930s, state authorities had finally begun to survey 
coconut areas most heavily affected by flooding, including Sri Menanti 
and another sub-district, Senggarang, with the intention of launching 
comprehensive drainage schemes that would prevent salt water ingress 
permanently.  
Moreover, many growers themselves, including the new Chinese 
and Indian landowners at Sri Menanti, were refusing to give up on coastal 
coconuts. Wealthier individuals sought to rectify local drainage problems 
with their own privately-hired engineers. Less badly affected coastal areas 
were even playing host to large numbers of fresh settlers who had been 
squeezed out from other coastal settlements during the Depression. For 
instance, just several kilometres east of Sri Menanti, Bugis settlers from 
Benut, a particularly stressed area during the Depression, were found 
preparing several hundred acres of previously abandoned rice lands for 
coconuts in 1938. The area had been chosen by settlers after they had 
determined that the terrain was sufficiently elevated to prevent 
unwarranted tidal ingress, unlike those near the heavily eroded foreshores 
of Sri Menanti (Map 9).57 To some extent then, West Johor’s 
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environmental decline was a patchwork phenomenon, vulnerable to 
contradictions and countervailing developments. 
 
Map 9. Sri Menanti: preliminary plans for government bunding and drainage 
scheme, with lands recently cleared by Bugis settlers (bottom left area), circa 
1938-1939. Source: ANM-JB: CL&M 202/39, Enc. 1D. 
Nevertheless, there were crucial factors working against the 
fortunes of West Johor’s worst-affected coastal farmlands. Progress with 
large-scale coastal engineering efforts was extremely slow in Johor, 
comparing to other major coconut-growing states like Selangor and Perak. 
In Selangor, extensive coastal bunding works had been undertaken by the 
Malayan authorities during the mid-1930s at Bernam Peninsula and Klang 
District, resulting in a ‘striking improvement’ of previously affected 





encouraged smallholders to spend more time tending to palms by the late 
1930s.58 Nothing remotely similar happened in Johor’s case. 
Johor’s problems with coastal engineering were manifold. First, 
there were serious disagreements within the highest levels of office on 
whether drainage schemes to protect coconut farms constituted the best 
use of public resources. Planter representatives drew on their growing 
influence within Johor’s Council of State to criticise the government’s 
ambitious drainage plans, arguing that coconuts were now little more 
than a ‘glut on the market’.59 Instead, money spent on such schemes 
would be better used to assist owners of debilitated coastland to move to 
better farmlands within the state.60 Nevertheless, such views were 
ultimately overruled by Johor’s administrators. As in the 1910s, when 
administrators balked at spending taxpayer’s money to exclude Malays 
from coconut-related occupations, the idea of using public funds to ‘evict’ 
Malay communities from lands that might be subsequently occupied by 
Chinese and Indian intermediaries discomfited officials. As Muar’s 
Collector of Land Revenue contended: ‘The last Malay if he could be 
induced to leave would be ousted with Government money. This way 
madness lies’.61  The more politically acceptable solution was to leave all 
growers in place, and find ways to arrest the deterioration of coastal 
soils.62 
But this approach demanded levels of technical proficiency that 
the Johor authorities did not yet possess. In contrast to the Federated 
Malay States, the Johor government did not have its own Drainage Board, 
staffed by qualified civil engineers, until 1935.63 This was a truly curious 
development, given the fact that state authorities had, until 1930, allocated 
roughly 40 per cent of annual budgetary expenditures towards the 
expansion of the Public Works Department and its activities.64 Clearly 
exhibiting a bias towards road-building, the authorities had prioritised 
                                                          
58
 AR DAM 1937, 12; AR DAM 1938, 11. 
59
 ANM-JB: CL&M 955/38, Enc. 1; Gray, ‘Johore’, 113-118. 
60
 ANM-JB: CL&M 955/38, Enc. 1. 
61




 ANM-JB: CL&M 299/39, Enc. 1A. 
64





large-scale infrastructural policies that overrode important drainage 
concerns, much to the chagrin of West Johor’s copra producers. In one 
exemplary case, Johor’s Public Works Department completed a 50-
kilometre coastal road between Johor’s northwest and southwest regions 
in 1935. In doing so, the Department had bisected a series of waterways 
used by local growers for drainage and goods transport. Inland growers 
and dealers were consequently forced to use costlier land transport. In 
order to reduce conveyance costs, coconut produce was reduced in bulk 
and weight through husking and splitting the previous day before being 
transported to the kiln, instead of processing everything at the kiln itself. 
This delay ultimately dragged down copra quality, since fresh coconut 
kernel decays within hours of exposure to fresh air.65 
Even after its establishment, the Drainage Board’s schemes 
encountered numerous hurdles. The Board was initially given little power, 
starting off as a subordinate branch of the Public Works Department.66 
Only in June 1938, with the effects of coastal flooding becoming 
increasingly apparent, was the Board reconstituted as a separate 
department, headed by Johor’s powerful Commissioner of Lands and 
Mines.67 $35,000 was finally ring-fenced in Johor’s 1941 budget for a large-
scale drainage scheme at Sri Menanti. But plans for other sites remained 
subject to further revision.68 Unfortunately, the few remaining 
opportunities to undertake actual engineering work were postponed 
amidst the upheavals of the Japanese Occupation, followed by the chaos of 
peninsular-wide reconstruction under British colonial rule.69 
Consequently, the few existing drainage schemes being planned for West 
Johor during the late 1930s were not executed until the 1950s. 
A third difficulty laid with coconut farmers themselves, and their 
often poor relationships with state authorities. The most ambitious 
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private drainage initiatives appear to have originated from wealthier 
farmers and dealers in contact with Malaya’s professional engineering 
community. The Johor authorities, however, were wary of supporting any 
private proposal that might have counterproductive effects on adjoining 
areas, since West Johor’s interconnected drainage networks now extended 
across thousands of acres of occupied farmland. Thus, an application from 
a group of 11 Chinese and Chettiar landowners for permission to install a 
sluice gate with automatic valves at Parit Rabu, Sri Menanti, was made in 
early 1936, but was held in abeyance by district and state authorities until 
March 1939. This occurred despite the applicants’ willingness to pay for 
the works, costing $2,500, themselves.70 Revealingly, approval was finally 
granted on the understanding that the structure would be temporary, 
subject to removal without public compensation once the state scheme 
had been established.71  
Where they could spare time and energy, poorer coconut 
cultivators continued to undertake minor bunding and drainage 
restoration works near their own farms. These alterations were of a rapidly 
degradable nature, usually drawing on soft mud and clay in the vicinity.72 
They were also probably inadequate to stem the increasing subsidence of 
the coastline, if official descriptions of widespread flooding during this 
period are to be believed. Unlike the initiatives launched by dealers, state 
authorities did little to impede the efforts of these farmers, and were 
probably unable to do so even if they tried, due to the widespread, 
sporadic character of such activities. To be sure, the Johor authorities were 
increasingly keen to stem the loss of forest rent along the western 
coastline, and this would become overwhelmingly apparent by the 1950s. 
But to the contemporary external observer, little appeared to have 
changed since coconut farming’s early days. 
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COCONUT SMALLHOLDER LIVELIHOOD STRATEGIES 
Given these worrying conditions for coastal agriculture, it seems 
fair to ask why so many of Johor’s households persisted with efforts to 
remain on their coconut farms. The answer, in short, is that households 
continued to diversify livelihoods, reducing the impact of coastal flooding 
on their main means of support. This meant engaging in a wide variety of 
farm and non-farm activities, which helped prop up ailing coconut farms. 
In any case, a significant number of coconut smallholdings were not as 
badly affected by flooding as officials sometimes feared, including those 
further away from the coastline. Here, many growers could still depend on 
coconuts for steady incomes, as markets for produce remained resilient. 
In Johor, the rubber diversification option for coastal smallholders 
appears to have been limited during this period, and not just because of 
unsuitable soils. Across the state, many poorer rubber smallholders had to 
seek additional work to augment lower rubber earnings, due to the 
production restrictions of the International Rubber Regulation Agreement 
between 1934 and 1941. Nevertheless, as international prices rose 
sporadically, there were signs pointing to short-lived spurts of tapping in 
existing holdings.73 Moreover, although Malayan smallholder rubber 
acreage records are imprecise, there appears to have been some new 
rubber planting, especially in 1934 and 1938, when land restrictions eased 
temporarily.74 In the end, how much of this can be traced to the efforts of 
the West Coast growers is uncertain, but probably not a whole lot. 
The picture is somewhat clearer, and more positive, for other 
crops. Growing numbers of food crops, including maize, cassava, sweet 
potato, chillies, and dry rice, appear to have been intercropped with 
coconut palms. This became especially apparent towards the end of the 
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1930s, when the importance of local food production was felt across 
Malaya as major wars broke out, first in China, and then Europe.75 
Arecanut farming remained a popular activity in many parts of 
West Johor throughout the second half of the 1930s, partly because of the 
palm’s tolerance for waterlogged soils, and also because of the crop’s 
much more favourable prices than copra’s. Average returns for Johor’s 
arecanuts from 1935-1939 were 43 per cent higher than they had been in 
1928, whereas average copra earnings from the second half of the 1930s 
were less than half of their real value in 1928.76 In many cases, idle copra 
kilns were being used to dry out arecanuts.77 Yet, despite a rise in arecanut 
exports that contributed to an all-time Malayan high of 43,915 tons net 
exports in 1940, most of which ended up going to British India, there did 
not appear to be any significant accompanying expansion in cultivation 
area in Johor.78  
Bearing in mind the usual caveats about smallholding acreage 
estimates, these figures suggest that either the Johor arecanut palms had 
been underexploited to begin with, or that rising exports of Malayan 
arecanuts were actually a response to falling domestic consumption of 
betel quid. Tempting as it may be to infer the latter, there is still little 
known evidence to date the decline of betel-chewing in Malaya with any 
certainty. We still do not know the extent to which Western ideas of 
hygiene and beauty actually gained influence within different segments of 
Malayan society by the interwar years, denigrating arecanut consumption 
in the process.79 And until we do, it is seems safer to assume that arecanut 
palms were being brought back into production, following an earlier 
hiatus. 
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Participation in non-farm activities also seems to have increased.  
While precise estimates of smallholders involved in commercial fishing 
remain unknown, numbers may have risen during the period, given that 
state revenues from the issue of licenses grew significantly, from $8,590 in 
1935 to $12,560 in 1939.80 Thousands of Malays, many likely to have been 
from coastal households, also entered employment in Johor’s iron and 
bauxite mines, on the back of rising mineral extraction (and mining 
wages) during the interval.81 Perhaps in response to this growth in mining, 
and the accompanying demands made on firewood for ore smelting, 
mangrove firewood extraction in South Johor rose sharply. This pursuit, 
almost entirely financed and worked by Malays, expanded to the point 
where production fell sharply in 1938 due to overexploitation.82 While 
necessarily speculative, the overall effect of these alternative sources of 
income for coastal households may have been to encourage the retention 
of some coconut holdings, while, in the case of mangrove harvesting, 
undermining the local environmental foundations of coastal agriculture in 
select venues. 
Ongoing livelihood diversification should not obscure the fact that 
the decline of coconut farming in Johor remained gradual.  Smallholders 
and dealers still found it worthwhile to vacillate between the market for 
copra, and those for non-copra products. This was underpinned by the 
sheer variety of local and regional outlets for coconut products during this 
period.  
Although Johor’s copra exports failed to return to their pre-
Depression-era market values, and in fact plumbed even lower depths in 
1937, interest in copra production remained firm.83 Between 1935-1939, 
Johor exports were actually slightly higher than the interval between 1930-
1934.84 There were several reasons for this persistent trend. First, as seen in 
Chapter Four, a large number of palms planted at the inner edges of the 
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great coconut belt between Muar and Batu Pahat during the late 1920s 
were only beginning to reach maximum yields during the following 
decade, prompting affiliated smallholders to sell off growing volumes of 
nuts at low prices. This probably helped balance out falling yields from 
coconut palms closer to the foreshore, where environmental conditions 
were more hostile.  
Second, as Europe lurched towards war, imports of industrial acid 
used to process the valuable latex harvested from rubber trees became 
scarce in Malaya. Substitutes had to be found, since external demand for 
rubber remained high during the late 1930s. One of these stand-ins was 
coconut water, which contains sugars that convert into acetic acid after 
several weeks’ fermentation.85 With some encouragement from rubber 
extension officials, smallholders and dealers began extracting water from 
split nuts at copra kiln sites.86 Official statistics thus underestimated 
actual cash returns from copra production, as they did not account for by-
products that could be sold even before kernels were smoked. 
Most importantly, a massive swing in Malaya’s copra trade helped 
stem further losses in copra value, thus preventing more growers from 
exiting the coconut industry altogether. This was initiated when Malaya’s 
usual export markets for copra, virtually all in Europe, became more costly 
to penetrate during the early 1930s.87 Because copra freight charges to 
European destinations had not fallen in proportion to copra price declines 
during the Depression, producer margins were effectively whittled away.88 
This was a serious setback, not least for Johor’s coconut growers and 
dealers. These parties were especially reliant on sales to the Singapore 
market, where they were now competing even harder against a flood of 
cheap copra from the Dutch East Indies.89  
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The Malayan coconut industry’s response to this de facto hike in 
freight rates was to process more low-grade copra at home. Domestic 
copra crushers were at the forefront of this shift. Crude copra oil 
production expanded rapidly, and, aided by falling freight costs for copra 
oil, oil exports swelled from 25,484 tons in 1934 to 64,945 tons in 1941.90 A 
rising proportion of this produce was delivered to British India, which by 
the end of the period accounted for 70 per cent of Malayan exports. 
Smaller quantities were sent to Burma, Britain, and Hong Kong, 
presumably for conversion into soap, refined cooking oil, and margarine.91  
Colonial authorities in both London and Singapore generally 
condoned this rapid expansion of processed oil, with concerns about 
combating unemployment in Singapore apparently outweighing earlier 
misgivings concerning the development of industry within colonial 
territories.92 Yet, the basis of this production surge, concentrated mostly 
in Singapore and Penang, stemmed from manufacturing plant that had 
been largely underused since the 1920s. In 1932, when copra oil production 
began to increase markedly, roughly only a fifth of Malaya’s total copra 
crushing capacity was being tapped. This latent capacity, in addition to 
some newly-installed facilities in 1935, was what enabled Malaya’s millers 
to escalate oil production in 1940 to seven times the output of 1931.93 
Yet it would be premature to dismiss these production revivals as a 
mere return to the past. Indeed, Malaya’s surge in copra oil production 
was met not just through increased exports of crude copra oil, but through 
unprecedentedly large transformations of copra oil into finished goods 
within Malaya itself. Two groups of commodities, semi-refined cooking oil 
and household soap, probably used up 35-40 per cent of all copra oil made 
in Malaya during the period, with the remaining copra oil sent abroad, 
mostly to Asian markets.94  
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Cooking oil products, already manufactured locally since the early 
twentieth century, began to expand in variety during the second half of 
the 1930s, thanks to the installation of refineries by several millers in 
Singapore and Penang. Among these pioneers was Ho Hong Oil Mills, 
whose Elephant/Palm Tree brand of cooking oil blended semi-refined 
copra oil with smaller amounts of groundnut oil, successfully catering to a 
growing Malayan Chinese consumer market. Larger oil millers also began 
producing another kind of semi-refined cooking oil, made from 
neutralised, non-deodorised copra oil, for sale to Malays and Indians who 
wanted a manufacture that retained home-made coconut oil’s distinctive 
flavour.95  
The domestic soap-making scene, already buoyant since the 
Depression, continued to expand in response to local demand for laundry 
cleansers, and, to a lesser extent, toilet soap. Between 1934 and 1940, the 
amount of soap sold in Malaya escalated from about 7,150 to 12,000 tons.96 
Some of this increase can be attributed to population growth in Malaya, 
rising from about 3.7 million to 4.6 million.97 Rising incomes and changing 
notions of cleanliness probably accounted for the rest. Half of all soap 
consumed in Malaya in 1935 came from local Chinese-owned factories, a 
proportion which rose to two-thirds by 1940.98 The Chinese-dominated 
soap industry also exported products to the surrounding region, which, 
while difficult to quantify, were probably significant. 
As if these copra-related reorientations were not already enough, 
the Chinese entrepreneurial contribution also extended to a seemingly 
innocuous by-product that would eventually be responsible for keeping 
Malaya’s coconut industry alive during the war-driven cataclysms of the 
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1940s. This was copra cake, a carbohydrate-rich residue generated from 
copra crushing. Originally, most of these ‘leftovers’ were sold to Europe as 
cattle feed.99 By the late 1930s, however, much larger amounts of copra 
cake were being retained within Malaya (Figure 3). While it is true that 
the surge of copra crushing during the 1930s generated an oversupply of 
cheap by-products in need of disposal, copra cake’s local popularity would 
not have been possible without changing demand patterns within Malaya 
itself. 
 
Figure 3. Malaya: copra cake trade, 1930-1941. Source: Appendix 6.2. 
The rise of the domestic copra cake market was driven by two 
interrelated developments. One was the expansion of the local swine 
farming industry, which was dominated by Chinese smallholders from the 
outset (similar trends may have occurred with chicken and goat-rearing, 
but evidence for this is much more fragmented and vague). Pigs were 
usually farmed in conjunction with vegetables in market gardens and carp 
in ponds near ethnic Chinese settlements in mining areas.100 Pig-rearing 
seems to have grown rapidly during the 1930s, thanks to human 
population growth in Johor and Singapore (particularly that of Chinese 
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residents, the main consumers of pork). Rising unemployment during the 
Depression may have also boosted the numbers of individuals involved in 
pig farming as a livelihood. By 1930, Johor had swung from being a net 
importer to a net exporter of live pigs, sending 5,519 swine out of state that 
year, mostly to Singapore. Johor remained a net pig exporter every year 
thereafter.101 
What really cemented copra cake’s importance for Malaya was a 
growing tendency for local pig farmers to use the cake as a feed 
concentrate. Before the 1930s, farmers typically fed their pigs boiled 
vegetables and starches, including sweet potato stalks, kangkong (Ipomoea 
aquatica), and cassava refuse (hampas, by-products of Malaya’s cassava 
starch processing industry). Indeed, cassava factory owners frequently 
kept swine themselves.102 These diets produced pork of a particularly 
sweet and tender quality, purportedly catering to the tastes of the Chinese 
working classes. Concentrated foods did enter the picture, but these were 
mostly used to supplement any mineral and protein deficiencies in pig 
diets, and fatten pigs up for slaughter at about eight to ten months of 
age.103 During the 1930s, however, Malayan demands for leaner kinds of 
pork began to increase, possibly due to the emulation of western-style 
consumption patterns, as well as rising demands for vegetables within 
Chinese diets.104 Whatever the case, the proportion of concentrated feed 
relative to vegetables used in pig feed began to grow accordingly, since the 
former was a cheaper way of increasing pig weight. In the process, more 
costly forms of concentrates, such as rice bran, broken rice, and fish meal 
were increasingly displaced by copra cake.105   
Malaya’s burgeoning domestic markets for copra cake and copra 
oil had immense significance for the future of local coconut farming.  By 
opening up more valuable avenues for the use of coconut material within 
Malaya itself, they helped consolidate the importance of coconut produce 
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within a wider range of vital economic activities than ever before, and 
amplified the influence of the Malayan copra crushers over Peninsular-
affairs. But because the millers had staked their existence on vast 
quantities of cheap raw materials, of which only a part was supplied by 
Malaya’s farms, they would end up using their growing influence to 
pressure domestic coconut farmers into producing more coconuts, when 
copra supplies from the Dutch East Indies became more difficult to obtain 
during the 1950s. 
In the meantime, however, the millers’ ascendance within Malaya’s 
economy was paradoxically accompanied by a growing fragmentation of 
production during the late 1930s. In the past, crushing operations had 
been concentrated in Singapore and Penang. But the unprecedented 
growth of the local copra cake market now generated opportunities for 
entrepreneurs to establish mills on the mainland, close to both coconut-
growing areas and pig farms. What they lacked in size, they made up for 
in lower transport costs for copra, copra oil, and copra cake.  
To be sure, small mills catering to an internal trade in copra oil 
and cake had long existed within Malaya, including traditional wooden 
mortars of Indian origin (ghani), yoked to oxen.106 However, with rising 
copra cake demand, downsized replicas of the mechanical crushing 
facilities found in Penang and Singapore began to appear on the mainland 
itself, a trend that would only accelerate when coconut product exports 
collapsed during the 1940s. These new mills were forged in local foundries 
which had accumulated decades of experience fabricating machinery for 
the tin industry.107 By 1941, a mechanised mill was established in Batu 
Pahat, Johor, the first in nearly three decades, with the potential to turn 
out 1,200 tons of copra oil and 680 tons of copra cake a year.108  
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The increasingly diffuse nature of the crushing sector ultimately 
meant greater competition for copra within Malaya. Smallholders and 
dealers benefited from this support for copra prices, especially in localities 
where a new mill had been set up. Just as importantly, it strengthened the 
coconut industry’s general ability to withstand wild fluctuations in 
external demand for its products. These arrangements were not sufficient 
in themselves to lift copra values back to pre-Depression-era levels, but 
they were far better than nothing.109  
In such a situation, it made perfect sense for most coconut 
smallholders to continue hedging between the markets for copra and non-
copra based activities, depending on relative prices. Across Malaya, village 
oil production appears to have increased whenever prices for copra fell.110 
In Johor, an interstate nut trade centred on the Muar and Kota Tinggi 
districts continued to be ‘considerable’ throughout the entire period.111 
One particularly ominous sign of the times was a sharp rise in local palm 
sugar production. This was being spurred by shortages of imported cane 
sugar in selected areas across Malaya (like Eastern Pahang), in turn due to 
wartime shipping disruptions.112 A laborious and highly-skilled process 
involving the tapping of sap from the unopened male inflorescence of the 
coconut palm, extraction could be carried out repeatedly on a single palm 
for up to a year, before a much-needed interval of recovery.113 Like other 
forms of import substitution, this activity would be taken to new heights 
during the wartime traumas of the 1940s. 
As seen in Chapter Four, initial estimates of Malayan consumption 
pegged the share of artisanal coconut produce (namely that produced 
outside the industrial manufacturing sector, including fresh nuts, village-
pressed oil and coconut milk) at between 25 to 40 percent of the total 
harvested crop. These assessments, for reasons already given, probably 
underestimated the amount of coconut consumption occurring within 
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Malaya during the early 1930s. By the early 1940s, Raymond Firth, an 
economic anthropologist who had just undertaken a year of fieldwork in 
rural Kelantan with his colleague and partner Rosemary Firth (née 
Upcott), was claiming that domestic coconut-related consumption, 
excluding industrial manufactures, was probably hovering around one 
coconut per person per day. This astounding figure was three to six times 
higher than earlier official estimates.114  
Firth’s estimate seems excessive, but there is little reason to 
dismiss his claim completely. His impression was based on locally-
grounded field studies of rural household consumption and production, 
conducted together with Rosemary Firth during the late 1930s. Firth 
actually considered his assessment fairly conservative, given the sheer 
amount of coconut material he and Rosemary had personally observed 
being consumed within households over the course of an entire year, in 
the form of coconut water, coconut milk, cooking oil, cakes, and snacks, 
all boosted by the occasional celebratory feast.115 
At the same time, there is probably good reason to taper down 
Firth’s claims to a certain degree. The underlying math makes such 
estimates improbable. One coconut per person per day, in a population of 
roughly 4.7 million in 1940, implies the equivalent of 290,000 tons of 
copra oil per year. To get a better understanding of this figure, Malaya’s 
estimated industrial output of coconut products in 1940, purely through 
the copra crushing route, was around 103,000 tons copra oil equivalent.116  
Even taking into account the relatively low prices being offered for copra 
during the late 1930s, the possibility that domestic consumption of 
artisanal coconut produce could constitute almost 75 per cent of Malaya’s 
total entire coconut output by 1940, with the rest going into copra and 
industrial copra oil, seems rather far-fetched.117 
Moreover, the Firths’ decision to conduct fieldwork in Kelantan 
probably introduced an upward bias into their estimates, given that this 
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was a largely rural state with an extremely high proportion of Malays, as 
opposed to the more urbanised, multi-ethnic communities of the Western 
half of the Peninsula.118 To make matters worse, in places where poverty 
was more prevalent, such as inland Kedah and littoral Selangor, health 
surveys conducted independently by medical officers during the second 
half of the 1930s showed that very little coconut oil consumption was 
taking place within Malay settlements.119 And finally, regarding the oft-
neglected issue of coconut water, general demand for uncontaminated 
drinking water from coconuts may have also been on the wane, compared 
to the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, given that publicly-owned 
potable water infrastructure in states like Johor had expanded during the 
1930s (itself a product of growing official concern for rural Malay 
welfare).120  
Bearing these various caveats in mind, the overall share of village-
scale coconut produce in Malaya’s coconut sector seems closer to 50 per 
cent at the most during this period. But this still suggests that the 
consumption of artisanal coconut produce remained a major pillar 
supporting Malayan coconut farming during the late 1930s, in the face of 
flagging external demand and an expanding industrial sector. How long 
this complicated balancing act of supply and demand could continue on 
for was another question altogether. Indeed, by the 1950s, flagging 
internal demand for village coconut produce would contribute to the 
coconut’s growing obsolescence among local farmers, and spur the 
popularity of other cash crops, including oil palms. 
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LIMITS TO OIL PALM’S HOME MARKET 
 Meanwhile, efforts by Malayan authorities, chemists, and planters 
to increase the oil palm’s share of the Malayan market were having little 
effect, let alone approximating anything akin to that of the coconut 
market. Local demand for palm kernels remained nascent. From the oil 
palm sector’s beginnings until the 1960s, there was little domestic demand 
for either palm kernel cake, or the other product of kernel crushing, palm 
kernel oil. Kernel cake was less palatable, and lower in protein content 
than copra cake or fish meal, limiting its usefulness as a growth-boosting 
ration for pigs and other livestock.121 Singapore’s copra millers showed no 
interest in crushing such kernels, which is unsurprising given that copra 
supplies remained plentiful. Palm kernel prices in Europe made it more 
worthwhile to export them whole, for crushing into oil for confections, 
high-grade soap, and cake for cattle feeding.122  
The only known exception to this general tendency was Socfin Co. 
Ltd.’s oil palm estate at Labis, Johor, which opened Malaya’s first palm 
kernel oil extraction facility during the mid-1930s.123 Some of this oil seems 
to have been used in local vegetable oil and soap manufacturers, while 
small amounts of palm kernel cake were also sold on a regular basis into 
the early 1950s.124 As such, the oil palm industry remained heavily 
dependent on external demand for whole kernels. This would become a 
genuine problem during the first half of the 1940s, when the cessation of 
foreign demand for palm kernels meant that they were simply left to pile 
up unused in factories, or turned into burner fuel.125 
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Of much greater concern was the demand for palm oil itself, since 
palm oil constituted a much larger proportion of earnings for the industry, 
and plans to break into the more lucrative British and North American 
margarine markets had failed to materialise during the 1930s. Efforts to 
refine low-acid palm oil within Malaya, with a view towards increased 
sales in regional markets for soap and margarine, met with numerous 
problems. In 1934 and 1935, experiments by the Department of Agriculture 
to fractionate palm oil on a semi-commercial scale saw samples of both 
the liquid and solid portions sent to London to gauge market interest. 
Meanwhile, the Department managed to refine palm oil at a temperature 
of 250 oC, in a high vacuum with a hydrogen leak, reportedly yielding an 
oil that was ‘pale yellow in colour, odourless and practically tasteless’.126 
Yet, neither lead appeared to generate any commercial interest at the 
time, and the chemists did not report on the matter any further. This bore 
some resemblance to the difficulties experienced by United Plantation’s 
own chemists with marketing fractionated Malayan palm oil during the 
1930s.127 
The use of palm oil within local soap manufacturing appears to 
have expanded, but quantities are difficult to establish. Due to old 
concerns that a local market for inferior-quality palm oil might lead to the 
adulteration of low-acid palm oil for the export sector, there continued to 
be significant official reluctance in acknowledging the ongoing use of 
palm oil in this sector.128 The quantities of palm oil entering the local soap 
industry were certainly smaller than those for copra oil, but they were not 
insignificant, judging by the fact that some smaller oil palm estates were 
dedicating most of their production to such purposes during the 1930s. 
For example, at Tampin, Negri Sembilan, a 500-acre Chinese-owned estate 
was known to be using a wooden press to grind out palm oil, well into the 
period of the Japanese Occupation. According to Datuk Boon Weng Siew, 
a planter who grew up on a rubber estate nearby, the oil itself was sold 
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primarily to make soap during the interwar years.129 Presumably, the 
buyers of such oil were based in Singapore, Malacca, or other urban areas 
with a significant cluster of specialist soap-makers. 
 The most telling difference between local markets for coconut and 
oil palm products lay with dietary preferences. Following the Great 
Depression, increasing numbers of nutritionally-minded elites began 
championing the consumption of palm oil in its red, unrefined form. John 
Rosedale and Christopher Oliveiro, the Singapore-based biochemists who 
had established unrefined Malayan palm oil’s qualities as a leading local 
source of vitamin A, continued to advocate its local usage, particularly 
among Indian children.130  The Colonial Office’s Labour Adviser, Major 
Orde Browne, built on this suggestion during a visit to Malaya in 1941, 
proposing that malnourishment among Indian labourers and their 
families could be partly overcome through the stocking of red palm oil in 
local estate shops. This was to be done through marketing cooperatives 
where necessary, since local shopkeepers were evidently uninterested in 
providing such supplies.131 
 Rural Malays also became targets of this emerging nutritional 
crusade, thanks in part to a growing official Malayan interest in health 
surveys of remote communities, backed by the Colonial Office. After one 
such field assessment, a team of medical officers proposed in 1937 that red 
palm oil should be provided to Malay households in localities where 
coconut oil was proving difficult to procure, such as inland Kedah.132 
Following his 1938 visit to Malaya, Frank Stockdale, the Colonial Office’s 
Agricultural Adviser, took this idea even further. He advocated providing 
smallholders with the means to produce their own palm oil for home 
consumption, rather than become mere passive recipients of oil provisions 
from above. The incongruous strategy of promoting the consumption of 
                                                          
129
 Interview with Datuk Boon Weng Siew, Johor Baru, 16.14.2015; Tan Pek Leng, Land to 
Till: The Chinese in the Agricultural Economy of Malaysia (Kuala Lumpur: Centre for 
Malaysian Chinese Studies, 2008), 157. 
130
 John Lewis Rosedale, "The Improvement of Local Dietaries." Malayan Medical Journal 11, 
no. 3 (1936), 151-53; Christopher Joseph Oliveiro, "A Survey of Singapore Children in Regard 
to Their Weight, Height and Nutrition." Malayan Medical Journal 12, no. 1 (1937), 9-17. 
131
 TNA: CO 273/671/1, Enc. 1. 
132





an estate-manufactured product that could otherwise be produced using 
simple hand methods was finally being challenged, albeit from within 
official circles. 
 In reality, probably only a minority of Malayan inhabitants were 
physically exposed to unrefined palm oil before the onset of the Japanese 
Occupation. Most consumption appears to have been confined to two sets 
of institutional venues. The first of these, as mentioned in the previous 
chapter, were Child Welfare Centres, where mothers and children 
presented themselves for treatment by medical personnel. The second 
venue was the plantation. Although rubber estates partook in these 
activities, the immediate availability of palm oil from estates allowed 
plantations to play the dual role of nutritional custodian to their own 
labourers, as well as issuer of supplements to other venues.133 
 Responses from the new consumers of palm oil were 
unenthusiastic at best. Sometime around 1938, one unidentified oil palm 
estate in Johor was found to be pressuring its Indian labourers into 
accepting unrefined palm oil as a cod liver oil substitute, when in fact 
coconut oil had apparently long assumed this role in Indian medicinal 
practices.134 This may have accounted for numerous complaints about 
unrefined palm oil’s unattractiveness. Some workers even alleged that the 
oil was responsible for causing skin disease and stomach pains.135 Such 
concerns were not rare, and may have been prompted by the fact that 
bottles of palm oil were being regularly distributed together with its solid 
fraction, the latter reportedly making the oil hard to digest on its own.136 
In other estates, labourers had to be paid to ingest palm oil, suggesting 
that most either refused palm oil outright, or else consumed it with great 
reluctance.137 In response to complaints from labourers, one assistant 
estate manager had reportedly begun consuming the oil himself regularly, 
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in a bid to prove his workers wrong.138 Given that estate managers 
otherwise had no interest in engaging in palm oil consumption 
themselves, palm oil provisioning was clearly part of a general tendency 
for food to be used ‘as a vehicle of manipulation and the exercise of power’ 
on Malayan plantations.139   
 Revealingly, labourers continued to demonstrate their own 
household methods of combating vitamin deficiencies, even if they were 
not acutely aware of doing so. Workers on some estates made regular 
voluntary contributions of 10 cents a month to fund a weekly communal 
feast where goats and other animals were eaten.140 Consuming meat 
obtained from dealers helped labourers circumvent prohibitions against 
livestock rearing within estates, while providing them with valuable 
nutrition. In contrast to palm oil provisioning, these feasts were subsumed 
within broader social contexts of eating for pleasure and company. Here, 
food intake was probably limited only by cost and availability. 
 The only cases where red palm oil appears to have been consumed 
without complaint were at the above-mentioned Welfare Centres, and on 
plantations where it was used as an ingredient in meals, rather than as a 
medicine. For several months in 1940, medical officers provided daily 
courses of fortified cake and pudding to malnourished Tamil children on 
several large estates in Selangor and Perak. The cake consisted of 
soybeans, skimmed milk, powder, dhal, and under-milled rice flour, fried 
in unrefined palm oil. The pudding was somewhat similar, except that the 
palm oil was added directly together with some sugar. In the same year, 
some Malayan Indian children were also put on trials of skimmed milk 
filled with palm oil. Judging by the fact that all children subjected to these 
various rations gained significant weight, and recovered from previous 
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vitamin deficiency disorders, the foods must have been generally accepted 
by their recipients. 141   
 Willingness, however, did not necessarily equate to awareness of 
red palm oil as a food ingredient, let alone its enjoyment. Palm oil was 
evidently incorporated into these preparations through specific methods 
that anthropologist Richard Wilk has termed ‘submersion’ and 
‘substitution’.142 Such techniques caused palm oil’s identity to effectively 
disappear within the final blend. The fact that preparations seemed to 
have been concocted by the medical officers themselves, rather than 
within the consuming household, adds another layer to this invisibility of 
ingredients and lack of consumer knowledge regarding food preparation. 
Finally, in all of these scenarios involving children, the relative 
powerlessness of recipients may have been critical for prolonging palm oil 
consumption. 
On the whole then, there was little demonstrated consumer desire 
for unrefined palm oil as an edible substance, and considerable aversion to 
palm oil as a medicinal supplement. From the perspective of growers 
themselves, continued local disinterest in palm oil as a dietary fat made 
the opportunity costs of diversifying into oil palm cultivation relatively 
high during the period. Yet these nutritional schemes had a much greater 
significance than local reactions at the time would suggest. By establishing 
paternalistic food provisioning programs for deprived social classes in the 
name of nutrition, Malayan elites inadvertently paved the way for a much 
harsher, wider-ranging set of food supply programmes during the 
Japanese Occupation of Malaya. Red palm oil consumption would become 
inextricably linked with oppression, provoking equally extreme responses 
from those at palm oil’s receiving end.  
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 The evidence from this chapter provides a strong corrective to 
scholars and officials who assume superior knowledge regarding the crops 
suitable for smallholder cultivation. The shifting vagaries of soil 
conditions, social contexts, and market demand ensure that there are 
usually exceptions to any supposed general rule. Because official 
preferences for smallholder coconut farming did not take underlying local 
environmental conditions into account, many smallholders were 
encouraged to stay in the coconut sector for longer than necessary. Oil 
palms may have been still out of the reach for most smallholders and 
dealers, but circumstances were arguably less forbidding by the late 1930s, 
given the renewed availability of efficient small-scale presses. Land tenure 
arrangements in Johor continued to discriminate against smallholders 
interested in oil palms, but what was especially damaging to smallholder 
prospects was the persistent tendency of the entire Malayan state to 
conceal and ignore evidence of smallholder involvement in oil palms 
within the official record. This burying of evidence, apparent since the late 
1920s, would make it much more difficult to promote alternatives to large-
scale oil palm farming arrangements when colonial authorities grew more 
open to smallholder involvement in oil palms during the 1950s, since there 
were no readily known operational precedents to build on, unlike those 
set by highly-publicised European-owned estates. 
One implicit question within this chapter, and indeed this entire 
thesis, is what made for a satisfactory livelihood in colonial Malaya, and 
whether such a livelihood could include farming, and in what form. Given 
Johor’s recent history of large-scale migration and land abandonment, one 
can legitimately wonder if permanent agricultural settlement was part of 
this satisfactory standard of living, even with a long-term crop like 
coconuts. However, relying on colonial records for answers creates 
another set of problems. Official correspondence on such matters is 
heavily skewed by the notion that secure land ownership was the 





viewing any perceived neglect of holdings, including drainage 
maintenance, as aberrant and undesirable activity.143 
 Yet, historical evidence to the contrary repeatedly surfaces during 
the 1930s, especially in the second half of the decade. Many growers were 
recent migrants themselves, gradually relinquishing coconut lands so as to 
avoid further indebtedness, recolonizing available coastal lands elsewhere 
in Johor, and turning towards casual labour in the non-farm sector. 
Moreover, unofficials argued fiercely against heavy public expenditures on 
coastal drainage. All of these actions seem to point to the equally valid 
idea that so-called Malay identity and welfare were not necessarily tied to 
permanent coastal farmland ownership. By highlighting the more dynamic 
aspects of West Johor’s coconut farming sector, namely how a decline in 
coconut farming was accompanied by the growth of other perennial 
cultivars better adapted to Johor’s changing economic and environmental 
circumstances, this thesis has tried to take a middle path that 
acknowledges some continuity amidst change. However, it is hard to 
escape the sense that there was something rather pathological about this 
shift towards other crops, rather than something more cyclical in 
character. 
 Strongly connected to this debate is the problem of recovering 
nuanced histories of drainage engineering in tropical agriculture. In 
relying on official colonial records for details of smallholder drainage 
creation, expansion, and maintenance, the researcher risks taking on 
biases from the creators of these records themselves. Much official 
correspondence from Malaya is infused with the notion that smallholders 
lacked the ‘mental capacity’ to be able to conceive of large-scale drainage 
schemes.144 From this perspective, West Johor’s smallholders could not 
sustain the basis of their agricultural frontier because they had neither the 
ability nor knowledge to surmount the long-term difficulties of farming in 
coastal clay and organic soil ecologies. But this assumes that smallholders 
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had a long-term interest in farming such soils, something which the 
records do not conclusively demonstrate. 
 Such biases meant that officials seldom paid attention to the 
details and underlying social rationales behind the design and 
construction of non-European drainage systems in Malaya. An alternative 
explanation for the drainage degradation observed in this chapter (and 
others) might begin with the premise that such drainage systems were not 
meant to be permanent constructions to begin with, and were built 
according to the exigencies of available land and labour at certain points 
in time. Rather than attempt to establish a rigid and permanent 
demarcation between land and sea, as the state would tend to do, 
smallholder-led constructions were meant to maximise the output of land 
with minimum input, and would be abandoned once the land’s forest rent 
had declined to a level which made it impractical to farm. To substantiate 
such an argument would require a much more focused research approach 
to this topic. But in doing so, new light may be shed on alternative ways of 
rural living, and contribute to a long-standing historical debate regarding 
the extent to which small farmers have found it more useful to be 
itinerant than settled.145 
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OIL AND COCONUT PALMS DURING WARTIME AND 
RECONSTRUCTION, 1942-1948. 
 
Unlike the 1930s and 1950s in Malaya, the 1940s does not lend itself 
to easy periodisation. Historical narratives of 1940s Malaya often assign 
primacy to the Japanese Occupation, a relatively brief but traumatic 
interval for many residents between 1942 and 1945. Discussions have 
tended to dwell on the extent to which these four years constituted a 
‘major watershed’ in the history of Malaya, chiefly in terms of the 
territory’s economic, political and social trajectory.1  Accordingly, many 
accounts of the interval end in 1945, effectively replicating the handover of 
political power that took place between the Japanese and returning British 
colonial forces.2 Studies re-tracing the origins of modern Malaysia 
sometimes adopt this perspective in a converse manner, launching their 
narratives from the time that the Japanese ceased to occupy Malaya in 
1945.3  
Historians more focused on the social and economic aspects of 
Malaya’s history have occasionally chosen to downplay this chronological 
juncture, instead preferring to analyse a series of events that traversed the 
intervals before and after 1945.4 There are sound reasons for doing so. For 
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many residents, daily life between 1945 and 1948 was in some ways more 
similar to the years before 1945 than the period after 1948. During the 
years of reconstruction following the flight of the Japanese forces, the 
overwhelming priority of most locals, in Mary Turnbull’s own words, was 
‘to find work, decent accommodation, schooling, and enough to eat’.5 Yet, 
in the years before 1949, these objectives were not easily met, leaving 
locals wondering how much had truly changed since the departure of 
their Japanese overseers.  
 Two overriding features give the period between 1942 and 1948 a 
coherence not shared by other periods of Malayan history. One was a 
widespread shortage of basic goods. For Malaya, an open economy heavily 
reliant on international trade for most of its consumer essentials and cash 
earnings, restrictions on shipping and overseas markets throughout the 
period were an economic catastrophe. Scarcities of consumer essentials 
became more pronounced from 1943 onwards, persisting all the way until 
1948. The growing dearth of rice, a consumer staple which had to be 
mostly imported before the Japanese Occupation, was a classic example of 
this slide towards material deprivation.6  Faced with growing scarcities of 
consumer essentials, unfamiliar substitutes had to be used by many locals 
in order to survive. Doing so sent shockwaves rippling through the 
Malayan economy, as patterns of commodity production, consumption 
and trade were twisted to meet conditions of economic autarky. 
The second feature, which in some ways exacerbated the first, was 
the persistent tendency of successive military administrations, first 
Japanese and then British, to try to interfere with almost every aspect of 
daily economic life. This did not merely consist of the rationing of basic 
consumer goods, but also meant crimping internal trade, restricting 
commodity production, and replacing everyday consumer items with 
unfamiliar substitutes. The substance and routine of daily diets, normally 
undeserving of comment due to their mundane nature, became especially 
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salient. Scarcity breathed life into what had previously been taken for 
granted. Accordingly, historical sources for the period, especially oral 
testimonies, took an unprecedented interest in the sensual qualities of 
food. 
 Yet these developments did not occur in a vacuum. Patterns of 
economic life during wartime were often shaped by the circumstances of 
preceding decades. Malaya’s oil and coconut palm industries provide 
exemplary illustrations of these continuities amidst change. These 
complexities come packaged within several smaller conundrums. First, we 
need to understand why there was a widespread shortage of coconuts for 
Malayan consumers for much of the 1940s, despite a concurrent glut of 
copra and copra oil, the industry’s main exports. Second, as growing 
coconut shortages created new openings for oil palm products to fill gaps 
in consumer needs, the reasons why palm oil became increasingly 
detested the more it was used need to be addressed. Finally, it is 
imperative to appreciate why, despite persistent interest in Malayan 
coconut produce from local and foreign markets, it was the Malayan oil 
palm sector which recovered more quickly than the coconut industry, in 
terms of output, and perhaps profitability as well. In addressing these 
interconnected questions, the continuation of a longer-term trajectory in 
smallholder cash cropping patterns also becomes more visible: one in 
which coconuts were increasingly farmed by smallholders for local 
markets, precipitating a gradual contraction of the sector, and where oil 
palms were increasingly farmed by smallholders, but for foreign markets. 
  Between 1942 and 1948, unprecedented levels of surplus and 
scarcity in all manner of produce were underwritten by massive 
breakdowns in Peninsula-wide trade networks. Older patterns of 
commodity distribution were replaced by draconian procurement policies 
which prioritised the requirements of imperial powers over Malaya’s own 
needs. Partly in reaction to these changes, black markets exploded across 
Malaya, but remained mostly inaccessible to the Peninsula’s poorer social 
classes. Severe rice shortages aggravated coconut trade imbalances 
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further, since they prompted many smallholders to shift labour from 
coconuts to rice production.  
 Although Malayan authorities, both Japanese and British, made 
great efforts to regulate the coconut trade, the oil palm industry proved 
easier to control in the end, not least because the oil product trade was 
restricted to a handful of large-scale businesses, making them easier to 
monitor and supervise. Paradoxically, this concentration of ownership and 
management undermined the ability of Malayan authorities to promote 
palm oil as a more nutritious substitute for coconut oil, since the vast 
majority of Malaya’s residents were neither familiar with cooking methods 
using red palm oil, nor the cultivation of the tree itself. The Japanese 
authorities, however, were willing to use violence to enforce consumption. 
As a result, palm oil, a substance already associated by local consumers 
with oppression, unwanted medical interventions, and impoverished 
communities, became loathed with even greater intensity. Red palm oil 
quickly assumed the status of a food item of last resort for many 
Malayans, sometimes even failing to meet this criterion. This widespread, 
lingering disdain for red palm oil dealt a mortal blow to the oil palm’s 
long-term prospects for widespread adoption by Malayan smallholders. 
Paradoxically, the ‘foreign’ character of the oil palm in Malaya 
became its greatest strength after 1945. The oil palm industry’s pre-war 
dependence on a handful of Western markets harmonized with the 
requirements of the British economy in a post-war, fat-scarce era. The 
ability of the Malayan oil palm industry’s largest producers to adopt a 
common front in post-war trade negotiations allowed producers to obtain 
attractive prices for palm oil and palm kernels in Europe.7  These 
dynamics eventually persuaded more smallholders to take a chance with 
oil palms during the late 1940s and early 1950s, primarily along the lines of 
fruit sales to already existing estate factories, for which business was 
booming. 
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In contrast, the Malayan coconut industry’s experience with post-
war export controls was a prolonged fiasco. Asian markets competed with 
British demand for Malayan copra and copra oil exports, but the 
restoration of copra production was stymied by forceful measures 
designed to supply British processors with cheap fat supplies. These trade 
restrictions became counter-productive, damaging not only the interests 
of Malayan sellers and British buyers, but also depriving other Asian 
markets of much needed oil crop material, and ultimately stalling the 
Malayan coconut sector’s recovery through copra production. For 
smallholders, the coconut palm’s multiplicity of markets, a source of 
commercial strength during the 1930s, had now become a liability. In a 
time of global fat scarcity, reviving European consumer demand, and 
heavy-handed British colonial intervention, the Malayan oil palm 
industry’s predominant Western orientation gave Malayan oil palm 
estates a leading edge over the smallholder-dominated coconut sector. 
 
COCONUTS AND OIL PALMS UNDER JAPANESE RULE 
 The Japanese invasion of Malaya began in December 1941, and by 
15 February 1942, the British Malayan authorities had formally surrendered 
all claims to their territories.8 In many ways, the Japanese Occupation’s 
main impact on oil crop production was to accelerate trends already 
underway, especially the localisation of economic activity since the Great 
Depression. Under Japanese rule, many of Malaya’s previous largest 
customers were now considered part of enemy territory, and denying 
them Malaya’s exports presented producers with a fundamental problem. 
Japanese demand for products such as copra oil, palm oil, rubber and tin, 
already relatively minor before the 1940s, could only meet a fraction of 
Malaya’s previous worldwide export volumes.9 Essential supplies, 
particularly staple cereals, became hard to obtain, not least because the 
export earnings needed to purchase such imports, especially those from 
rubber and tin, had tailed off dramatically. Shortages of international 
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shipping and local storage facilities compounded Malaya’s difficulties with 
international trade.10 
 Malaya’s coconut and oil palm sectors were crippled by these 
problems. To be sure, and contrary to what at least one scholar has 
suggested, the Japanese (and German) authorities had a strategic interest 
in securing Malayan copra oil for military and industrial uses.11 In Japan’s 
case, some 8,300 tons of the Malayan product were exported home during 
the entire Occupation.12 But this paled in comparison to the 65,000 tons 
exported in 1941, mostly to other British Asian colonies.13 Similarly, 
although a total of 32,000 tons of Malayan palm oil was apparently 
shipped to Japan during the Occupation, this did little for an industry that 
had been exporting almost 60,000 tons per year by the late 1930s.14 
For the coconut industry, this glowing glut of copra and copra oil, 
already a disaster in the making, was buttressed by Japanese strictures on 
internal goods movement. For instance, by September 1942, sales of copra 
from Johor, Selangor and other major producer regions were formally 
confined to the Japanese administration’s designated purchasing agents, 
who were to deliver all consignments at fixed prices to the Japanese 
conglomerate, Mitsui Bussan Kaisha Ltd., in Singapore. No stranger to 
business in Malaya, Mitsui had purchased considerable quantities of 
coconut oil from Malayan millers in previous decades. This included one 
consignment from Singapore Oil Mills during the First World War, 
eventually confiscated by the British Colonial Secretary owing to its then-
German-owned manufacturer’s origins.15 Now, ironically, the tables had 
been turned. As a result of Japanese regulations, 12 dealers of Chinese and 
Malay ethnicities in Johor were compelled to pay $100 each for copra 
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purchasing licences.16  Most copra supplies mobilised in this manner (at 
least from Malaya’s southern half) then remained idle in Singapore, or 
were otherwise converted into a growing deluge of copra oil.17 
In turn, Singapore’s rising stockpile created significant copra 
shortages for mainland Malayan millers. For example, in January 1943, 21 
registered Selangor crushers were allocated less than 30 per cent of the 
total copra that they had originally requested, for processing into copra oil 
and cake.18 The local market for pork still drove a strong demand for pig 
feed during the Occupation, even though Malaya’s pig population 
declined drastically owing to Japanese market controls. More than ever, 
copra cake was needed to replace shortages of other pig food staples, 
including sweet potatoes and cassava.19 With growing rice shortages, 
Malayan residents were now consuming higher levels of starchy root 
vegetables, making it more economical for pig farmers to acquire copra 
cake instead.20 In practice, however, difficulties with obtaining copra cake 
and other copra derivatives were watered down by black markets, which, 
according to historian Paul Kratoska, operated ‘more or less openly’ in 
Japanese-occupied Malaya.21 Licensed dealers sometimes diverted copra 
supplies to the black market in order to earn more cash. For instance, 
unofficial copra prices in Selangor reached $7 per picul by the end of 1942, 
while the proposed official price for copra was $4.22 Such circumstances 
created a fertile terrain for small-scale copra millers – already on the 
ascent since the late 1930s – to continue proliferating. 
Black markets also benefitted many coconut smallholders who 
could sell their crops to unlicensed dealers on a regular basis, for 
presumably higher prices than those permitted under Japanese 
regulations. Although official penalties for smuggling were ostensibly 
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harsh, the Japanese authorities had little capacity to suppress the lively 
nature of the coconut trade, because of the trade’s piecemeal, widespread 
character. Throughout 1942, village-manufactured coconut oil and palm 
sugar became increasingly common sights in Malayan rural markets 
wherever coconuts were cultivated. Whole nuts were also sold to dealers 
for consumption by local households elsewhere on the Peninsula.23 
Acknowledging difficulties with controlling the illicit trade, the Perak 
authorities promulgated new regulations in February 1944 to try and halt 
unauthorised movements of copra, while requiring households to obtain a 
written permit before they could make their own coconut oil. The oil was 
to be intended for home use only, and was subject to a production limit of 
one kati (1 1/3 pounds) per person per month.24  As was usual practice at 
the time, the Japanese were forced to rely on local informants to monitor 
most illicit activity. 
In contrast to the domestic coconut trade, which was driven by 
innumerable small producers and dealers, efforts to find local uses for oil 
palm produce were driven mostly by the Japanese authorities. Officials 
found it relatively easy to oversee the takeover of a relatively small handful 
of oil palm estates and large-scale processing facilities. Government 
chemists strove to transform palm oil’s solid fraction into candles and 
machinery lubricants for railways, mining operations and rubber goods 
manufacturers.25 Ho Hong Oil Mills, now under the control of the 
Japanese organisation Nippon Chiso Butai, also produced small amounts 
of glycerine (a raw material for making explosives), which may or may not 
have been derived from palm oil-based soap manufacture (but certainly 
from copra oil-related activities).26 Faced with a glut of palm kernels, the 
Japanese authorities also tried developing new sources of lubricants from 
palm kernel oil. But widespread damage to palm kernel crushing 
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machinery forced them to use Penang’s copra oil factories for this 
project.27 
One coconut-based commodity became especially important to 
Malayan consumers during wartime and its aftermath: laundry soap. 
Already popular before the Japanese Occupation, laundry soap became 
even more desirable once wartime shortages of imported clothing grew 
acute: without soap, items like shirts would degrade beyond repair within 
a year of vigorous washing.28 However, soap supplies from Malaya’s 
established Chinese-owned brands were now increasingly hard to come 
by, not least because of shortages of imported caustic soda (sodium 
hydroxide, an alkaline reagent was typically used to transform liquid fat 
into solid soap).29 Cognizant of the growing problem, the Japanese 
authorities tried assisting with local efforts to produce soap from early 
1943 onwards, publicising soap-making recipes using wood ashes (the 
ashes contained potassium hydroxide, another alkali).30 
 Soap production did become more diffuse and widespread during 
the Occupation, but this owed less to Japanese efforts than local initiative. 
Crude, small-scale soap-making was a relatively accessible activity, 
requiring little more than a vegetable fat, an alkaline reagent, and a 
repurposed cigarette tin to hold the mixture. Knowledge of how to do so 
was already widespread within rural areas during the interwar years.31 
Japanese prompting mainly encouraged new centres of small-scale 
production to spring up across Malaya.32 To be sure, product standards 
were extremely varied. Many formulas using coconut oil and wood ash 
turned out a jelly-like substance that was only deemed fit for laundry 
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purposes, but this temporarily sufficed, given ongoing shortages.33 Some 
enterprising urbanites made more elaborate soap varieties from palm oil 
and carbolic acid, catering to wealthier consumers looking for antiseptic 
bathing soap.34 
In this atmosphere of entrepreneurial fervour, increasing numbers 
of individuals were capitalising on the fragmentation of Malaya’s trade 
networks to make and sell small quantities of goods like soap, copra oil, 
and copra cake to local markets. The ground was gradually being laid for 
post-war explosion in domestic manufacturing, led by a large numbers of 
small producers scattered across Malaya, as opposed to the large-scale, 
port-centric firms of the past. By the 1950s, these increasingly competitive 
conditions were to add fuel to an industrial crisis that would have far-
reaching implications for Malaya’s coconut farmers. 
In the meantime, however, the most immediate problem facing 
coconut smallholders was the very same one encouraging the 
mushrooming of entrepreneurial activity, namely the uneven reach of 
markets within Malaya. The chief underlying problem was the tightening 
of state controls on the internal trade of consumer goods, in turn 
exacerbated by the deterioration and destruction of local transport 
networks, a process which had been dramatically set in motion during 
initial skirmishes with British forces in Malaya at the end of 1941.35 As 
coconut-deficit areas became increasingly unable to transmit their 
demands to surplus areas accurately, the commercial attractiveness of 
coconut harvesting for smallholders grew more dependent on local 
circumstance, such as whether growers had contact with black market 
dealers interested in their crops.  
Coconut market disruptions were aggravated by the fact that 
poorer consumers had little leverage on black markets. Indeed, their 
situation was aggravated by a depreciating Japanese-issued currency in the 
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later stages of the Occupation.36  In Kedah’s Kota Star District, for 
instance, the price of a fresh coconut rose from 2 cents before the 
Occupation to 45 cents in August 1944, reaching $2.30 in February 1945.37 
In general, the most deprived households appeared to be those of Tamils 
living on rubber estates, and villages in remote areas.38 But even in an 
urban area like Singapore, unrefined palm oil had begun to replace 
coconut oil in cooking oil rations by 1944.39  
 It is thus worth asking why such wartime scarcities did not push 
rural communities into farming oil palms, both for their household 
consumption needs, and for sale to nearby urban centres like Singapore. 
One obvious problem with this strategy was that oil palm trees took at 
least four years to bear fruit from the time of planting, making other 
strategies involving existing coconut palms or faster-growing cultivars 
more sensible. The more urgent food shortages lay with starchy staples, 
which had directly negative impacts on both oil and coconut palm 
cultivation. In Penang, Perak, Selangor and other coconut-growing areas, 
swathes of coconut palms were felled, and replaced with starchy staples 
like rice and cassava.40 At Elmina Estate in Selangor, Indian labourers 
actually cut down oil palms in order to plant finger millet (ragi) and other 
preferred foodstuffs.41 
In places like West Johor, labour shortages conspired with 
deteriorating soil conditions to make all kinds of crop farming more 
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difficult. Little assistance, if any, was provided by the Japanese authorities 
to mitigate the worsening effects of tidal inundations along Malaya’s 
western coastline, as state-mobilised labour was instead directed towards 
infrastructural projects seen as more strategic to Japan’s war effort.42 In 
Pontian District, southwest Johor, the resident Javanese population 
declined by 50 per cent between 1931 and 1947, virtually all due to harsh 
conditions under Japanese rule. Several hundred residents were recruited 
to work on the Death Railway in Thailand and Burma, most of whom died 
of illness during forced labour. Partly in response to these demands, many 
residents abandoned their farms and fled to other areas within Malaya, or 
returned to Indonesia during the latter’s transition to political 
independence in 1945.43  
Just how much Malayan smallholding oil crop acreage was lost 
through such neglect and destruction is unclear. For oil palms, the lack of 
any systematic recordkeeping for smallholdings, unlike for estates, makes 
it impossible to produce any useful figures. Even the fate of the oil palm 
cluster at Ayer Hitam in Johor, 120 acres in total before the Occupation, is 
mostly still unknown. For coconuts, decline in general acreage was 
probably significant, but existing statistical records cannot be taken at 
face value. Published records claim an overall decrease from over 614,000 
to 512,000 acres after the Japanese Occupation.44 However, this fall mostly 
reflected the results of different methodologies used by land officials to 
estimate coconut holdings before and after the Second World War.45 
Earlier acreage figures were almost certainly overestimates of major 
coconut areas, and decline during wartime probably totalled several 
thousand acres at the most. 
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Given the numerous challenges facing smallholders under 
Japanese rule, it made obvious sense for dealers and processors to meet 
any local demands for palm oil from existing estates, whose crops were 
badly in need of outlets in any case. Ho Hong Oil Mills continued to 
source palm oil from Johor estates throughout the Occupation, processing 
the oil’s solid and liquid fractions into soap and edible uses respectively.46 
A small-scale internal trade in palm oil also seems to have spontaneously 
developed within various parts of Malaya, between oil palm estates and 
areas short of cooking oil. There is no known written documentation of 
such activity, and it only came to light when I interviewed a former oil 
palm estate manager, now retired in Johor. Datuk Boon Weng Siew, whose 
father was a tapping contractor at Tebolang Estate in Malacca prior to the 
Japanese Occupation, helped run a sundry goods shop within the estate. 
During the Occupation, Datuk Boon made forays to a 500-acre Chinese-
owned oil palm estate in Tampin, Negri Sembilan. Datuk Boon brought 
his own four-gallon kerosene tins, filled them up with estate oil, and paid 
for the lot in Japanese currency, before returning to his family’s plantation 
shop to sell the unrefined oil as a cooking ingredient.47 Whether Datuk’s 
Boon’s activities were an example of something more typical across 
Malaya during the Occupation is impossible to say. But like coconut 
dealers catering to the local trade, Boon’s purchases helped producers 
maintain some semblance of production during difficult times. 
 
THE MAKING OF A DETESTED WAR FOOD 
 Indeed, for Malaya’s oil crops, perhaps the most lasting legacy of 
Japanese rule lay not in the neglect and destruction of oil and coconut 
palms, but at the other end of the commodity chain, in the realm of 
consumption. During the interwar years, the British Malayan authorities 
had already taken measures to encourage the use of edible red palm oil 
among Malaya’s most impoverished populations, including Tamil estate 
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labourers and their families, and malnourished children in urban areas. 
When the Japanese forces invaded Malaya, extant knowledge of 
knowledge of red palm oil’s uses was accordingly already concentrated in 
various institutions, foremost of which was the Department of 
Agriculture’s Research Branch, home to experiments with fractionated 
palm oil since the mid-1930s. 
The Japanese Occupation inaugurated a transfer of agricultural 
knowledge and staff to the Japanese Malayan authorities, but the process 
was anything but straightforward. Control over the Agricultural 
Department was ceded to the Japanese in January 1942, a month before 
Singapore’s surrender, with considerable loss of staff and expertise. Many 
British nationals who had joined local combat units to resist the Japanese 
advance were eventually interred in Singapore gaols, taking with them 
their specialist agricultural and nutritional knowledge.48 Meanwhile, at 
Kuala Lumpur, the remaining Asian staff within the Research Branch were 
not reorganised until March or April 1942, under the direction of T. 
Mitani, the new Chief Officer of the Agricultural Department.49 Upon the 
Branch’s restoration, research staff were directed to resume producing red 
palm oil for nutritional purposes (as well as processing palm oil into soap 
and industrial lubricants).50 The new military administration’s interest in 
red palm oil appears to have been linked to one of their core objectives 
while governing Malaya: to maintain local public order by preventing 
widespread starvation and malnutrition, which would otherwise sow 
unrest and fuel local resistance to Japanese rule.51 
 In actual fact, the Japanese authorities’ zeal for red palm oil as a 
silver bullet to counter vitamin A deficiencies was out of sync with the 
most recent research findings of British Malayan nutritionists before the 
Occupation. Amongst these findings were those of Professor John 
Rosedale, the Singapore-based biochemist largely responsible for bringing 
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Malayan palm oil’s nutritional benefits to the initial attention of British 
colonial authorities during the 1930s. Two years before the Japanese 
invasion, Rosedale, assisted by John Milsum, a senior agricultural officer 
stationed in Perak, conducted a path-breaking field survey of cultivated 
and wild vegetables being consumed in rural Malaya.52  Their research had 
been spurred by anxieties regarding wartime scarcities of imported 
vegetables.53 During their fieldwork, Rosedale and Milsum managed to 
compile a list of 62 previously undocumented vegetables, the ways in 
which Malays and Indian prepared them for cooking, as well as their 
nutritional composition.54 The results were electrifying. Of the 62, at least 
44 were typically cooked with a coconut oil base, usually in the form of a 
savoury, spicy gravy containing coconut milk (gulai lemak). Most of these 
plant foods were dark green leafy vegetables, high in carotenoids. Three 
quarters of the vegetables used with coconut kernel easily met, if not 
exceeded international guidelines for vitamin A requirements, provided 
100 grams was consumed daily (slightly over a cup equivalent).55  
In commending these vegetables as ‘excellent supplements’ to rice-
based diets, Rosedale implicitly refuted his own designation of coconut oil 
as a nutritionally inferior substance, an allegation made during the early 
1930s (Chapter Four). The new field data, coupled with a path-breaking 
ethnography of rural Malay consumption patterns published by Rosemary 
Firth in 1943, lent strength to the view that coconut oil was the most 
commonly used relish accompanying large amounts of green leafy 
vegetables prepared by most Malayans, effectively increasing the 
palatability of vitamin-bearing foods.56 Such findings constituted a small 
pushback against the dominant tendency for biomedical scientists to view 
the nutritional merits of food ingredients in isolation from one another.57 
They also reinforced a growing sense that economic deprivation, as 
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opposed to dietary ignorance, was more responsible for malnourishment 
among Malayans.58 
Yet, despite the study’s focus on the vitamin-bearing properties of 
Malay plants and vegetables, Rosedale and Milsum had omitted betel leaf 
from the list. Typically chewed together with arecanuts and lime as a 
masticatory, Rosedale had previously shown that betel leaf contained 
higher levels of carotene than most local vegetables familiar to chemists at 
the time (Chapter Three).59 In comparison to other consumables, not least 
red palm oil, Rosedale had done nothing to promote betel leaf’s domestic 
use since its nutritional properties had been published in 1935, possibly 
because of the betel quid’s associations with oral cancer since the 1930s, 
and probably because of the quid’s negative connections with 
addictiveness and blackened teeth.60 Rosedale’s latest publication on 
popular plants consumed by rural Malays only confirmed these biases 
further. 
 Assuming they were even aware of such findings, Japanese 
authorities were unable to rescind the mass distribution of red palm oil in 
favour of coconut-vegetable pairings, let alone betel-chewing. Wartime 
exigencies made such shifts impractical. The initial Japanese attack on 
Malaya had left the Agricultural Department in a state of chaos. Within 
the Research Branch, almost all scientific instruments and chemical 
reagents had gone missing. Pre-Occupation staffing had consisted of 
eighteen specialist researchers, but following the reorganisation of the 
Branch under Japanese rule, only one leading graduate member was left, 
assisted by a handful of Malay support staff.61 In such circumstances, 
things could only proceed on a ‘care and maintenance basis’ at best.62 
Moreover, the sole remaining research staff member with graduate 
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qualifications, Gunn Lay Teik, already had a background in palm oil 
chemistry.63 
 To be sure, the Japanese authorities did eventually conduct a 
highly public campaign to encourage residents to plant more vegetables 
(as well as tubers and dry rice).64 But harvested vegetables (including betel 
leaf) perished quickly, and could not be easily hoarded for controlled 
distribution, unlike palm oil. Furthermore, Malayan palm oil, now cut off 
from its usual British imperial markets, was a plentiful substance in need 
of a use. Malaya’s inhabitants, now faced with the imminent threat of 
widespread malnourishment, represented the perfect target population for 
the propagation of red palm oil, by an administration willing to exercise 
coercive measures in order to ensure public compliance with regulations. 
 Although red palm oil production by the Department of 
Agriculture appears to have begun as early as March or April 1942, 
versions branded as ‘Refined Medicinal Red Palm Oil’, were placed on the 
market by August, if not earlier.65 Under Gunn’s instructions, Malayan oil 
palm estates also began producing their own supplies of palm oil for 
medicinal purposes. Estate supplies were delivered either in their crude 
form, for further processing in Kuala Lumpur and Singapore, or in their 
liquid fraction, already stripped of semi-solid components, where estate 
facilities permitted.66  
From the outset, palm oil’s vitamin-bearing properties were 
emphasised to consumers. The language used by a Singapore dispensary 
in one such newspaper advertisement in August 1942 was typically 
technical: ‘In these times when the choice of diets is limited, it is 
especially important to supplement one’s food with Vitamin concentrates. 
REFINED RED PALM OIL (Sincere Brand) is guaranteed to contain 1000 
International Units of Vitamin A per cc’.67 No information was provided 
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regarding red palm oil’s taste, or the manner in which it was supposed to 
be used, whether as a cooking oil, condiment, or directly by the spoonful. 
In contrast, Malayan recipes issued by the Japanese authorities 
from 1943 onwards appear to have stressed the many ways of preparing 
coconut kernels for home cooking, with comparatively little space to given 
to red palm oil. Published in books and newspaper articles, these 
campaigns were explicitly focused on helping households stretch and 
replace their dwindling rice rations with substitute starchy staples.68 To 
make all of these starches more palatable, coconut oil was typically 
recommended as an accompanying relish. Many of the recipes, in fact, 
may have drawn inspiration from publications launched under previous 
British rule, namely two editions of a locally-produced cookbook entitled 
‘Coconut Recipes’. Both were published after the Depression, as part of 
British efforts to cushion the impact of falling copra exports from Malaya 
by promoting local uses for coconuts.69 
Regardless of whether such efforts actually boosted local coconut 
consumption during the Occupation, the fact remains that the fruit was 
widely eaten. Locally-grown coconuts were portable, widely available (at 
least during the first couple of years of the Occupation), and could be 
used to replace other scarce ingredients in home cooking and street 
snacks. In the absence of salt, coconut milk was used to flavour vegetables 
and meat. Through necessity, if nothing else, many families ended up 
consuming masses of leafy green vegetables cooked in coconut milk, in 
order to add more body to dishes suffering from dwindling meat 
provisions.70 Coconut milk was also used as a condensed milk substitute 
and thickener in soups and caffeinated beverages, providing a much-
needed sense of satiation. Where people could make and afford them, 
sweetened coconut cakes remained popular.71 Even Japanese officials 
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reportedly acquired a taste for coconut-based dishes, including coconut 
rice (nasi lemak), and grated cassava with coconut milk.72  
Yet there were also implicit limits as to how much coconut 
produce Malayans were willing to ingest during the Occupation and its 
aftermath. Following the departure of the Japanese, British nutritionists 
tried promoting coconuts to Malayans as a calorie-rich substitute for still-
scarce rice in mid-1946. Their efforts were swiftly met with animosity and 
ridicule by members of the Malayan public.73 As one contributor to a 
prominent local broadsheet grumbled, 
[in] the Jap period practically everything centred around 
the coconut – coconut food, coconut cakes, coconut oil 
for cooking, and yes, even sugar was obtained from the 
coconut. Judging by the amount of coconuts the people 
consumed in those days, I should think that everybody 
[has] had enough calories – whatever they are – to last 
them for a long while to come.
74
 
Promoting coconut-based diets may have been part of a belated attempt 
by British experts to rehabilitate the coconut through nutritional policies. 
But many Malayan consumers, including those from urban, literate 
classes, were clearly exasperated by these state-driven efforts to increase 
coconut consumption, not to mention the narrow scientific principles 
used to justify such actions. 
 Red palm oil underwent an even more dramatic spike in 
consumption during the Japanese Occupation. While precise figures are 
unknown, uptake was certainly much larger than at any point before or 
after the Occupation. For instance, in Kuala Lumpur, a post-war survey of 
369 households found that over half had knowingly consumed red palm 
oil in one form or another during the Occupation. Only the wealthiest 
families managed to exempt themselves from red palm oil consumption, 
as they could usually afford to purchase more familiar vegetable oils – like 
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coconut oil and groundnut oil – on a regular basis.75 Moreover, the oral 
history records of the National Archives of Singapore are replete with 
accounts from Malayans who harboured vivid memories of red palm oil 
consumption under Japanese rule. Thanks in large part to these 
testimonies, we can now map out the channels through red palm oil was 
disseminated, as well as the reasons for the almost unanimous sense of 
loathing expressed by its consumers. 
 Under Japanese rule, red palm oil was disseminated through three 
primary avenues. The first avenue was through retail markets, or at least 
what passed for them during the Japanese Occupation. To this end, 
official sale prices were manipulated by the Japanese authorities by 1944, if 
not earlier, so as to make red palm oil cheaper than coconut oil.76 Beyond 
official reach, however, lay pockets of mini-markets in rural areas, where, 
as in the case of Datuk Boon, estates sold surplus palm oil to dealers, who 
then sold it to retail customers. 
The second avenue for red palm oil consumption was through 
state-controlled cooking ration issues to households, alongside essential 
goods like rice, salt, soap and kerosene. Malayans working for Japanese 
organisations during the war were sometimes given palm oil in lieu of 
wages.77  When red palm oil became part of general rationing remains 
unclear, but fragmentary evidence suggests that palm oil became a 
common sight from around 1943 onwards, roughly at same time that 
coconut oil supplies were growing scarce in some parts of Malaya.78  
Consumer reactions to red palm oil rations were uniformly 
negative. Some families appear to have shunned palm oil’s use in meals, 
using their provisions as lighting fuel or soap feedstock instead.79 For 
households who lacked access to any alternative cooking oil, some tried 
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removing what they felt to be an objectionable smell through various 
means, including boiling palm oil with baking soda.80 Many others 
reported great discomfort with palm oil’s intense colour, which lent an 
unmistakable orange-red tinge to everything it was cooked with.81 For one 
such recipient, interviewed 40 years later, the very memory of palm oil’s 
hue implicitly brought back the horrors of Japanese rule: 
…the only oil, what we can get from teng kee [personal 
food ration cards], is this palm oil, red palm oil [exhales 
loudly]….It was not processed, simply red and raw. Like 
red tomato. So what can you do? We look at it only, 
cannot eat. I understand from many people, they say this 




 Palm oil distribution in schools, the third major site for oil 
provisioning, led to even more unpleasant encounters. Here, state 
paternalism (or maternalism, given a significant number of female 
teachers involved) was taken to a new level. Without the presence of 
intervening family members, the Malayan students were left at the mercy 
of Japanese and Malayan school teachers. Like Malaya’s Indian plantation 
labourers of the late 1930s, school-going youth were given daily doses of 
red palm oil straight from the bottle, cod liver oil-style. One interviewee 
recalled being told by his Japanese teachers that palm oil was being 
provided because of milk shortages.83 Such justifications were of little 
comfort to students, who often had to consume the oil with the threat of 
caning, or slaps, hanging over their heads.84 
Many interviewees had trouble describing, if not recalling 
medicinal palm oil’s taste. One interviewee likened it to castor oil, which 
draws parallels with situations where servants were force-fed castor oil in 
British India, or, more famously, force-feeding humiliations meted out by 
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Italian Fascists to political dissidents.85 Another labelled palm oil’s taste as 
‘horrible’, but claimed that palm oil tasted nothing like castor oil – which  
was ‘horribly bitter and so awful’ – and instead more like ‘coconut oil, but 
with a slightly different taste’.86 Others focused on what they felt to be 
medicinal palm oil’s indescribably unpleasant smell.87 In some school 
classes, more fortunate children were given a sweet or a peanut to assist 
with ingestion. The remainder ended up holding their noses while a spoon 
brimming with oil was shoved into their mouths each day.88 Even with 
variations in taste perceptions between interviewees, and the tendency for 
time to distort memories, the fact remains that bottled palm oil 
consumption in schools was a unanimously disagreeable experience for all 
concerned.  
Other school-based methods of disseminating red palm oil, as 
either a grease to be slathered on bread, or as a frying oil for bread, seem 
to have been even more distasteful for students. It did not help that the 
loaves, either made from cassava, millet, or maize flour, were often 
lamentably rubbery. One respondent, about 10 years old at the time of the 
Occupation, recalled with Proustian intensity that despite experiencing 
unremitting hunger, her maize bread 
…was definitely not palatable. It was thickish, oily, and 
the corn could not absorb the [palm] oil, so it was a bit 
softish….[W]e were so frightened, we refused to say 
no….[I]magine a loaf of bread which is soaked with 
milk….We were not able to cut it into slices…Because of 
the grease, the oily part of it, it was not palatable. But 
then it was food.
89
 
 Compounding these problems of palatability was the fact that oil 
rations themselves were generally poorly prepared. Malaya had yet to host 
any hydrogenation facilities that could be used to manufacture palm oil-
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based margarine.90 Consequently, the semi-solid fraction of palm oil 
served with bread made for a very poor butter substitute. As a cod liver oil 
substitute, the liquid fraction of palm oil also tended to vary in quality. 
Some bottles still contained large amounts of the solid fraction 
(tripalmitine), which was tedious to remove in full using available filtering 
techniques at the time.91 Like the Chinese miners who had been provided 
with unfiltered palm oil in lieu of groundnut oil during the late 1920s, 
children tended to find the taste of such poorly filtered samples especially 
objectionable.92 Problems were heightened by rancid oil stocks, as well as 
contamination from leftover kerosene in unwashed containers.93 
 Besides bad chemistry, the stressful psychological effects of 
wartime deprivation intensified the significance and meaning that locals 
ascribed to food and meals. Many residents, worn down by the dreariness 
of everyday life and uncertainty regarding the future, felt a growing sense 
of aimlessness.94 There was widespread nostalgia for the period preceding 
the Japanese Occupation. In one historian’s words, ‘food and eating 
became a way of returning to a sense of familiarity and normalcy in a time 
of upheaval’.95 To Malayans, who were more used to pale-coloured oils 
infused with the gratifying aromas of coconuts, sesame seeds, and 
groundnuts, there was nothing at all familiar about red palm oil, whether 
as a medicinal supplement, a cooking oil, or when combined with an 
equally alien food such as bread made from cassava, millet, or maize flour. 
And, as we have seen, even with familiar foods like the coconut, locals 
were only willing to increase their intake within certain limits. 
 The longing for familiarity continued with the return of British 
rule. In early 1946, the British Military Administration managed to 
requisition about 2,000 tons of local palm oil for domestic use. Malaya’s 
Resident Commissioners (successors to the British Residents of each 
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Malay state), hospitals, welfare officers, estates, mining firms and 
industrial enterprises were given the right of first refusal before palm oil 
was placed on the market.96 However, popular memories of the 
Occupation remained fresh, and expressions of interest were subdued, 
despite signs of severe malnourishment among estate labourers.97 When 
supplies were put on sale at a fixed price of $0.35 per kati, public response 
was reportedly even worse. ‘The people’, lamented Malaya’s new Director 
of Public Relations, ‘will not buy it…as Coconut Oil is just as cheap and is 
less unpalatable’.98 All in all, only about 100 tons of red palm oil was taken 
up in the end, and the rest was eventually exported to Liverpool for soap-
making the following year.99 Despite official efforts to continue red palm 
oil’s dissemination into the early 1950s, actual uptake remained poor. 
There was little enthusiasm shown for government-sponsored recipes 
containing numerous uses for red palm oil (Illustration 5), let alone 
bottled palm oil rations that were circulated by healthcare practitioners 
within malnourished rural communities.100 
 
Illustration 5. Front cover of a recipe booklet endorsing the use of red palm oil in 
homemade meals, 1947. Source: ANM-KL: PR 389/46, Encs. 1, 44. 
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There is probably no definitive answer as to whether the events of 
the Japanese Occupation and its aftermath instilled a permanent sense of 
revulsion in Malayans towards lightly refined red palm oil. On the one 
hand, some allowance should be given for a degree of exaggeration in the 
disgust expressed by interviewees, as many testimonies were collected as 
part of a larger project stressing the trials suffered by locals under 
Japanese rule. On the other hand, the series of events recounted here 
provide an outstanding illustration of Bee Wilson’s contention that ‘if a 
food is repeatedly tasted under conditions of coercion or stress, the 
exposure may have the effect of reinforcing rather than reversing an 
aversion’.101 Indeed, as late as 1964, a team of visiting nutritionists reported 
that red palm oil was still strongly associated by Malayans with the events 
of the Japanese Occupation. Based on this finding, the nutritionists 
concluded that red palm oil was generally unacceptable as a local dietary 
supplement.102 
Although coconut oil ingestion during the Japanese Occupation 
had also provoked moderate amounts of domestic revulsion, Malaya’s 
coconut industry had more pressing problems to deal with by 1946. 
Following the termination of hostilities between the Allied and Axis 
Powers, and the halting restoration of international trade, the coconut 
sector found itself facing demands for its produce from local, Asian, and 
British markets. The British segment, finding itself alarmingly short of raw 
materials, sought to reassert itself through coercive measures, at the 
expense of other competing consumer markets. In contrast, the oil palm 
industry, having previously aligned itself with British buyers, benefitted 
immensely from the opportunity to renew contact with the United 
Kingdom. These were, in short, the telling features of a new colonial 
occupation, driven by an old set of foreign interests. 
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THE RESTORATION OF MALAYA’S OIL CROP EXPORTS UNDER BRITISH RULE 
The international fats situation after the Second World War was 
virtually the opposite of its pre-war stance. Between 1935 and 1939, annual 
world production of oils and fats had reached almost 20 million tons, of 
which about 5.8 million tons was in international circulation, creating a 
generous supply buffer.103  By the end of 1946, surplus had turned into 
scarcity. Wartime devastation of existing producer networks, worldwide 
population growth and changing consumption patterns meant that the 
world supply of fats was in deficit to the tune of between two-and-a-half 
to four million tons, with dire consequences for the security of supplies in 
Europe and North America.104 Britain, whose domestic producers only met 
a tenth of annual fat consumption in 1938, was extremely reliant on 
imports even before the Second World War.105 Yet, by 1947, severe 
shortages of animal feed meant that British tallow and butter production 
were now just a third and sixth of their respective 1938 levels.106    
Despite these shortages, neither the Malayan oil palm nor coconut 
sectors were able to restore domestic production and exports to pre-war 
levels until the 1950s. Recovery was initially stymied by widespread 
damage to dock facilities, railways, roads and bridges, as well as the loss of 
vehicles and animals used to ply these routes. Agricultural labour was also 
in short supply, not least due to continued scarcities of consumer 
essentials. This situation was aggravated by the British Military 
Administration’s decision to restrict trade between each of the nine 
geographic subdivisions it had imposed on Malaya, as part of initial 
attempts to control and restore the distribution of essential goods to pre-
war levels.107 Severe shortages of clothing and rice persisted because of 
these internal trade strictures, in turn impeding efforts to attract and 
revitalise labour needed for agriculture. Pre-war rice consumption levels 
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had yet to be attained by 1949, due to post-war scarcities of rice imports, 
and shortfalls in domestic cultivation.108 
Notwithstanding these general difficulties, the Malayan oil palm 
industry had its own specific barriers to reconstruction. Looted and 
defective estate machinery, labour shortages (including white-collar 
workers), and general field neglect ensured that only 31 out of 46 
plantations across Malaya were somewhat operational by the end of 
1946.109 The oil palm industry nevertheless soon found startlingly effective 
ways to restore production. The sector’s recovery was aided in large part 
by subsidies from both the Malayan government and British taxpayer. The 
prime beneficiaries of this assistance were oil palm estates directly 
represented by a Malayan Palm Oil Committee, led by the agency house of 
Guthrie & Co. Ltd. Committee members claimed to account for 67,000 
acres of oil palms, which amounted to 86 per cent of all recorded Malayan 
oil palm lands in 1947.110 Aid was eventually delivered in two forms. First, 
relatively cheap credit for reconstruction was disbursed by commercial 
banks, underwritten by the Malayan government, at three per cent 
interest per annum.111 The agreement was modelled on a previous credit 
arrangement with the Malayan tin mining industry, and justified on 
similar grounds: that the oil palm industry’s factories, railways, and bulk 
storage facilities were as capital-intensive as the tin mining sector’s 
dredges.112 The Palm Oil Committee’s mechanist rationale, coupled with 
its argument stressing the ‘importance of this comparatively new industry 
to Malayan economy [sic]’, may have helped it to gain access to credit 
facilities otherwise denied to the Malayan rubber and coconut sectors, 
which Whitehall viewed as less capital-intensive in comparison.113  
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Second, the Ministry of Food decided to purchase the entire 
supply of low-acid Malayan palm oil from July 1946 onwards. This 
arrangement initially carried on for two years, at a nominal price of 
$400/ton ex-factory, a rate that Palm Oil Committee representatives 
claimed covered their current costs of production, ‘plus reasonable 
profit’.114 The Ministry soon extended the offer to smaller Malayan 
producers putting out about 80-100 tons of palm oil a month in drums, 
provided their supplies could meet the Ministry’s stipulated five per cent 
limit on free fatty acid content. The Malayan government, worried about 
criticisms of the arrangement from the local rubber industry, protested 
that the long-term contract was unnecessary for the oil palm industry’s 
rehabilitation and in fact ‘very generous’.115 Nevertheless, the contract was 
updated in consultation with the Committee, and extended until 
December 1952. Ministry payouts accordingly ascended from a nominal 
average of $600/ton in 1947 to $1,020/ton by 1952 for palm oil alone, even 
before profits from kernels (sold mostly to other European markets) were 
factored in.116 
Judging by the swift rise in recorded exports to the United 
Kingdom, most Malayan producers had taken advantage of the Ministry of 
Food’s market guarantee by 1947 (see Table 3). For some large estates, the 
ensuing windfall was evidently more than reasonable: Guthrie’s Oil Palms 
of Malaya in Johor was able to offer shareholder dividends of 7.5 per cent 
in 1947, rising to 12.5 per cent in 1948.117 In Perak, United Plantations’ two 
oil palm estates were able to achieve average gross profit margins of 73 per 
cent between 1946 and 1949, 16 percent more than that obtained during 
the post-Depression years of 1936-1939.118  Smaller producers packing oil in 
drums, whose higher transport costs would normally have confined their 
sales to Asia, apparently found the Ministry’s price quotes lucrative 
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enough to join the rush. Guthrie & Co., keen to preserve the workings of 
the system, lobbied the Ministry to have the fixed contract reinstated after 
1952, but without success. By then, the Ministry was already hard pressed 
to meet prior contractual obligations to purchase unexpectedly large 
quantities of low-acid palm oil from British West Africa.119 Without the 
market guarantee, prices for Malayan palm oil fell by one-third in 1953, 
prompting sellers of Malayan palm oil (but not kernels) to focus their 
efforts outside Britain.120  










Sent to Britain 
(%) 
1947 44,432 899 45,331 98.0 
1948 46,688 2,121 48,811 95.7 
1949 54,085 1,167 55,252 97.9 
1950 49,029 2,176 51,205 95.8 
1951 44,170 2,378 46,548 94.9 
1952 45,659 492 46,151 98.9 
1953 25,572 22,790 48,362 52.9 
1954 16,940 32,359 49,299 34.4 
Table 3.  Malaya: palm oil exports, 1947-1954. Source: Appendix 3.3. 
Ironically, the financial support responsible for renewed 
confidence in the industry’s future also helped delay output recovery in 
the short term. The fact that Malayan palm oil production only surpassed 
the previous high set in 1940 by 1957 was less a sign of the sector’s 
weakness than the renewed confidence of growers in its future.121 Renewed 
cash flows enabled reinvestment in plantation factories, fields, and 
internal transport networks in the years following the Japanese 
departure.122  Many of the oldest estates planted up during the 1920s 
seized the chance to replace ageing palms with higher-yielding varieties 
during the late 1940s and early 1950s, which in turn helped reduce 
harvesting labour costs associated with tall palms. Just as significantly, 
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smallholders located near estates throughout Malaya also became 
increasingly interested in oil palms, and some would go on to develop 
palm fruit sales arrangements with estate mills by the early 1950s. As 
yields from recently replanted oil palms entered the picture, Malayan 
exports eventually exceeded previous records set in 1939. Palm kernel 
exports were double their 1939 levels by 1958, and palm oil exports were 71 
per cent higher than 1939 volumes by 1962.123 
In contrast, the Malayan coconut industry’s post-war recovery was 
far more tortuous than the oil palm sector’s. There were three critical 
factors behind this divergence. First, as returning British authorities soon 
learnt, many smallholders continued to view sales of surplus coconut fruit 
as less remunerative than competing coconut-related activities that they 
had taken up before and during the Japanese Occupation. This was 
especially so for palm sugar production. During 1946 and 1947, large 
quantities of palm sugar were still being made and sold through the black 
market to households lacking access to imported refined sugar.124 By the 
end of 1947, as imported sugar became more widely available, demand for 
palm sugar was reported to be declining rapidly. Selling whole nuts for 
direct local consumption and copra-making became more remunerative 
once more, although there continued to be a vigorous market for palm 
sugar in states like Malacca.125   
With rice shortages ravaging Malaya until 1948, rice cultivation 
sometimes offered a more economically sensible alternative to coconut 
harvesting. Smallholders could be found diverting their efforts from 
coconuts to rice harvesting in places like Sabak Bernam in 1946, despite 
the locality’s status as one of the largest coconut-producing areas in 
Malaya at the time.126 This was all in fact part of a momentary global 
phenomenon, affecting swathes of Asia, the Pacific, Latin America, and 
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the Middle East, wherein oil crop cultivation by small farmers was being 
neglected in favour of starchy staple production.127  
Yet many areas within Malaya continued to be desperately short of 
coconut supplies, underlying the extent to which coconut-deficit areas 
were unable to convey their demands to surplus regions.128 In early 1946, 
for instance, no quantity of edible oil above one picul was permitted 
transfer between the British Military Administration’s nine sub-regions, 
which meant that areas such as Pahang remained heavily deprived of 
supplies.129 Even within each sub-region, trade imbalances were 
commonplace. Within a major coconut-growing region like Selangor, 
inland districts reported heavy shortages of coconut oil, while coastal 
districts lacked sufficient price incentives to harvest nuts beyond 
household requirements.130 European estates themselves were prohibited 
from selling any nuts until European managers could be reinstated, a 
situation which provoked substantial nut theft in the meantime.131 Thanks 
to transport and labour shortages, nut prices fluctuated wildly depending 
on distance from producing areas.132 
To make matters worse, the British Military Administration did 
not appear capable of effectively requisitioning stocks of copra oil for local 
redistribution. Initially this was blamed on the fact that there was no 
centralised supply consortium with which the Administration’s officials 
could negotiate, unlike that of the Palm Oil Committee. Instead, the 
Administration’s Food Control Department approached millers and copra 
oil merchants individually. In January 1946, a Singapore-based merchant 
reportedly offered the Department 200 tons of copra oil at a not 
unreasonable nominal rate of 50 cents a kati ($847/ton). But officials were 
reluctant to purchase such a small quantity for what they claimed to be an 
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overly inflated price, perhaps hoping to obtain cheaper quotations from 
other merchants.133  
These two broad factors underpinning the contradiction - 
smallholder disinterest in coconut production, and the fragmentation of 
the Malayan domestic market - were underwritten by the most critical 
issue of all: the continued curtailment of coconut product exports from 
Malaya. As with palm oil and palm kernels, local setbacks for coconut 
production could have been alleviated through an emphasis on external 
markets, where demand was now extremely high. The primary difficulty 
for coconut producers lay with Britain’s intentions to corral Malayan 
copra and copra oil supplies for its own domestic requirements between 
1946 and 1948, at prices that proved deeply unsatisfactory to exporters, 
who could obtain much higher prices elsewhere in Asia.  
In anticipation of purchases from the British government, a 
virtually complete ban on copra and copra oil exports from Malaya was 
established by January 1946. Haggling between the Malayan authorities 
and Britain’s Ministry of Food meant another six months were to pass 
before an official contractual arrangement could be reached, albeit one 
with terms that proved so detestable to exporters that the deal was revised 
six months later, in January 1947.134 Even then, the modified nominal 
prices offered by the Ministry of Food for Malayan copra oil (£70/ton) 
were still only half of those prevailing on the world market, and failed to 
meet even current Malayan ex-factory prices.135 Despite repeated 
complaints from Malayan officials that export controls were retarding the 
coconut sector’s recovery, Malayan exporters were only permitted to sell 
coconut products freely on the world market from September 1948 
onwards.136 
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The Ministry of Food’s decision to keep its coconut produce 
quotations low seems to have been motivated more by longer-term goals. 
Especially disconcerting for the Ministry was post-war British India’s 
demand for coconut products. British India, the Ministry claimed, was 
offering such high prices for coconut produce that any attempt by Britain 
to lift export controls from Malaya would cause British India to absorb all 
forthcoming supplies. The Ministry thus justified the imposition of 
Malayan export controls on the grounds that British India needed to be 
pressured into increasing domestic production of oil crops, and thus 
contribute to fat supplies at a global level, even if this effectively meant 
discouraging copra oil output from other territories in the meantime, 
including Malaya.137 
Local Malayan responses to British government trade strictures 
were vigorous, and ultimately benefited coconut growers to some extent. 
Malayan millers and coconut merchants quickly made numerous 
representations to the local authorities, backing their complaints by 
withholding stocks for sale to the Ministry of Food.138 News that Philippine 
copra oil exporters were stepping into the space that Malayans had been 
forced to vacate in newly-independent India became grist for the mill of 
the Malayan press.139 Both these petitions and negative publicity helped to 
overturn some of the more controversial features of initial trade 
restrictions, including export controls on copra of non-Malayan origin, 
and sales prohibitions to India’s food and chemical industries.  
Besides legal approaches, international smuggling also became 
commonplace as a way to challenge trade strictures, if it was not already 
prevalent during Japanese rule. By 1947, it was an open secret among 
British authorities in Malaya and London that merchants were regularly 
moving coconut produce out of Malaya to unauthorised destinations, 
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including Siam, Indochina, and India.140 This may have begun as early as 
the onset of controls in 1946. As a result, significant quantities of copra 
appear to have been transferred from Malaya’s hinterlands to Singapore, 
Klang and Penang, from where they were then exported illicitly. Not 
unlike during the Japanese Occupation, this port-centric supply 
movement left some mainland millers short of supplies.141 By the end of 
1947, smuggling via Singapore became especially commonplace. The 
island’s status had been recently altered to that of a Crown Colony, 
administered separately from the rest of Malaya. This, coupled with 
Singapore’s longstanding position as a staples port, enabled Singapore 
merchants and millers to pass off large quantities of copra derived from 
the Malayan mainland as copra of Indonesian origin. By September 1948, 
the remaining prohibitions on the Malayan Federation’s coconut product 
exports were lifted, hastened by official awareness of their 
ineffectiveness.142  
In the meantime, mainland coconut processors used their 
proximity to local markets to try and make ends meet. If anything, the 
demand for copra cake had become even more pronounced after the 
Japanese Occupation, owing to the release of pent-up demand for pork in 
daily dishes, as well as a continued shortage of cereal imports, including 
rice bran, another pig feed staple before the 1940s.143 In September 1946, a 
Malaya-wide survey by visiting senior Unilever executives noted that 
[p]rices of Copra in Malaya…vary from place to 
place….Local demand is the ruling factor and oil mills 
have sprung up all over the country. It would appear also 
that it is local demand for cake as pig food which is the 
dominating influence. Cake is selling at even higher 
prices than copra itself. Moreover oil is selling in certain 
                                                          
140
 TNA: MAF 83/2195, ‘Correction of Draft Notes of the Meeting Held on the 3
rd
 of 
February 1947,’ enclosed in Managing Director, J.H. Vavasseur & Co. Ltd, to Supply 
Secretariat, Ministry of Food, London, 18.2.1947. 
141
 ANM-KL: SEL.C.A 463/45, Encs. 10-11, 14A. 
142
 ANM-KL: PR 803/47, Enc. 3; TNA: MAF 97/42, Amaze X9186, 27.10.1948; Selvadurai, 
‘Penang’, 46. 
143
 UNI: GB1752.UNI/RM/OC/2/2/64/11, A. Knox and J. Buxton, ‘Malaya: Notes on General 




   258 
 
places below what was in Malaya over many years 
prewar, the approximate parity with copra i.e. double.
144
 
Thus, for a brief time, copra cake became the main manufacture, and 
copra oil the by-product. In 1947, many Selangor and Johor millers found 
it worthwhile to produce a particularly oil-rich copra cake, made from a 
single (rather than double, or triple) squeeze in a hydraulic press. 
Although this meant less copra oil could be sold, high copra cake prices 
covered the costs of raw materials from both estates and smallholdings.145   
At the same time, copra oil’s low domestic market value both 
propelled, and was cushioned by, another legacy of the Japanese 
Occupation: the booming interest in soap-making. Renewed imports of 
caustic soda from Britain and other sources aided this expansion.146 In 
1946, an estimated 18,050 tons of soap was being manufactured locally; 
more than twice the estimate for 1940.147 The increase was largely driven 
by newcomers to the soap business, rather than established players. By 
1946, one such upstart, Lam Soon, a Singapore-based food manufacturer 
before the war, was believed to be turning out as much soap as the 
twenty-year-old Ho Hong Soap Factory, using a simple corrugated iron 
shed as its main production facility.148 Despite this mounting competition, 
many Chinese-owned businesses across Malaya – including two Johor-
based factories in 1947 – continued producing soap for smaller towns and 
rural areas.149 
Moreover, because Britain’s demand for Malayan fats extended 
mainly to unfinished rather than finished goods, Malayan soap exports 
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were less subject to stringent imperial controls.150 In 1946 and 1947, both 
Singapore and Penang resumed their respective soap trades with a 
vengeance, with about 1,200 tons of soap produced each month for local 
consumption. Supplies were also exported to Hong Kong, Indonesia, 
Burma, Borneo, and Sarawak. Malaya’s regional soap exports in 1946, 
mainly from Singapore to Hong Kong and Indonesia, were roughly 10 
times higher than 1939’s, suggesting a massive clearance of inventories.151 
Despite these disposals, local and regional demand remained so high that 
Singapore’s ongoing production of low-grade soap in early 1947 was 
double that of the pre-war period.152  
Notwithstanding the diversity of markets for coconut produce 
during and after the Japanese Occupation, smallholder interest in coconut 
farming remained significantly dampened by export controls on copra and 
copra oil. From the beginning of the Japanese Occupation until the 
termination of British export restrictions in 1948, the production of palm 
sugar, household coconut oil, and fresh nuts are arguably best understood 
as the actions of households trying to stem a significant loss of income 
from coconut-based exports. Only by the end of 1947, as export 
restrictions selectively eased, did growers see a notable increase in prices 
for copra and copra oil across Malaya.153 Officials commented that 
smallholders in central and northern Johor had begun spending more 
time tending their coconut holdings, in response to these rising prices.154 
Superficially at least, things were finally returning to normal. 
 
CONCLUSION 
 At least one historian has noted that any scholar who still treats 
the years of Japanese rule in Malaya as ‘an aberration or, worse still, of no 
                                                          
150
 UNI: GB1752.UNI/RM/OC/2/2/64/11, A. Knox and J. Buxton, ‘Malaya: Notes on General 
Situation’, 25.9.1946, 9. 
151
 Ibid., 17. 
152
 TNA: MAF 83/2178, Enc. 64; ANM-KL: BMA/DEPT 18/26, Enc 7. 
153
 AR DAM 1947, 5. 
154
 ANM-KL: 2006/0009406, Malayan Union Department of Agriculture Monthly Reports, 
December 1947, 7-8. 
CHAPTER 6 
 
   260 
 
consequential meaning to the history of Malaya’ will risk leaving many 
important historical questions unsatisfactorily answered.155 This 
observation can be usefully extended to the entire period between 1942 
and 1948. Amidst many undeniably traumatic changes within Malaya’s 
politics, society and economy during this period, the overall impression 
gleaned from the evidence shown in this chapter is one of the period’s 
strong connection with preceding decades, and, as we shall see in the 
penultimate chapter, major continuities with the years to come.  
Neither the expansion of red palm oil provisioning policies during 
wartime, nor the resultant widespread consumer aversion to palm oil, 
could have been possible without a prior Western fascination with 
nutritional chemistry’s potential to address colonial welfare concerns. 
Thus, despite a government-supported abundance of unrefined palm oil, 
the years between 1942 and 1948 saw Malayan households distance 
themselves from palm oil provisions as far as possible. With the domestic 
market for unrefined palm oil in tatters, the Malayan oil palm industry 
was able to consolidate its export-oriented character, and even take 
advantage of international fat scarcities that had arisen during the period. 
In the years following 1948, this resurgence in production for overseas 
industrial markets would lead to renewed interest in Malayan oil palm 
planting among growers of varying levels of capitalisation, including 
smallholders. 
The Malayan coconut industry, in contrast, continued to be 
hamstrung by environmental difficulties that only worsened due to labour 
shortages between 1942 and 1948. These deteriorating conditions were 
compounded by the continued retreat of the coconut sector into a focus 
on local markets. Yet, the domestic scene was now weakened and 
fragmented by wartime events. Home demand for coconut produce, while 
useful in providing marginal incomes for producers, could hardly cope 
with the glut of copra produce that arose from the industry’s devastating 
loss of external markets during the entire period. Moreover, as will be 
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seen this study’s penultimate chapter, wartime advances in refining 
technologies ended up making palm oil more suitable for edible purposes 
than ever before. As a result, the Malayan coconut industry would find it 
difficult to re-establish its foothold in traditional overseas markets during 
the 1950s, even after export restrictions had been lifted. 
It is ironical that one of the most dirigiste periods in Malaya’s 
history has left comparatively little by way of reliable official records.156 
Discussions on many aspects of Malaya’s oil and coconut palm trades are 
unavoidably impressionistic as a result, particularly for the years between 
1942 and 1945. Fortunately, vivid oral testimonies have helped address 
knowledge gaps regarding everyday realities for many of Malaya’s 
residents, as well as the central features of the black market trade. The 
author’s serendipitous encounter with a former palm oil dealer is yet 
another instance of how interviews can supplement official documents to 
a degree. At the same time, the author’s language limitations prevented 
him from using existing Chinese-language literature and oral testimonies 
to help refine the analysis. More oral interviews with those who have had 
first-hand experience living under Japanese rule would also almost 
certainly address further knowledge gaps, but time to do so is running 
out. 
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THE SECOND NARROWING OF THE PARTICIPATION GAP, 1948-1963. 
 
Having emerged from the morass of acute food shortages, Malaya’s 
smallholders now had to confront cumulative developments brewing since 
the late 1920s. Thanks to roaring demand for oils and fats after the Second 
World War, the Malayan oil palm industry was now at its strongest 
position to date. Meanwhile, coconut farming was receding in many 
localities. International markets for copra oil, already under threat for 
decades, now faced stiff competition from palm oil in the post-war period. 
The domestic market for coconut produce, a crucial buffer against export 
fluctuations, was also waning. Soil conditions on Johor’s western coast 
were continuing to deteriorate, and worse still, agriculturalists were 
beginning to realise that their environmental problems were not simply 
hydrological, but chemical as well. 
There is no shortage of questions that can be asked of this crucial 
period in Malaya’s history. However, those pertaining to the smallholder 
participation gap between oil palms and other tree crops are of special 
importance, not least because this period marked a major turning point in 
Malaya’s economic history, one where smallholders began to dominate 
the farming of virtually every major crop in local agriculture, except for 
the oil palm. The underlying condition that made this general shift 
towards smallholder farming possible was the ageing of Malaya’s major 
tree crops, many of which were now in urgent need of replacement by 
newer, more productive cultivars. This situation created an 
unprecedented opportunity to alter Malaya’s agricultural trajectory for the 
longer term. 
The chief paradox of coconut farming after 1948 was that many 
farmers did not want to commit to the crop any longer, and yet Malayan 
authorities felt obliged to keep the sector propped up. Old colonial 





played a small but significant role in state responses. To this flawed 
ideology were added a number of developments, some newer than others: 
compulsions to diversify away from natural rubber cultivation, the 
politicisation of rural poverty, and pressures to industrialise. With its long 
history of cultivation by Malay growers, and its affiliation with a well-
established manufacturing sector, the coconut sector appeared to be the 
perfect candidate for official support. Unfortunately, this was not 
something many growers themselves agreed with. 
A similar conundrum occurred as oil palm cultivation expanded 
rapidly across Malaya during the 1950s and 1960s. Here, smallholder 
interest in oil palms grew markedly, but did not translate into 
corresponding cultivation. Past studies have usually dwelled on the 
impact that Malaya’s highly-publicised land settlement schemes have had 
on redirecting smallholder interest in oil palms into government-managed 
large-scale programmes. Such studies, however, ignore other important 
smallholder-government dynamics, the records for which lie buried and 
scattered in the Malaysian public archives. 
These sources tell us a complex, yet ultimately unflattering story 
about government interactions with smallholders, both before and after 
Malaya’s independence. Following the Second World War, British colonial 
officials were even more conflicted in their views regarding smallholder 
involvement with oil palms than they had been during the second half of 
the 1930s. The Colonial Office was now making it clear that it preferred oil 
palms in Malaya to become a peasant food crop worthy of home 
consumption. Malayan administrators, in contrast, proved implacable in 
their belief that large-scale mechanised processing was critical to 
commercial success. Malayan rubber estates were accordingly given ample 
support to switch over to oil palms, while support for smallholder oil palm 
cultivation remained grudging for the most part, and premised on the 
ability to organise production for centralised processing. Yet, without the 
benefit of an internal market for the crop, smallholder responses to state 





opportunities presented, given the heavier presence of dealers in rubber 
and food crop marketing networks. 
All of these matters came to a head by the late 1950s, when the 
Federal Malayan authorities began to establish a national-level 
programme aimed at regenerating Malaya’s coconut smallholdings. The 
circumstances surrounding the launch of the first of these schemes at 
Minyak Beku (a particularly deprived area in West Johor) were 
emblematic of the economic difficulties facing many smallholders. The 
Scheme was promoted to growers on the grounds that it would improve 
economic and environmental conditions for coconut farming, but was 
starved of the funding and expertise needed to accomplish these 
objectives. The Scheme also exacerbated the oil palm conundrum for 
smallholders by refusing to permit the use of replanting funds for any tree 
crops other than coconut palms. In doing so, it revealed its bias towards 
meeting the needs of industrialists for cheap raw materials, rather than 
assuaging the demands of smallholders for stable incomes. Smallholders, 
in turn, remained a difficult resource for authorities to control and 
manage, cooperating only when government priorities suited their own 
specific circumstances, or when they had little choice left in the matter. 
 
THE REPLANTING IMPERATIVE 
During the 1950s and 1960s, Malaya’s major tree crops all came 
under increasing pressure to be destroyed and replaced. The commercial 
lifespans of the first generation of tree crops planted to meet global 
industrial demands – rubber, oil palms, and to some extent, coconut 
palms - were finally coming to an end. Many of the original farmers of 
these crops were themselves now entering old age. Moreover, public and 
privately-funded research conducted during the interwar years had 
produced a stable of higher-yielding tree varieties (and bud-grafted 





after the Second World War.1 Estates and smallholders with more lands 
and cash in hand were capable of undertaking such reforms without 
government financial assistance. However, most smallholders, working on 
plots of five acres or less, found it difficult to do so unless they had 
government backing.2 
Underlining this push for replanting were a number of crucial 
developments affecting Malaya’s political economy. First, the 1950s saw 
mounting pressures to intensify agricultural land use. This was partly due 
to population growth, but more importantly, the reluctance of individual 
Malay States to use their prerogatives over land policy to alienate parcels 
for agricultural purposes (other than rice planting).3 Second, post-war 
British administrators had become increasingly aware of the economic 
value of the Asian smallholder contribution to the entire Malayan rubber 
industry.4 Authorities in both London and Malaya now sought to yoke 
smallholder production to Britain’s goal of increasing its United States 
dollar-denominated foreign exchange earnings through a more 
interventionist Malayan development strategy.5 Both the Colonial Office 
and the newly-restructured Federal Malayan government were also keen 
to support efforts to raise the productivity and prosperity of growers in 
general, if only to pre-empt economic nationalism, as well as stifle more 
radical demands for political change.6  
Finally, the wartime traumas of the 1940s had reawakened fears 
among British and nationalist elites that Malaya’s economy, long reliant 
on a handful of export mainstays, was vulnerable to hardship and ruin. In 
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a world where natural rubber’s resource monopoly was being 
progressively eroded by the post-war rise of synthetic substitutes from the 
United States, policymakers became convinced that Malaya’s agricultural 
base needed to shift away from over-reliance on rubber, and focus more 
on crops like oil and coconut palms, while finding ways to increase all of 
their respective yields. Yet all this came at the same moment as Malaya’s 
coconut farms were experiencing their worst conditions to date. 
 
RETREAT OF THE COCONUT PALM 
The economic outlook for the coconut palm during the 1950s was 
far graver than that of the 1930s. Copra oil faced altogether new 
competition for use in detergents, due to inroads made by synthetic 
substitutes in Western markets.7 Following the Second World War, 
international advances in edible oil refining and transport techniques 
increased the substitutability of different oils and fats in margarine-
making. Margarine, in turn, was under pressure from a resurgence of 
Western butter production.8 Palm oil, which had previously been limited 
in the industrial world to mostly inedible uses, could now firmly join the 
ranks of coconuts and other oil crops in the margarine sector. For 
instance, by 1957, the proportion of palm oil used in Netherlands 
margarine was almost a quarter of all fats and oils used, virtually equal to 
copra oil’s share. In Britain, palm oil had already surpassed copra oil as a 
margarine-making ingredient.9 Palm oil’s increased use in Western 
markets thus boosted its popularity among Malayan growers in the 1950s. 
But this came at the expense of copra oil’s market share, pushing prices 
for coconut produce downwards.10 
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There were nevertheless signs that the home market for artisanal 
coconut produce could still be a promising alternative for coconut 
farmers. Coconut milk, the basic ingredient of domestic curries and 
snacks, remained an important substance typically produced within the 
household (or the local corner shop) during the 1950s and 1960s. It had yet 
to become the pre-packaged, pasteurised item seen on supermarket 
shelves around the world today. Where large quantities of coconut milk 
were needed for village celebrations, a small motorised kernel grater could 
now be hired to save labour and time.11 A stock of unopened coconuts in 
one’s backyard, ready for splitting, scraping and pressing, remained key to 
generating a ‘continuous supply of coconut milk for daily cooking’.12 
Yet, such anecdotal evidence is readily contradicted by other 
vignettes, as well as broader surveys of Malayan society. A 1960 estimate of 
consumption of artisanal coconut produce claimed that the average 
Malayan was now only using the equivalent of 19 coconuts per year, which 
equated to just one-fifth of the entire Malayan coconut crop. Derived from 
Malaya’s first national-level household budget survey conducted two years 
earlier, this per capita estimate was far lower than estimates made during 
the 1930s.13 The 1960 figure probably underestimated coconut 
consumption to some extent, given that the household survey massively 
under-assessed the amount of foodstuffs that were being consumed 
through concealed channels, such as sugar hidden in food and beverages.14 
It nevertheless seems likely that a shift towards the consumption of 
industrially manufactured goods had already begun to take place across 
Malaya during this period, if not earlier. In rural Johor, potable drinking 
supplies were now commonplace, with a common public tap within 
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walking distance of most households.15 Coconut water had thus become 
more of a recreational luxury than an essential item.  
In addition, artisanal coconut oil appears to have declined 
significantly in domestic popularity by the mid-twentieth century. One 
well-known source on Malaya suggests a significant decline in the local 
use of coconut oil as a skin emollient during the first half of the twentieth 
century, partly because more people had begun covering greater portions 
of their bodies with clothing.16 In rural Kelantan during the early 1960s, 
households were found using commercially manufactured soap powder 
where none had previously been used, as well as a widening variety of 
industrially manufactured cosmetics.17 Moreover, village production of 
coconut sweetcakes was being gradually supplanted by the local 
consumption of factory-made biscuits and ice cream.18  
Falling domestic demand for artisanal coconut produce was not 
necessarily a death knell for an industry whose external markets were 
under threat, if home demand was shifting to coconut-based industrial 
manufactures, like refined cooking oil, packaged soap, margarine, and 
vegetable shortening. But national statistics show that this was not the 
case. During the 1950s, the amount of copra oil channelled into products 
for the Malayan domestic market did not expand to a level that could 
match the estimated fall in consumption of artisanal produce, suggesting 
instead a broad-based consumer shift towards more prestigious products 
that were not made from coconut ingredients.19 This general stagnation in 
local demand for coconut produce may have even reflected lingering 
disdain for coconuts, following the overconsumption of coconuts in home 
cooking during the Japanese Occupation. The shrinkage of domestic 
demand for coconut products thus limited the ability of the Malayan 
consumer to act as a buffer for flagging international demand. The 
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approaches used to combat the coconut trade crisis of the 1930s could not 
be repeated with the same effectiveness as before. 
Coconut farming’s troubles were magnified by new environmental 
problems. By the 1950s, both coastal growers and federal officials were 
aware that a factor previously overlooked – the acidification of heavy clay 
and organic Malayan soils – was compounding pre-existing problems of 
ineffective drainage, namely by stunting palm development in less water-
logged coastal areas. At the time, however, the process of acid soil 
formation was only understood as a static phenomenon, wherein 
previously buried soils would acidify when dug up and exposed to air.20 In 
response, growers and officials permitted incursions of sea water through 
drainage systems, in the belief that such movements would wash coastal 
soils free of excess acid.21 
Only in the 1970s was acid formation in these coastal soils better 
understood by Malaysian agricultural scientists. This discovery upended 
previous understandings of the phenomenon. Essentially, the Peninsula’s 
acid sulphate soils were not timeless geological fixtures waiting to be 
uncovered, but were instead a historically fluid process. They were the 
result of the repeated inundation of Malaya’s low-lying clay and organic 
soils with sulphur-bearing sea water. In West Johor, the key factor 
enabling the accumulation of acid in soils was the presence of large 
amounts of decaying organic material, surrounded by an anaerobic, 
brackish environment, typically found around tidal rivers such as the Batu 
Pahat River. Aggressive drainage techniques could avoid the problem, 
provided they kept sea water out. Otherwise, such drains would inevitably 
cause agricultural soils within their reach to acidify over time. By the 
1970s, scientists believed that over half of all alluvial clays along West 
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Johor’s coastline had become acid sulphate soils, in part owing to earlier 
misguided attempts to address the problem through seawater flushing.22 
These challenging economic and environmental conditions were 
matched only by the growing ambitions of Malayan colonial authorities to 
prop up the coconut sector, and stem an accompanying exodus of 
smallholders from coconut farming. Older official beliefs in the centrality 
of coconuts to Malay identity, rural income generation, and domestic food 
security, were now bolstered by an ethnicised electoral system.  By the 
mid-1950s, the parlous state of coconut smallholdings along Malaya’s 
western coastline had become sufficiently well-known in the popular press 
and halls of legislature to push the federal authorities into taking more 
focused action to rehabilitate coconut farmland. The Alliance Front, a 
Malayan coalition of race-based political parties, had made the revival of 
the coconut industry one of its campaign promises during the inaugural 
hustings of 1955, with the bulk of political pressure being filtered through 
the United Malays National Organisation, the Alliance’s Malay-based 
party.23 
The popularity of the Alliance Front’s platform put immense 
pressure on colonial authorities to be seen delivering more progressive 
results quickly. In the words of Thomas Wilson, the federal government’s 
chief agricultural economist, the protection of coastal agricultural lands 
from salt or fresh water flooding was now ‘a social function properly the 
responsibility of Government’.24 But this newfound willingness to tackle 
West Johor’s environmental challenges continued to be confounded by 
the technical complexities of large-scale coastal engineering. Besides the 
poorly understood problem of soil acidification, the completion of 
bunding works in some Johor schemes during the mid-1950s was causing 
adjoining areas of coconut farmland to be subjected to chronic flooding.25 
In one area of Batu Pahat District, the situation had become so dire that 
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local Legislative Council representative S. Chelvasingam-MacIntyre had 
personally approached the Johor State Government for funding to build 
temporary bunds to prevent further floods, only for negotiations to break 
down due to disagreements between smallholders and the drainage 
authorities over the number of tidal gates necessary to manage water 
flows.26  
In the face of these seemingly intractable challenges, short-term 
measures had to be taken. Malayan authorities thus increased their 
support for coconut producer cooperatives throughout the 1950s. 
Although state-supported marketing initiatives had shown very mixed 
results during the 1930s, Malay ethno-nationalism had become much 
more politically salient by the 1950s.27 Both federal and state authorities 
felt compelled to act on popular arguments that rural Malay poverty was 
due to exploitation by Chinese-dominated trading networks, even though 
contemporary surveys of coconut grower indebtedness suggested few 
grounds for this belief.28 Essentially a form of political posturing, colonial 
authorities supported coconut cooperatives so as to address Malay ethno-
nationalist concerns without expropriating Chinese operators. 
The main novelty of such interventions lay in their financial scale, 
in line with the ambitions of the late colonial state in Malaya. By the early 
1950s, federal support encompassed not just co-operative Malay 
manufacture of copra, but copra milling. Copra crushing machinery was 
now relatively more affordable than in the past. Groups of Malay growers 
and traders claiming entrepreneurial aspirations took advantage of such 
opportunities to claim public funding from the federal authorities, but 
often without any accompanying experience in the basics of large-scale 
factory process management. 
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Attempts to establish Malay-owned cooperative copra mills during 
the period were thus either abject failures or remained in their infancy. 
For example, the first attempt at launching a cooperatively-owned copra 
oil mill began in the late 1940s, under the joint Malay proprietorship of 
the Kanchong Darat Cooperative Oil Mill Society in Selangor. Upon 
beginning operations in June 1949, the factory reportedly ran into serious 
problems immediately. Insufficient capital and poor strategic planning 
meant that emplaced machinery was either inappropriate or too small to 
run the mill efficiently. Meanwhile, working capital had been 
misallocated. Wages paid to factory labour and management were far in 
excess of the mill’s actual output. There was purportedly ‘a lot of 
backbiting’ in the Society, including individual appeals to Selangor’s Chief 
Minister for financial aid without the consent of other society 
representatives.29 At the end of 1950, the factory had racked up a loss of 
$1,280. Existing shareholders, many of whom were coconut smallholders, 
were reluctant to make any further financial contributions, having realised 
the greater attraction of incumbent Chinese marketing networks. Instead, 
the Rural and Industrial Development Authority, a body officially 
established in 1950 to accelerate agrarian economic development (but 
essentially a heavily politicised vehicle used to disburse cheap credit to 
Malay small producers) granted a loan of $28,100 to rectify technical 
problems with the mill in 1952. Yet, the factory swiftly closed the following 
year, suggesting that underlying managerial problems were never 
resolved.30 
Troubled by poor coconut prices, inferior soils, and incompetent 
state support, many households continued to channel their time and 
resources into more remunerative activities. During a brief boom in 
rubber and copra prices during the Korean War in the early 1950s, many 
smallholders in coastal Selangor invested their temporarily swollen 
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earnings in non-farm expenditures, especially motorcycles. These acted as 
powerful instruments to widen the number of livelihood options that 
smallholders could access within a daily commute, including the transport 
of goods and people, without having to disrupt family ties in the process.31 
As in the 1930s, fishing was also pursued, both for home consumption and 
commercial sales. It was not unusual to find cases where an elderly 
smallholder delegated the relatively more strenuous tasks of coconut 
harvesting and copra preparation to his adult children, while spending 
most of his own nights at sea.32 In some cases nearly two-fifths of 
household income came from fishing alone.33 
On the whole, Malaya’s coconut smallholding sector was now 
undeniably moribund, not least in Johor (Map 10). During Malaya’s 
inaugural large-scale field survey of coconut smallholdings in 1956, one in 
every 10 acres of West Johor’s coconut lands were found to be devoid of 
palms.34 Extensive flooding had killed off whatever remained of nuts left 
to germinate on the ground, leaving over half the entire area without any 
juvenile saplings.35 A quarter of the area lacked any internal drainage, and 
two-thirds of existing drains were ‘completely choked’.36 At the same time, 
many smallholders were loath to cut down degenerate palms because 
many still bore small numbers of miserable-looking fruits fairly regularly.37  
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Map 10. West Johor: coconut areas surveyed, 1956. Source: Wilson, Johore, 3. 
The survey also indicated extensive crop diversification away from 
coconuts. Two-thirds of the main coconut area was found to be inter-
planted with other cash crops, chiefly bananas, coffee, nipah palms, 
pineapples, and a variety of other fruit trees, all providing varying 
amounts of supplementary income to growers. Some smallholders in the 
surveyed area had recently begun replanting less waterlogged coconut 
lands with rubber trees, often in violation of land title conditions.38  
Interplanted among some 47,000 acres of coconut lands, areca 
palms had developed into the second most widely cultivated tree crop 
within the surveyed area by 1956. Unfortunately, international demand for 
arecanuts had fallen sharply after the Second World War, even more 
drastically than coconuts. While in 1938, net exports of arecanuts from 
Malaya were 33,769 tons (three-fifths of which came from Johor), the 
figure had plummeted to 2,074 tons by 1960, largely due to the sharp 
decline of exports to India.39 This was probably less about falling 
consumption in India than the Indian government’s efforts to increase 
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domestic production, after the bulk of arecanut lands went to Pakistan 
following British India’s Partition in 1947.40 Across Malaya, thousands of 
acres of areca palms were either being cut down or left idle, though 
continued demand for arecanuts from Burma, China, and rural Malaya 
itself helped stem the decline somewhat.41  
Coconut estates on Malaya’s West Coast faced similar economic 
and environmental difficulties during the 1950s. Already aware of the risks 
of planting new trees on potentially acidic soils, some estates took a 
cautious approach when replacing their old coconut stands with non-
coconut crops. For instance, in Perak, Straits Plantations Ltd. (for whom 
Harrisons & Crosfield were agents) had begun replacing small blocks of 
coconut lands with oil palms, to see if local coastal soils were suitable for 
the new crop.42 But labour shortages may have also been responsible for 
holding back the rate of replanting, as was the case for many other 
Malayan coconut and rubber estates which were replacing old trees with 
oil palms during early 1950s.43  
Well aware of ongoing widespread diversification away from 
coconut palms, Thomas Wilson, chief agricultural economist to the 
Federal Government and architect of the West Johor coconut survey, 
made a number of policy recommendations that went sharply against the 
prevailing official consensus. Wilson essentially tried to see things from 
the point of view of coconut smallholders themselves, rather than national 
perspectives prizing food security and an imagined Malay identity. He 
argued that the present dereliction of smallholder coconut farms was a 
blessing in disguise, creating opportunities to rehabilitate affected lands, 
and plant them with more remunerative crops. Wilson suggested two 
possible approaches. One was to rejuvenate the most productive coconut 
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stands and integrate them into a more intensive intercropping system. In 
other words, the loss of West Johor’s forest rent could be mitigated 
through the publicly-funded addition of new catch crops and increased 
labour inputs. The other option, which Wilson preferred on the grounds 
of its lower costs, was to dispense with coconut palms altogether and 
replace them with more remunerative tree crops like rubber. Wilson also 
considered oil palms in this regard, but was hesitant to recommend their 
state-sponsored introduction because he believed they had not ‘been 
proved satisfactory for smallholders’.44 This was a typical example of how 
previous official decisions to play down the existence of actual oil palm 
smallholdings, like the 120-acre cluster at Ayer Hitam, were continuing to 
hinder subsequent attempts at promoting smallholder oil palm cultivation 
in Malaya. 
Wilson’s report received enthusiastic responses from both 
government officials and private manufacturers, but neither group chose 
to engage with his recommendations to abolish coconut farming. In fact, 
as will be shown later, industrialists used the Report’s findings to argue for 
the opposite, namely the publicly-funded retention of coconut farming, 
despite Wilson’s warning about the higher costs involved.45 In the 
meantime, officials tasked with carrying out Wilson’s recommendations 
chose to ignore the progress being made by estates, including those 
growing coconuts, in switching to oil palms. Worse still, much of this 
ongoing diversification within estates was being directly funded by the 
federal authorities themselves. 
 
THE OIL PALM QUESTION 
In 1952, federal Malayan authorities launched the first-ever series 
of schemes providing long-term financial incentives to growers to replace 
old tree crops. Intended to encourage the removal of old, unproductive 
rubber stands, the schemes created an unequal dynamic for diversification 
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into oil palms. Just a year after the termination of the British Ministry of 
Food’s guaranteed market for Malayan oil palm produce, rubber estates 
were permitted to use their new replanting subsidies to plant oil palms 
from 1954 onwards. In contrast, rubber smallholdings were only permitted 
to do the same from 1963.46 In response to this new scheme and earlier 
public support for reconstruction, Malayan estate lands devoted to oil 
palms doubled from 78,200 acres in 1947 to 153,400 acres in 1962, most of 
this farmland European-owned.47 Smallholder oil palm acreage also 
almost certainly rose, but was relatively minute, and went unrecorded in 
official publications until smallholders actually began to qualify for oil 
palm planting subsidies. 
 Clearly such a policy was discriminatory, but whether it was 
intentionally so is another question altogether. It is certainly possible to 
argue that federal officials were merely following what made common 
sense at the time. Malayan estates already had a long history of successful 
oil palm cash cropping, making it easy for officials to visualise a further 
expansion of cultivation along existing lines. In contrast, the lack of 
historical precedent for oil palm smallholder cultivation posed a problem 
for officials needing to justify the use of public funds for such purposes. 
The non-rubber crops that rubber smallholders were permitted to use 
their replanting grants for – coffee, pineapples, coconuts, rice, sago, and 
fruit trees (excluding oil palms) – were all crops with a prominent record 
of smallholder involvement in Malaya.48 
Furthermore, rubber smallholders themselves were generally 
disinterested in oil palms during the 1950s. Many of the non-rubber crops 
that qualified for replanting subsidies were only added to replanting 
schemes after smallholders themselves had lobbied for their inclusion. In 
1953, for example, coffee and sago were both offered federal support only 
after repeated representations by smallholders from Klang and other 
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areas.49 In such circumstances, the posture of replanting authorities was 
reactive, rather than anticipatory. Moreover, replanting statistics 
themselves convey a strong impression of the enduring popularity of 
rubber among smallholders. By 1963, a total of 603,000 acres of rubber 
smallholdings had been replanted with none other than new rubber 
stands. In a distant second place was Malaya’s most popular tree crop of 
times past, coconut palms, having replaced 8,536 acres of rubber 
smallholdings.50 
Yet, the numbers also paint a deceptively simplistic picture. 
Smallholder replanting figures during this interval were artificially inflated 
by estates who took advantage of regulatory loopholes to sub-divide their 
rubber properties in order to qualify for more generous smallholding 
grants.51 Worse still, until 1962, smallholders wishing to plant fresh lands 
with their grants were only typically permitted to adopt rubber as the 
expansionary cultivar, which put those interested in other crops at a 
severe disadvantage.52 Many households could not afford to forego income 
from existing holdings if their stands had to be cut down in preparation 
for new plantings.53 Finally, while the first published figures for oil palm 
smallholdings only appear in 1963, in conjunction with the Rubber 
Industry (Replanting) Board’s corresponding annual report, many 
smallholders, as will be seen, were already known to be replanting and 
new planting lands with oil palms before this date. The growth of 
smallholder oil palm cultivation was just not on the same level as that of 
estates, and certainly did not occur with the same level of official support. 
What undoubtedly exacerbated matters for smallholders 
interested in oil palms was the prevailing Malayan official preference for a 
particularly inaccessible farming arrangement during the 1950s. It was not 
simply that oil palm growers had to form collectives, something that had 
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been accomplished during the interwar years, albeit with considerable 
difficulty. Now, mimicking the official consensus regarding coconut 
marketing arrangements, growers were expected to divorce themselves 
from interactions with existing privately-owned fruit mills, in favour of 
sales through government-sponsored channels. This was a complete 
turnaround from previous guidelines advocating oil palm clustering 
strategies during the late 1920s, which, although not often followed in 
practice, at least gave lip service to the notion that smallholders and 
estates might have a common interest in working together. Again, the 
exclusion of estate mills from smallholder marketing arrangements might 
have been overcome through recourse to the small-scale hand-operated 
presses so enthusiastically touted by federal Malayan officials during the 
1930s. Instead, this possibility, if officials were even still aware of it, was 
excluded, in favour of much larger milling configurations that 
overwhelmingly exceeded the capabilities of smallholders and petty 
dealers to own and manage themselves. These exclusions effectively 
transferred control over marketing and processing to the authorities 
instead. Given such official preferences, the notion of allowing 
smallholder rubber replanting subsidies to be used for oil palms, as 
discussed earlier, was clearly untenable for most officials during the 1950s. 
The new enthusiasm for state capitalism was problematic for 
smallholders already doing business with estate mills. In Selangor, an 
Indian grower with a small area of productive oil palms was found to be 
successfully selling his fruit to the nearby factory of Highlands Estate 
sometime before the mid-1950s. This arrangement, once known to the 
local authorities, came in for strong disapproval, and possible 
prohibition.54 Worse still, for many who were not yet in the business, but 
were considering it, the Selangor authorities’ responses had a distinct 
chilling effect. Around 1952, a large group of Malay smallholders at Kuala 
Langat voiced a joint interest in oil palms, informing the local district 
officer of their plans to plant up their lands and sell the resulting harvest 
to the local mill already present in their area.55 E. J. H. Berwick, Selangor’s 
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State Agricultural Officer, denied the Malay smallholder collective 
permission to proceed with proposed plans, and informed them that they 
needed to work with a large-scale publicly-owned mill instead.56 
Yet, at the same time, Selangor agricultural officials were unable to 
make this mill a reality. Their dependence on the Federal Malayan 
authorities for funding for such a capital-intensive project left them 
vulnerable to the federal government’s own shifting political priorities. 
Partly in response to the collective Malay smallholder appeal, Berwick 
spearheaded proposals in 1952 to establish a 2,000 acre oil palm ‘settler’ 
scheme, all materials, including a factory costing $500,000, to be funded 
by the cash-rich Rural Industrial Development Authority. These plans, 
however, had to be abandoned the following year when the area set aside 
for the scheme was used to resettle ex-Special Constable Malay personnel, 
as a reward for their service against Malayan Communist Party forces. The 
ex-personnel, in contrast to the Kuala Langat growers, expressly wished to 
grow crops other than oil palms on their newly acquired lands.57 
 
THE KULAI SCHEME 
After several such fiascos, the Malayan authorities were only able 
to realise the vision of marrying smallholder oil palm farming 
arrangements with large-scale publicly-owned mills at the end of the 
1950s, through Malaya’s inaugural oil palm settler scheme at Kulai, Johor. 
However, the prime beneficiaries of the Kulai Oil Palm Scheme, and the 
many subsequent oil palm schemes that Kulai helped catalyse, were not 
existing smallholders, but mostly land-starved Malay households, pre-
selected on the basis of age, economic need, agricultural background, and 
political loyalty.58 Such projects paved the way for a loss of power over 
decisions regarding labour allocation, one of the central distinguishing 
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features of smallholder households. Growers under Federal Land 
Development Authority schemes found themselves relinquishing their 
ability to choose what to farm, and when to harvest, to a professional 
managerial class, in settings more akin to the hierarchy of a ‘modern 
plantation’.59 
The Kulai Scheme, however, had a much less well-known 
smallholder dimension to it. During initial planning, Kulai was conceived 
as a union of two distinctly different farming arrangements, each favoured 
by a different set of interests. The first group of backers comprised the 
majority of senior agricultural officials in Malaya, who, in stressing the oil 
palm’s main value as an export-oriented cash crop, inherited the long-held 
assumption that oil palms were a crop commercially unsuitable for 
peasant growers, owing to cost economies at the processing stage.60 Their 
belief was now reinforced by clear evidence that, unlike West Africans, 
Malayans ‘regarded palm oil as unpalatable’, a phenomenon consolidated 
by the events of the previous three decades.61 
The interests of the second group of supporters, an assortment of 
metropolitan agricultural officials and federal Malayan specialists, lay 
primarily in grower self-sufficiency, namely seeing the oil palm as part of 
village culture. This view echoed the Colonial Office’s support for 
intensive small-scale food crop farming during the 1930s, conveyed 
through the recommendations of the Agricultural Adviser at the time, 
Frank Stockdale. Following the Japanese Occupation, the thread was 
picked up by Geoffrey Clay, the Colonial Office’s new Agricultural Adviser, 
when visiting Malaya in 1948. Like his predecessor, Clay noted the 
incongruity of oil palms being solely cultivated by plantations, and 
recommended that Malaya’s Department of Agriculture take steps to help 
rural dwellers incorporate oil palms into village settings, alongside rice 
and cocoa (the latter crop was unpopular with smallholders in Malaya at 
the time, due to its higher labour requirements and lower returns relative 
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to rubber).62 Clearly taken with the notion that oil palms could replace 
coconut palms in village life, he recommended that the Federal 
Experiment Station at Serdang make its dwarf oil palm varieties, with their 
relatively light harvesting labour demands, easily available to 
smallholders. Meanwhile, the accompanying oil extraction challenge 
could be overcome with ‘small processing plants…on the lines of the 
Pioneer Mills being used in Nigeria’.63  
Yet, seven years after Clay’s report, Malaya’s Department of 
Agriculture was upbraided by G. Nye, the Colonial Office’s visiting Deputy 
Agricultural Adviser, for having apparently done ‘nothing…towards 
encouraging oil palm production amongst…small farmers’.64 Nye 
essentially repeated Clay’s earlier recommendations, insisting that pioneer 
mills and smallholder-friendly oil palm varieties be promoted to 
smallholders.65  
Nye’s criticisms, however, were not entirely fair, for they did not 
take into account ongoing developments within the Kulai Scheme. Since 
the beginning of the 1950s, the recently-formed Colonial Development 
Corporation, blessed with the authority to borrow up to £100 million, had 
sought to influence the shape of the Malaya’s export sector. The 
Corporation found in oil palms an opportunity to link rural welfare with 
Britain’s own industrial needs, not to mention reaffirm the political 
legitimacy of British colonial rule.66 With no known precedents to draw on 
in Malaya, the Corporation attempted to reconcile the two conflicting 
perspectives regarding the appropriate scale of oil palm farming with a 
concept largely imported from West Africa: the nucleus estate.67 In 
Malaya, the nucleus was to consist of a central mill linked directly to a 
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core area of oil palms farmed by heavily supervised settlers, thus 
guaranteeing the initial investment.  
To start the project, the Corporation looked to Johor, where 
several Chinese-owned oil palm estates had been put up for sale by their 
owners after the ravages of the Japanese Occupation. One of these, a 1,722 
acre plantation owned by Lee Quee Choo at Kulai, was purchased by the 
Corporation, which then delegated the tasks of rehabilitation and field 
operations to Managing Agent Guthrie & Co. Ltd in 1950.68 Within this 
farmed core, private middlemen could be excluded from oil palm 
marketing activities, thereby assuaging official anxieties regarding peasant 
indebtedness and sales of lands to non-Malay dealers.69  
The second half of the nucleus concept proved much harder to 
operationalise, and helped delay the scheme’s opening until 1959. Planners 
had initially intended for existing smallholders within 16 kilometres of the 
nucleus to show interest in the Scheme, turn over a part of their village 
lands to oil palms, and eventually sell palm fruit to the Scheme’s new 
factory. The chief proponents of this vision were D. E. M. Fiennes, the 
Corporation’s then-Regional Controller, and Guthrie’s very own managing 
director of Malayan operations at the time, Charles Thornton. Indeed, 
new factory capacity was planned with this goal in mind. Processing 
facilities would initially cater to 5,000 acres of oil palms, with room for 
further expansion when needed.70 However, neither Thornton nor Fiennes 
appeared to have seriously considered how smallholders outside the 
nucleus were to market their produce. 
The central problem facing these planners was how to foster 
outgrower participation without the involvement of private trader 
intermediaries. Kulai, home to a Chinese agricultural population during 
the interwar period, had seen its numbers swell during the Malayan 
Communist insurgency when numerous Chinese community resettlement 
projects were established in the locality. The Corporation saw in these 
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rapidly expanding settlements the opportunity to court substantial 
smallholder interest in the Kulai Scheme, and made enquiries during the 
mid-1950s at two recently settled areas to gauge interest: Kelapa Sawit 
New Village, and Bukit Batu New Village. The latter settlement lay in the 
vicinity of 2,000 acres of land whose soils were believed to be especially 
suitable for oil palms.71 
The Corporation’s enquiries, however, were met with 
overwhelmingly negative responses. Growers at Kelapa Sawit were already 
aware of the oil palm’s economic possibilities, having contributed years of 
part-time labour to Kulai Estate’s rehabilitation during the early 1950s.72  
But in both villages, growers preferred retaining their current mixed 
farming systems, consisting of pineapples, tubers, vegetables, rice, pigs, 
and poultry, all mostly for sale to Johor and Singapore. Pig sales were the 
principal source of income for growers, and copra cake feed was in high 
demand.73 All this commercial activity had been made possible through a 
network of private dealers, with the encouragement of the local 
authorities themselves, as part of efforts to address a mounting food 
supply deficit in Singapore and Johor since the 1940s, if not earlier.74 The 
fact that residents already had familiar ties with a number of competing 
dealers was not lost on Johor’s State Agricultural Officer, who commented 
after a visit in late 1955 that growers would ‘be very conscious of the fact 
that there would be only one potential purchaser for their [oil palm] 
produce’.75   
Undeterred, Fiennes and Thornton considered sweetening their 
offer with the prospect of oil palm replanting subsidies. But this notion 
met with even less success, as the powers to permit such an arrangement 
lay not with the Federal Land Development Authority, but with the Johor 
authorities and the Rubber Industry Replanting Board. Fiennes confessed 
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to being stymied by both the marketing and planting challenges, writing 
in 1956 that ‘I can do nothing but put the [replanting subsidy] suggestion 
forward with an offer of processing in Kulai factory...the price paid for 
fruit will be fair to all concerned, perhaps something on the same lines 
as…smallholders’ pineapples’.76  
The Kulai conundrum was an inversion of the early 1930s, when 
migrant smallholders from the Dutch East Indies had been keen to join 
the outgrower scheme proposed by Socfin at Johor Labis Estate, but had 
been discouraged from doing so by the Johor authorities. Then, as now, 
growers had been approached by a single large buyer for their produce, 
without any private intermediaries. In both cases, officials assumed, and 
not without good reason, that smallholders would be exploited by a 
monopsonistic private miller. And yet, when the state finally assumed the 
role of central processor, officials saw no irony in that fact that growers 
were still reluctant to participate, despite evidence of the superior 
marketing arrangements offered by private dealers. 
Thus, instead of bringing about a revolution in smallholder oil 
palm farming, planners resigned themselves to making the nucleus the 
sole feature of the Kulai Scheme, setting a precedent for government-
organised oil palm farming projects that has continued until today. At the 
time, however, the nucleus-only arrangement was a politically tricky to 
sell to the public. Without the involvement of existing smallholders, 
Malayan authorities were left with the problem of presenting the Scheme 
as a socially progressive project, especially since many Malayans already 
felt that oil palms could only be commercially farmed as part of a 
corporate, hierarchically-managed labour regime. 
Yet, even in its compromised format, the Kulai Scheme came with 
a number of powerful benefits. The Scheme had a significant level of 
external financial backing from the Corporation ($2 million for land 
development alone). As a massive settler project, it offered thousands of 
acres of fertile soil to Malay households, at a time of pronounced land 
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hunger.77  The Scheme also attracted support for demographic reasons. 
For instance, Johor’s Executive Council saw the Scheme as a way of 
encouraging Malay population growth in an area dominated by Chinese 
pig farmers, whose activities made it otherwise difficult for Malay-
Muslims to live nearby.78 Such were the Scheme’s attractions that, under 
the watchful eyes of FELDA’s new chairman Taib Andak, the first 100 
Malay settlers had arrived at Kulai by 1961. And by 1965, 3,000 acres of oil 
palms were being farmed by 250 Malay households, with more settlers on 
the way.79 
The Kulai Scheme’s launch as a large-scale enterprise nevertheless 
did create openings for independent smallholders to sink their teeth into 
oil palms. In focussing on the crop, the Scheme helped reform the existing 
rubber smallholders’ replanting programme. In September 1960, C. 
Whitehead, the Acting Assistant Director for Agriculture, circulated a 
memorandum informing all State Agricultural Officers that oil palms 
would soon be considered a smallholder crop eligible for financial 
support. Under pressure to accelerate smallholder crop diversification 
away from rubber, he was now able to use favourable income figures from 
oil palm cash cropping to make his case, figures that had actually been 
derived from the Federal Land Development Authority’s own calculations 
for the Kulai Scheme four years earlier.80  
By June 1963, rubber replanting authorities were acquiring dozens 
of copies of the Federal Land Development Authority’s policy brochure, 
No Need to be Poor, for dissemination to extension officers.81 The 
pamphlet contained the same numbers used by Whitehead three years 
earlier to press the case for oil palms over rubber. With this material in 
hand, replanting officers now hoped they could persuade more rubber 
                                                          
77
 ANM-KL: SA 28/6, Enc. 45; TNA: DO 35/9995, Johor Government, ‘Press Statement: The 
Oil Palm Smallholders’ Scheme’, 3.8.1959. 
78
 ANM-JB: ADO.KULAI (L) 2/15/57, Minute, ACLR Kulai, 12.11.1958. 
79
 Willard A. Hanna, The Kulai Oil Palm Scheme (New York: American Universities Field 
Staff Reports Service, 1965), 3. 
80
 ANM-KL: SA 407, Enc. 1. 
81
 Federal Land Development Authority, No Need to Be Poor: A Policy Statement (Kuala 





smallholders to adopt the oil palm.82 But this would prove to be an uphill 
task. Such figures did not take into account the high opportunity costs 
associated with palm fruit harvesting and handling, costs that would make 
many rubber smallholders reluctant to diversify into oil palms for decades 
to come. 
 
THE MILLERS’ DILEMMA 
The Kulai story also makes it necessary to ask why Asian 
commercial networks, especially those of Chinese copra millers, were not 
more involved in the domestic oil palm product trade by the 1950s. If they 
had been more involved, they would probably have encouraged more 
smallholder participation in the crop. After all, during the interwar years, 
Asian dealers and processors had sought to create their own streams of oil 
palm and coconut products, either through purchases from smallholders, 
or by direct investments in cultivation, together with smaller growers. At a 
stretch, copra mills could even be temporarily reconfigured to crush palm 
kernels, as was done during the Japanese Occupation. 
The reluctance of most Malayan copra millers to move into palm 
fruit milling is even more puzzling when we consider what is now known 
about the increasingly desperate commercial situation millers faced by the 
late 1950s. Between 1956 and 1959, the Malayan crushing industry’s oil 
output fell from an estimated 62 to 38 per cent of combined maximum 
capacity.83 Millers blamed their woes on shortages of local copra supplies 
from the dilapidated Malayan farm sector, and more critically, Indonesia’s 
nationalistic copra trade policies, which were only somewhat mitigated by 
copra smuggling between Indonesia and Singapore. The situation was 
especially bad in 1959, due to recent rebellions in North Sulawesi and 
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Sumatra, both major copra producing areas.84 Why did the millers not try 
to make up for the copra shortfall with palm fruit supplies instead? 
It is certainly true that the Malayan crushing sector was no 
stranger to under-capacity. The millers had lived with far worse underuse 
of plant during the 1920s and early 1930s.85 However, during this earlier 
interval, milling capacity was concentrated within a handful of large 
enterprises located mostly in Singapore and Penang. By the 1950s, this 
structure had changed beyond recognition. Industry incumbents had been 
forced to accommodate a rapid influx of millers since the late 1930s. Most 
of the new entrants were not the lumpy port-centric investments of 
previous decades; instead, they operated small-scale establishments on 
the mainland, catering to a geographically circumspect trade in copra cake 
and oil.86 Under such circumstances, domestic competition for copra 
supplies was much more intense. Worse still, all millers were now also 
facing competition on their own turf from Indonesia. Exports of copra 
cake from Indonesia, especially Java, were beginning to flood the Malayan 
market, putting downward pressure on Malayan cake prices.87 
An unfavourable shipping situation compounded the woes of the 
millers. In a reversal of the 1930s situation, shipping rates charged by the 
Far East Conference on coconut products to European countries became 
far higher for copra oil than for copra from the late 1950s onwards, despite 
repeated Malayan government representations to the Conference. Worse 
still, unlike Ceylon and India, Malaya was unable to avoid a 15 per cent 
import duty on copra oil sold to the United Kingdom, one of its major 
markets, because Malayan-made copra oil was disqualified from 
Commonwealth Preference. Still heavily reliant on Indonesian supplies, 
millers in Singapore and Penang could not satisfy the United Kingdom’s 
certification criteria for exports to have at least 25 per cent of value, ex-
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mill, of Commonwealth origin.88 Although copra oil was still being sold in 
large amounts to Asian destinations such as India, China, Burma, and 
Hong Kong, these trades were disadvantaged by the continued use of 
expensive oil drums, rather than bulk tankers. The main problem was not 
with the Malayan side – which had erected bulk transport facilities for 
copra oil as early as the 1930s – but with overseas Asian buyers, whose 
ports still lacked the ability to receive tanker shipments.89 Caught in a 
squeeze between supply and demand, the millers were unable to offer 
more competitive prices for copra. All this made it more profitable for 
wholesale copra merchants in Malaya to sell copra abroad, rather than to 
allocate it to domestic crushers. 
 Despite these increasingly grave circumstances for the millers, 
they were neither willing nor able to move into oil palm fruit processing. 
The dearth of local and regional marketing opportunities for oil palm 
products remained a serious impediment to Asian commercial interests. 
In its unrefined form, palm oil as an edible fat still had few Asian takers: a 
situation which had only worsened as a result of wartime feeding 
experiences during 1940s. Palm kernels continued to be a poor economic 
proposition for Malayan copra millers, especially when compared to 
oilcakes from coconut, sesame, soy and groundnut sources.90 Even into 
the 1970s, palm kernel cake remained lowly valued in Malaya and the 
surrounding region. Palm kernel oil exports also made little sense before 
the late 1960s, weighed down by tariff barriers from traditional kernel 
buying markets in Great Britain and Japan.91 
 It is certainly true that Malaya’s domestic soap industry remained 
interested in locally-made palm oil and palm kernel oil. But the presence 
of cheaper local substitutes often hampered uptake. During the early 
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1950s, tallow obtained from local meat renderings cost a nominal $463 per 
ton, at a time when world market prices for tallow were quadruple of the 
local Malayan variety, and international palm oil prices even higher. 
Unsurprisingly, a number of local soap-makers preferred using local 
tallow, blending it with copra oil to achieve creamier-textured soaps.92 
 A more serious problem faced by copra millers seeking to elbow 
their way into the post-1945 Malayan oil palm sector was that of internal 
capabilities. Many lacked the managerial expertise, technical ability and 
capital now needed to make the shift. Many of Malaya’s oldest, and largest 
millers were saddled with ‘obsolete and worn out’ crushing equipment, 
and lacked the resources needed to augment, let alone replace them.93 In a 
sense, their situation mirrored that of smallholders who were concurrently 
struggling to replant tree crops without significant external financial 
support.  
Even relatively recent large-scale entrants to oil crop processing 
were racked by elementary teething concerns. Lam Soon Oil and Soap 
Manufacturing, a rapidly growing enterprise after the Second World War, 
sought to establish a modern soap and cooking oil factory in Singapore to 
complement its copra crushing business in the early 1950s. But its efforts 
were hampered by shortages of skilled manpower. Despite having already 
become one of Malaya’s biggest soap manufacturers, the firm did not 
employ a single professionally-trained engineer until the mid-1950s. When 
Samuel Kam, a Berkeley-trained chemical engineer, was finally hired, he 
allegedly found the Singapore factory site devoid of basic American 
industrial management principles. State-of-the-art oil processing 
machinery purchased from North America and England had, according to 
him, been incoherently arranged and misused.94 
                                                          
92
 UNI: GB1752.UNI/RM/OC/2/2/64/20, P. Rykens and S. Van Den Bergh, ‘Notes on Visit to 
Malaya’, 21.3.1952, 8. 
93
 Goh, ‘Singapore’, 8-12. 
94
 Gan Shangwu, Through Wars and Peace: From the Gunfire of the Sino-Japanese War to 
the Golden Oil of Malaya: A Memoir by Samuel S.W. Kam at 96 (Hong Kong: Peace Book 





Having rectified these problems, Kam was then tasked with 
leading the expansion of Lam Soon’s soap and edible oils manufacturing 
subsidiary in Malaya. There, he found his efforts stymied by credit 
shortages and continued manpower deficits. As a result, Kam was forced 
to deal personally with menial business matters on a daily basis, leaving 
no time to expand the firm’s technical acumen to include palm kernel 
crushing. Consequently, Lam Soon’s diversification into palm oil and palm 
kernel feedstocks only began in the mid-1960s, once marketing, 
administrative and quality issues with existing soap and margarine 
products were ironed out.95 
 Malaya’s copra millers were thus largely followers, and not 
initiators, of smallholder diversification into oil palms. In fact, their 
prevailing response to the copra shortages of the 1950s and early 1960s was 
to entrench themselves further in the copra crushing business. To this 
end, a number of the industry’s leading millers began to lobby the 
Malayan authorities, suggesting measures to cheapen the price of copra, 
their main raw material. In March 1959, Lam Soon’s Malayan subsidiary 
became one of the leading representatives of a joint petition to the federal 
government. The letter, citing findings from the Wilson report on West 
Johor coconut farms, made extensive reference to the parlous situation 
facing Malaya’s coconut smallholdings.96 In doing so, the appeal spurred 
the federal authorities into embarking on their most ambitious plans for 
coconut farming to date. 
 
MALAYA’S FIRST COCONUT SCHEME 
  The route to Malaya’s first Coconut Rehabilitation and Replanting 
Scheme was beset by a paradox. The Scheme was fiendishly complex in its 
technical and agricultural requirements. There were simpler ways to 
enlarge the supply of copra, ways that the copra millers themselves had 
been willing to consider. Considerable numbers of growers and 
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agricultural officials were opposed to the Scheme, both in principle and in 
its execution. Despite all this, the Scheme was eventually launched in 1963 
at the economically depressed locality of Minyak Beku, Johor, setting a 
controversial precedent that would be followed by similar coconut 
projects across Peninsular Malaysia.97  
 The roots of the contradiction lay in Malaya’s dysfunctional 
political economy. As seen earlier, it had become almost impossible by the 
1950s to separate the economic arguments regarding coconut cultivation 
from ethno-nationalist support for Malay nationals, particularly when 
rubber smallholdings had already begun receiving their own federal 
replanting subsidies. By 1955, the Department of Agriculture had 
embarked on coconut rehabilitation and replanting experiments at a field 
station in Johor.98 Three years later, a high-level report containing a 
summary list of policy recommendations, including measures to 
rehabilitate coconut soils, was submitted to the Cabinet’s Economic 
Committee for final approval.99  
These recommendations would have been passed swiftly, if not for 
what seems to have been the Economic Committee’s preoccupation with 
the rubber industry’s own problems.100 However, in early 1959, a large 
group of mainland copra millers, responsible for about 55-60 per cent of 
the Malayan Federation’s total copra oil production, brought the 
rehabilitation issue back to the Cabinet’s attention with a carefully worded 
petition to the Minister for Commerce and Industry, Tan Siew Sin, 
outlining their urgent need for copra supplies.101 The Economic 
Committee then quickly gave the green light for the Scheme, beginning 
with northwest Johor, an area whose problems were now particularly well-
known, thanks to Thomas Wilson’s coconut farm survey, published in 
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1958. Various working committees were then established to hammer out 
detailed plans for the Scheme. 
 Yet, even in 1959, copra crushers had been willing to countenance 
alternatives to grower-level interventions, if the latter proved too difficult 
to plan and execute at short notice. In their petition, the mainland millers 
advocated increasing the export duty on copra from the existing five to 30 
per cent, as an ‘emergency stop-gap aid’.102 This would, in theory, allow for 
more local copra stocks to be retained within the mainland.103 However, 
this suggestion was firmly opposed by the millers of Penang Island, who 
still accounted for about 40-45 per cent of the Malayan Federation’s copra 
oil output at the time (Singapore was not part of the Federation). The 
Penang millers had long relied on their island’s status as a duty-free port 
for their commercial success, meaning that they would not agree to the 
proposal unless they were exempted from its terms.  
Eventually, both groups of millers agreed on an alternative 
proposal, namely to enact import duties on copra cake from Indonesia. 
This would presumably help shift the centre of the copra cake trade back 
to Malaya, triggering a flood of raw copra imports. This time, the new 
suggestion was rejected by a federal-level committee chaired by Abdul 
Ghani bin Mohd. Noor, Controller of the Trade Division at the Ministry of 
Commerce and Industry, on the grounds that such a policy would raise 
the operating costs of Malaya’s domestic livestock industry, a sector whose 
development the federal authorities had recently accorded priority in the 
interests of food self-sufficiency.104 Relatively simple administrative 
measures thus faltered because they pitted one valued economic segment 
against another. Ministry of Commerce and Industry officials also doubted 
that any gains by the millers from such reforms would be passed on to 
growers and copra producers themselves.105 This left the Federal 
authorities with only one main option: to increase Malaya’s own coconut 
harvest as quickly as possible. 
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 Even then, officials frequently expressed reservations amongst 
themselves about this production-centric approach. Many agricultural 
officials already viewed coconut farming as a sunset occupation, and 
wanted to see alternative crops planted. One prominent advocate, as seen 
earlier, was Thomas Wilson himself.  At the Department of Agriculture’s 
annual conference of 1960, Wilson warned colleagues that coconut 
smallholders who could afford to do so were already replanting their 
stands with oil palms and rubber, developments which he personally 
welcomed.106 Similarly, D. E. M. Fiennes, who was directing the Kulai Oil 
Palm Scheme’s launch at the time, was strongly in favour of getting 
Malaya’s existing coconut farmers to switch to oil palms, arguing that the 
latter crop would now produce twice as much income per acre as the 
former.107 Indeed, all the way up to the Scheme’s official launch, federal 
and state officials, including Selangor State Agricultural Officer G. F. 
Darnell and Agriculture Publications Officer J. Wilson, were cautioning 
Scheme planners that they ‘should not be concerned with rehabilitating 
the coconut industry but [with] rehabilitating the coconut farmer’.108 
 Even the very officials tasked with planning the Scheme were 
themselves pessimistic about its prospects. Some administrators openly 
agreed with their agricultural colleagues that the international market 
outlook for copra and copra oil was unappealing.109 Moreover, with the 
bulk of federal attention focused on rubber smallholdings, Scheme 
planners knew that their own efforts were severely underfunded by 
comparison. With $15 million allocated for the Scheme under the Second 
Malayan Five Year Plan, only 25,000 acres of coconut could be conceivably 
rehabilitated between 1961 and 1965. This was a fraction of the 238,700 
acres of Malayan coconut farmland identified to be in need of either 
partial rehabilitation or complete replanting.110 Such funding constraints 
meant that coconut estates were excluded from Scheme subsidies, 
although this did not prevent plantation executives from taking 
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permanent seats within the Scheme’s working committees, and 
subsequently influencing the conduct of the Scheme for smallholders. 
More cash could have been raised for the Scheme through a high export 
cess on copra and copra oil, but millers were unwilling to shoulder the 
greater part of a tax whose purported direct beneficiaries would be 
smallholders.111 Confronted with such constraints, Lew Sip Hon, chairman 
of one working committee and Controller at the Ministry of Commerce 
and Industry, privately lamented the piecemeal nature of the Scheme’s 
plans: they were a recipe for a ‘bad start’ and ‘would never become 
popular’.112 Officials like J. S. Ure, the Acting Director of Agriculture in 
1960, generally excused themselves from this predicament by arguing that 
the coconut working committee’s terms of reference did not permit the 
consideration of tree crops other than coconut palms.113 
 Not mentioned by any of these parties, but just as questionable, 
were the economic and environmental trade-offs arising from large-scale 
coastal engineering work. Permanent bunds and drainage work would 
essentially require the destruction of much of Johor’s remaining coastal 
mangrove forest. A lack of coordination between agricultural and forestry 
officials meant that the new bunding projects did not take into account 
their likely detrimental effects on Johor’s lucrative fisheries, firewood, and 
timber production industries, all of which depended on the mangroves for 
sustenance.114 Many smallholders relied on these non-farm activities to 
supplement their incomes.  
A more radical alternative to coconut-centric coastal landscaping 
would have been to allow local mangrove ecologies to regenerate, and 
offer all interested cash croppers the opportunity to settle elsewhere and 
grow more remunerative crops. This had indeed been proposed to the 
Johor authorities during the late 1930s in a different context, but the main 
concern precluding such an approach – official fears of widespread Malay 
landlessness – was even more prevalent in the period after the Second 
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World War. Moreover, as seen in the case of Kulai, large-scale settlement 
schemes for the landless were still in their infancy at the time.  
 Finally, for all the official rhetoric promising coconut smallholders 
aid from the state, the harsh truth was that federal authorities had 
consistently placed the needs of industry above those of growers since the 
early 1950s. Despite genuinely-felt contempt towards Chinese coconut 
processors and their agents, officials still valued their economic 
contributions, in terms of forward linkages generated, export revenues 
earned, and their infusions of technical and commercial expertise. These 
qualities had put the aspirations of Malay-owned cooperatives to shame. 
The fact that many Chinese millers were struggling to overcome 
equipment shortages and poor cash-flows only seemed to make their case 
for support even worthier of consideration. In lobbying the federal 
authorities in 1959, copra millers positioned themselves ‘one of the few 
major branches of industries’ in Malaya at the time.115 And given this head 
start, they argued, the Malayan government needed to begin thinking of 
the coconut as raw material for value-added industrial manufactures, and 
support the industry accordingly.116 Such rationales may account for why 
plans to rehabilitate coconut farms were resumed in mid-1959, after being 
delayed for almost two years at the Cabinet level. 
 Official disregard for grower views made it even easier to proceed 
with the Scheme. In this, senior federal officials demonstrated that they 
had thoroughly absorbed previous colonial stereotypes of rural Malayan 
society. Coconut growers, simplistically ascribed with Malay ancestry, 
were frequently characterised as backward, lazy, fractious, and in need of 
tutelage from better educated parties. Within several months of the 
Scheme’s launch at Minyak Beku, Othman bin Mohd Lela, the Acting 
Chief Coconut Replanting Officer, declared that his role was to be one of 
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an educator, teaching smallholders how ‘to make the best use of the 
available land in proper farm management’.117  
Part of the gulf between the federal authorities and small 
producers came from the latter’s disinterest in forming coconut-based 
associations at the state level, which was out of line with the government’s 
corporatist preferences.118 In the absence of such participation, the 
authorities recruited Malay delegates on an ad-hoc basis, including those 
who already had close personal ties with various branches of government. 
This sometimes led to advice that went directly against the interests of 
local farmers, such as the recommendations of one Senator Raja Rastam 
Sharome, well-known to senior officials in the Ministry of Commerce and 
Industry. In the interests of fiscal parsimony, the Senator advocated 
reducing the proposed coconut replanting grant from $655 to $500 per 
individual, without consulting his Selangor constituents. This suggestion 
was subsequently approved by the federal authorities.119  
Likewise, the views of crop buyers, invariably construed to be 
those of exploitative Chinese monopsonists, were officially treated with 
intense distrust and kept at arms’ length. While smallholders, estates and 
copra millers were all allocated seats on the working committees of the 
Scheme, no spaces were reserved for the representatives of rural coconut 
traders.120 Feedback from these intermediates was instead received at 
arm’s length, through individual petitions, market surveys and field 
interviews, where they could then be discounted within the relative 
privacy of internal committee discussions.121 
Differences in working languages compounded the federal 
government’s disregard for the views of smallholders and petty traders. 
The officials, estate managers, and millers convened to plan and 
implement the coconut schemes were predominantly Anglophone in 
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outlook, whereas many smallholder representatives were Malay speakers, 
deeply uncomfortable with the use of spoken and written English. 
Between 1960 and 1962, one such grower representative, Encik Kamsan bin 
Anuar, a smallholder and chairperson of a copra marketing society in Batu 
Pahat, found his concerns repeatedly ignored by the working sub-
committee he had been nominated to join. Official invitation letters, 
lengthy background papers, and meeting minutes were sent to all 
committee members in English, often without any accompanying Malay 
translations, making it difficult for Kamsan to follow the proceedings.122 
When Kamsan finally received the translated minutes of one such meeting 
in 1961, he took immediate issue with the committee’s blatant 
presumption that smallholders were being exploited by Chinese 
middlemen through indebtedness. Kamsan, drawing on his own personal 
experience and knowledge, contended that most growers he knew of 
found it useful to work with Chinese crop buyers, so as to free up their 
time for more remunerative pursuits.123 There is no record of Kamsan’s 
views, expressed in Romanised Malay, being acknowledged by the 
working sub-committee’s chair, Mohd. Hussein bin Ibrahim, then Deputy 
Commissioner for Co-operative Development. In fact, Kamsan found 
himself frequently shut out of the sub-committee’s activities after this, 
and other similar exchanges.124 
As it stood, federal agricultural officials, under the influence of 
copra millers and estates, remained in charge of the most important 
decisions of the Scheme. These included questions regarding the order in 
which each coconut area would qualify for a rehabilitation project, when 
exactly subsidies would be allocated to growers, what crops were 
considered suitable for replanting, planting densities, and overall drainage 
management. Yet, like Johor’s drainage policy fiasco during the 1930s, the 
agricultural officials tasked with designing the Scheme often confessed 
that they lacked sufficient experience with the various environmental, 
                                                          
122
 ANM-KL: C&I/E 1180, Enc. 52; C&I/E 1180/1 VOL. 1, 60-61, in Enc. 21; KPDANSK 1083/58, 
Enc. 46. 
123
 ANM-KL: MA/P&R 1083/58, VOL. 1, Encs. 26, 36. 
124
 ANM-KL: MA/P&R 1083/58, VOL. 1, Enc. 59; Ibid., Minutes, Lim Peng Kin, Ministry of 





economic, and arboreal challenges presented by such a concerted 
programme of coconut palm rejuvenation and replanting, even one on the 
limited scale envisaged.125 
This combination of official paternalism and ignorance began to 
bear fruit in June 1963, upon the onset of Scheme operations at Minyak 
Beku (Map 11). Wealthier smallholders, whose holdings reached densities 
of over 100 palms per acre, were extremely reluctant to participate in the 
scheme as advertised, due to conditionalities bringing the number of 
palms down to 65 per acre, akin to estate averages. Not only did many 
growers object to cutting down what they saw as healthy, productive 
palms, but they also balked at initial specifications stating that only 
pineapples, a notoriously labour-intensive crop, could be planted under 
young coconut palms.126 Marketing was also a potential problem for 
pineapples. Unlike southwest Johor, where most pineapple cultivation was 
taking place, Minyak Beku was in northwest Johor, placing it far away 
from Johor’s canneries in the south.127 Cocoa, a more popular intercrop 
during the 1970s boom in cocoa prices, had yet to make a significant 
appearance in government schemes, due to recent crop failures in field 
trials.128 The Scheme’s soil rehabilitation measures also proved 
contentious, with smallholders in the Parit Jabar locality refusing to 
participate, ostensibly because they had little faith in official drainage 
interventions.129 
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Map 11. Minyak Beku: areas identified for initial replanting and rehabilitation 
work, 1963. Source: ANM-KL: KPDANSK 1338, Enc. 86A. 
Many such concerns were vindicated by subsequent developments. 
A new committee convened to review the Scheme in 1964 found that the 
previously recommended palm planting density was unnecessarily low, 
endorsing a much higher 90-palm standard instead.130 Officials also 
belatedly realised that local opportunities to market pineapples were 
crimped by an absence of metalled roads that could accommodate lorries. 
For a crop like the pineapple, which degraded significantly within hours of 
harvesting, a sparse road network was highly detrimental to the fruit’s 
commercial prospects.131  Furthermore, pineapples were discovered to be 
incompatible with many coconut holdings because goats were already 
being reared, often feasting on freshly planted pineapple suckers during 
their roamings.132 In the meantime, internal drainage systems and coastal 
bunds continued to deteriorate, due to a lack of care by smallholders 
themselves, disillusioned with the general incompetent conduct of the 
scheme, and its refusal to countenance alternatives to coconut farming. 
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Despite these problems, many coconut growers, in all likelihood 
those who were older and poorer, had little choice but to eke out financial 
and technical support from the authorities. In 1964, a second scheme was 
launched at Bagan Datoh, Perak, followed by others involving the 
participation of thousands of smallholders, with varying degrees of 
commercial success (Photograph 15). While some smallholders did 
complete the entire course of rehabilitation, many others discontinued 
involvement early on. At Minyak Beku, nearly half of all smallholders who 
signed up for the Scheme in 1965 neglected their holdings once the first 
grant instalment was paid out.133 
 
Photograph 15. Tuan Haji Johari bin Tok Puteh (foreground, right), a coconut 
smallholder, receiving a cheque of RM$1,800 from the Minister of Agriculture and 
Co-operatives, 17 October 1964. Tn. Hj. Johari, aged 70 at the time, was among the 
first to finish rehabilitation work on his smallholding at Matang Kunda, Bagan 
Datoh, Perak. Photograph reproduced with permission from Arkib Negara 
Malaysia, Kuala Lumpur. 
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Ironically, it was only through all these problems encountered in 
the field that many of the schemes’ operational flaws finally attracted 
wider attention. In April 1972, an internal review by the Ministry of 
Primary Industries found that the rehabilitation schemes had been unable 
to reverse the general trend of declining yields across Malaya’s coconut 
smallholdings. The schemes in their current format were subsequently 
prevented from expanding until further notice.134 
 
CONCLUSION 
The economic resilience of smallholders in Johor was severely 
tested during the 1950s and 1960s. Structural changes in international 
markets weighed against coconuts and rubber, while forest rents 
continued to decline in many areas along Malaya’s West Coast. British and 
Malayan authorities contributed to this muddle, chiefly by trying to 
confine the range of crops open to smallholder cultivation, and 
channelling public support accordingly.  
Smallholders sought to mitigate these problems through various 
means. They engaged in alternative livelihood strategies, and sought the 
ear of the authorities where possible. Given the evidence at hand, one 
cannot help but wonder whether smallholders would have benefitted 
much more from state support if Malayan authorities had simply acted 
more as economic facilitators, as they had usually done for the plantation 
sector, rather than as authoritarian paternalists presuming to know what 
was best for their subjects. 
For this period, the study would have profited from better 
historical coverage of a number of topics. Unlike for the interwar years, it 
is difficult to reconstruct the role that the Johor state government played 
in local agricultural development. This is partly because the Federal 
government assumed a larger role in the economy than before the Second 
World War. But the more important problem is one of sources. Many of 
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the usual archival series dealing with the decisions of senior Johor 
authorities are not available for the period, including those of Johor’s 
Resident Commissioner (previously General Adviser), and the 
Commissioner of Lands and Mines. Many files on the period also remain 
inaccessible to the external researcher, despite their listing in catalogues. 
Political sensitivities surrounding the circumstances of the Malayan 
Emergency are probably causing a large number of official records to be 
held back, including those of Johor’s, since the state was extensively 
involved in the conflict with Malayan Communist Party insurgents during 
the 1950s. 
More critically, there is the matter of smallholders themselves. For 
a study of this scope, the brush used to illustrate historical change within 
the farm sector has been unavoidably broad most of the time. 
Smallholders certainly do not form homogeneous communities. As this 
thesis has sought to suggest repeatedly, differences in local-level 
leadership, wealth, age, and gender may play important roles in 
conditioning smallholder decisions regarding the timing and choice of 
crop to diversify into. But substantiating these dynamics in any significant 
detail would almost certainly involve collecting historical evidence from a 
much smaller locality (assuming such evidence exists). This thesis should 
thus be seen as an attempt to re-trace the roots of agricultural 
development in a former colonial territory, whose past remains 






This study has examined the history of smallholder involvement in 
tree crops in Malaya between 1862 and 1963.  Particular emphasis was 
placed on grower interest in oil and coconut palms, tracing the intimate 
links between the two cultivars, as well as their products. While it is 
important not to exaggerate what can be distilled from the period studied, 
the overall findings of the study are fairly clear-cut. 
 
THE PERSISTENCE OF SMALLHOLDER DIVERSIFICATION STRATEGIES 
 The historical record of the oil palm in Malaya demonstrates that 
weak local demand for oil palm products, combined with the tiresome and 
hazardous labour needed to harvest and handle its fruits, ensured that the 
crop remained one that most smallholders avoided, in favour of 
agricultural alternatives. State antipathy towards smallholder involvement 
aggravated matters further, but it was not the key cause of crop aversion. 
Oil palms thus became, in the words of John McCarthy, a ‘rich farmer’s 
crop’.1 However, this was not due primarily to the oil palm’s apparent need 
for costly inputs and capital investments, but rather because of more 
general marketing coordination challenges, which placed the heavy 
burden of crop pioneering on skilled intermediaries. 
In pre-1960s Malaya, palm fruit intermediaries were either dealers 
or smallholder representatives, and often both. Their roles in organising 
the pooling, processing, and timely transport of smallholder produce, 
were of utmost importance. This was not merely because there were so 
few smallholders willing to grow the crop to begin with, but also because 
palm fruit processing, like copra manufacture, demanded a certain 
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amount of labour specialisation that lay beyond the preferences of most 
households at the time. Although access to roads was helpful, particularly 
if fruit deliveries were intended for inland factories, such access was not 
the sole prerogative of estates.  The settlement of migrant smallholders at 
Labis during the early 1930s makes this absolutely clear. 
 The enduring importance of the pioneering intermediary is borne 
out in subsequent studies of smallholder oil palm involvement in 
Peninsular Malaysia. In Perak, groups of Chinese smallholders were 
persuaded to switch over from rubber to oil palms during the late 1960s, 
primarily because of the lead taken by fellow clansmen, who doubled up 
as crop dealers and oil mill owners.2 As dealer involvement in the crop 
grew across Malaya, so did competition for fruit supplies, sparking more 
interest from smallholders.3  
Nevertheless, the proportion of actual smallholder involvement in 
the crop has remained minuscule. By the early 1980s, most smallholders 
across Malaya, including those farming oil palms, were still heavily 
involved in rubber, coconut and rice cultivation, despite evidence of 
increasingly unremunerative returns in these latter sectors.4 Only about 
25,000 out of 963,000 Malayan households grew oil palms as their main 
crop, most using family labour and some hired help to do so.5 Of these 
growers, the majority farmed the crop on less than six acres of land, 
mainly former rubber holdings. Low-cost, low-yield strategies were 
widespread. Malay oil palm smallholders tended to be more diversified in 
their farming activities, devoting less land and time to the oil palm than 
their Chinese counterparts. Growers more specialised in the crop tended 
to achieve higher crop yields and incomes that approximated those 
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settlers from government-sponsored oil palm schemes. Most households 
also relied on non-farm sources of employment to a large extent. 6  
A Peninsula-wide survey of Malaysian oil palm smallholders in 
1986 revealed widespread grower ambivalence towards the crop. On the 
one hand, growers typically reported feeling satisfied with their earnings 
and production strategies. On the other hand, nine out of ten said that 
they would prefer to move away from oil palms when the time came for 
replanting, with most expressing a predilection for rubber or fruit trees. 
Even oil palm scheme settlers themselves expressed similar views.7 No 
explicit reasons were given for these preferences. But the mixed feelings 
expressed hint at palm oil’s price volatility (the survey was conducted 
during an international commodities slump), the hazardous nature of 
work with the oil palm, as well as unwanted pressures to specialise in the 
tree, given the complete dominance of large-scale mills over crop 
processing arrangements. 
In contrast, control over basic rubber and coconut crop processing 
has remained firmly in the hands of smallholders and dealers, allowing for 
more diverse farming arrangements. Both crops remain free of the serious 
physical dangers associated with oil palm harvesting, hazards which were 
becoming more widely publicised once increasing numbers of estate 
labourers found themselves having to work with oil palms during the 
1960s and 1970s.8 Although frequently touted as a more remunerative and 
supposedly less labour-intensive crop, in many ways the oil palm 
continues to be a poisoned chalice for growers. 
The crucial point is that even with increased state support from 
the 1960s onwards, many smallholders did not want to become oil palm 
specialists in the longer term. Crop specialisation clashed with ongoing 
preferences for enhancing household resilience to economic shocks by 
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spreading risks among different forms of economic activity. Large-scale 
milling arrangements were a deterrent to smallholder oil palm uptake, 
because their projected hunger for fruit supplies demanded an excessively 
heavy upfront commitment from growers in terms of their land and 
labour, and not because they demanded capital which growers did not 
possess. Rubber and coconut processing, though often beyond the ken of 
smallholders themselves, had far lower cost economies. In short, it was far 
easier for intermediaries to open and shut a copra processing facility than 
an oil palm factory. This flexibility made it more attractive for 
smallholders to work with the former than the latter, thus reducing the 
risks of ‘inclusion on disadvantageous terms’.9 
The contemporary Malaysian coconut farming sector suffers from 
a different challenge, namely that of long-term attrition. Relative prices 
for coconut produce have continued to deteriorate, primarily due to 
competition from other fats, including palm oil and palm kernel oil. As a 
result, coconut acreage has been on a steady decline since the 1980s, 
despite the launch of numerous replanting and rehabilitation schemes 
over the past few decades, and a brief boom in cocoa intercropping during 
the 1980s and 1990s.10 By 2010, coconut palms occupied just over 260,000 
acres of land across Malaysia, including Sabah and Sarawak: a far cry from 
the 500,000 acres estimated for the Malay Peninsula during the 1950s.11 
Coconut cultivation, already led by smallholders during the 1960s, has 
become even further dominated by smallholdings. In 2010, smallholdings 
were responsible for 93 per cent of all coconuts harvested in Malaysia.12  
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Coconut growers, and their supporting officials, face a 
fundamental dilemma: is it worth remaining invested in coconut farming, 
when neighbouring economies, with lower business costs, have already 
acquired much larger shares of the coconut cultivation and processing 
chains? Malaysia has not been self-sufficient in coconuts for the past 
decade. In 2007, domestic production of nuts was only able to meet two-
thirds of local consumption levels. This shortfall was met by imports, 
mostly from Thailand and Indonesia.13 The main consumers of these 
supplies, in the form of fresh nuts, coconut oil, or processed cream 
powders, were Malaysian households. The remaining 37 per cent of 
imported coconut produce was upgraded within Malaysia before being re-
exported, typically in the form of industrial manufactures such as coconut 
cream powder, desiccated coconut, detergent feedstocks, activated 
carbon, coir, and copra oil.14 Yet the majority of the Malaysian companies 
dealing with the production of these goods were also facing heavy 
competition from abroad, and were only running at around half their 
potential capacity.15  
At the same time, Malaysian authorities have been confronted by 
numerous calls from the public to alleviate nut shortages for households, 
especially during various annual religious festivals, when large numbers of 
nuts are consumed.16 Thus, despite changing consumption patterns in 
favour of industrial produce, coconuts remain a highly politicised concern, 
as they were in times past. 
There are no easy answers to this quandary. Like rice, coconuts are 
still seen as an essential consumer staple, giving coconuts a social 
significance disproportionate to their marginal contribution to Malaysia’s 
current gross domestic product. There are also public concerns about the 
supposedly inferior quality of nuts imported from Thailand and Indonesia, 
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as well as the reliability of supplies from these two economies.17 Food 
security concerns thus make it hard not to channel public funding into the 
Malaysian coconut smallholding sector, even if this means competing with 
neighbouring economies, whose farmers are already suffering from low 
incomes to begin with.  
Nevertheless, successive government rehabilitation and replanting 
schemes have been unable to stem the loss of grower interest in the 
sector, due to competition for labour and investment from other sectors, 
including more remunerative employment on oil palm estates.18 Unless 
demand for coconut produce on the world market translates into 
sufficiently high farmgate prices, interest will continue to wither. Once 
the leading cash crop for smallholders looking to maximise cash returns, 
coconut palms have now become a minor element in a portfolio approach 
to agriculture and income generation. They are now trees typically 
retained by elderly Malaysian landowners seeking to preserve their 
retirement capital through small but stable incomes.19 However, this 
situation is not necessarily a bad thing. A crop with modest earnings 
encourages mixed farming strategies that help to combat the loss of forest 
rent and income, at least until such farms are handed over to a new 
generation of owners.  
 
ENVIRONMENTAL ASPECTS OF SMALLHOLDER TREE CROP FARMING 
 This study has repeatedly shown that no crop has a monopoly on 
environmental degradation. Rather, it is the way in which crops are 
cultivated that is the problem. François Ruf and his colleagues have 
contended that diversified smallholder cropping arrangements often only 
occur long after earlier household decisions to specialise in a single tree 
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crop, in the apparent interests of income maximisation.20 This study finds 
much support for this argument. In the case of Johor, coconut palms were 
planted in dense, monotonous blocks along the West Coast even before 
the copra boom began in the late nineteenth century. These early 
plantings bore little resemblance to the complex coconut palm-based 
agroforests being promoted a century later in the Pacific Region.21 Efforts 
to clear land for Malaya’s pioneer coconut farms involved felling coastal 
forests and excavating canals; these actions, in turn, led to a gradual 
decline in forest rent, prompting coconut growers to diversify further into 
crops like areca palms and bananas by the 1930s, if not earlier. 
The oil palm situation is less clear-cut, given the piecemeal nature 
of known historical evidence. But in all cases documented for the interwar 
years, the general trend was for growers to opt for fresh, recently cleared 
lands, on which dense stands of oil palms could be grown. Other cultivars 
like sago, fruit trees, and food crops were considered peripheral to the 
main oil palm venture. Even for rubber, which some scholars consider an 
environmentally benign crop under smallholder farming arrangements, 
many peasant holdings during the colonial era were at best simple 
agroforests, consisting of one dominant tree species.22  
 In truth, both the specialised and diversified crop farming 
strategies practised by smallholders were on opposite ends of a continuum 
grounded in historically specific circumstances. Contrary to what some 
scholars have suggested as a general rule, both farming strategies in 
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Malaya were ‘traditional’.23 Tree crop monocultures made sense for 
smallholders when they perceived that there was an outstanding tree crop 
which could fetch high prices all year round, and could be easily 
marketed, making annual crop rotations unnecessary. During the second 
half of the nineteenth century, pride of place was awarded to the coconut 
palm in Malaya. Rubber then took on this role for the first half of the 
twentieth century. But in coastal areas, where rubber did poorly, coconuts 
remained a more viable commercial option. Indeed, a significant number 
of smallholder coconut and oil palm plantings in Johor during the 
interwar years should be seen as attempts to diversify away from rubber 
when international prices plunged during the early 1920s and early 1930s.  
Unfortunately, the coconut palm was subjected to even greater 
commercial insecurity than rubber by the 1930s, due to a difficult 
international market situation, as well as site-specific environmental 
challenges. Diversification into other cultivars alongside the palm thus 
made complete sense by the 1930s. In such situations, income stabilisation 
strategies were not so much about being risk-averse, as simply pursuing 
the most informed course of action amidst overwhelming economic 
uncertainty. Smallholders would almost certainly have diversified even 
more rapidly away from coconut farming, if not for supportive 
government policies, and, more importantly, the pervasive presence of 
local markets for coconut produce. 
 The Johor smallholders who attempted to farm oil palms during 
the 1930s had very specific reasons for pursuing monocultures. In all cases, 
the lack of precedent meant that sowing a critical mass of palms was 
necessary to achieve a successful bulk fruit sale to external parties. Crop 
specialisation was also something being actively encouraged by 
processors, as the case of the Socfin outgrower proposal demonstrated, 
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and possibly that of the Ayer Hitam cluster as well. In the case of Frank 
Tan’s bid for oil palm land near Labis during the late 1920s, the situation 
was different. Tan’s economic specialisation in oil palms was largely 
illusory, as he was already involved in a large number of other economic 
activities. The same may have applied to Hj. Omar, who spearheaded the 
Ayer Hitam oil palm cluster with his own private resources. All of these 
dynamics are consistent with the more recent spate of smallholder 
involvement with oil palms in Peninsular Malaysia. 
 
POLICY IMPLICATIONS 
 Following on from these findings are recommendations intended 
to encourage greater smallholder oil palm participation in Southeast Asia. 
They are relatively straightforward, but may still prove controversial in 
today’s political climate. Some scholars have posited that smallholder 
participation in oil palms should involve a choice between that of bringing 
yields and cultivation conditions in line with estates, and that of farming 
oil palms in a more diverse cropping arrangement, with a view to selling a 
very different palm product, as in West Africa.24 Such choices are not 
novel, and have existed in the distant past with other popular ‘dual-use’ 
crops, not least coconuts.25 At present, however, this choice is simply not 
available to Southeast Asian growers. Fostering a choice will involve 
transforming the commodity form of oil palm fruit and other parts of the 
palm in Southeast Asia, and breaking the grip of large-scale oil palm 
factories on the market for palm fruit. The opportunity costs of engaging 
with oil palms need to be reduced to levels that make the crop more 
attractive to less prosperous farmers. 
 First, governments must resist the temptation to determine what 
smallholders choose to grow. The problems that stem from policies based 
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on assumptions that some crops are more suited for smallholder 
arrangements than others have been made clear throughout this thesis. 
Relinquishing control is particularly crucial in the case of replanting 
grants for oil palms, since current smallholder subsidies in Malaysia 
encourage growers to specialise in oil palms, in order to match the yields 
of estates. If anything, the conditions attached to such subsidies should 
increase grower crop choice, rather than diminish it. Failing this, dealers 
can take the lead in supplying credit and planting materials, since these 
can be tailored to individual grower circumstances, and will cost less than 
a full-scale public subsidy premised on input maximisation. Non-
government organisations can help to accelerate the diffusion of 
knowledge regarding agro-diverse oil palm farming arrangements by 
playing the role of matchmaker, facilitating knowledge exchanges 
between growers and dealers from different regions. 
 Second, the hazards associated with oil palm fruit collection and 
handling need to be substantially reduced. Emphasis needs to shift from 
the provision of high oil-yielding planting materials, such as the tenera 
variety, to that of more ‘rustic’ palm breeds.26 The latter include dwarf 
palms, as well as lesser-known strains of thornless palms, such as the 
idolatrica variety (Elaies guineensis var idolatrica [Chevalier]). Thornless 
specimens are rarely found outside of West Africa, but there is evidence of 
some hybrid stock being currently held at gene banks in Andhra 
Pradesh.27 All of these different palm varieties need to be reviewed for 
further cross-breeding and widespread dissemination. These efforts could 
be spearheaded by the Malaysian Palm Oil Board, which currently houses 
the world’s largest collection of palm germplasm, including stocks 
specifically intended for diversification, agroforestry and intercropping 
purposes.28 Governments, plantation firms and smallholders all have a 
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common interest in finding ways to alleviate the intense physical suffering 
involved in oil palm work, if only to improve the productivity of labour 
involved in palm harvesting and bunch handling. 
 Third, local and regional cultural connotations associated with 
tangy, unrefined palm oil need to be upgraded into something that 
approximates the high esteem with which coconut milk is still held in 
Southeast Asia. In doing so, it will become more feasible to create an 
initial local market for ‘boutique’ oil palm products that need not rely on 
existing large-scale mills.29 Such efforts can be the thin end of a wedge, 
opening the way for wider changes in local consumption patterns, to the 
point where cooking recipes involving ‘oil palm butter’ become common 
knowledge for a significant proportion of Southeast Asians. Only by doing 
so can the high-yield, high-input oil palm cropping model, linked to social 
and environmental upheaval in Malaysia and Indonesia, cede ground to 
something that resembles a complex agroforestry system, or at least one 
where oil palms become a common village crop like coconut palms in 
Southeast Asia, amenable to autoconsumption.30 
 These recommendations might seem far-fetched, given the 
considerable powers held by vested interests keen to see existing 
plantation-dominated systems continue in Malaysia and Indonesia, and 
perpetuated elsewhere outside of these two territories. But pressures can 
be brought to bear on governments by appealing to those tasked with 
rehabilitating the oil palm’s public profile among international 
consumers. The Malaysian Palm Oil Council has already been leading 
such efforts through campaigns highlighting the financial gains that oil 
palms have brought to certain smallholders working with large-scale 
mills.31 The rise of artisanal production arrangements in Malaysia and 
Indonesia would provide a further boost in this direction. In addition, the 
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developing local and regional markets for unrefined palm oil can arguably 
offer an additional safety net for an industry which has been vulnerable to 
violent fluctuations in international commodity prices since inception. 
The resilience of Malaya’s coconut industry during the 1930s may provide 
useful lessons in this regard. 
 Changes in fat consumption patterns need not rely on the 
hypothetical emergence of a West African diaspora within Southeast Asia. 
In Singapore, there has already been a recent turn towards more positive 
views of unrefined palm oil, as part of a broader groundswell of interest in 
local history and heritage recovery. In 2009, a monograph entitled 
Wartime Kitchen: Food and Eating in Singapore, 1942-1950, was published 
as part of wider efforts to harness popular interest in Singapore’s 
heritage.32 In Wartime Kitchen’s concluding chapter, a selection of 
‘original wartime recipes’ were reproduced, replete with lush, full-colour 
photographs of each dish.33 The recipes, however, had been altered by a 
local ‘food consultant’ to make them ‘easier to follow and more appealing 
to the 21st-century palate’, and thus included a wider variety of ingredients 
than would have been available during the 1940s.34  
Incredibly, Wartime Kitchen’s selection featured a sumptuous stew 
containing red palm oil, chicken, oysters, prawns, okra and chillies.35 This 
was effectively a variant of ‘palm oil chop’, a West African dish whose 
earlier recipe had been circulated around the Malayan establishment with 
little enthusiasm during the 1920s. However, Wartime Kitchen’s 
formulation was derived from the scribblings of a prisoner of war of 
British Sarawakian origin, incarcerated in Singapore during the Japanese 
Occupation. Although the prisoner never actually had the opportunity to 
prepare and consume the dish during the Occupation, the very act of 
imagining such a dish helped him and fellow prisoners stave off physical 
                                                          
32
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and mental collapse.36  Wartime Kitchen’s attempt to kindle popular 
interest in the dish thus involved a double act of food nostalgia, since it 
involved re-imagining red palm oil as an essential ingredient once in 2009, 
and once during the Japanese Occupation. 
The cultural appropriation of palm oil chop by Singaporean 
culinarians demonstrates how food items can leap upwards in status, 
chiefly through nostalgia, nationalism, and sufficient distance from 
wartime trauma.37 Moreover, if the experiences of the 1930s and 1940s 
have anything positive to impart, it is that consumers will only desire food 
items if these can be imbued with qualities that appeal to a broader sense 
of pleasure and wellness, rather than a narrow emphasis on nutritional 
chemistry. Taste workshops involving members of the public would be the 
next logical step forward.38 Given current consumer interest in organic, 
fair trade foods in Southeast Asian urban centres, the greater challenge, in 
fact, may be of securing supplies of unprocessed ‘palm butter’ in local 
retail markets, since these are not readily available at present, unlike 
organic coconut milk and coconut oil. 
 Bridging the gap between supply and demand brings us to one 
final recommendation. Rural intermediaries need to be seen as part of the 
solution to encouraging smallholder oil palm uptake. Peddlers, crop 
dealers, and small-scale processors all play vital roles in linking rural 
producers with markets, credit, inputs and consumer goods, particularly 
growers in remote areas. Unlike in the past, there is now a large 
population of oil palm smallholders in East Malaysia and Indonesia with 
whom intermediaries can work, making it potentially far easier to quickly 
acquire a critical mass of fruit supplies for small-scale processing. 
Governments in Malaysia and Indonesia can support this dynamic 
in several ways. First, they can encourage competition between dealers, so 
as to allow more product value to accrue to growers. Lowering barriers to 
entry to new intermediaries can be partly achieved by public investments 
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in transport and communications, so as to reduce trade risks and 
transaction costs for traders. These should also be backed by measures to 
disseminate more accurate market information regularly, and safeguard 
property rights and contracts.39 Second, governments can facilitate 
product quality standards for new variants of red palm oil by enforcing 
accurate labelling (the same applies to high-value coconut produce, such 
as organic virgin coconut oil). Third, any regulations specifying a lower 
floor on mill size, and measures tying mills to estates, should be repealed. 
These need to be replaced with licenses holding crop buyers and 
processors accountable for the sources of their palm fruit, so as to 
discourage oil palm farming within existing conservation areas. If such 
policies can be enacted and enforced, they would go a long way towards 
bringing artisanal production methods closer to the growers who would 
stand to benefit the most from them, in an environmentally sustainable 
manner. 
The long history of the oil palm in Malaya shows how dramatically 
the character of a commodity can be altered, given the right 
circumstances. There is nothing either inevitable or permanent about 
such a shift. With time, the oil palm’s trajectory can hopefully be altered 
again, for the sake of the people and biomes that continue bearing the 
heavy costs of the oil palm’s industrial march across the tropical world. 
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APPENDIX 1. MALAY VERNACULAR NAMES, AND KNOWN USES OF THE COCONUT AT VARIOUS 












When nut becomes 
recognisable, after the end of 
the flowering stage 
0 to 4 
Water used as an astringent for 




When the kernel shell first 
appears, and is very soft 
4 to 5.5 
Immature kernel flesh is served to new 
mothers as part of a postpartum diet. 
3 Nyiur ingusan 
When the kernel shell begins to 






Further hardening of the kernel 







When the kernel shell becomes 
firm, kernel flesh solidifies 
further 





When the kernel meat is hard 
enough to be scraped with a 
rasp 




When the husk darkens on the 
exposed side. Nut is now at full 
size. 
8 
Coconut milk can be made from grated 
and pressed kernel flesh at this stage, for 




When the nut has developed an 
air cavity within, allowing for 
the sound of water splashing 
inside to be heard when the nut 
is shaken 
9 to 10 
Coconut water no longer astringent, 
suitable for casual drinking. Kernel flesh 
eaten as a delicacy, but can be made into 
coconut milk as well. 
9 
Nyiur tuba / 
nyiur masak 
When the nut is fully ripe, with 
maximum oil content 
11 to 12 
Coconut milk and coconut oil, mostly for 
cooking, and to a lesser extent, 
medicines, ointments. Also optimal for 
copra manufacture. Husk and kernel 
shells usually used as fuel for copra 
drying. Husk occasionally used as 
construction fibre, while shell ash often 




When the husk has dried up, 
nut ready to fall on its own. 
12  Similar to nyiur tuba. 
 
Sources: I. H. Burkill. A Dictionary of the Economic Products of the Malay Peninsula (2nd ed.) (Kuala 
Lumpur: Ministry of Agriculture and Cooperatives, 1966), 607-13, 616-618, 623; Rosemary Firth. 
Housekeeping among Malay Peasants (2nd ed.) (London: Athlone Press, 1966), 219; Reginald Child. 








APPENDIX 2.1. ANNUAL AVERAGE WHOLESALE PRICES, SINGAPORE, IN STRAITS/MALAYAN 
DOLLARS PER TON, DEFLATED BY THE SUGIMOTO CONSUMER PRICE INDEX, 1923-1962. 
 
*Year 











































1923  - - - - 195 107 354 112 161 112 1199 144 97.1 
1924  - - - - 212 116 384 122 242 168 1097 132 96.7 
1925  - - - - 207 113 376 119 272 189 2339 280 99.0 
1926  - - - - 189 103 350 111 239 166 1812 217 102.4 
1927 316 119 175 127 186 102 328 104 149 103 1452 174 100.9 
1928 265 100 138 100 183 100 316 100 144 100 834 100 100.0 
1929 279 105 148 107 162 89 287 91 156 108 796 95 97.8 
1930 299 113 163 118 141 77 259 82 162 113 474 57 93.0 
1931 278 105 153 111 108 59 205 65 143 99 287 34 79.5 
1932 206 78 130 94 138 75 241 76 135 94 189 23 69.9 
1933 173 65 76 55 101 55 199 63 168 117 437 52 65.0 
1934 129 49 56 41 74 40 150 47 164 114 709 85 66.7 
1935 193 73 76 55 110 60 221 70 158 110 651 78 69.3 
1936 198 75 101 73 143 78 295 93 168 117 889 107 68.1 
1937 210 79 132 96 150 82 259 82 174 121 990 119 72.2 
1938 164 62 85 62 85 46 181 57 176 122 768 92 69.9 
1939 141 53 73 53 86 47 214 68 133 92 993 119 70.3 
1947 215 81 70 51 133 73 241 76 97 67 189 23 270.2 
1948 348 131 113 82 284 155 510 161 105 73 275 33 227.4 
1949 329 124 130 94 232 127 409 129 104 72 254 30 223.5 
1950 364 137 165 120 288 157 513 162 174 121 1064 128 229.2 
1951 433 163 161 117 256 140 458 145 191 133 1327 159 288.3 
1952 303 114 204 148 163 89 268 85 187 130 720 86 299.9 
1953 198 75 146 106 216 118 341 108 174 121 513 62 292.6 
1954 221 83 168 122 196 107 331 105 141 98 537 64 278.9 
1955 238 90 141 102 172 94 274 87 206 143 943 113 272.7 
1956 260 98 132 96 167 91 271 86 291 202 789 95 275.6 
1957 254 96 135 98 162 89 275 87 177 123 698 84 283.6 
1958 224 85 142 103 202 110 321 102 106 74 634 76 282.1 
1959 237 89 141 102 247 135 392 124 130 90 824 99 278.9 
1960 223 84 175 127 199 109 317 100 124 86 878 105 279.0 
1961 228 86 160 116 158 86 248 78 82 57 673 81 279.4 
1962 212 80 124 90 167 91 252 80 85 59 631 76 280.2 
 
Note: All listed price averages are ‘free on board’, which usually includes all costs of transporting the 
goods to the customs frontier of the exporting country, export duties, and the cost of loading the goods 
onto the international carrier. 
 
* The years between 1940 and 1946 are not covered, owing to a lack of statistical data needed to generate 
the Consumer Price Index during this period. 
**For years between 1927 and 1939, unit values of net Malayan palm oil exports are used. No values are 
available for the years before 1927. 
***Unit values of net Malayan exports. No values are available for the years before 1927. 
****’Fair merchantable sundried’ is an imprecise grading label applied to copra uncontaminated by smoke 







APPENDIX 2.2. ANNUAL AVERAGE WHOLESALE PRICES OF COPRA, SINGAPORE, IN STRAITS/MALAYAN 
















1923 195 188 3.7 97.1 
1924 212 206 2.9 96.7 
1925 207 201 3.0 99.0 
1926 189 185 2.2 102.4 
1927 186 177 5.1 100.9 
1928 183 180 1.7 100.0 
1929 162 155 4.5 97.8 
1930 141 136 3.7 93.0 
1931 108 99 9.1 79.5 
1932 138 127 8.7 69.9 
1933 101 88 14.8 65.0 
1934 74 62 19.4 66.7 
1935 110 101 8.9 69.3 
1936 143 134 6.7 68.1 
1937 150 143 4.9 72.2 
1938 85 77 10.4 69.9 
1939 86 78 10.3 70.3 
1947 133 126 5.6 270.2 
1948 284 280 1.4 227.4 
1949 232 228 1.8 223.5 
1950 288 284 1.4 229.2 
1951 256 253 1.2 288.3 
1952 163 160 1.9 299.9 
1953 216 213 1.4 292.6 
1954 196 193 1.6 278.9 
1955 172 169 1.8 272.7 
1956 167 164 1.8 275.6 
1957 162 159 1.9 283.6 
1958 202 199 1.5 282.1 
1959 247 244 1.2 278.9 
1960 199 196 1.5 279.0 
1961 158 155 1.9 279.4 
1962 167 - - 280.2 
 
Note: All listed price averages are ‘free on board’, which usually includes all costs of transporting the 
goods to the customs frontier of the exporting country, export duties, and the cost of loading the goods 
onto the international carrier. 
*’Fair merchantable sundried’ is an imprecise grading label applied to copra uncontaminated by smoke 
and rain, and includes top-quality kiln-dried copra. ‘Fair merchantable’ applies to copra of lesser quality. 
 
Sources for Appendices 2.1 and 2.2:  
Arecanut prices, 1923-1931, and rubber prices, 1923-1939: Department of Agriculture, FMS and SS, Malayan 
Agricultural Statistics 1931 (Kuala Lumpur: Caxton Press, 1932), Table 63. 
Copra and copra oil prices, 1923-1939: Department of Agriculture, Federation of Malaya, Malayan 
Agricultural Statistics 1947 (Kuala Lumpur: Caxton Press, 1948), Table 95. 
Palm oil prices, 1927-1939: Department of Statistics of Malaya. British Malaya: Return of Foreign Imports 
and Exports, 1927-1937 (Singapore: Methodist Publishing House); Department of Statistics, Singapore. 
Malayan Statistics. External Trade, 1938-1939 (Singapore: Government Printing Office). 
Arecanut prices, 1932-1962, and prices of rubber, palm oil, and copra, 1947-1962: Pee Tew Teck. A 
Statistical Source Book on Malayan Agriculture: Selected by Time-Series and by State (In Two Volumes). 
Volume 2. Miscellaneous Crops (Kuala Lumpur: University of Malaya, 1967), Tables V.1.16, V.1.18. Price 
deflator:  
Copra oil prices, 1947-1962: Department of Statistics, Federation of Malaya. Monthly Statistical Bulletin of 
the Federation of Malaya (Kuala Lumpur: Department of Statistics, Federation of Malaysia, 1951-1963). 
Price deflator: Ichirō Sugimoto. Economic Growth of Singapore in the Twentieth Century: Historical GDP 







APPENDIX 3.1. NET EXPORTS OF COPRA, BY TERRITORIES OF ORIGIN, ANNUAL AVERAGES 
(LONG TONS), 1909-1924. 
 
Exporting Countries 1909-1913 1914-18 1919-24 
Dutch East Indies 243,963 148,839 297,245 
Philippine Islands 117,450 87,782 121,086 
Ceylon 41,721 62,814 74,634 
British India 30,635 (1,429) (623) 








   87,908  
Johor Unknown 14,631 23,458 
Straits Settlements 3,035 (5,598) 18,538 
Kelantan 4,028 3,683 5,790 
Trengganu 1,458 1,013 1,686 
Rest of World 95,269 101,049 163,712 
Total 545,306 430,787 743,962 
 
Sources: H. W. Jack. "Selection of Coconuts." Malayan Agricultural Journal 10, no. 5 (1922), 122-127; 









APPENDIX 3.2. MALAYA’S TRADE BALANCE OF OIL PALM PRODUCE, COCONUT PRODUCE, AND 
ARECANUTS, TONS PER ANNUM, 1921-1962. 
 
Year 











































1921 n.a. n.a n.a n.a. 68,435 72 7,884 79 2,670 33 20,932 87 
1922 n.a. n.a n.a. n.a. 104,496 109 6,333 64 1,422 18 20,639 86 
1923 195 15 50 20 90,570 95 6,026 61 2,078 26 23,453 97 
1924 286 21 81 32 91,734 96 6,084 62 2,910 36 22,174 92 
1925 536 40 110 43 86,421 90 7,672 78 6,463 80 18,931 79 
1926 751 56 168 66 104,394 109 8,504 86 4,311 53 22,496 94 
1927 768 58 175 69 86,504 90 10,275 104 5,396 67 17,747 74 
1928 1,334 100 255 100 95,628 100 9,884 100 8,071 100 24,057 100 
1929 1,831 137 263 103 112,429 118 8,725 88 7,667 95 24,470 102 
1930 3,211 241 485 190 102,014 107 9,473 96 5,497 68 23,248 97 
1931 4,575 343 727 285 100,568 105 9,928 100 6,034 75 19,260 80 
1932 7,892 592 1,248 489 97,277 102 11,949 121 8,145 101 20,288 84 
1933 12,100 907 2,019 792 110,298 115 17,582 178 15,850 196 20,742 86 
1934 15,851 1,188 3,195 1,253 95,599 100 25,484 258 18,217 226 27,336 114 
1935 24,597 1,844 3,892 1,526 111,752 117 35,910 363 15,992 198 22,885 95 
1936 29,295 2,196 4,965 1,947 76,680 80 46,504 470 20,438 253 26,548 110 
1937 42,787 3,207 7,312 2,867 75,592 79 39,762 402 15,026 186 30,084 125 
1938 54,377 4,076 9,359 3,670 68,754 72 49,140 497 7,112 88 33,769 140 
1939 59,717 4,477 10,774 4,225 34,420 36 61,360 621 10,707 133 38,489 160 
1940 55,990 4,197 9,219 3,615 (9,904) (10) 69,446 703 (1,215) (15) 43,915 183 
1941 44,406 3,329 1,984 778 (32,682) (34) 64,945 657 (5,659) (70) 22,993 96 
1946 8,179 613 153 60 (34,213) (36) 8,008 81 (2,226) (28) 9,000 37 
1947 43,325 3,248 5,245 2,057 (45,339) (47) 41,112 416 (5,260) (65) 12,506 52 
1948 47,259 3,543 6,461 2,534 (28,624) (30) 45,245 458 (12,176) (151) 6,043 25 
1949 55,211 4,139 8,744 3,429 (24,424) (26) 60,504 612 (28,003) (347) 5,607 23 
1950 50,368 3,776 9,070 3,557 4,778 5 56,046 567 (31,104) (385) 14,867 62 
1951 45,022 3,375 11,809 4,631 (10,878) (11) 68,139 689 (37,891) (469) 13,547 56 
1952 46,008 3,449 10,869 4,262 (27,821) (29) 65,113 659 (60,287) (747) 10,467 44 
1953 47,579 3,567 12,884 5,053 (9,751) (10) 60,779 615 (59,129) (733) 11,580 48 
1954 48,908 3,666 14,029 5,501 (67,472) (71) 78,507 794 (40,520) (502) 5,511 23 
1955 52,832 3,960 12,004 4,707 (75,076) (79) 91,176 922 (56,404) (699) 13,679 57 
1956 55,252 4,142 13,028 5,109 (82,549) (86) 103,132 1,043 (66,174) (820) 11,288 47 
1957 56,728 4,252 15,265 5,986 (71,718) (75) 100,031 1,012 (73,209) (907) 9,625 40 
1958 67,818 5,084 18,807 7,375 (55,906) (58) 67,485 683 (72,453) (898) 4,938 21 
1959 69,097 5,180 17,793 6,977 (27,012) (28) 37,379 378 (69,153) (857) 6,899 29 
1960 90,073 6,752 22,028 8,638 (5,519) (6) 37,754 382 (60,976) (755) 2,074 9 
1961 87,827 6,584 19,136 7,504 (17,791) (19) 54,211 548 (75,712) (938) 6,076 25 
1962 97,022 7,273 14,115 5,535 (44,211) (46) 39,751 402 (57,445) (712) 2,650 11 
Total 1,329,007 266,720 1,047,454 1,527,241 (722,590) 670,813 
 
*Gross export figures for all oil cakes used to represent net copra cake exports for the years 1923-1937, in 
keeping with Department of Agriculture, Federation of Malaya, Malayan Agricultural Statistics 1949 
(Kuala Lumpur: Caxton Press, 1950), Table 23. 
 
Sources: 
Department of Agriculture, Federation of Malaya, Malayan Agricultural Statistics 1949 (Kuala Lumpur: 
Caxton Press, 1950), Tables 23 and 41; Department of Statistics, Malaya. British Malaya: Return of Foreign 
Imports and Exports, 1921-1937 (Singapore: Methodist Publishing House); Department of Statistics, 

















Iraq Japan USA Netherlands Australia Jordan **Germany Others 
1927 854 228 - - - - 246 - - - - 380 
1928 1,463 420 - 2 - - 737 20 23 - - 261 
1929 1,889 605 - 1 - 2 1,019 21 - - - 241 
1930 3,253 1,964 - - - 4 772 153 2 - 95 263 
1931 4,664 2,373 - - - 48 1,267 222 6 - 61 687 
1932 7,906 3,526 - 25 - 9 925 447 7 - 464 2,503 
1933 12,381 3,506 2,826 4 - 77 2,991 33 - - - 2,944 
1934 15,979 7,641 5,000 143 - 891 50 - 5 - - 2,249 
1935 24,746 9,200 10,198 2,582 - 1,654 - 22 35 - - 1,055 
1936 29,437 13,571 10,491 2,983 - 1,591 - - 18 - - 783 
1937 42,928 18,225 16,715 2,520 - 840 2,717 - 56 - - 1,855 
1938 54,540 31,087 18,748 2,606 - 30 - - 72 - - 1,978 
1939 59,779 31,799 24,100 1,448 - - - - 129 - - 2,303 
1940 56,091 44,020 7,116 1,855 - - - - 152 - - 2,948 
1941 44,524 41,655 - 508 - - 174 - 144 - - 2,043 
1946 8,314 8,275 - - - - - - - - - 39 
1947 45,331 44,432 - - - - - - - - - 899 
1948 48,811 46,688 - 15 - - - 210 - - - 1,899 
1949 55,252 54,085 - 405 23 - - - 1 - - 739 
1950 51,205 49,029 - 386 247 - 264 260 48 - 24 948 
1951 46,548 44,170 - 249 398 - 34 428 3 - 75 1,190 
1952 46,151 45,659 - 234 161 - - - 2 - - 94 
1953 48,362 25,572 2,836 14,064 - - - 1,328 12 - 3,422 1,127 
1954 49,299 16,940 11,645 12,691 25 - - 4,437 - - 1,163 2,398 
1955 54,704 43,773 5,929 4,759 - - - - 21 - - 220 
1956 58,584 30,506 11,282 16,554 100 - - - 14 - - 128 
1957 60,272 28,917 10,066 20,566 101 - - - 1 - - 620 
1958 79,575 42,093 16,820 15,324 2,800 1,326 - - 2 - - 1,209 
1959 77,369 32,312 9,905 24,351 8,750 1,215 - 5 2 - - 828 
1960 95,439 37,653 9,040 28,069 15,703 300 - 505 768 1,207 - 2,193 
1961 94,156 34,837 17,978 18,995 14,681 40 300 657 2,425 2,105 - 2,136 
1962 102,474 32,922 12,690 28,477 16,800 4,034 - - 2,985 2,498 - 2,068 
Total 1,382,280 827,683 203,385 199,818 59,789 12,061 11,496 8,748 6,933 5,811 5,304 41,247 
 
*Figures prior to 1927 unavailable. 
**Figures are for West Germany after 1953. 
 
Sources: 
Department of Statistics, Malaya. British Malaya: Return of Foreign Imports and Exports, 1921-1937 
(Singapore: Methodist Publishing House); Department of Statistics, Singapore. Malayan Statistics. 







APPENDIX 3.4. MALAYA’S GROSS EXPORTS OF PALM KERNELS BY DESTINATION, TONS PER 
ANNUM, 1927-1962. 
 
*Year Total Japan  Netherlands 
United 
Kingdom 





1927 179 - 16 158 - - - - 5 
1928 260 - - 260 - - - - - 
1929 283 - 9 264 - - - - 1 
1930 486 - 174 232 35 - - - 45 
1931 727 - 100 527 100 - - - - 
1932 1,248 20 205 493 518 - - - 12 
1933 2,019 - 896 387 481 255 - - - 
1934 3,199 - 260 1,023 455 1,251 - - 210 
1935 3,896 - 200 2,321 670 705 - - - 
1936 4,965 2 568 821 3,123 420 - - 31 
1937 7,312 5 550 140 5,571 1,046 - - - 
1938 9,359 - 2,975 2,457 3,117 410 - 200 200 
1939 10,774 - 2,843 3,702 3,179 600 - - 450 
1940 9,219 - - 5,599 - - - 3,560 60 
1941 1,984 - - - - - - 1,899 85 
1946 153 - - 153 - - - - - 
1947 5,245 - - 5,245 - - - - - 
1948 6,472 - 719 4,434 - - 1,319 - - 
1949 8,744 - 2,045 4,071 - 1,086 1,541 - - 
1950 9,079 - 3,721 274 1,173 1,149 - - 2,762 
1951 11,809 - 5,897 800 1,791 1,636 200 - 1,485 
1952 10,869 - 4,574 1,351 3,051 1,893 - - - 
1953 12,884 - 5,668 220 2,817 2,818 1,361 - - 
1954 14,029 15 7,011 50 1,590 1,818 2,920 - 625 
1955 12,140 - 4,304 3,010 2,630 100 1,825 - 271 
1956 13,820 - 8,699 640 690 3,116 - - 675 
1957 16,243 8,721 3,536 1,855 50 650 510 - 921 
1958 21,969 16,180 50 1,915 665 1,280 150 - 1,729 
1959 20,882 11,712 3,362 5,025 354 225 200 - 5 
1960 24,637 12,066 2,790 5,227 1,950 900 - - 1,704 
1961 21,246 11,715 1,428 3,328 1,898 1,837 - - 1,040 
1962 17,407 9,749 838 4,440 109 1,410 - - 861 
Total 283,540 70,184 63,436 60,423 36,017 24,605 10,026 5,659 13,186 
 
*Figures prior to 1927 unavailable. 
**Figures are for West Germany after 1953. 
 
Sources: 
Department of Statistics, Malaya. British Malaya: Return of Foreign Imports and Exports, 1921-1937 
(Singapore: Methodist Publishing House); Department of Statistics, Singapore. Malayan Statistics. 









APPENDIX 3.5. MALAYA’S GROSS EXPORTS OF COPRA BY DESTINATION, TONS PER ANNUM, 
1921-1962. 
 












1921 138,200 44,775 18,202 31,906 21,345 16 6,311 - 12,452 3,194 
1922 170,486 39,301 28,825 47,825 27,198 - 6,198 - 16,382 4,756 
1923 153,721 36,612 30,324 20,468 23,418 40 19,758 - 12,708 10,392 
1924 159,048 51,580 25,181 16,793 24,924 2 10,986 3,453 16,565 9,567 
1925 153,236 53,369 23,934 13,640 21,235 - 5,873 12,945 14,258 7,973 
1926 185,404 50,679 17,065 30,376 3,985 - 7,898 46,992 14,688 13,721 
1927 143,042 45,839 12,078 27,133 10,679 - 10,029 22,120 7,181 7,983 
1928 182,858 56,327 10,557 45,680 20,827 - 13,250 16,859 10,832 8,526 
1929 198,638 60,920 7,851 45,080 17,518 - 11,726 39,703 8,644 7,196 
1930 191,703 62,188 7,610 31,168 23,103 - 15,956 27,579 7,211 16,888 
1931 187,836 51,453 20,221 36,900 23,566 - 10,525 23,350 9,002 12,819 
1932 197,420 30,104 47,885 29,753 28,038 1 16,805 10,579 4,860 29,395 
1933 210,588 32,834 49,632 37,346 14,707 5 8,900 17,618 2,177 47,369 
1934 190,233 30,271 52,386 47,721 9,931 - 5,775 2,506 5,818 35,825 
1935 217,330 16,987 91,313 22,409 21,575 9,768 3,726 - 3,545 48,007 
1936 196,434 32,320 49,376 58,429 17,607 4,462 300 1,001 - 32,939 
1937 200,989 40,707 42,642 63,868 14,619 44 600 800 - 37,708 
1938 186,271 35,532 41,205 60,078 12,081 - 1,800 - - 35,575 
1939 157,430 22,381 64,214 32,690 5,076 535 2,300 - - 30,233 
1940 93,142 - 59,068 - 17,711 1,753 - - - 14,540 
1941 49,906 - 46,256 - - 1,729 - 300 - 1,621 
1946 1,797 - 1,566 - - - - - - 231 
1947 7,166 - 6,119 - - 48 - - - 998 
1948 59,041 11,323 2,081 - 2,196 - 7,453 - - 35,989 
1949 89,325 16,454 5,095 3,030 3,490 679 15,495 - - 45,082 
1950 124,763 18,013 13,504 18,653 4,600 4 23,599 - - 46,391 
1951 90,021 8,435 20,310 8,240 2,727 1,155 13,630 - 353 35,172 
1952 61,493 6,650 16,168 4,650 8,080 1,325 2,200 - 5,074 17,346 
1953 67,953 11,394 7,440 11,306 300 2,802 6,870 - 3,639 24,204 
1954 64,898 10,337 100 6,623 4,100 13,166 4,350 - 561 25,661 
1955 42,419 12,695 - 3,898 1,948 1,247 2,600 - 9,917 10,113 
1956 39,333 4,100 - 1,450 680 18,210 1,645 - 4,200 9,048 
1957 116,628 11,678 - - - 68,320 1,000 - 200 35,429 
1958 88,685 2,950 50 1,050 - 42,845 1,363 - 1,213 39,214 
1959 65,685 7,045 392 7,743 - 26,569 488 - 2,098 21,350 
1960 112,998 6,568 650 2,175 738 63,701 200 - 7,356 31,609 
1961 107,492 7,384 1,506 1,921 493 37,724 590 - 2,082 55,792 
1962 38,307 300 200 298 - 20,304 - - 496 16,708 
Total 4,741,917 929,505 821,006 770,299 388,496 316,452 240,197 225,805 183,512 866,635 
 
*Figures are for West Germany after 1953. 
**Figures include both British Burma and India together before 1931. 
 
Sources: 
Department of Statistics, Malaya. British Malaya: Return of Foreign Imports and Exports, 1921-1937 
(Singapore: Methodist Publishing House); Department of Statistics, Singapore. Malayan Statistics. 







APPENDIX 3.6. MALAYA’S GROSS IMPORTS OF COPRA BY PREVIOUS PLACE OF ORIGIN, TONS 
PER ANNUM, 1921-1962. 
 


















1921 70,849 15,713 13,906 32,752 13 1,832 1,715 463 - 4,454 
1922 65,991 20,131 15,330 20,215 - 2,909 3,631 905 - 2,870 
1923 63,151 21,346 15,552 14,403 14 2,992 4,904 777 - 3,163 
1924 67,314 24,332 12,711 17,654 1 3,333 4,483 770 2,090 1,951 
1925 66,815 23,791 13,302 18,015 1 3,192 4,363 781 1,796 1,574 
1926 81,010 30,804 15,724 19,236 7 4,477 5,846 1,266 2,631 1,019 
1927 56,538 28,257 10,239 10,942 - 3,034 1,140 1,179 744 1,003 
1928 87,230 38,241 14,289 17,553 12 5,676 6,470 1,640 2,487 862 
1929 86,209 43,991 12,800 13,657 - 5,206 4,570 2,059 2,593 1,333 
1930 89,689 48,168 12,268 16,435 20 5,288 2,831 2,406 1,134 1,139 
1931 87,268 53,031 13,252 10,710 - 4,127 1,646 2,510 1,003 989 
1932 100,143 60,255 13,509 11,285 - 6,697 1,747 2,910 3,362 378 
1933 100,290 56,841 17,398 11,536 30 7,446 1,634 2,474 2,732 199 
1934 94,634 56,252 12,385 15,691 - 5,430 806 2,653 804 613 
1935 105,578 63,681 13,687 14,613 - 5,827 2,217 3,022 1,973 377 
1936 119,754 70,702 15,677 17,550 - 6,866 3,304 3,448 1,402 805 
1937 125,397 74,475 13,789 21,129 - 6,761 3,638 3,294 1,429.30 882 
1938 117,517 74,166 14,891 15,939 4 7,027 465 3,807 791 427 
1939 123,009 77,773 12,649 20,890 - 6,636 541 3,986 78 456 
1940 103,047 67,629 11,883 14,464 - 5,508 461 2,402 304 396 
1941 82,588 59,549 9,789 9,420 - 2,379 - 609 590 251 
1946 36,010 26,468 3,126 5,934 16 363 66 36 1 - 
1947 52,605 39,355 9,391 3,069 15 371 146 212 40 6 
1948 87,666 62,840 10,107 6,399 1,211 3,622 797 1,832 61 798 
1949 113,749 38,392 34,165 3,328 11,313 17,927 836 3,152 809 3,828 
1950 119,985 65,748 23,911 418 140 21,458 746 4,115 201 3,248 
1951 100,898 64,458 18,727 2,513 164 8,860 648 4,164 2 1,361 
1952 89,314 57,573 19,052 - 1,955 6,793 223 3,077 62 579 
1953 77,704 54,746 14,127 - - 1,918 334 3,313 - 3,267 
1954 132,369 97,385 20,266 - - 1,488 4989 2,908 - 5,514 
1955 117,495 95,769 17,758 - 46 222 260 1744 - 1,695 
1956 121,881 95,797 17,816 - 2,976 3,381 46 541 285 1,039 
1957 188,346 85,337 17,154 - 75,837 8,412 9 - 148 1,449 
1958 144,590 52,028 18,149 - 69,897 940 1744 82 - 1,750 
1959 92,697 45,643 16,265 - 24,449 2,195 58 118 253 3,715 
1960 118,517 77,199 23,872 92 11,660 655 3231 - - 1,808 
1961 125,283 97,661 17,989 - 6,682 508 347 - - 2,095 
1962 82,517 61,045 16,594 295 - 2,767 10 - - 1,806 
Total 3,695,648 2,126,572 583,497 366,139 206,461 184,512 70,903 68,655 29,805 59,096 
 
Sources: 
Department of Statistics, Malaya. British Malaya: Return of Foreign Imports and Exports, 1921-1937 
(Singapore: Methodist Publishing House); Department of Statistics, Singapore. Malayan Statistics. 





























1921 8,175 105 - - - - 3,806 405 - 551 - 2,403 905 
1922 6,335 3 - 14 - - 3,426 401 - 309 - 2,073 109 
1923 6,025 5 - 20 - - 3,489 513 - - - 1,520 477 
1924 6,093 22 - - - - 2,757 855 12 658 - 1,664 124 
1925 7,685 5 - - - - 4,184 1,268 - 328 - 1,749 152 
1926 8,586 1 - - - - 4,576 1,728 - 339 - 1,729 213 
1927 10,300 3 - 5 - - 5,834 1,495 - 408 - 2,416 139 
1928 9,890 3 - 121 - - 3,774 2,238 125 454 - 2,571 604 
1929 8,731 3 - - - - 4,074 2,093 70 367 - 1,647 477 
1930 9,503 - - - - - 4,856 2,313 - 495 - 1,608 231 
1931 10,178 1 1 18 3 - 4,694 3,389 - 872 1 1,058 141 
1932 12,404 906 1,522 110 - 100 3,865 3,100 - 484 499 1,426 392 
1933 18,654 4,390 1,989 598 - 70 3,309 3,977 - 866 1,585 1,360 510 
1934 25,798 4,672 2,338 3,759 610 460 5,349 2,942 140 990 2,465 775 1,298 
1935 36,836 15,064 2,752 3,235 525 160 4,530 1,227 350 865 4,808 677 2,193 
1936 47,256 22,200 4,086 5,399 100 - 4,273 230 515 271 3,810 491 5,881 
1937 40,508 12,972 2,635 10,419 250 60 4,059 159 1,023 210 2,589 329 5,804 
1938 49,502 18,625 3,268 12,899 1,200 20 2,742 2,417 100 755 3,419 859 3,199 
1939 61,898 26,476 4,547 12,336 445 - 3,523 1,638 - 2,027 5,790 243 4,872 
1940 70,027 43,795 5,913 243 - - 3,529 557 - 4,121 7,085 327 4,457 
1941 65,033 45,691 6,094 - - - 1,981 284 - 4,683 1255 1,734 3,312 
1946 9,130 - 1,449 1,124 - - 4,306 27 - 1,819 - 347 59 
1947 43,257 - 6,674 27,239 - 43 2,499 5.48 - 5,763 27 16 991 
1948 48,276 299 3,829 3,334 3,488 8,198 374 78 - 8,031 3,821 2 16,823 
1949 61,226 24,606 3,877 - 5,574 4,065 939 192 758 4,471 4,070 4 12,670 
1950 57,032 13,435 3,804 - 7,709 8,191 813 240 7,608 4,340 1,523 63 9,309 
1951 68,335 12,708 13,738 8,277 6,732 2,034 596 - 6,997 2,717 3,659 414 10,463 
1952 66,212 11,380 22,318 1,657 9,605 5,382 371 - 2,361 3,155 3,551 613 5,821 
1953 61,411 13,180 9,700 291 9,392 6,407 229 5,781 7,492 1,160 653 475 6,651 
1954 79,226 11,847 26,029 2,506 2,403 6,253 170 19,757 2,952 890 813 - 5,609 
1955 91,826 11,559 6,481 15,344 10,663 10,049 231 14,974 8,971 1,434 926 4 11,191 
1956 104,284 10,090 4,946 14,907 24,146 9,567 238 500 11,388 1,425 1,815 51 25,211 
1957 101,177 6,660 19,952 3,933 5,001 14,756 240 6,484 8,013 3,068 257 6 32,807 
1958 68,481 4,899 4,993 1,759 5,011 12,773 488 959 11,127 1,522 857 301 23,792 
1959 39,246 1,055 4,779 1,248 4,666 5,256 185 2,905 1,536 460 267 1,330 15,558 
1960 40,642 - 1,717 4,802 3,258 5,283 160 3,750 174 480 1,749 240 19,029 
1961 57,143 54 34 11,239 8,418 6,091 213 2,700 4,483 1,153 1,256 74 21,428 
1962 41,514 45 1,849 1,773 685 2,594 699 600 - 388 1,035 776 31,070 
Total 1,557,835 316,759 171,314 148,609 148,608 107,812 95,380 92,180 76,195 62,330 59,584 33,372 280,280 
 
*Figures include both British Burma and India together before 1931. 
**Figures are for West Germany after 1953. 
 
Sources: 
Department of Statistics, Malaya. British Malaya: Return of Foreign Imports and Exports, 1921-1937 (Singapore: 
Methodist Publishing House); Department of Statistics, Singapore. Malayan Statistics. External Trade, 1938-1962 







APPENDIX 3.8. MALAYA’S GROSS EXPORTS OF COPRA CAKE BY DESTINATION, TONS PER 
ANNUM, 1921-1962. 
 











1921 3,623 - - 1,053 350 1,053 50 900 37 179 
1922 3,408 50 - 1,116 263 1,203 446 125 21 183 
1923 2,078 - - 1,101 189 202 150 258 50 127 
1924 2,910 - 229 896 325 750 100 475 13 122 
1925 6,463 - 3,525 197 505 1,119 348 688 31 49 
1926 4,322 - 2,148 - 569 100 50 1,306 22 127 
1927 5,396 447 2,496 50 1,222 97 1 855 40 188 
1928 8,071 2,044 2,057 1 2,140 75 100 1,433 122 99 
1929 7,667 1,196 1,532 50 3,054 - 150 1,185 435 65 
1930 5,497 1,247 1,596 - 1,260 - - 981 361 52 
1931 6,034 1,297 1,247 - 1,678 730 100 786 166 30 
1932 8,145 996 2,961 - 1,209 1,050 - 1,540 114 275 
1933 15,850 1,700 3,798 2,223 1,715 1,401 4,377 244 334 58 
1934 18,217 552 500 6,911 3,791 1,926 2,755 633 648 501 
1935 15,992 1,601 3,349 3,521 783 2,000 2,425 166 366 1781 
1936 20,438 800 - 4,877 718 4,901 1,505 551 256 6830 
1937 15,026 10,712 - 2,830 576 40 50 77 195 187 
1938 7,894 7,250 50 50 - 250 - - 49 245 
1939 12,076 10,000 50 560 - 1,200 50 - 66 150 
1940 6,710 1,585 - 4,102 46 300 - - 385 292 
1941 1,277 - - - 191 - - - 1024 61 
1946 21 - - - 2 - - - 19 - 
1947 10 - - - - - - - 9 1 
1948 16 - - - 13 - - - 3 - 
1949 400 - - - - - - - 350 49 
1950 696 - - - 43 - - - 545 109 
1951 732 - - - 78 - - - 545 109 
1952 1,083 - - - 134 - - - 768 180 
1953 1,052 - - - 126 - 200 - 661 64 
1954 5,461 1,770 1,600 595 91 700 - - 479 226 
1955 2,173 300 - 1,040 64 - - - 603 165 
1956 2,427 845 - 400 63 - - - 726 393 
1957 5,893 1,600 2,320 250 114 - - - 943 666 
1958 3,004 500 1,375 - 68 - - - 820 241 
1959 1,784 400 667 330 38 - 100 - 228 21 
1960 254 - 84 - 26 - - - 124 21 
1961 177 - - - 21 - - - 75 81 
1962 2,372 200 1,899 - 14 - - - 110 149 
1963 724 269 387 - 12 - - - 28 23 
Total 205,370 47,362 33,869 32,154 21,493 19,456 12,958 12,202 11,771 14,097 
 
*Gross export figures for all oil cakes used for years 1921-1937. It is assumed that copra cake constitutes the 
overwhelming majority of exports (based on figures for 1939). 
**Figures are for West Germany after 1953. 
Sources: 
Department of Statistics, Malaya. British Malaya: Return of Foreign Imports and Exports, 1921-1937 
(Singapore: Methodist Publishing House); Department of Statistics, Singapore. Malayan Statistics. 








APPENDIX 3.9. MALAYA’S GROSS IMPORTS OF COPRA CAKE, BY PREVIOUS PLACE OF ORIGIN, 
TONS PER ANNUM, 1938-1962. 
 



















1938 782 - 109 433 - - - 240 - - - 
1939 1,369 4 - 926 - - - 440 - - - 
1940 7,925 5,383 89 1,873 - 12 - 567 - - - 
1941 6,935 5,735 - 1,060 - 106 - - - - 35 
1946 2,247 - 605 600 - - 75 924 - - 43 
1947 5,270 200 3,666 686 49 5 - 615 - - 49 
1948 12,191 5,832 3,905 398 1,492 100 234 40 - - 190 
1949 28,403 13,694 6,835 245 1,932 100 3,975 85 - 1,166 11 
1950 31,801 21,478 6,127 953 1,681 287 951 25 8 100 191 
1951 38,623 30,210 5,515 - 1,228 969 700 - - - 1 
1952 61,369 46,690 5,016 1,679 3,518 882 2,165 49 8 54 1,308 
1953 60,181 48,757 3,097 1,812 2,277 2,706 725 679 - - 128 
1954 45,981 38,541 3,235 775 295 2,137 469 148 - 177 204 
1955 58,577 50,148 4,024 599 175 2,131 465 394 120 59 463 
1956 68,600 59,755 3,964 1,644 1,808 1,228 - - 40 - 161 
1957 79,101 66,547 3,401 5,645 1,487 1,562 - - 210 - 248 
1958 75,457 67,520 1,992 4,087 566 587 - - 578 - 127 
1959 70,936 64,826 1,361 3,415 - 492 - - 254 - 589 
1960 61,231 52,809 3,663 3,050 779 246 - - 217 - 467 
1961 75,889 65,422 4,088 2,634 1,432 2,095 - - 177 - 40 
1962 59,816 43,203 5,557 3,862 4,636 1,192 - - 73 - 1,294 
Total 852,686 686,755 66,249 36,375 23,355 16,834 9,759 4,205 1,684 1,557 5,548 
 
Sources: 



























1921 49,141 38,235 - 3,510 1,831 2,959 2,585 7 14 
1922 51,697 40,533 - 2,712 2,845 2,826 2,761 - 19 
1923 63,792 51,889 - 3,176 4,059 3,306 1,293 23 46 
1924 62,196 51,506 - 3,214 3,534 1,903 1,871 57 110 
1925 58,908 50,545 - 2,591 2,772 2,134 703 18 145 
1926 63,021 51,490 - 2,926 2,927 2,976 2,417 204 81 
1927 49,879 37,349 - 3,536 2,938 4,041 1,871 80 64 
1928 69,259 59,484 - 3,005 2,928 2,116 1,623 33 70 
1929 72,127 62,447 - 2,993 4,054 1,721 720 136 56 
1930 65,803 58,125 - 2,944 2,680 989 1,017 2 46 
1931 58,054 42,674 4,754 3,161 2,903 1,514 2,756 13 279 
1932 57,593 43,647 4,717 2,649 3,159 2,504 835 22 60 
1933 55,298 45,026 3,740 533 2,722 2,100 1,140 - 37 
1934 65,899 53,974 4,790 2,512 2,521 956 1,479 7 20 
1935 64,784 51,311 5,049 2,434 2,540 2,125 1,196 97 32 
1936 71,729 58,631 4,858 27,04 1,795 2,696 990 37 18 
1937 83,156 71,459 5,737 2,367 2,044 1,096 357 40 56 
1938 89,189 76,497 - 2,369 1,710 1,257 479 34 6,843 
1939 91,139 80,355 5,362 2,054 1,528 348 1,218 228 46 
1940 94,328 82,568 6,514 2.225 928 331 1,540 214 8 
1941 75,806 64,382 7,613 1,807 545 1364 64 - 32 
1946 24,468 23,184 834 - - 36 332 65 17 
1947 46,075 42,367 3,382 - - 156 39 - 131 
1948 32,785 24,462 4,176 4 - 105 157 - 3,881 
1949 43,782 34,072 3,913 160 304 1016 97 - 4,221 
1950 42,623 37,597 1,451 1,436 888 636 91 - 524 
1951 43,322 38,355 2,386 1,891 218 315 45 - 112 
1952 40,119 32,516 4,204 2,172 312 798 - - 117 
1953 36,699 28,674 3,933 2,809 672 432 21 - 159 
1954 37,913 27,090 5,661 3,959 1037 - - - 165 
1955 41,060 35,360 2,495 2,980 - - 5 - 219 
1956 42,793 37,126 1,635 - - - 1 1,285 2,745 
1957 37,807 30,515 2,315 - 12 50 51 1,672 3,192 
1958 26,098 18,021 3,352 - - 169 7 1,719 2,830 
1959 20,718 13,283 2,754 - - 391 620 824 2,845 
1960 16,444 11,681 3,600 - - 2 26 698 436 
1961 13,683 9,226 3,640 - - - 2 450 365 
1962 14,736 9,473 4,325 - - - 16 346 575 
Total 1,973,918 1,625,127 107,188 70,836 56,404 45,366 30,424 8,311 30,614 
 
*All figures before 1931 are amalgamated with British India’s. 
Sources: 
Department of Statistics, Malaya. British Malaya: Return of Foreign Imports and Exports, 1921-1937 
(Singapore: Methodist Publishing House); Department of Statistics, Singapore. Malayan Statistics. 







APPENDIX 3.11. MALAYA’S GROSS IMPORTS OF ARECANUTS BY PREVIOUS PLACE OF ORIGIN, 



























1921 28,209 20,021 6,514 178 1,149 - 75 - 271 
1922 31,058 20,713 7,871 553 1,434 - 38 - 449 
1923 40,339 27,787 8,168 1,896 1,862 - 281 47 298 
1924 40,021 27,374 7,311 2,870 1,548 - 567 2 348 
1925 39,977 28,379 5,777 2,533 1,984 - 634 276 392 
1926 40,525 27,709 6,501 2,785 2,120 - 243 560 607 
1927 32,132 22,933 6,931 539 1,048 - 272 212 197 
1928 45,202 33,699 7,081 1,878 1,278 - 809 198 259 
1929 47,657 32,831 8,960 2,871 1,556 - 725 417 297 
1930 42,555 30,286 7,107 3,015 1,471 - 218 251 207 
1931 38,794 29,245 6,192 1,946 857 - 270 36 248 
1932 37,305 27,062 7,005 1,596 353 - 1,149 - 140 
1933 34,556 26,977 5,280 1,977 71 - 130 35 86 
1934 38,563 30,802 4,731 2,722 8 - 253 26 21 
1935 41,899 33,773 4,345 2,419 618 - 529 51 154 
1936 45,181 35,959 4,778 2,217 1,571 - 416 133 107 
1937 53,071 38,549 5,926 5,584 1,390 - 656 900 66 
1938 55,420 42,872 6,234 2,965 1,736 - 984 447 181 
1939 52,650 40,728 6,874 3,458 638 - 143 691 118 
1940 50,413 35,855 6,935 6,644 251 - 511 169 48 
1941 51,173 42,360 6,192 723 353 849 491 180 24 
1946 15,468 11,649 636 1,960 34 1,132 3 2 52 
1947 33,568 22,584 3126 6,632 86 796 19 275 50 
1948 26,743 20,567 1,353 3,272 - 1,347 9 122 71 
1949 38,175 26,335 2,768 6,105 - 1,329 25 440 1,173 
1950 27,756 20,580 2,908 2,092 - 1,683 10 155 329 
1951 29,775 21,588 2,718 3,837 - 1,334 1 201 94 
1952 29,652 21,219 2,012 4,615 - 1,181 60 468 98 
1953 25,119 17,859 1,796 4,169 - 1,016 30 150 99 
1954 32,402 21,023 2,047 7,600 5 1,057 4 170 497 
1955 27,381 19,114 983 5,805 - 861 23 514 81 
1956 31,505 23,676 1,627 3,998 - 765 37 588 815 
1957 28,182 23,212 1,650 2,368 - 652 8 105 186 
1958 21,160 17,059 1,280 2,112 - 389 - 151 169 
1959 13,818 10,679 1,437 1,071 - 263 - 238 129 
1960 14,370 11,839 692 1,471 - 131 - 140 98 
1961 7,608 7,169 46 209 - 73 - 25 86 
1962 12,086 11,657 175 109 - 5 - 47 93 
 Total 1,301,466 963,721 163,967 108,792 23,422 14,865 9,624 8,420 8,640 
 
Sources: 
Department of Statistics, Malaya. British Malaya: Return of Foreign Imports and Exports, 1921-1937 
(Singapore: Methodist Publishing House); Department of Statistics, Singapore. Malayan Statistics. 








APPENDIX 4.1. JOHOR’S EXPORT VOLUMES AND UNIT VALUES OF COPRA, ARECANUTS AND 
RUBBER, TONS PER ANNUM, VALUED IN STRAITS DOLLARS PER TON, 1928-1939, DEFLATED BY 
THE SUGIMOTO CONSUMER PRICE INDEX (1928=100). 
 
Year 




























1928 34,345 181 100 10,946 102 100 62,738 705 100 100.0 
1929 35,349 161 89 13,527 124 122 96,480 792 112 97.8 
1930 38,711 155 85 12,910 111 108 90,643 466 66 93.0 
1931 38,428 109 60 13,744 73 72 90,780 282 40 79.5 
1932 41,817 131 72 14,359 84 83 86,685 229 33 69.9 
1933 48,398 102 56 14,765 57 55 97,797 356 50 65.0 
1934 41,735 68 38 16,280 57 56 103,994 686 97 66.7 
1935 39,171 98 54 14,686 155 151 83,358 571 81 69.3 
1936 40,613 104 58 15,538 147 144 89,019 979 139 68.1 
1937 44,170 52 29 17,060 145 142 123,045 972 138 72.2 
1938 45,640 77 42 20,899 144 141 89,128 713 101 69.9 
1939 40,257 82 45 18,011 143 140 91,149 937 133 70.3 
 
Sources: 
Government of Johore, Annual Reports of the Principal Agricultural Officer, Johore, 1932 (Johore Bahru: 
Government Printer), 46-47; Government of Johore, Annual Report of the State Agricultural Officer, Johore 
(henceforth SAOJ), 1935 (Johore Bahru: Government Printer), Appendix C; SAOJ 1937, Appendix E, vi; 
SAOJ 1938, Appendix E, vi; Government of Johore, Annual Report on the Social and Economic Progress of 








APPENDIX 4.2. JOHOR’S BALANCE OF TRADE IN PIGS, AND ESTIMATED CHINESE POPULATIONS 























1928 - - -12.9 - 339.7 
1929 - - -13.4 - 352.4 
1930 - - 5.2 - 348.1 
1931 - 23.2 3.9 214.4 354.6 
1932 - 31.0 4.7 - 344.0 
1933 - 19.7 8.3 - 324.1 
1934 - 38.6 7.8 - 330.9 
1935 202.3 43.9 1.8 218.0 360.5 
1936 210.6 46.1 2.1 274.4 380.0 
1937 169.5 45.0 4.4 268.3 410.4 
1938 163.3 37.5 9.0 311.6 447.3 
1939 100.7 42.1 12.9 366.0 458.4 
 
Sources:  
Government of Johore, Annual Report on the Social and Economic Progress of the People of Johore for 1928-
1939 (Johore Bahru: Government Printer); Ichirō Sugimoto. Economic Growth of Singapore in the Twentieth 








APPENDIX 5.1. TOTAL PLANTED ACREAGE IN JOHOR AND MALAYA: OIL PALMS, COCONUT 
PALMS, ARECA PALMS, AND RUBBER. 
 
Year 
Oil Palms Coconut Palms* Areca Palms* Rubber 




1922 - 2,199 -  - -  - 218,033 297,924 2,328,537 
1923  - 3,369  -  -  -  - 222,007 303,730 - 
1924  - 5,930 92,500 492,495  -  - 225,223 307,830 - 
1925 1,034 8,368 -  - 7,500  - 226,192 308,579 - 
1926 2,294 12,327 -  -  -  - 226,192 313,348 - 
1927 4,828 18,205  -  -  -  - 226,192 340,862 - 
1928 6,228 22,715  -  -  -  - 238,565 340,862 - 
1929 9,020 31,605  -  -  -  - 288,025 417,273 - 
1930 17,845 49,007 165,050 587,200  -  - 324,333 440,949 3,079,899 
1931 23,443 55,801 165,050  - 9,550 16,022 341,613 459,142 3,151,799 
1932 26,086 59,098 198,000 587,700 10,000 22,005 396,725 459,142 3,214,868 
1933 28,549 61,929 169,367 623,600 39,225 54,106 392,589 459,874 3,208,295 
1934 29,278 62,908 170,085 597,500 36,958 52,982 392,589 507,768 3,284,216 
1935 30,066 63,928 170,085 595,100 31,318 47,905 322,225 517,125 3,194,856 
1936 30,573 65,608 170,085 595,600 34,793 50,546 359,007 516,176 3,236,644 
1937 33,106 69,681 170,085 604,600 38,402 61,658 360,759 523,145 3,302,170 
1938 34,956 72,720 170,452 597,900 37,079 61,872 365,996 525,155 3,296,647 
1939 36,591 75,825 171,752 599,100 37,567 63,524 384,533 556,596 3,442,649 
1940 37,514 77,700 172,447 600,900 32,232 58,619 394,766 559,712 3,472,691 
1946  - 77,500  -  -  -  - 392,599 483,976 3,248,642 
1947 39,160 78,200 113,898 512,100 25,139 50,983 384,412 501,565 3,344,252 
1948 41,078 83,300 117,037 510,800 24,030 49,394 405,643 504,899 3,389,566 
1949 41,078 90,500 117,965 499,600 23,439 48,957 411,145 508,871 3,395,224 
1950 41,218 96,000 118,041 485,000 23,395 48,392 411,145 509,802 3,378,976 
1951 42,990 97,400 117,714 484,000 23,267 47,659 534,729 507,868 3,535,221 
1952 44,226 100,200 118,046 485,300 21,151 44,862 541,240 526,658 3,632,574 
1953 46,555 108,300 117,752 485,000 22,925 46,300  -  - 3,636,000 
1954 46,651 109,300 118,305 494,000 22,144 45,417  -  - 3,647,000 
1955  - 111,400 141,463 495,000 22,166 40,303  -  - 3,665,000 
1956  - 115,200 141,781 521,300 20,862 42,974  -  - 3,694,000 
1957  - 115,900  - 517,000 20,650 40,993  -  - 3,721,000 
1958 53,945 119,800 141,550 518,300 20,701 40,524  -  - 3,747,000 
1959 57,347 126,200 142,295 520,200 17,736 36,600  -  - 3,783,000 
1960 60,885 135,000 143,465 520,200 17,823 36,741  -  - 3,840,000 
1961 61,527 141,200 143,491 519,600 17,699 35,395  -  - 3,923,000 
1962 63,606 153,400 134,378 509,800 15,493 32,794  -  - 3,987,000 
 




Oil palms 1922-1939: Department of Agriculture, FMS and SS, Malayan Agricultural Statistics 1939 (Kuala Lumpur: 
Caxton Press, 1940), Table 32. 
Coconut palms 1924: D. H. Grist. "The Malayan Coconut Census, 1930." Malayan Agricultural Journal 19 (1931), p. 60. 
Areca palms 1925: D. H. Grist. "The Betel-Nut Industry." Malayan Agricultural Journal 14, no. 7 (1926), p. 220. 
Rubber 1922-1940: Department of Statistics, SS and FMS, Malaya. Rubber Statistics Handbook (henceforth RSH) 1940 
(Singapore: Government Printing Office, 1940), 15; John H. Drabble. Malayan Rubber: The Interwar Years (Basingstoke: 
Macmillan, 1991), 308. 
Rubber 1946-1952: RSH 1946-1952, Table 2. 
Oil palms 1940-1962, coconut palms 1930-1962, areca palms 1931-1962, rubber 1953-1962: Pee Yew Teck. A Statistical 
Source Book on Malayan Agriculture: Selected by Time-Series and by State (In Two Volumes). Volume 1. Acreage and 
Production of Main Crops (Kuala Lumpur: University of Malaya, 1967), Tables I.1(a), I.3, I.4, II.3, II.4; Idem., A Statistical 
Source Book on Malayan Agriculture: Selected by Time-Series and by State (In Two Volumes). Volume 2. Miscellaneous 







APPENDIX 5.2. MALAYA: RUBBER SMALLHOLDINGS REPLANTED UNDER FUND ‘B’ GRANT, 
LISTED BY REPLACEMENT CROP, ACRES PER ANNUM, 1953-1963. 
 











Nutmeg Cloves Total 
1953 26,689 343 121 49 314 39 22 36 - - - 27,612 
1954 21,417 778 623 102 866 567 51 135 - - - 24,539 
1955 24,622 887 767 699 413 422 130 208 - - - 28,149 
1956 45,447 843 757 730 293 318 156 163 - - - 48,707 
1957 49,078 788 650 881 137 360 142 172 - - - 52,208 
1958 58,650 770 749 447 305 296 242 118 - - 9 61,584 
1959 72,484 1,093 556 369 296 184 228 152 - - 1 75,363 
1960 74,680 777 432 123 95 95 160 22 - - - 76,383 
1961 64,466 799 437 195 22 88 104 17 - - 2 66,130 
1962 74,355 543 519 934 30 85 140 17 - 20 4 76,646 
1963 91,270 915 965 1,519 43 103 263 118 271 96 24 95,586 
Total 603,156 8,536 6,575 6,047 2,814 2,556 1,638 1,159 271 116 40 632,905 
 
Source: Rubber Industry (Replanting) Board. Rubber Industry (Replanting) Board, Fund “B”: Report on 



















Elaeis 2,380 Mengkibol 2,100.47 200 
Ulu Remis 5,000 Layang Layang 4,356.53 627 
Malacca Rubber 
Plantations 
5,200 Layang Layang NIL 978 
United Sua 
Betong 
5,000 Layang Layang NIL NIL 





Lee Quee Choo 1,700 Kulai NIL 350 
Oil Palm 
Plantations, Ltd. 
10,000 Kluang NIL 480 





25,000 Labis NIL NIL 
Total  58,280   6,457 2,635 
 
Sources: ANM-JB: CL&M 260/30, 'List of Oil Palm Estates and details of planting', n.d.; Government of 









APPENDIX 5.4. FEDERATION OF MALAYA: LIST OF OIL PALM ESTATES REGISTERED IN THE 
DEPARTMENT OF STATISTICS, INCLUDING LOCATIONS AND PLANTED ACREAGE AS OF 31ST 
DECEMBER 1958. 
 





as of 31 Dec 1958 
1 Oil Palms of Malaya Ltd. Johor European 16,702 
2 Johore Labis Estate Johor European 15,751 
3 Ulu Bernam Estate Perak European 8,277 
4 Pamol Estate Johor European 7,924 
5 Lima Balas Estate Perak European 5,952 
6 Kulai Oil Palm Estate Johor European 4,864 
7 Jendarata Estate Perak European 4,768 
8 Sungei Samak Estate Perak European 4,586 
9 Kelapa Bali Estate Perak European 3,826 
10 Elaies Estate Johor European 3,035 
11 Teluk Merbau Plantations Ltd Selangor European 2,950 
12 Highlands Estate Selangor European 2,694 
13 Minyak Estate Selangor European 2,212 
14 Elmina Estate  Selangor European 2,100 
15 Pakloh Oil Palm Plantation Johor Asian 1,897 
16 Lanadron Estate Johor European 1,859 
17 Selaba Estate Perak European 1,579 
18 Bukit Jelutong Estate Selangor European 1,533 
19 Senama Estate Negri Sembilan European 1,414 
20 Riverside Estate Selangor European 1,373 
21 Hopeful Estate Selangor European 1,334 
22 Raja Musa Estate Selangor European 1,292 
23 Tumbuk Estate Selangor European 1,258 
24 Sungei Tekal Estate Pahang European 1,246 
25 Bukit Berutong Estate Selangor European 1,235 
26 Tennamaram Estate Selangor European 1,194 
27 Fermanagh Estate Selangor Asian 1,182 
28 Klanang Bahru Estate Selangor European 1,147 
29 Bukit Cheraka Estate Selangor European 1,080 
30 Nordanal Estate Johor European 1,080 
31 Dusun Durian Estate Selangor European 1,056 
32 Jugra Estate Selangor European 1,016 
33 Ng Teong Kiat Plantations Pahang Asian 1,010 
34 Golden Hope Estate Selangor European 978 
35 
Sungei Buaya Estate (Lunderston 
Division) 
Selangor European 912 
36 Koh Foh Estate Negri Sembilan Asian 900 




38 Ichamaram Estate Selangor European 711 
39 Hong Huat Oil Palm Estate Pahang Asian 700 
40 Bukit Munchong Estate Selangor European 632 
41 Mentara Estate Kelantan Asian 630 
42 Gim Tien Estate Johor Asian 600 
43 Dingkil Palm Oil Plantations Selangor Asian 560 
44 Sungei Rawang Estate Selangor European 502 
45 Gadong Estate Selangor European 467 
46 Poh Aun Estate Selangor Asian 445 







48 Keru Oil Palm Estate Negri Sembilan Asian 416 
49 Sungei Gappin Estate Selangor European 408 
50 Midlands Estate Selangor European 347 
51 His Highness' Oil Palm Estate Negri Sembilan Government 257 
52 Chinniah Estate Selangor Asian 230 
53 Bukit Minyak Estate Selangor Asian 164 
54 Thailamal Estate Selangor Asian 150 
55 Bukit Blembing Estate Selangor European 149 
56 Dennistown Estate Perak European 142 
57 Federal Experiment Station Selangor Government 51 
58 T.S. Chinniah's Kampong Estate Selangor Asian 38 
59 Carey Island Estate Selangor European 20 
60 Cheam Tow Fong Estate Kelantan Asian 20 
61 Gula Estate Perak Asian 11 
Total 122,024 
 







APPENDIX 6.1. CUMULATIVE LIST OF OPERATIONAL COPRA OIL MILLS IN MALAYA, AND 
KNOWN OIL PRODUCTION CAPACITY, UP UNTIL END-1957. 
 








Singapore Oil Mills (facilities merged 
with Bintang Oil Mills in 1899, and taken 
over by Ho Hong Oil Mills in 1917) 
Singapore 1882 40.00 
2 Ban Teik Bee Penang 1901 50.00 
3 Khie Heng Bee Mills Penang 1902 6.00 
4 Federal Oil Mills @ Selangor Oil Mills Selangor 1903 3.00 
5 Ho Hong Oil Mills Singapore 1904 20.00 
6 Sun Wo Loong Penang 1911 70.00 
7 Ban Hin Bee Oil Mill Penang 1926 40.00 
8 Ho Hong Oil Mills (expansion) Singapore 1931 40.00 
9 Kian Hin Guan Singapore 1933 30.00 
10 Ban Hin Leong Singapore 1935 27.00 
11 Ban Hin Lee Penang 1935 Unknown 
12 Chuan Lee Oil Mill Kedah 1938 0.18 
13 Unknown  Perak 1941 0.33 
14 Unknown Johor 1941 3.33 
15 Joo Seng Oil Mill Malacca 1942 1.98 
16 Chin Thong Oil Mill Kelantan 1942 5.70 
17 Kien Huat Oil Mill Selangor 1946 3.47 
18 Chung Hwa Oil Factory Negri Sembilan 1946 4.76 
19 Nam Hoe Oil Mill Johor 1946 1.79 
20 Sin Ee Heng Oil Mill Johor 1946 1.78 
21 Eng Seng Oil Mill Johor 1946 1.38 
22 Nam Heng Oil Mill Johor 1946 14.95 
23 Eng Nam Heng Oil Mill Johor 1946 2.98 
24 Guan Seng Oil Mill Province Wellesley 1946 1.15 
25 Heap Lee Oil Mill Perak 1947 2.44 
26 Beng Kee Oil Mill Selangor 1947 2.95 
27 Lean Huat Oil Mill Province Wellesley 1947 1.43 
28 Eng Huat Oil Mill Province Wellesley 1947 11.90 
29 Hock Chuan Lee Province Wellesley 1947 1.71 
30 Lian Heng Oil Mill Johor 1947 1.78 
31 Hup Joo Oil Mill Johor 1947 2.68 
32 Hup Seng Oil Mill Johor 1947 5.95 
33 Chop Hiap Seng Leong Johor 1947 14.28 
34 Hock Hoe Mill Co. Pahang 1947 0.90 
35 Chop Hong Thye Trengganu 1947 0.45 
36 Lam Soon Cannery Singapore 1948 45.00 
37 Hock Wah Oil Mill Perak 1948 5.95 
38 Tai Lee Oil Mill Perak 1948 6.33 
39 Chuan Kee Oil Mill Perak 1948 7.93 
40 Mun Hing Loong Perak 1948 8.33 
41 Sun Hup Fatt Oil Mill Selangor 1948 2.30 
42 Sin Guan Hup Province Wellesley 1948 0.45 
43 Ban Chin Hong Province Wellesley 1948 0.36 
44 Ng Tong Leong Johor 1948 0.36 
45 Eng Tong Joo Johor 1948 1.49 
46 Kwong Fatt Hing Kee Selangor 1949 2.81 
47 Seng Lean Hong Province Wellesley 1949 1.39 







49 Hoe Heng Oil Mill Johor 1949 1.34 
50 Kim Leong Huat Hup Kee Johor 1949 3.45 
51 Guan Hap Oil Mill Kelantan 1949 2.97 
52 Hock Hoe Hin Trengganu 1949 0.40 
53 Tong Huat Oil Mill Perak 1950 3.74 
54 Lee Oil Mills Ltd. Selangor 1950 60.00 
55 Hock Chuang Hong Co. Oil & Rice Mill Province Wellesley 1950 7.14 
56 Lam Hin Lee Singapore 1951 24.00 
57 Synn Heng Oil Mill Perak 1951 10.00 
58 Leong Huat Oil Mill Province Wellesley 1951 0.89 
59 Lee Seng Oil Mill Province Wellesley 1951 1.63 
60 Sin Hock Aun Province Wellesley 1951 2.14 
61 Lee Huat Oil Mill Province Wellesley 1951 4.96 
62 Ban Hong Oil Mill Perak 1952 4.17 
63 Poh Ann Oil Mill & Co. Selangor 1952 8.91 
64 Tee Tng Oil Mill Johor 1952 0.65 
65 Hoe Seng Oil Mill Selangor 1953 5.76 
66 Tong Hin Oil Mill Co. Ltd Kelantan 1953 3.33 
67 Kin San Coconut Oil Factory Malacca 1953 0.60 
68 Perak Oil Mill Perak 1954 25.00 
69 Sin Chip Seng Oil Mill Province Wellesley 1954 2.14 
70 Sin Long Geoh Oil Mill Johor 1954 3.57 
71 Sun Weng Woh Oil Mill Selangor 1955 1.25 
72 Seng Aun Oil Mill Province Wellesley 1955 2.78 
73 Choo Chin Hin Oil Mill Kelantan 1955 0.32 
74 Yeo Khee Lin Pahang 1955 0.64 
75 Malayan Oil Mill Co. Province Wellesley 1957 20.00 
Total 702.52 
 
*This listing excludes approximately 30-40 mills for whom production capacity figures are unknown, but 
probably very small at an individual level. See ANM-KL: C&I/E 1015 Vol. 1, Enc. 31 for a list of 102 known 
mills in the Federation of Malaya (Singapore excluded). The author has also excluded mills known to have 
opened and shut down permanently within the period. 
Sources:  
ANM-KL: C&I/E 1015 Vol. 1, Enc. 45; ANM-KL: HCO NO JOHORE 1164/1916, Acting General Adviser to 
Secretary to the High Commissioner for the Malay States, 25.6.1916, p. 3; TNA: CO 852/292/6, Enc. No. 1 to 
Straits Despatch of 20th March 1940; Molly Goh. "The Possibilities for Expansion in the Coconut Oil 
Industry in Singapore." (Academic Exercise, BA (Hons) Economics, University of Singapore, 1963), 10; Ung 
Gim-Sei. "An Analysis of Singapore's Trade on Copra-Group Commodities, 1954-1963." (Graduation 
Exercise, BA (Hons) Economics, University of Singapore, 1965), 42; Wong Yee Tuan, "The Rise and Fall of 
the Big Five of Penang and Their Regional Networks, 1800s-1900s." (PhD Thesis. The Australian National 
University, 2007), 114; Anon., "Singapore Oil Mills", The Singapore Free Press and Mercantile Advertiser, 
18.10.1917, 244; Anon. "From the Districts: September, 1941." Malayan Agricultural Journal 29, no. 10 (1941), 
416; Arnold Wright, ed. Twentieth Century Impressions of British Malaya: Its History, People, Commerce, 
Industries and Resources (London: Lloyd's Greater Britain Publishing Company Ltd, 1908), 647-650, 652, 
824, 828, 907-908; William Tai Yuen, Chinese Capitalism in Colonial Malaya, 1900-1941 (Bangi: Penerbit 
Universiti Kebangsaan Malaysia, 2013), 192-193; Wu Xiao An, "Rice Trade and Chinese Rice Millers in the 
Late-Nineteenth and Early-Twentieth Centuries: The Case of British Malaya." In Chinese Circulations: 
Capital, Commodities and Networks in Southeast Asia, eds. Eric Tagliacozzo and Chang Wen-chin 







APPENDIX 6.2. MALAYA’S ESTIMATED TOTAL COPRA OIL PRODUCTION AND CONSUMPTION, 

































1921 10,512 7,884 2,628 25 16,819 5,887 2,670 3,217 
1922 8,444 6,333 2,111 25 13,510 4,729 1,422 3,307 
1923 8,035 6,026 2,009 25 12,855 4,499 2,078 2,421 
1924 8,112 6,084 2,028 25 12,979 4,543 2,910 1,633 
1925 10,229 7,672 2,557 25 16,337 5,728 6,463 (735) 
1926 12,149 8,504 3,645 30 19,438 6,803 4,311 2,492 
1927 14,679 10,275 4,404 30 23,486 8,220 5,396 2,824 
1928 15,206 9,884 5,322 35 24,329 8,515 8,071 444 
1929 13,423 8,725 4,698 35 21,477 7,517 7,667 (150) 
1930 14,574 9,473 5,101 35 23,318 8,161 5,497 2,664 
1931 15,274 9,928 5,346 35 24,438 8,553 6,034 2,519 
1932 18,383 11,949 6,434 35 29,413 10,295 8,145 2,150 
1933 29,303 17,582 11,721 40 46,885 16,410 15,830 580 
1934 42,473 25,484 16,989 40 67,957 23,785 18,217 5,568 
1935 59,850 35,910 23,940 40 95,760 33,516 15,992 17,524 
1936 71,544 46,504 25,041 35 114,471 40,065 20,438 19,627 
1937 61,172 39,762 21,410 35 97,876 34,256 15,046 19,210 
1938 75,600 49,140 26,460 35 120,960 42,336 7,112 35,224 
1939 94,400 61,360 33,040 35 151,040 52,864 10,707 42,157 
1940 106,840 69,446 37,394 35 170,944 59,830 -1,215 61,045 
1941 108,242 64,945 43,297 40 173,187 60,616 -5,659 66,275 
1946 16,016 8,008 8,008 50 25,626 8,969 -2,226 11,195 
1947 96,243 41,112 55,131 57 153,989 53,896 -5,260 59,156 
1948 93,085 45,245 47,840 51 148,936 52,128 -12,176 64,304 
1949 90,962 60,504 30,458 33 145,539 50,939 -28,003 78,942 
1950 90,469 56,046 34,423 38 144,750 50,663 -31,104 81,767 
1951 106,072 68,139 37,933 36 169,715 59,400 -37,891 97,291 
1952 106,805 65,113 41,692 39 170,888 59,811 -60,287 120,098 
1953 95,922 60,779 35,143 37 153,475 53,716 -59,129 112,845 
1954 134,545 78,507 56,038 42 215,272 75,345 -40,520 115,865 
1955 128,613 91,176 37,437 29 205,781 72,023 -56,404 128,427 
1956 148,171 103,132 45,039 30 237,074 82,976 -66,174 149,150 
1957 145,209 100,031 45,178 31 232,334 81,317 -73,209 154,526 
1958 108,778 67,485 41,293 38 174,045 60,916 -72,453 133,369 
1959 87,742 37,379 50,363 57 140,387 49,135 -69,153 118,288 
1960 98,152 37,754 60,398 62 157,043 54,965 -60,976 115,941 
 
^Estimated oil production from coconut mills only. Excludes production from smallholdings and estates. 
*Author’s own estimates for years 1921-1946. 
**Author’s own estimates. See ‘Note on currencies, weights, and measures’ (page 13) for coconut 
conversion assumptions. 
***Gross export figures for all oil cakes used for years 1921-1937, in keeping with Department of 
Agriculture, Federation of Malaya, Malayan Agricultural Statistics 1949 (Kuala Lumpur: Caxton Press, 











Net exports of copra oil and copra cake, 1921-1960: Department of Statistics, Malaya. British Malaya: 
Return of Foreign Imports and Exports, 1921-1937 (Singapore: Methodist Publishing House); Department of 
Statistics, Singapore. Malayan Statistics. External Trade, 1938-1960 (Singapore: Government Printing 
Office). 
Copra oil produced, 1947-1952: Registrar of Malayan Statistics at Singapore. Malayan Statistics: Monthly 
Digest of Economic and Social Statistics Relating to the Colony of Singapore and the Federation of Malaya 
(MSMD), February 1953 (Singapore: Government Printer), Table E1, p. 46. 
Copra oil production, 1953-1956: MSMD December 1957, Table 7.1, p. 18 







APPENDIX 6.3. MALAYA’S ESTIMATED COPRA OIL OUTPUT FROM INDUSTRIAL MILLS, AS A 




Production Capacity for 
Copra Oil per Day 
Total Maximum 
Production Capacity for 




Average Proportion of 
Total Production 
Capacity (%) 
1921 189.00 63,236 10,512 16.6 
1922 189.00 63,236 8,444 13.4 
1923 189.00 63,236 8,035 12.7 
1924 189.00 63,236 8,112 12.8 
1925 189.00 63,236 10,229 16.2 
1926 229.00 76,620 12,149 15.9 
1927 229.00 76,620 14,679 19.2 
1928 229.00 76,620 15,206 19.8 
1929 229.00 76,620 13,423 17.5 
1930 229.00 76,620 14,574 19.0 
1931 269.00 90,003 15,274 17.0 
1932 269.00 90,003 18,383 20.4 
1933 299.00 100,040 29,303 29.3 
1934 299.00 100,040 42,473 42.5 
1935 326.00 109,074 59,850 54.9 
1936 326.00 109,074 71,544 65.6 
1937 326.00 109,074 61,172 56.1 
1938 326.18 109,134 75,600 69.3 
1939 326.18 109,134 94,400 86.5 
1940 326.18 109,134 106,840 97.9 
1941 329.84 110,359 108,242 98.1 
1946 369.78 123,772 16,016 12.9 
1947 416.25 139,270 96,243 69.1 
1948 494.75 165,535 93,085 56.2 
1949 508.90 170,269 90,962 53.4 
1950 579.78 193,985 90,469 46.6 
1951 623.40 208,579 106,072 50.9 
1952 637.13 213,173 106,805 50.1 
1953 646.82 216,415 95,922 44.3 
1954 677.53 226,690 134,545 59.4 
1955 682.52 228,360 128,613 56.3 
1956 682.52 228,360 148,171 64.9 
1957 702.52 235,051 145,209 61.8 
 




Total maximum production capacity for copra oil per day, 1921-1957: Appendix 6.1. 







APPENDIX 6.4. MALAYA’S ESTIMATED TOTAL PRODUCTION OF FRESH NUTS AND COPRA FOR 
EXPORT PURPOSES, AND DOMESTIC COPRA OIL PRODUCTION, TONS PER ANNUM, 1924-1960. 
 
Year 














1924 13,035 3,086 91,734 57,334 8,112 68,532 
1925 13,190 3,123 86,421 54,013 10,229 67,365 
1926 10,032 2,375 104,394 65,246 12,149 79,770 
1927 15,988 3,785 86,504 54,065 14,679 72,529 
1928 13,479 3,191 95,628 59,768 15,206 78,165 
1929 11,239 2,661 112,429 70,268 13,423 86,352 
1930 10,477 2,481 102,014 63,759 14,574 80,814 
1931 10,511 2,489 100,568 62,855 15,274 80,618 
1932 7,824 1,852 97,277 60,798 18,383 81,033 
1933 7,408 1,754 110,298 68,936 29,303 99,993 
1934 7,201 1,705 95,599 59,749 42,473 103,927 
1935 7,591 1,797 111,752 69,845 59,850 131,492 
1936 8,165 1,933 76,680 47,925 71,544 121,402 
1937 6,802 1,610 75,592 47,245 61,172 110,027 
1938 8,339 1,974 68,754 42,971 75,600 120,545 
1939 6,948 1,645 34,420 21,513 94,400 117,558 
1940 9,391 2,223 (9,904) (6,190) 106,840 102,873 
1941 12,486 2,956 (32,682) (20,426) 108,242 90,772 
1946 298 70 (34,213) (21,383) 16,016 (5,297) 
1947 4,491 1,063 (45,339) (28,337) 96,243 68,969 
1948 3,206 759 (28,624) (17,890) 93,085 75,954 
1949 1,569 372 (24,424) (15,265) 90,962 76,069 
1950 2,637 624 4,778 2,986 90,469 94,079 
1951 2,326 551 (10,878) (6,799) 106,072 99,824 
1952 6,716 1,590 (27,821) (17,388) 106,805 91,007 
1953 6,308 1,494 (9,751) (6,094) 95,922 91,322 
1954 6,745 1,597 (67,472) (42,170) 134,545 93,972 
1955 5,153 1,220 (75,076) (46,923) 128,613 82,911 
1956 2,484 588 (82,549) (51,593) 148,171 97,166 
1957 2,676 634 (71,718) (44,824) 145,209 101,019 
1958 3,739 885 (55,906) (34,941) 108,778 74,722 
1959 6,924 1,639 (27,012) (16,883) 87,742 72,499 
1960 2,615 619 (5,519) (3,449) 98,152 95,322 




Fresh nuts, net exports, 1924-1960:  Department of Statistics, Malaya. British Malaya: Return of Foreign 
Imports and Exports, 1924-1937 (Singapore: Methodist Publishing House); Department of Statistics, 
Singapore. Malayan Statistics. External Trade, 1938-1960 (Singapore: Government Printing Office). 
Copra, net exports, 1924-1960: Appendix 3.2. 








APPENDIX 6.5. KNOWN ESTIMATES OF MALAYA’S TOTAL DOMESTIC CONSUMPTION OF NON-


















Products, Tons of 
Copra oil Equivalent 
(as a percentage of 
Malaya's total coconut 


























27,350 (25%) 80,814 109,401** 
F. C. Cooke. "The World's 
Coconut Crop." Malayan 
Agricultural Journal 18, 







64,265 (39%) 99,993 164,258 
Straits Settlements 
Vegetable Oils Committee 
(SSVOC). Report of a 
Committee…on the 
Present Economic 
Condition of the Coconut 
and Other Vegetable Oil 
Producing Industries in 
Malaya (Kuala Lumpur: 







289,673 (74%) 102,873 392,546 
LSE: FIRTH 2/7/10, 
Raymond Firth and A. E. 







23,508 (20%) 95,322 118,830 
A. Sedky. The Situation of 
Food Production and 
Consumption in Malaya: A 
Preliminary Study (Kuala 
Lumpur: Ministry of 
Agriculture and 
Cooperatives, 1962), 29. 
*See Appendix 1 for a list of such village coconut produce, excluding copra. 
**Calculations based on Cooke, Coconut Crop, p. 344. 
 
Sources: 
Population estimate for 1930: Cooke, Coconut Crop, 344. 
Population estimate for 1933: SSVOC, Report, 20. 
Population estimate for 1940: Nazrin Shah, “Mid-year population estimates and annual growth rates, 
Malaya, 1900-1956, Peninsular Malaysia, 1957-2015.” Economic History Malaya website (last accessed 1 June 
2017, at http://bit.ly/2swj9f2). 
Population estimate for 1960: Sedky, Malaya, 19. 
Estimated total production of fresh nuts and copra for export purposes, and domestic copra oil production 
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CRUDE PALM OIL 
PALM KERNELS 
EXPORTS (MOSTLY BRITAIN AND NORTH AMERICA): 
















CRUDE PALM OIL 
PALM KERNELS 
EXPORTS (MOSTLY UK AND 
NORTH AMERICA): 
 CRUDE PALM OIL, PALM 
KERNELS 
 
Malayan Palm Oil Bulking Company 
(Singapore) + Other Wholesalers (Drums) 
 
 
Ho Hong Oil Mills & Soap Factory 
 
EXPORTS: 
 COOKING OIL, SOAP 
Wholesalers 




EXPORTS: (INDIA AND 
MIDDLE EAST): 
BLEACHED PALM OIL 
Ulu Bernam Estate 







APPENDIX 8.1. HAROLD TEMPANY’S MEMORANDUM REGARDING THE ALIENATION OF SMALL 



















Source: ANM-JB: CLR BP 264/29, Enc. 2. 
MEMORANDUM 
To,  
The Principal Agricultural Officer, Johore.   12
th
 September 1929. 
____________________________________________________________________________
__ 
In view of the probability of the demands arising for the alienation of small 
plots of land for cultivation in Oil Palms, the following statement has been prepared 
concerning policy which it is desirable to adopt in this connection. It is considered that 
it would be unwise to alienate small areas of land for oil palm cultivation unless the 
applicant is either prepared to erect a factory for the preparation of the products, or it 
is possible for the applicant to dispose of his fruit to an adjoining estate on which a 
factory is already working. 
2. Except under such conditions the Department of Agriculture is not in favour of 
the general alienation of small areas for this form of cultivation, principally because 
palm oil is not the oil of the country and Malaya is trying to specialise in the production 
of a high grade oil for export. 
3. Further, the employment of hand methods, such as those used for example in 
the West Coast of Africa, for the preparation of the product would be unremunerative 
in Malaya since under this mode of extraction the yields of the products are low, more 
especially that of the oil, which is the most important constituent of the fruit. Also 
there is the danger that if hand methods of extraction become at all generalised small 
parcels of low grade oil might find their way on the market. This would have a most 
detrimental effect on the industry as a whole and might severely prejudice large scale 
developments. 
Sd. H. Tempany 








APPENDIX 8.2. DRAFT AGREEMENT BETWEEN SOCFIN COMPANY LTD. AND SMALLHOLDINGS 
























Source: ANM-JB: CLR BP 374/31, Enc. 5. 
 
AGREEMENT. 
(a) An agreement between Socfin Company, Ltd., through Malayan Cultures Company and small 
holdings in the vicinity of Johore Labis Estates. 
(b) Socfin Company, Ltd., agree to give Oilpalm Seeds free, but charge for transport of Seeds from 
head-quarters to the Estate, to Malay small holders only in the vicinity of Johore Labis Estates. 
(c) The Seeds are given on the distinct understanding that they are for the cultivation of Oilpalms 
on the holder’s property. 
(d) Any infringement of para 3 re the sale of Oilpalm Seeds to other small holders or outsiders 
renders this contract liable to cancellation and Socfin Company, Ltd., will refuse to issue further supplies 
of Oilpalm Seeds. 
(e)  The Staff of Johore Labis Estates will, as far as time is available, assist small holders and inspect 
their holdings. 
(f) It will be necessary that the minimum of 1,000 acres be planted in the vicinity of the Estates. 
(g) Socfin Company, Ltd., through their representatives in Johore, agree [sic] to buy first class fruit 
from the small holders at the current market rate. 
(h) The Company reserve [sic] the right to refuse to buy fruit in an unripe or decomposed state 
which would affect their percentage of F.F.A. [free fatty acids] in their own oil. 
(i) Small Holders must combine to arrange transport for the delivery of the fruit to the Main 
Factory on the dates specified by the Manager of Johore Labis Estates. 
(j) Small Holders must arrange a representative or representatives through whom all 
correspondence, sales, and payments will be conducted. 
(k) It is understood that the minimum quantity of fruit which will be accepted at the Factory is 
2,000 lbs. 
(l) The Company request that the Assistant Adviser, Batu Pahat, instructs small holders on the 
urgent necessity for co-operation and organisation. 
(m) The decision of the Director, Socfin Company, Ltd. or through his representative in Johore shall 
be final in all matters. 
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